

A Companion to Foucault

Edited by
Christopher Falzon
Timothy O'Leary
Jana Sawicki

 **WILEY-BLACKWELL**

A John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., Publication

This edition first published 2013
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Blackwell Publishing was acquired by John Wiley & Sons in February 2007. Blackwell's publishing program has been merged with Wiley's global Scientific, Technical, and Medical business to form Wiley-Blackwell.

Registered Office

John Wiley & Sons Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK

Editorial Offices

350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148-5020, USA

9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK

The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A companion to Foucault / edited by Christopher Falzon, Timothy O'Leary, Jana Sawicki.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-1-4443-3406-7 (cloth)

1. Foucault, Michel, 1926-1984. I. Falzon, Christopher, 1957- II. O'Leary, Timothy, 1966- III. Sawicki, Jana.

B2430.F724C6545 2013

194-dc23

2012036592

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Cover image: Photo of Michel Foucault © Sipa Press / Rex Features.

Cover design by Design Deluxe.

Set in 10/12.5 pt Photina by Toppan Best-set Premedia Limited

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Notes on the Editors and Contributors

Editors

Christopher Falzon is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Newcastle, Australia. He is the author of *Foucault and Social Dialogue* (1998) and *Philosophy Goes to the Movies* (2002 and 2007, new edition forthcoming). He is also co-editor, with Timothy O'Leary, of *Foucault and Philosophy* (2010).

Timothy O'Leary is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Hong Kong. He has published widely on Foucault, ethics, and the philosophy of literature. He has written *Foucault and the Art of Ethics* (2002 and 2006), and *Foucault and Fiction: The Experience Book* (2009). He has co-edited *Foucault and Philosophy* (2010) and *Ethics in Early China* (2011).

Jana Sawicki is the Carl Vogt '58 Professor of Philosophy at Williams College. Author of *Disciplining Foucault* (1991) and many articles on Foucault and feminist theory, she is currently finishing a series of essays on the reception of Foucault's work by queer theorists and co-editing an issue of *Foucault Studies* devoted to queer theory with Shannon Winnubst.

Contributors

Linda Martín Alcoff is Professor of Philosophy at Hunter College and the CUNY Graduate Center. Her writings have focused on social identity, epistemology and politics, sexual violence, Foucault, and Latino issues in philosophy. Her books include *Visible Identities: Race, Gender and the Self* (2006), *Real Knowing* (1996), and several edited anthologies. She is currently working on a book on Foucault and rape.

Paul Alberts teaches philosophy at the University of Western Sydney. He is writing a monograph on critical philosophy, ethics, and climate crisis. He has previously published on Foucault, political philosophy, and issues of conflict and violence.

Amy Allen is Parents Distinguished Research Professor in the Humanities and Professor of Philosophy and Women's and Gender Studies at Dartmouth College, where she has taught since 1997. She is the author of two books – *The Power of Feminist Theory: Domination, Resistance, Solidarity* (1999) and *The Politics of Our Selves: Power, Autonomy, and Gender in Contemporary Critical Theory* (2008) – and numerous articles on the concepts of power, subjectivity, agency, and autonomy in the work of Foucault, Habermas, Butler, Honneth, and Arendt.

Jeremy Carrette is Professor of Religion and Culture and Head of Religious Studies at the University of Kent, UK. He is the author of *Foucault and Religion* (2000) and editor of *Religion and Culture by Michel Foucault* (1999). He is also joint editor with James Bernauer of *Michel Foucault and Theology* (2004).

Jeremy W. Crampton is a professor of Geography at the University of Kentucky. He works on the political representation of space, especially through mapping and cartographies. His areas of historical interest have focused on both world wars, and most recently on the relationship between geography and intelligence or spying. He is co-editor of *Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography* (2007).

Daniel Defert is Professor of Sociology at the University of Paris, VIII. He has published articles on public health and in the field of ethnography – in which he defined “ethno-iconography” as a new field of study. He was the founder of the first French AIDS activist group (AIDES) and is a *Chevalier* of the French Legion of Honor. He was Foucault's partner from 1963 until Foucault's death in 1984 and was subsequently a co-editor of Foucault's *Dits et écrits* (1994) and editor of his *Leçons sur la volonté de savoir, Cours au Collège de France, 1970–1971* (2011).

Marc Djaballah has been Professor of Philosophy at the University of Quebec at Montreal since 2006. He has also taught at University of Memphis and at Acadia University's Faculty of Theology in Montreal. He has published *Kant, Foucault, and Forms of Experience* (2008). Aside from Foucault and Kant, his current research centrally involves Bergson, Freud, Merleau-Ponty, and phenomenological hermeneutics. He is preparing a book on the history of the experience of screens.

James D. Faubion is Professor and Chair and Director of Graduate Studies in the Department of Anthropology at Rice University. He is the editor of *Rethinking the Subject: An Anthology of Contemporary European Social Thought* (1995); the second and third volumes of *Essential Works of Michel Foucault* (1999 and 2000); *The Ethics of Kinship: Ethnographic Inquiries* (2001); the second edition of Michel Foucault's *Death and the Labyrinth* (2004); and, with George E. Marcus, of *Fieldwork Is Not What It Used To Be: Learning Anthropology's Method in a Time of Transition* (2008). He is the author of *Modern Greek Lessons: A Primer in Historical Constructivism* (1993), *The Shadows and Lights of Waco: Millennialism Today* (2001), and *An Anthropology of Ethics* (2011).

Ellen K. Feder teaches philosophy at American University. She is the author of *Family Bonds: Genealogies of Race and Gender* (2007), and is currently completing a manuscript on ethics and the medical management of children born with atypical sex.

Colin Gordon has been translating, editing and writing about Michel Foucault's work and related writers and themes since the 1970s, alongside a career in health informat-

ics. He edited *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977* by Michel Foucault (1980), co-edited and co-authored *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* (1991), selected the contents and wrote the introduction of *Power: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984*, volume 3 (2000), and co-organized the conference *The Foucault Effect 1991–2011* at Birkbeck College in June 2011. He recently wrote “Expelled Questions: Foucault, the Left and the Law,” in *Re-reading Foucault on Law, Power and Rights*, ed. Ben Golder (2013).

David-Olivier Gougelet has taught at American University, in Washington, DC, and currently teaches in the Department of Philosophy at Simpson College, in Indianapolis, IA. He has published on Foucault and the concept of biopower, and is currently working on the relation between Foucault’s analysis of power and colonial practices and institutions.

Wendy Grace is an Honorary Research Fellow at the University of Western Australia researching the history of heterosexuality. She has written on Foucault and Deleuze in relation to sexuality and desire, and is co-author, with Alec McHoul, of *A Foucault Primer: Discourse, Power and the Subject* (1993). She has taught courses on Foucault and twentieth-century French intellectuals.

Lynne Huffer is Professor of Women’s Studies at Emory University. She is the author of *Mad for Foucault: Rethinking the Foundations of Queer Theory* (2010); *Maternal Pasts, Feminist Futures: Nostalgia and the Question of Difference* (1998); *Another Colette: The Question of Gendered Writing* (1992); and numerous articles on Foucault, feminist philosophy and theory, queer theory, post-structuralism, and literature. Her most recent book is *Are the Lips a Grave? Queer Feminist Reflections on the Ethics of Sex* (forthcoming).

Mark G. E. Kelly is Lecturer in Philosophy at Middlesex University. He previously taught at Macquarie University and the University of Sydney. He is the author of *The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault* (2009).

Michael Kelly is Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte. His publications include *A Hunger for Aesthetics: Enacting the Demands of Art* (2012) and *Iconoclasm in Aesthetics* (2003); he is editor-in-chief of the *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics* (1998; new edition forthcoming), editor of *Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate* (1994), and co-editor with Daniel Herwitz, of *Action, Art, History: Engagement with Arthur C. Danto* (2007). He is currently writing a book on the migration of artistic agency from individual to collective-participatory agency.

Colin Koopman is Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy and 2011–12 Robert F. and Evelyn Nelson Wulf Professor in the Humanities at the University of Oregon. He is the author of *Pragmatism as Transition: Historicity and Hope in James, Dewey, & Rorty* (2009) and *Genealogy as Critique: Problems of Modernity in Foucault* (forthcoming). He has published articles on Foucault, Richard Rorty, Bernard Williams, and others.

Richard A. Lynch teaches philosophy and women’s studies at DePauw University. His current research focuses on the emergence of ethics within power relations in the work

of Michel Foucault, and connections between Foucault and such thinkers as Simone de Beauvoir, Alexis de Tocqueville, and Paul Tillich. Most recently he completed a translation of Isabelle Thomas-Fogiel's *The Death of Philosophy: Reference and Self-Reference in Contemporary Thought* (2011). He has also published scholarly articles on Hegel, Habermas, Bakhtin, and others.

Patrice Maniglier was a lecturer at the University of Essex until September 2012 and is now a lecturer in the Philosophy Department of the University of Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense. He is the author of various books and articles on structuralism and its impact on twentieth-century French philosophy as well as its relevance for contemporary debates in philosophy. He has published *La Vie énigmatique des signes: Saussure et la naissance du structuralisme* (2006), *Vocabulaire de Lévi-Strauss* (2002), *La Perspective du Diable: Figurations de l'espace et philosophie de la Renaissance à Rosemary's Baby* (2010); and *Foucault va au cinéma* (2010; English translation by Clare O'Farrell forthcoming).

Johanna Oksala is Senior Research Fellow in the Academy of Finland research project *Philosophy and Politics in Feminist Theory* at the University of Helsinki. She teaches and writes in the areas of twentieth-century European philosophy, political philosophy, feminist theory, and phenomenology. She is the author of *Foucault on Freedom* (2005), *How to Read Foucault* (2007), and *Foucault, Politics, and Violence* (2012). She has also published articles in journals such as *Constellations*, *Continental Philosophy Review*, *Hyppatia*, and *Foucault Studies*.

Paul Patton is Professor of Philosophy at the University of New South Wales in Sydney. He is the author of *Deleuze and the Political* (2000) and *Deleuzian Concepts: Philosophy, Colonization, Politics* (2010). He has published widely on French post-structuralist philosophy and political philosophy, including a number of essays on Foucault.

Paul Rabinow is Professor of Anthropology at the University of California (Berkeley) and currently the Director of the Anthropology of the Contemporary Research Collaboratory (ARC). His major works include *The Accompaniment: Assembling the Contemporary* (2011), *Marking Time: On the Anthropology of the Contemporary* (2007), *Anthropos Today: Reflections on Modern Equipment* (2003), *The Essential Foucault* (with Nicolas Rose; 2003), *Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth*, volume 1 of *The Essential Works of Michel Foucault 1954–1984* (1997), *The Foucault Reader* (1984), *Michel Foucault, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (with Hubert Dreyfus; 1983), and *Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco* (1977).

Alan D. Schrift is the F. Wendell Miller Professor of Philosophy, founding director of the Grinnell College Center for the Humanities, and general editor of *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*, the Stanford University Press translation of Nietzsche's *Kritische Studienausgabe*. In addition to many published articles and book chapters on Nietzsche and French and German twentieth-century philosophy, he is the author of three books: *Twentieth Century French Philosophy: Key Themes and Thinkers* (2005), *Nietzsche's French Legacy: A Genealogy of Poststructuralism* (1995), and *Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation: Between Hermeneutics and Deconstruction* (1990). Schrift has also edited several volumes on a variety of topics, including, most recently, the eight-volume *History of Continental Philosophy* (2010).

Jon Simons is Associate Professor of Communication and Culture at Indiana University, Bloomington. He has published *Foucault and the Political* (1995) as well as essays on Foucault in the journals *Cultural Values*, *Intertexts*, *Millennium*, *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, and *Strategies*. He has edited three volumes about critical theory, *From Kant to Lévi-Strauss* (2002), *Contemporary Critical Theorists* (2004), and *From Agamben to Žižek* (2010), all with Edinburgh University Press. He has also co-edited *Images: A Reader* (2006), and edited two special issues of *Culture, Theory, and Critique* on “Images and Text” (2003) and “Democratic Aesthetics” (2009).

Brad Elliott Stone is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Director of the University Honors Program at Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles, California. His research focuses on twentieth-century continental philosophy (German, French, and Spanish) and American Neo-Pragmatism. His articles have been published in *Foucault Studies*, *Contemporary Pragmatism*, *The Journal of Scriptural Reasoning*, *The Other Journal*, *Kronoscope*, and *The Xavier Zubiri Review*. He is the co-editor (with Jacob Goodson) of *Richard Rorty and Philosophical Theology: Christian Engagements with a Secular Thinker* (2012) and is currently finishing a section-by-section commentary of Heidegger’s *Being and Time* as well as a manuscript on Foucault’s metaphysics.

Joseph J. Tanke is an assistant professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Hawaii, Mānoa. He is the author of *Foucault’s Philosophy of Art: A Genealogy of Modernity* (2009), and *Jacques Rancière: An Introduction – Philosophy, Politics, and Aesthetics* (2011). He is currently editing (with Colin McQuillan) a new anthology of aesthetic philosophy.

Chloë Taylor is Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Women’s Studies at the University of Alberta in Canada. She has published articles in the areas of twentieth-century French philosophy, philosophy of sexuality, feminist philosophy, philosophy of food, and animal ethics. She is the author of *The Culture of Confession from Augustine to Foucault* (2009) and is currently working on two book manuscripts: *Foucault, Feminism, and Sex Crimes* and *Abnormal Appetites: Foucault and the Politics of Food*.

Dianna Taylor is Associate Professor of Philosophy at John Carroll University in Cleveland, Ohio. Her research focuses on twentieth-century continental philosophy, especially the work of Michel Foucault, and contemporary feminist theory. She is editor of *Michel Foucault: Key Concepts* (2010) and co-editor of both *Feminist Politics: Identity, Difference, Agency* (2007) and *Feminism and the Final Foucault* (2004).

Shannon Winnubst is the author of *Queering Freedom* (2006) and editor of *Reading Bataille Now* (2006). She is currently working on a series of articles, as well as a book manuscript on neoliberalism and the twinned problems of difference and ethics.

Abbreviations

Texts by Michel Foucault in English Translation

- AK *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language* (tr. Alan Sheridan Smith). New York: Pantheon Books, 1972.
- BC *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception* (tr. Alan Sheridan Smith). New York: Vintage Books, 1994.
- C-AN *Abnormal. Lectures at the Collège de France 1974–1975* (tr. Graham Burchell). New York: Picador, 2003.
- C-BB *The Birth of Biopolitics. Lectures at the Collège de France 1978–1979* (tr. Graham Burchell). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
- C-CT *The Courage of Truth. Lectures at the Collège de France 1984* (tr. Graham Burchell). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
- C-GSO *The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1982–1983* (tr. Graham Burchell). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
- C-HS *The Hermeneutics of the Subject. Lectures at the Collège de France 1981–1982* (tr. Graham Burchell). New York: Picador, 2006.
- C-PP *Psychiatric Power. Lectures at the Collège de France 1973–1974* (tr. Graham Burchell). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
- C-SMD *“Society Must Be Defended.” Lectures at the Collège de France 1975–1976* (tr. David Macey). New York: Picador, 2003.
- C-STP *Security, Territory, Population. Lectures at the Collège de France 1977–1978* (tr. Graham Burchell). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
- DE *Dream and Existence* by Ludwig Binswanger (tr. Jacob Needleman), Introduction (“Dream, Imagination, Existence”) by Michel Foucault (tr. Forrest Williams). Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1985.
- DL *Death and the Labyrinth: The World of Raymond Roussel* (tr. Charles Ruas). New York: Continuum, 2007.
- DP *Discipline and Punish* (tr. Alan Sheridan). New York: Vintage, 1995.
- EF *The Essential Foucault*, ed. Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose. New York: The New Press, 2003.
- EW1 *Ethics, Subjectivity, and Truth. Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984*, ed. Paul Rabinow. New York: The New Press, 1997.

- EW2 *Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology. Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984*, ed. James D. Faubion. New York: The New Press, 1998.
- EW3 *Power. Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984*, ed. James D. Faubion. New York: The New Press, 2000.
- FB *Foucault/Blanchot. Maurice Blanchot: The Thought from Outside, by Michel Foucault, and Michel Foucault as I Imagine Him, by Maurice Blanchot* (tr. Jeffrey Mehlman and Brian Massumi). New York: Zone Books, 1987.
- FE *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- FI “Final Interview.” *Raritan Review* 5:1, 1985, 1–13.
- FL *Foucault Live Interviews, 1961–1984*, ed. Sylvere Lotringer (tr. Lysa Hochroth and John Johnston). 2nd edn., New York: Semiotext(e), 1996.
- FR *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow. New York: Pantheon Books, 1984.
- FS *Fearless Speech*, ed. Joseph Pearson. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2001.
- HB *Herculine Barbin (Being the Recently Discovered Memoirs of a Nineteenth Century French Hermaphrodite)* (tr. Richard McDougall). New York: Pantheon Books, 1980.
- HM *History of Madness* (tr. Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa). London: Routledge, 2006.
- HS1 *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction*, volume 1 (tr. Robert Hurley). New York: Vintage, 1990.
- HS2 *The Use of Pleasure. The History of Sexuality*, volume 2 (tr. Robert Hurley). New York: Random House, 1985.
- HS3 *The Care of the Self. The History of Sexuality*, volume 3 (tr. Robert Hurley). New York: Vintage, 1988.
- IA *Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology* (tr. Roberto Nigro and Kate Briggs). Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2008.
- LCP *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews by Michel Foucault*, ed. Donald F. Bouchard. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977.
- MC *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* (tr. Richard Howard). London: Routledge, 1989.
- MFI “Human Nature: Justice versus Power” (Michel Foucault and Noam Chomsky), in *Michel Foucault and his Interlocutors*, ed. A. I. Davidson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997, pp. 107–45.
- MP *Manet and the Object of Painting* (tr. Matthew Barr). London: Tate Publishing, 2010.
- NP *This is Not a Pipe* (tr. James Harkness). Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.
- OD “The Order of Discourse,” in *Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader*, ed. R. Young. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970.
- OT *The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences* (anonymous translation). New York: Vintage, 1994.
- PK *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977* ed. Colin Gordon. New York: Vintage, 1980.
- PPC *Michel Foucault. Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and other Writings, 1977–1984*, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman. New York: Routledge, 1988.

ABBREVIATIONS

- PR *I, Pierre Rivière, Having Slaughtered my Mother, my Sister, and my Brother: A Case of Parricide in the 19th Century*, ed. Michel Foucault (tr. Frank Jellinek). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982.
- PT *The Politics of Truth* (tr. Lysa Hochroth and Catherine Porter). Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2007.
- RC *Religion and Culture: Michel Foucault*, ed. Jeremy R. Carrette. New York: Routledge, 1999.
- RM *Remarks on Marx* (tr. R. James Goldstein and James Cascaito). Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 1978.
- SKP *Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography*, ed. J. W. Crampton and S. Elden. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- TS *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault*, ed. Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988.
- WC "What is Critique?" in *What is Enlightenment?*, ed. J. Schmidt. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996, pp. 382–98.

Texts by Michel Foucault in French

Abbreviations of English translations are given in square brackets.

- FAS *L'Archéologie du savoir*. Paris: NRF Gallimard, 1969. [AK]
- FC-AN *Les Anormaux. Cours au Collège de France, 1974–1975*. Paris: Seuil Gallimard, 1999. [C-AN]
- FC-CV *Le Courage de la vérité, le gouvernement de soi et des autres II. Cours au Collège de France, 1984*. Paris: Seuil Gallimard, 2009. [C-CT]
- FC-FDS "Il faut défendre la société." *Cours au Collège de France, 1976*. Paris: Seuil Gallimard, 1997. [C-SMD]
- FC-GSA *Le Gouvernement de soi et des autres. Cours au Collège de France, 1982–1983*. Paris: Seuil Gallimard, 2008. [C-GSO]
- FC-HS *L'Herméneutique du sujet. Cours au Collège de France, 1981–1982*. Paris: Seuil Gallimard, 2001. [C-HS]
- FC-NB *Naissance de la biopolitique, Cours au Collège de France, 1978–1979*. Paris: Seuil Gallimard, 2004. [C-BB]
- FC-PP *Le Pouvoir psychiatrique. Cours au Collège de France, 1973–1974*. Paris: Seuil Gallimard, 2003. [C-PP]
- FC-STP *Sécurité, territoire, population. Cours au Collège de France, 1977–1978*. Paris: Seuil Gallimard, 2004. [C-STP]
- FDE1 *Dits et écrits, I, 1954–1969*. Paris: NRF Gallimard, 1994.
- FDE2 *Dits et écrits, II, 1970–1975*. Paris: NRF Gallimard, 1994.
- FDE3 *Dits et écrits, III, 1976–1979*. Paris: NRF Gallimard, 1994.
- FDE4 *Dits et écrits, IV, 1980–1988*. Paris: NRF Gallimard, 1994.
- FDE1a *Dits et écrits, I, 1954–1975*. Paris: Quarto Gallimard, 2001.
- FDE2a *Dits et écrits, II, 1976–1988*. Paris: Quarto Gallimard, 2001.
- FHF *Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique*. Paris: Tel Gallimard, 1972. [HM]

FHS1	<i>Histoire de la sexualité 1: La Volonté de savoir</i> . Paris: Tel Gallimard, 1976. [HS1]
FHS2	<i>Histoire de la sexualité 2: L'Usage des plaisirs</i> . Paris: Tel Gallimard, 1984. [HS2]
FHS3	<i>Histoire de la sexualité 3: Le Souci de soi</i> . Paris: Tel Gallimard, 1984. [HS3]
FIA	<i>Introduction à l'anthropologie</i> . Paris: Vrin Bibliothèque des Textes Philosophiques, 2008. [IA]
FMC	<i>Les Mots et les choses</i> . Paris: Tel Gallimard, 1966. [OT]
FNC	<i>Naissance de la clinique</i> . Paris: Quadrige Presses Universitaires de France, 1963. [BC]
FOD	<i>L'Ordre du discours</i> . Paris: NRF Gallimard, 1971. [OD]
FPM	<i>La Peinture de Manet, suivi de Michel Foucault, un regard</i> , ed. Maryvonne Saison. Paris: Traces Écrites Seuil, 2004. [MP]
FQC	"Qu'est-ce que la critique? (Critique et <i>Aufklärung</i>)," <i>Bulletin de la Société française de philosophie</i> 84:2, 1990, pp. 35–63. [WC]
FRE	<i>Le Rêve et l'existence de Ludwig Binswanger</i> (tr. Jacqueline Verdeaux), introduction and notes Michel Foucault. Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1954. [DE]
FRR	<i>Raymond Roussel</i> . Paris: NRF Gallimard, 1963. [DL]
FSP	<i>Surveiller et punir</i> . Paris: Tel Gallimard, 1975. [DP]

Introduction

The work of Michel Foucault has exercised an enormous influence across a wide range of disciplines for almost half a century. From the history of the human sciences to the study of power, from ancient sexuality to contemporary ethics, Foucault's ground-breaking work has given impetus to new research directions across the humanities and social sciences. While the range of his influence is wide, so too is the range of forms in which his work was published both during and after his lifetime. We can distinguish three major categories of work: the books; the shorter works (comprised of essays, occasional lectures, and interviews); and the recently published lecture courses from the Collège de France (1971–84).

At the center of his oeuvre is a series of books, almost all of which are histories of one kind or another, that made vibrant contributions to the intellectual life of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. These are the books that made Foucault, in turn: a hero of the anti-psychiatry movement (*History of Madness*, 1961); a supposed high priest of structuralism (*The Order of Things*, 1966); the prophet of modern discipline (*Discipline and Punish*, 1975); the purveyor of a radically new theory of power and the founding figure of queer studies (*History of Sexuality*, volume 1, 1976); and finally, the instigator of a new turn towards ethics as an aesthetically formed practice of the self (*History of Sexuality*, volumes 2 and 3, 1984).

Alongside these books there was a continuous output of shorter works that sometimes comment on aspects of the books and sometimes branch out, in essays and interviews, into related areas of exploration. In the 1960s, for example, there was a series of articles, mostly on literature, art and music, that were published in key French journals such as *Critique*, *Tel quel*, and the *Nouvelle Revue française*. Then, gathering speed from the mid-1960s, there was a growing output of interviews in which Foucault, as it were, lets down his intellectual hair in wide-ranging discussions that situate the books in a political and intellectual context and draw out some of their implications for critical practice. In later years, some of these interviews and lectures (notably “What

is an Author?," "On the Genealogy of Ethics," and "What is Enlightenment?") became almost as important to Foucault-inspired scholars as the books themselves.

The third major category of work is the lectures Foucault gave in a series of annual courses at the Collège de France each year (except 1977) from 1970 to just before his death in 1984. These courses, in line with the mission of the Collège, where Foucault was Professor of the History of Systems of Thought from 1969, were open to the public and attracted large numbers of auditors. In them, Foucault presented his ongoing research, some of which ended up in the published books and some of which is only now becoming available for the first time. The first of these courses to be published, *Society Must Be Defended* (1975–6), appeared in French in 1997 and in English in 2003. According to current projections, the entire series of twelve lecture courses should be available within the coming years. These publications are already provoking a renewed impetus to research in fields including biopower, governmentality, and questions about truth-telling and ethics.

This *Companion* to the work of Foucault consists of specially written essays that offer both an overview of Foucault's own work and an exciting snapshot of his continuing influence in areas as diverse as queer studies, epistemology, the study of government and biopower, critical race studies, and ethics. Framing the collection are two unique elements: a detailed chronology of Foucault's life and work, written by Daniel Defert, and an appendix that includes a complete concordance of all of Foucault's shorter works. Contributors include both established researchers who have been utilizing the Foucauldian "tool-box" for many years and new scholars who will continue to hone and reassign those tools into the future.

The first section of the volume, "Landmarks," gives an outline map of the emergence and development of Foucault's work. The opening chapter is the first English translation of the "Chronology" of Foucault's life and work, written by his life-partner Daniel Defert for the *Dits et écrits* collection in 1994. This substantial and detailed intellectual biography avoids the worst excesses of some of Foucault's earlier biographers, providing an austere yet personal insight into the intertwining of Foucault's personal, political, and scholarly trajectory. The chapter by Colin Gordon introduces the historical context, and subsequent influence, of Foucault's first major work, *History of Madness* (1961, 1972). This book had a complicated publishing history, both in French and English, with a complete English translation not appearing until 2006. It was initially embraced by R. D. Laing and other leaders of the 1960s anti-psychiatry movement, and over the years it has continued to provoke controversy and debate. The chapter by Patrice Maniglier sets out the context and influence of the book that made Foucault an intellectual star at the high point of French structuralism, *The Order of Things* (1966). Maniglier shows how the book put Foucault firmly at the center of debates about humanism and the supposedly imminent "death of man." The chapter by Joseph J. Tanke focuses on an aspect of Foucault's early work that never gave rise to an extensive book-length treatment: his engagement with the visual arts, in particular the work of Manet. This is a little-studied, but important, part of Foucault's trajectory up to the end of the 1960s.

The next chapter, by Alan Schrift, marks the first significant turning point in Foucault's work – the turn from archaeology to genealogy, or from history of discourse to the history of political practices. Schrift shows how the book *Discipline and Punish* presented a forceful interpretation of modern power in terms of discipline while it posed

a major challenge to the dominant theories of power in the 1970s. The chapter by Richard A. Lynch presents the book Foucault published in the following year, *The History of Sexuality*, volume 1. This slim volume, which was originally intended to serve as the introduction to a series of four or five volumes, bristles with new research directions and insights: a new formulation of the theory of power (and resistance), a new conception of modern biopower, and the groundwork for the entire field of queer studies. Paul Patton's essay focuses on Foucault's lecture courses at the Collège de France, charting the shift between 1976 and 1979 from a concern with power and resistance to a concern with the newly defined phenomenon of governmentality. The section closes with an essay by Paul Rabinow that explores the apparent intellectual crisis that Foucault underwent in the late 1970s, a crisis associated both with his visits to the US, in particular to Berkeley, and with his shift of interest towards ethics and practices of self-fashioning, before his untimely death in 1984.

Parts II to V approach Foucault's work, and its influence, thematically rather than chronologically. Part II, "Knowledge and Critique," contains essays addressing Foucault's engagement with the theme so central to modern philosophy, the question of knowledge. For Foucault this becomes a concern to understand knowledge not as reducible to, but certainly as bound up with, social power practices, part of the historically emergent order that one's culture exhibits. Knowing that the order governing what we know and do is historically specific has critical implications, since that order is thereby stripped of any necessity or inevitability, and it becomes possible to think about whether or not it should be changed. Linda Alcoff's chapter explores Foucault's epistemological views, and shows how, for all Foucault's emphasis on the interweaving of knowledge and power, his views do not as some have suggested entail epistemic nihilism, or the dissolution of knowledge in favor of power-effects. He questions hegemony-seeking, global forms of knowledge not only because of their political effects but also for epistemic reasons, because they involve the distortion or omission of "anomalous or non-conforming particularities." Wendy Grace addresses Foucault's engagement with Freudian psychoanalysis, revealing a complex relationship. Not only does Foucault readily acknowledge the politically progressive aspects of Freud's psychoanalysis in *The History of Sexuality*, volume 1; like Lacan and Lévi-Strauss, he welcomes the psychoanalytic revelation of an unconscious that undermines existential and phenomenological accounts of knowledge and the subject, while at the same time rejecting its universal theories of sexuality and madness as ahistorical phenomena, the penchant for the universal that is also shared by Freud's structuralist successors.

Michael Kelly's chapter turns its attention to Foucault's conception of critical agency, the subject as able to act autonomously and criticize social practices and institutions. Where critics like Habermas have seen in Foucault only an account of subjectivity as subjection, Kelly argues that a conception of critical agency is already implicit in Foucault's art writings, such as his books on Manet and Magritte. It appears more explicitly in Foucault's conception of the "aesthetics of existence," the form of ethical self-fashioning or technology of the self peculiar to ancient ethics and studied in the later volumes of *The History of Sexuality*. Marc Djaballah examines Foucault's conception of critique, and indeed philosophy itself, as first of all an ethical practice of self-transformation, an understanding present in the ancient world and renewed in a tradition in modern thought that begins with Kant. He shows how, for Foucault,

a critical attitude already present in an untheorized form in practices of resistance to religious power in the Middle Ages is given its first theoretical formulation in Kant, as the interrogation of the present that is the attitude of enlightenment and modernity; and which is distinguishable from the transcendental form of critique more commonly associated with Kant's enterprise. Finally, Christopher Falzon looks at Foucault's conception of history, as a privileged avenue for critical reflection on the present. In the forms of archaeology, genealogy, and finally the critical ontology of ourselves, this reflection calls attention to the historicity of forms of thought and action, from a vantage point that is itself inescapably part of history.

Part III, "Power and Governmentality," contains chapters focusing on Foucault's engagement with the theme for which he became particularly well known during his lifetime, that of power. Foucault's distinctive conception of social power practices developed in the course of his work, from the discipline and biopower of *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality*, volume 1, to the pastoral power and governmentality explored mainly in the lecture courses at the Collège de France. Jon Simons' chapter outlines the ways Foucault successively conceptualizes power, as discipline, biopower, and finally governmentality; but always as something to be understood not as a monolithic imposition from above, but as a dynamic relation of forces, of power and resistance, indeed power and freedom. The chapter also examines Foucault's account of the relations between power and truth, and the role of power in the constitution of subjects. Johanna Oksala's chapter concentrates on Foucault's later conceptualizations of power, as biopower, pastoral power, and governmentality; and in particular examines his analysis of liberal and neoliberal governmentality, the forms of governmentality that he saw as being specific to modern Western societies. Amy Allen focuses on the relationship between power and the subject, examining Foucault's account of the constitution of the subject in the *History of Madness*, disciplinary subjection and normalization in *Discipline and Punish*, and *The History of Sexuality*, volume 1, and the technologies of the self in the later volumes of the *History of Sexuality*.

Brad Stone's chapter examines the understanding of racism that emerges out of Foucault's analysis of political power as biopower, in *The History of Sexuality*, volume 1, and also in *Society Must Be Defended*, the first of the Collège de France lecture courses to be published. For Foucault, racism becomes a useful political strategy for a biopolitical form of power that promotes life, but also allows groups deemed abnormal to die. Jeremy Carrette looks at Foucault's account of the role of religion in the development of modern forms of power, particularly in connection with the rationale and exercise of pastoral power, and how this account of religion and power itself developed in the course of the shifts from the disciplinary account that preceded it and the governmentality conception that came after. The discussion illuminates the place of religion, understood as a political reality, in Foucault's thinking. Finally, Jeremy Crampton's chapter addresses the theme of Foucault and geography. It traces Foucault's engagement with the interrelated concepts of space, territory, and geography, concepts that, while rarely the focus of his concerns, are nevertheless important elements in his thinking as far back as *The Order of Things*, and which run through the later discussions of discipline, biopolitics and public health, and governmentality.

Although Foucault was virtually silent about feminism, as well as the ways in which gender and race intersect, feminists, anti-racist, postcolonial, and queer theorists have

found his work both useful and controversial. The essays collected in Part IV, “Sexuality, Gender, and Race,” reflect the ongoing influence of Foucault in some of these fields and are necessarily representative of only some of the myriad approaches being taken. In the wake of the translation of the later volumes of *History of Sexuality* and the publication of his Collège de France lectures in English, a second wave of feminist writings on governmentality, ethics, and freedom in Foucault has emerged. The essay by Dianna Taylor represents a fresh exploration of the value and limitations of Foucault’s work for feminist theorists in the light of Foucault’s entire oeuvre. She draws upon Foucault’s later writings on ethics, his genealogies of conversion and self-sacrifice, to illuminate her feminist vision of a politics of ourselves. Feminists were also rightly provoked by Foucault’s gender blindness, androcentrism, and seeming insensitivity toward sexual violence as such in his work on discipline and biopower. Indeed much feminist ink has been spilled concerning Foucault’s remarks in a 1977 roundtable discussion that rape be treated in the same way as any other form of physical assault (like a “punch in the face”). Similarly, feminists regularly pointed to Foucault’s handling of the Jouy case in *History of Sexuality*, volume 1 and *Abnormal* as evidence of his insensitivity to patriarchal sexual domination. Chloe Taylor supplements this line of criticism in her essay here with a trenchant reading of his essays and lectures on the concept of the “dangerous individual,” psychiatric power, abnormality and, finally, the dossier on Pierre Rivière.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that one effect of feminist appropriations of Foucault (and poststructuralism more generally) was to lead some of them away from doctrinal feminism and its assumptions about sex and gender altogether. The 1990s marked the emergence of queer theory and Foucault’s *History of Sexuality*, volume 1 had become one of its founding texts. Queer theorists seized upon Foucault’s critique of the repressive hypothesis and his alleged suspicion of sexuality and sexual identity (as opposed to acts, bodies, and pleasures) as targets and anchors for the emergence and spread of biopower to advance a radical sexual politics. Lynne Huffer’s essay in this collection challenges queer theory’s reliance upon *History of Sexuality*, volume 1, as well as its anti-moral stance, arguing that Foucault’s earlier book, *History of Madness* serves as a more fruitful touchstone. Arguing that Foucault’s preoccupation with ethics spans the entire oeuvre, Huffer foregrounds what she calls the “erotic ethics” figured in his archival encounters with the marginal figures who consistently captured his attention. Here “eros” refers to what is lost in the increasing rationalization of modern sexuality. She identifies Foucault’s erotic ethical work with a practice of self-transformation and self-undoing – a dominant motif in Foucault’s later ethical writings. Dovetailing to some extent with Lynne Huffer’s emphasis on Foucault’s efforts to reorient our thinking away from Cartesian rationalism and the rationalizing discourses of the human sciences, Shannon Winnubst presents a compelling case for the value of becoming more attuned to the influence of Bataille on Foucault’s project. In particular, she suggests, we might regard Foucault’s preoccupation with the constriction of possible ways of being and living as borrowing directly from Bataille’s distinction between a general and restricted economy.

Foucault’s analysis of governmentality has had far-reaching if controversial effects not only on thinking about neoliberalism and sexuality, but also on thinking about racism, colonialism, and imperialism. In their essay, Ellen Feder and David Gougelet

adopt Foucault's genealogical approach to trace a specific US trajectory in the construction of race and gender categories. Treating race and gender not as fixed, ahistorical categories, but as products of power/knowledge, they turn to the story of the creation of Levittown to examine the production of a new form of "whiteness" that overlaps with disciplinary power relations that enforce normative gender roles as well as a normative sense of community.

Part V, "Ethics and Modernity," is comprised of essays that explore the contribution Foucault's later work might make to a contemporary reconceptualization of ethics. Beginning with a series of essays and lectures in the late 1970s and culminating with the publication of *The Use of Pleasure* and *The Care of the Self* (1984), Foucault's late work surprised many of his readers. The work had shifted both in terms of the historical period under investigation (classical and late antiquity) and the themes pursued (ethics and practices of the self) and it introduced the surprising notion of ethics as an aesthetics of existence. Now, almost thirty years later, we can see that this work (which is also becoming available in the later courses from the Collège de France) has had a significant impact, not only on philosophical accounts of ethics, but also on a wide range of other fields, including classical studies, feminism, and queer theory. The first essay in this section, by James D. Faubion, characterizes Foucault's ethics in terms of its ontological and epistemological features. Faubion shows how Foucault constructs an account, and a practice, of ethics that emerges from the interplay between care of the self, governance of others, and *parrhesia* (truth-telling). Through a close reading of Foucault's last lectures at the Collège de France, Faubion explores both the strengths and the weaknesses of this account, and urges us to persist in this perilous work.

In the next essay, Mark G. E. Kelly leads the reader through the context and background of Foucault's investigation of subjectivity, its history, and its relation to ethics. Kelly sets out Foucault's intellectual engagement with key French philosophers of subjectivity – from Descartes to Lacan – and he explores the possibility for a contemporary revival of a "spirituality" that could ground an ethics and politics for us today. In a similar vein, Colin Koopman responds to critics of a Foucauldian ethics by probing the possibility – and necessity – of mobilizing those insights into contemporary practices of self-transformation. Koopman introduces a distinction between ethical "orientations" and "commitments," arguing that it is only through understanding the former that we can make any sense of the concrete normative commitments that emerge in Foucault's work. On this basis, we can then begin to carry out the kind of ethical experimentation on our own present that constituted Foucault's primary orientation. In the last chapter in this section, Paul Alberts addresses one of the central political and ethical issues of our present: human engagement with the natural environment. While acknowledging that Foucault very rarely discussed this issue, Alberts provides an overview of the many discussions of "nature" and the "natural" that occur throughout his work. What emerges from this survey is a series of conclusions relating to the historically constructed category of "nature" and the multiple ways in which humans have seen themselves as acting on or engaging with what is taken to be the natural world. Alberts concludes that, whatever kind of environmental ethics will emerge in the future, it would do well to draw upon these Foucauldian resources.

The *Companion* concludes with an appendix containing a complete listing and concordance of Foucault's shorter writings in English. This bibliography will allow researchers to easily establish equivalences between different English translations of Foucault's interviews, essays, and occasional lectures and to identify their French sources in *Dits et écrits* (4 vols., 1994). It is the first such publication in English and promises to be an essential tool for future Foucault scholars.

Part I

Landmarks

1

Chronology

DANIEL DEFERT

*translated by Timothy O'Leary**

"What is this ever so fragile moment from which we cannot detach our identity and which will carry that identity away with it?"

Michel Foucault, *Essential Works*, III, 443

1926

October

The 15th, birth in Poitiers, at 10 rue de la Visitation, later rue Arthur Ranc, of Paul-Michel Foucault, to Paul-André Foucault, medical doctor, decorated with the Croix de Guerre, born at Fontainebleau July 25th 1893, and to Anne-Marie Malapert, born in Poitiers November 28th 1900. Surgeon at the Hotel-Dieu in Poitiers, Dr. Paul Foucault was a brilliant anatomist, according to the virologist Luc Montagnier, who followed his courses at the School of Medicine in Poitiers. He himself was the son of Dr. Paul Foucault, a doctor at Fontainebleau, son in his turn of Dr. Foucault, doctor to the poor at Nanterre, where a street commemorates his name and his work.

Anne Malapert, daughter of a surgeon – her father taught at the School of Medicine in Poitiers – always regretted the fact of being born too early for it to be possible for a woman to study medicine. Married in 1924, the couple had one daughter, Francine, born in 1925. While the paternal family was Catholic, and quite devout, the maternal

*Material in square brackets is by the translator. References with precise quotes from Foucault's works are given with page numbers to English translations, wherever possible. References to complete works/interviews from *Dits et écrits* are given with English title and EW volume number, or other source abbreviation; or, if untranslated, given as FDE, with text number (this number is consistent across the four-volume and the two-volume editions). Those with unwieldy reference details are given in the endnotes.

family, more relaxed, tended towards a refined Voltairism. The father's sister was a missionary in China, the mother's brother was a pharmacist in Peru.

1930

Enters the kindergarten class at the Lycée Henri-IV in Poitiers, with special permission because of his age, in order not to be separated from his older sister.

From 1932 to 1936 attends the primary school of the Lycée.

1933

January

The 1st, birth of his brother, Denys, who will become a surgeon.

1934

July

The 25th, assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss by Austrian Nazis: "I think it was my first strong fright about death" (EW1, 124).

1936

Arrival in the family of an English nanny, to "speak with the children," who stays with them until the end of the war. Paul-Michel begins sixth class [Middle School] at the Lycée Henri-IV in Poitiers, where he mixes with the first child refugees from Spain.

1937

Paul-Michel surprises his father, who had predicted a career as a surgeon, by announcing that he will become a history professor. "A status not acceptable to the family," commented Foucault, "unless it were at the Sorbonne like cousin Plattard" – a famous specialist on Rabelais.

The Minister of Health replaces "the charming name 'asylum'," given by Esquirol, with "psychiatric hospital."

1940

May

The Foucault children are sent to the family property in Vendeuve-du-Poitou, home of their grandmother Raynaud-Malapert, while the German army invades France.

June

In its Poitiers house, the family puts up relatives from Paris who are joining the exodus. On the 16th, Pétain orders a cessation of combat and replaces the Republic with a collaborationist “new order.” The family house in Vendevre is partially requisitioned by German officers up until the opening of the Russian front.

October

The absence of teachers and the flight to Poitiers of schoolchildren from Paris disrupts school life; Paul-Michel is placed by his family in the Middle School of Saint-Stanislas, which is run by the Brothers of the Christian Schools [De la Salle Christian Brothers].

1942

June

He passes the first part of the Classics baccalaureate, with special permission because of his age.

Autumn

His philosophy teacher at Saint-Stanislas school is deported for Resistance activities. His mother arranges private philosophy lessons for Paul-Michel, given by Louis Girard, a philosophy student later known in Poitiers for his readings of the *Communist Manifesto*. Meanwhile, she arranges for the school to hire a Benedictine from the Abbaye de Ligugé, Dom Pierro, to teach philosophy.

1943

October

Student in the “hypokhâgne” class at Lycée Henri-IV in Poitiers, preparing for the entrance exam to the École Normale Supérieure.

1944

June

Allied bombardment of Poitiers, shortly before its liberation.

1945

October

After failing in the entrance exam for the École Normale, enters the “khâgne” class at the Lycée Henri-IV in Paris.

DANIEL DEFERT

Jean Hyppolite, translator of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, teaches philosophy there. The high grades Hyppolite gives to Foucault's work are the beginning of his philosophical reputation.

December

Marriage of his sister, with whom he has remained very close.

1946

March

The 5th, at Westminster College, Fulton (Missouri), Winston Churchill announces: "An Iron Curtain has descended across the continent."

July

Paul-Michel Foucault is admitted to the École Normale Supérieure.

Summer

Annoyed at having mispronounced a quote at the oral exam for the École Normale, he starts to seriously study German.

Georges Bataille founds the journal *Critique*.

"To be 20 years old shortly after World War II . . . the urgent need of a society radically different from the one in which we were living, this society that had permitted Nazism" (EW3, 247).

At the École Normale, Foucault establishes long-lasting friendships and alliances with some of his peers: Maurice Pinguet, Robert Mauzi, Pierre Bourdieu, Jean-Claude Passeron, Jean-Pierre Serre, Paul Veyne, etc. His years at the École Normale are an unhappy period for Foucault, ill at ease with his physique and his sexual inclination.

1947

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, professor at Lyon, becomes a psychology tutor at the École Normale, responsible for preparing students for the *agrégation* [qualifying exam for university teachers]. His course on the union of the soul and the body in Malebranche, Maine de Biran, and Bergson shapes Foucault's first thesis project on the birth of psychology in the post-Cartesians.

Failure of the Moscow talks on Germany; beginning of the Cold War.

1948

Foucault obtains his BA in philosophy at the Sorbonne.

October

Louis Althusser, who returned to the École Normale in 1945 after five years in a camp in Germany, becomes a philosophy tutor and joins the Communist Party. In his autobiography (*L'Avenir dure longtemps*, Paris: Stock, 1992), he recounts that “the philosophical life at the École was not particularly intense; it was fashionable to distrust Sartre.”

December

The Lysenko affair erupts. As a result, philosophers and scientists begin to take a strong interest in the relation between things said and their external conditions of determination. Bourgeois and proletarian science confront each other in the heart of the École Normale, notably in the teaching of Jean-Toussaint Desanti and Tran Duc Thao, philosopher and Vietnamese patriot, “the two hopes of our generation,” according to Althusser.

Attempted suicide by Foucault (recounted by Maurice Pinguet in *Le Débat*, no. 41, Sept.–Nov. 1986).

1949

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, appointed as Professor of Psychology at the Sorbonne, gives his famous course on “The Sciences of Man and Phenomenology.” At the same time, he introduces the students at the École Normale to Ferdinand de Saussure, which gives Foucault the taste for what he will call formal thought as opposed to structuralism. “He exercised a fascination for us” (Foucault’s words, reported by Claude Mauriac in *Le Temps immobile*, Paris: Grasset, 1976, vol. 3, p. 492).

February

Thanks to his familiarity with optical tests, he is able to have his bad eyesight corrected.

Foucault passes the degree in psychology, created in 1947. During this period he alternates between work and violent anxiety; tempted by alcohol, he begins psychotherapy. “Reading Freud perhaps suggests to him that it is a good and healthy morality not to give up on the truth of desire” (Maurice Pinguet in *Le Débat*, no. 41). He writes his Diploma of Higher Studies in Philosophy on Hegel under the supervision of Jean Hyppolite.

1950

Foucault joins the French Communist Party (PCF). He later confided that the Indochina War had determined his decision. Nevertheless, he never made any reference to these circumstances in interviews when he discussed this period of his life. In February–March 1950, the communist students at the École Normale were indeed highly

mobilized against the Indochina War. Foucault took it very badly that the PCF at that time was exerting pressure on Althusser because of his private life, in order to make him break with his future wife, Hélène Legotien.

June

The 17th, another suicide attempt. In his biography of Althusser (Paris, Grasset, 1992), Yann Moulier-Boutang reports eleven episodes of suicide among the students of the École Normale in eighteen months, between 1952 and 1955. Even though he was reluctant to resort to psychoanalysis, Foucault saw a certain Dr. Gallot for a while. On the 23rd, he wrote to a friend who was worried about him, "Let me be silent . . . let me get used to facing things again, let me dispel the darkness that I had got used to surrounding myself in at midday." On the 24th, a position as assistant which had been promised to him at the Sorbonne is suddenly withdrawn, because of his political activities, he believes.

The musician Gilbert Humbert, a student of Messiaen, the closest witness in the years 1950–52, recalls an anxious young man, reciting Vigny, Musset, Éluard, Nerval by heart, and devouring Saint-John Perse, Husserl, Jaspers, and Bergson. He also reports the temptation of "limit experiences" in Bataille's sense. Recalling the same period, Maurice Pinguet writes: "My first image of Michel Foucault was of a cheerful young man with animated gestures, a clear and vigilant gaze behind rimless glasses; I heard in passing that it was all about *Dasein*, being towards death; I heard one of my fellow students declare with an air of expertise: 'Foucault is intelligent like all homosexuals.' Proof that he didn't know much about it" (*Le Débat*, no. 41).

July

Failure in the *agrégation*, which worries his fellow students, among whom there circulates the fantasy of a communist witch hunt. This brings Foucault closer to Althusser. Spends the summer studying Plotinus. With Gilbert Humbert, he discusses the theses developed at the time in the USSR by Andrei Zhdanov, extensively presented in *La Nouvelle Critique* and, in a more nuanced way, in Aragon's journal *Les Lettres françaises*; theses according to which every technique practiced in the West in music, philosophy, literature, and art in general, arises from a bourgeois formalism. He likes Mozart and Duke Ellington.

August

Study trip to Göttingen.

October

La Nouvelle Critique attacks Hyppolite and denounces the return to Hegel as the latest form of academic revisionism.

Brief treatment for detoxification: "I'm coming back from quite a distance," he writes. He discusses with his father the possibility of being hospitalized at Sainte-Anne Psychiatric Hospital. Is dissuaded by Althusser, who had been there for the first time in 1947.

Forcing himself to be “a good communist,” he writes in the communist student paper and sells *L'Humanité*.

1951

Thinks about leaving France once his studies are finished. Considers Denmark. Reading Kafka and Kierkegaard, taught at the Sorbonne by Jean Wahl, who also introduces German philosophy, Heidegger, Husserl, and Nietzsche. Also thinks about leaving the PCE.

June

The 1st, visits Georges Duhamel to submit his candidacy to the Thiers Foundation, his only possibility of getting a research position without doing two years of teaching. The 14th, meets Pierre Boulez during a visit to the Abbaye de Royaumont, where Boulez tells him that every composer has been influenced by a writer, and that for him it was Joyce.

August

Passes the *agrégation* in philosophy. The topic he drew for the Lecture component was “sexuality,” which had been proposed by Georges Canguilhem. He confides to Gilbert Humbert that he hasn't been a communist for three months.

October

Becomes a tutor in psychology at the École Normale, where his classes on Monday evenings quickly become well attended. Attending the classes over the years were Paul Veyne, Jacques Derrida, Jean-Claude Passeron, Gérard Genette, and Maurice Pinguet.

Works as a psychologist in the electroencephalography [EEG] laboratory of Dr. Verdeaux and his wife, Jacqueline, whom he had known in Poitiers during the war, in Professor Jean Delay's unit at Sainte-Anne Psychiatric Hospital.

As a Fellow at the Thiers Foundation, he begins his thesis on the post-Cartesians and the birth of psychology. Captivated by Malebranche and Maine de Biran. Spends time with Ignace Meyerson, director of the *Journal de psychologie normale et pathologique*.

Dr. Morichau-Beauchant, the first French member of the International Psychoanalytical Association (letter to Freud, December 3, 1910), author of the first article on psychoanalysis published in France (“The Affective Relation in the Cure of Psycho-neuroses,” *Gazette des hôpitaux*, November 14, 1911), friend of the Foucault family in Poitiers, gives Foucault his entire collection of early psychoanalysis journals.

Reading Heidegger. From now on, in the margins of pamphlets from the Communist Party cell in the École Normale, he begins to write notes, organized as plans for papers, on Heidegger and Husserl.

1952

Practices as a psychologist in Professor Delay's unit, where Henri Laborit is testing the first neuroleptic drug, marking the dawn of a psychiatric revolution.

May

Beginning of an intense relationship with the composer Jean Barraqué (1928–73). "Strange personality of this musician whom we didn't hesitate to call the most important figure in contemporary music since Debussy . . . the most ecstatic freedom under the most severe control of the pen," wrote André Hodeir ("La Musique occidentale post-webernienne," *Esprit*, special issue, January 1960). "Adorable, ugly as sin, terribly spiritual, his knowledge of bad boys touched on the encyclopedic. I was completely disconcerted at feeling called by him to explore a world of which I yet knew nothing, and where my suffering would surely follow me," Foucault wrote to a friend, according to whom the person who was seen as the only possible rival to Boulez produced "a transformation" in the young philosopher, ending his torment.

June

Completes his Diploma in Psychopathology at the Institut de Psychologie de Paris [Paris Institute of Psychology].

October

Leaves the Thiers Foundation and becomes a researcher in psychology in the Faculty of Arts at Lille, where, according to Canguilhem, A. Ombredane, the translator of Rorschach, was looking for somebody who was competent in experimental psychology. Leaves the Communist Party, with the assent of Althusser. The "Doctors' Plot," which reveals the anti-semitism of the USSR, in which so-called "Zionist" Jewish doctors were accused of plotting against Stalin, crystallizes the unease that Foucault is feeling in the PCF. The fact that a study on Descartes, which had been commissioned by the Party, has been significantly cut for publication has finally exasperated him. He studies surrealism with Maurice Pinquet.

1953

January

Foucault attends a performance of *Waiting for Godot*, which he considers to be a turning point. "[T]hen reading the works of Blanchot, Bataille . . ." (DL, 176). Foucault shares with Barraqué his enthusiasm for Nietzsche, whom he has discovered, and Barraqué shares his enthusiasm for serial music, Beethoven, and wine. Presents to the circle of communist students at the École Normale a short essay on materialist psychopathology, written at the suggestion of Althusser. Attends Jacques Lacan's seminar at Sainte-Anne Psychiatric Hospital.

March

The 5th, death of Stalin.

Barraqué reworks *Séquences*, composed in 1950 on texts by Rimbaud, for which he substitutes texts from *Ecce Homo* and the poetry of Nietzsche. Foucault's enthusiasm for René Char completely replaces that for Saint-John Perse. Intensive reading of German psychiatry from the inter-war years, on which he accumulates notes and translations, and also of theology (Barth) and anthropology (Haeberlin). Translates, without publishing, cases and articles by Binswanger (1881–1966), including "Delirium as a Biographical Phenomenon."

June

Daniel Lagache, Juliette Favez-Boutonnier, and Françoise Dolto create the Société Française de Psychanalyse [French Society of Psychoanalysis], which Lacan joins. Jacqueline Verdeaux and Foucault visit Binswanger, who introduced "*Dasein* analysis" into psychoanalytic and psychiatric practice, in Switzerland. They undertake the translation of his seminal text in existential psychiatry, *Dream and Existence*. They attend a "carnival of the mad" organized by the psychiatrist Roland Kuhn at the Münsterling Hospital.

Foucault works on interpretations of Rorschach cards, drawing on lectures of Kuhn, which are translated by J. Verdeaux with a preface by Bachelard. He studies the manuscripts of Husserl, which at that time were given by Van Breda to Merleau-Ponty and Tran Duc Thao, at the École Normale.

Receives his Diploma in Experimental Psychology from the Institut de Psychologie de Paris.

July

"[Drinking] a great deal, [no longer] unhappy, but [am] more alone than before. Replacing Althusser [as philosophy tutor at the École Normale] and no longer have time to work for [him]," he writes to a friend.

Writes a long article on the constitution of scientific psychology (FDE, no. 2). Thinks about breaking with a lifestyle to which his only tie is Barraqué's intelligence.

Roland Barthes publishes *Writing Degree Zero*.

August

Travels to Italy with Maurice Pinguet, who reports: "Hegel, Marx, Heidegger, Freud: in 1953, these were his axes of reference, at the time when his encounter with Nietzsche occurred . . . I can see Michel reading the *Untimely Meditations* in the sun, on the beach at Civitavecchia . . . But, from 1953, the direction of an overall plan was taking shape" (*Le Débat*, no. 41).

Foucault often said he had come to Nietzsche through Bataille and to Bataille through Blanchot. Later, he was to say that Nietzsche was revealed to him by Heidegger. In an unpublished passage from the interview with Trombadori in 1978 (EW3, "Interview

with Michel Foucault”), Foucault confided, “What bowled me over was reading an article which Sartre had written about Bataille before the war, which I read after the war, which was such a monument of incomprehension, of injustice and of arrogance, of spite and aggression, that I was from that moment implacably for Bataille and against Sartre.”

September

Lacan gives his famous Rome Discourse, on “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis.” Gilles Deleuze publishes *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, his first book, dedicated to Jean Hyppolite.

October

Foucault gives a course on “Knowledge of Man and Transcendental Reflection,” and some lectures on Nietzsche, at Lille. The Nietzsche that absorbs him is the writings of the 1880s. In his seminar at the École Normale, he works on Freud and Kant’s *Anthropology*.

1954

January

In Paris, creation of Arcadie, the first so-called “homophile” association, which uses forms of action inspired by Freemasonry (the French text of Foucault’s preface to HB was first published in this organization’s magazine, *Arcadie*).

April

Publication of *Maladie mentale et personnalité* [*Mental Illness and Personality*] (Presses Universitaires de France), a small book commissioned by Althusser for a series aimed at students. “True psychology,” Foucault writes in the conclusion, “like every human science, should aim to disalienate humanity.” Here, Pinel is liberating once again the chained patients in the Bicêtre. While there is a commentary on Binswanger’s existential psychiatry, the second part of the work is a justificatory account of Pavlov’s reflexology. In his “Candidacy Presentation: Collège de France, 1969” (EW2), Foucault still gives 1953 as the publication date of this work [in fact, this doesn’t appear in either French or English published text]. The manuscript seems to have been given to the publisher in the winter of 1952–53. At almost the same time, his long introduction to Binswanger’s *Dream and Existence* appears in the phenomenology collection “Textes et études anthropologique,” published by Desclée de Brouwer (DE). Still working as a psychology researcher at Lille and as a tutor at the École Normale, he gives a course on philosophical anthropology: Stirner, Feuerbach. Jacques Lagrange, who attends the course at the École Normale, also recalls the importance given to genetic psychology (Janet, Piaget, Piéron, Freud).

Fear of alcoholism. He later confides to Maurice Clavel (*Ce que je crois*, Paris: Grasset, 1975) that he wants to break with Jean Barraqué, leave France, and distance himself from his former training.

On the back of the typescript of *Mental Illness and Personality*, he writes a text on Nietzsche that was never published: "There are three related experiences: the dream, drunkenness, and madness"; he adds later: "All the Apollonian qualities defined in *The Birth of Tragedy* form the free and luminous space of philosophical existence." In 1982 he says to Gérard Raulet that he had "read Nietzsche in 1953 . . . from a perspective of inquiry into the history of knowledge – the history of reason" (EW2, 438). His friend, the numismatist Raoul Curiel, gives his name to the historian of religion Georges Dumézil, who is looking for a French language teaching assistant for Sweden.

July

The 20th, the Geneva Accords bring the Indochina War to an end.

October

Begins a course on "Phenomenology and Psychology."

The 15th, Dumézil informs him by letter of the vacancy of the position of teaching assistant and Director of the Maison de France in Uppsala, which he had himself filled twenty years earlier. "The position is one of the *top-jobs* [in English in the original] in cultural relations, with good future prospects. It has been held by linguists, historians, philosophers, future writers. I won't speak about the library, the Carolina Rediviva, one of the best in Europe, nor about the countryside, the forest two hundred meters from the town."

November

Beginning of the Algerian uprising.

1955

Enthusiasm of Foucault and Barraqué for *The Death of Virgil*, by Hermann Broch, discovered by Blanchot, upon which the musician will compose a gigantic musical cycle on which he was to work until 1968. "It [i.e. music] had as great an importance as reading Nietzsche," Foucault remarked ("Who are you, Professor Foucault?," in Jeremy Carrette, ed., *Religion and Culture*, London: Routledge, 1999, p. 97).

February

The journal *Critique*, in the person of Roland Caillois, reviews *Mental Illness and Personality*: "It's better than an introduction, it's an updating . . . It is surprising that the author thinks he has defined a materialism in psychopathology. An excellent scientific positivism, which in itself doesn't imply a metaphysical position. The word materialism is superfluous" (*Critique*, vol. 11, no. 93, pp. 189–90).

August

The 26th, Foucault is seconded for one year from the Ministry of Education to Foreign Affairs.

Autumn

Takes up the position in Uppsala. At this time, France is rebuilding its cultural relations. Washington, Moscow, and Stockholm – because of the Nobel Prize – are the important posts. The Cultural Relations Unit, on the fifth floor of the Quai d'Orsay [French Ministry of Foreign Affairs], thinks highly of the opinions of Foucault, who spends three years as teaching assistant in the Department of Romance Languages and Director of the Maison de France. Foucault is fascinated with questions about cultural organizations and cultural politics, an interest that will stay with him throughout his life. The Maison de France came to be much visited, notably by Jean-Christophe Öberg, who was later to play a role in the American–Vietnamese negotiations, and by Éric-Michel Nillson, future television director, to whom the first edition of *History of Madness* is dedicated – but nobody dined there if they were unable to recite René Char. The biologist Jean-François Miquel, in Uppsala at the time, reports that the talks given by Foucault were crowded; they were attended by one or other of the two Nobel prizewinners at the university, Svedberg and Tiselius.

November

Georges Canguilhem, philosopher and medical doctor, former member of the Resistance in the unit of Jean Cavaillès, succeeds Gaston Bachelard at the Sorbonne.

December

Foucault hosts Jean Hyppolite in Sweden, where he gives two talks on “History and Existence” and “Hegel and Kierkegaard in Contemporary French Thought.”

At Christmas, in Paris, Robert Mauzi introduces Foucault to Roland Barthes, formerly of the Cultural Relations Unit. Beginning of a long friendship.

1956

Becoming accustomed to the “long Swedish night” and its “quality of exile”: “A few hundred meters away, the immense forest where the world begins its genesis again; in Sigrina, the sun no longer rises at all. From the depths of this scarcity there arises only the essential, which one loves to re-learn: day and night, evenings protected by four walls, fruit growing nowhere, and at times a smile” (letter to a friend, January 27, 1956).

Collette Duhamel commissions a short history of psychiatry for the publisher Éditions de la Table Ronde, which Foucault doesn't think of as an academic work, even claiming that he is no longer thinking about a career in France. A white sports Jaguar with black leather trim, with which he coordinates his outfits, speed records between Stockholm

and Paris, all indicate this rupture, and create among his friends the legend of a dandy phase.

Discovers the medical collection of the University of Uppsala Library. Gives a course on French theater, then a series of talks on “Love from Sade to Genet” (this is the period when, in Paris, Pauvert is sued for his republication of the works of Sade).

March

“I have a Nietzschean need for the sun” (letter to a friend). At Uppsala, meets Dumézil, to whom he will be linked his whole life by ties of friendship and patronage. He visits the scientific laboratory of Tiselius and Svedberg’s Cyclotron. Also works on the translation of a neuro-psychiatry text by Weizsäcker. He hosts a visit by the Dominican scholar A. J. Festugière, specialist in Greek and Hellenistic philosophy and spirituality, with whom he will remain in contact his whole life.

1957

Infuriated by the time limits imposed on French doctoral candidates, Foucault decides to submit a shorter thesis in Sweden. His manuscript on the history of psychiatry, which in fact became a history of madness, is refused by Professor Lindroth, who had hoped for a more positivist approach. Announces a course on religious experience in French literature from Chateaubriand to Bernanos. All the while, he thinks about leaving for Frankfurt or Hamburg.

July

In Paris, where he works in the National Archives and the Library of the Arsenal every summer, he discovers *The View*, by Raymond Roussel, in the shop of the publisher José Corti, who advises him to buy the complete edition, which had become rare, from Lemerre (DL, 173–4).

Hosts Albert Camus, who has come to receive the Nobel Prize in Literature. In a talk that Jean-François Miquel recalls was dazzling, which hasn’t been preserved, he presents the work of this great representative of post-war humanism to the Uppsala public. Foucault is convinced that the Swedes wanted to honor Algeria and made a mistaken analysis of Camus’ political positions.

Hyppolite reads the manuscript of *History of Madness*. He advises him to turn it into a French thesis to be submitted to Canguilhem.

1958

February

Publication of the translation by Foucault and D. Rocher of the 1948 fourth edition of Viktor von Weizsäcker’s *Der Gestaltkreis* (*Le Cycle de la structure*, Desclée de Brouwer, series “Bibliothèque de Neuropsychiatrie”).

Maurice Pinguet leaves France for Japan. Foucault thinks about moving to Hamburg.

May

The 30th, returns hurriedly to Paris, with Jean-Christoph Öberg, in order to take part in the political events.

June

The 1st, investiture of General de Gaulle as head of the government.

September

The 28th, France adopts the Constitution of the Fifth Republic by referendum.

October

Foucault leaves Stockholm for Warsaw, which is still mostly in ruins. He is given the task of reopening the Center for French Civilization within the university. He sets himself up in the Bristol Hotel, above the café popular with the intellectuals at that time. There he rewrites *History of Madness*.

General de Gaulle, who is seeking political openings in the East, favors the French diplomatic mission in Poland, where he had been a military attaché in the 1930s. A highly Gaullist team accompanies the new ambassador, Étienne Burin des Roziers, a close friend of the general. Gradually, Foucault comes to play the role of cultural advisor to Burin des Roziers.

November

"Do you know that *Ubu Roi* is set in Poland, in other words nowhere. I am in prison: that is, on the other side, but that's worse. On the outside: impossible to come in; grating on the railings, the head hardly getting through, just enough to see the others inside, who are going around in a circle. A sign, they are already further away, one can do nothing for them, except to watch out for when they come around again and prepare a smile. But in the meantime, they've been kicked and no longer have the strength or the courage to respond. This smile isn't lost, somebody else will take it for himself and carry it away this time. Clouds continually rise from the Vistula. Nobody knows what light is any more. I am working on my 'Madness' which is in danger, in this outpouring of insanity, of becoming a little more like what it always pretended to be" (letter to a friend, November 22, 1958).

Christmas

Sends the manuscript, now very thick, of *History of Madness* to the formidable Georges Canguilhem, who declares: "Don't change anything, it's a thesis."

1959

In Warsaw, arising from the mutual esteem which grows between Burin des Roziers and Foucault, he develops views about De Gaulle's relation to institutions and to Algeria that are different from those of the French left, which at the time is chanting in the streets: "Fascism will not pass."

Familiar with Husserl and Brentano, Foucault develops ties with T. Kotarbiński, heir of the Lvov–Warsaw school and president of the Academy of Science.

Gives talks on Apollinaire in Kraków and Gdańsk. Thinks about moving to Berkeley, California, or to Japan, where Maurice Pinguet lives. Mixes with different Polish francophone circles. His thick manuscripts on imprisonment, along with the company he keeps, worry Gomulka's police, who trap him using a young interpreter and demand his departure.

September

The 14th, death of Dr. Paul Foucault.

October

The 1st, posted for three years to Germany, Foucault leaves Warsaw to direct the French Institute in Hamburg.

1960

Writes his complementary thesis *Genesis and Structure of Kant's Anthropology* and translates *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (this second thesis was published in 2008; see IA).

February

Writes the preface to the newly completed *History of Madness* (HM, xxvii–xxxvi).

April

Georges Canguilhem recommends him to Jules Vuillemin, head of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Clermont-Ferrand, who in turn offers him a position as Associate Professor of Psychology. This is conditional on his publishing *History of Madness*. Brice Parain, at Gallimard, rejects the manuscript. Philippe Ariès, whose *Centuries of Childhood* is beginning to change French historiography, accepts it for the series "Civilizations and Mentalities" with Plon, under the exact title *Folie et déraison: Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique* [*Madness and Insanity: History of Madness in the Classical Age*].

In Hamburg, where he is friends with the Africanist scholar Rolf Italiaander, he on occasion shows Robbe-Grillet, Roland Barthes, or Jean Bruce, at that time king of the

detective novel, around the maze of the red light district in Saint Pauli. He arranges for a play by Cocteau to be staged.

June

The 19th, Cocteau writes to thank him.

October

Receiving his appointment at Clermont-Ferrand, he moves back to 59 rue Monge, Paris. Robert Mauzi introduces him to a philosophy student, Daniel Defert, just started at the École Normale in Saint-Cloud, who will be his partner from 1963 until his death (FL, 316).

Foucault begins that form of life very specific to French academe, consisting of living in Paris while teaching in the provinces.

1961

In Clermont-Ferrand, apart from Jules Vuillemin, Foucault is friends with the philosophers Michel Serres and Jean-Claude Pariente and the historian Bertrand Gille. In Paris, long days spent in the Bibliothèque Nationale, where, under the dome that overlooks the reading room, he will be seen working for years.

May

The 20th, submits his two doctoral theses at the Sorbonne. *Kant, Anthropology*: introduction, translation and notes, examined by Hyppolite; *Madness and Insanity: History of Madness in the Classical Age*: principal thesis, examined by Canguilhem and Lagache.

History of Madness is hailed by the historians Robert Mandrou and Fernand Braudel as an important contribution to the history of mentalities. Maurice Blanchot writes: "In this book which is rich, insistent and, through its necessary repetitions, almost unreasonable (and as the book is a doctoral thesis we witness with pleasure this clash between the university and unreason), several essential ideas are given expression" (*La Nouvelle Revue française*, no. 106).

Is appointed as an examiner for the entrance exam of the École Normale, of which Hyppolite is director.

The 31st, begins a series of radio broadcasts on France-Culture, on "History of Madness and Literature," which will continue until 1963.

July

Death of his grandmother Raynaud-Malapert, to whom he had been very attached.

The 22nd, interview in *Le Monde*, which presents him as "the absolute young intellectual: timeless" (FL, 7).

The inheritance from his father allows him to move into number 13, rue du Docteur-Finlay, at the top of a new building whose large windows look out, on one side, over what is becoming the modern Seine river front and, on the other, over what is the still vacant site of the old Vélodrome d'Hiver [Winter Cycle Track].

November

The 27th, finishes writing *The Birth of the Clinic*, which he described as the “out-takes” from *History of Madness*.

December

The 25th, starts writing *Death and the Labyrinth*.

1962

Urged by the publisher to reissue *Mental Illness and Personality*, Foucault completely rewrites the second part called “The Conditions of Illness,” which becomes “Madness and Culture,” a summary of *History of Madness* which is a long way from both the Pavlovian reflexology and the existential anthropology of 1954. Its title is now *Maladie mentale et psychologie* [*Mental Illness and Psychology*].

February

Makes the acquaintance of Gilles Deleuze, who publishes *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (Presses Universitaires de France).

March

The 18th, the Évian Accords bring the Algerian War to an end.

May

The 18th, Foucault notes: “Sade and Bichat, contemporaries who were both strangers and twins, placed death and sexuality within the body of Western man; these two experiences that are so little natural, so transgressive, so charged with a power of uncompromising opposition, and on the basis of which contemporary culture has founded its dream of a knowledge which could reveal *natural Man* . . .”

Appearance of the French translation of *The Origin of Geometry*, by Husserl, with a long introduction by Jacques Derrida. This book immediately becomes central to epistemological thought in Paris. Foucault, who had worked on this text a great deal in the 1950s, speaks now about “the importance of this very disappointing text,” which forces him to further develop his notion of archaeology (letter**).

Is appointed Professor of Psychology at the University of Clermont-Ferrand, where he replaces Jules Vuillemin as head of the Department of Philosophy; Vuillemin succeeds Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who died unexpectedly on May 3rd 1961, at the Collège de France.

** “letter,” without indicating recipient, denotes a letter sent to Daniel Defert.

September

Gives the manuscript of *The Birth of the Clinic* to Althusser to read.

The craze for structural analysis grows at the École Normale.

1963

January

Along with Roland Barthes and Michel Deguy, he joins the editorial board of the journal *Critique*. According to Jean Piel, brother-in-law of Georges Bataille, the editor, Foucault's participation didn't become effective until after the appearance of *The Order of Things* (1966) and ended in 1973, even though he let his name appear there until 1977.

March

The 4th, in a talk at the Collège Philosophique, Jacques Derrida criticizes Foucault's reading of Descartes' First Meditation in his *History of Madness*. Derrida had invited Foucault in a letter of February 3rd: "I re-read you during the Christmas holidays with a constantly renewed pleasure. I think I will basically try to show that your reading of Descartes is justified and illuminating at a deep historical and philosophical level which it seems to me can't be immediately shown or indicated by the text you draw on and which, I think, I wouldn't read in exactly the way you do." But the "structuralist totalitarianism" denounced by Derrida hurts Foucault, who is working precisely to differentiate his archaeology from structuralism. "Why does historicity always have to be thought as forgetting?" (letter).

April

Publication of *Naissance de la Clinique: Une archéologie du regard médical* [*The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception*], in the series "History and Philosophy of Biology and Medicine," edited by Canguilhem at Presses Universitaires de France.

May

Publication of *Raymond Roussel* [*Death and the Labyrinth: The World of Raymond Roussel*] by Gallimard, in the series edited by Georges Lambrichs, hailed by Philippe Sollers in the journal *Tel quel* as "the birth of criticism." Its publication was to accompany a new edition of Roussel's oeuvre.

July

The Moscow Accords define peaceful coexistence.

Solzhenitsyn begins to collect accounts of the Gulag.

Holiday in Tangier and Marrakech with Barthes and Mauzi.

August

The 5th, “I have arrived at Vendevre. It’s time for sheets of paper that are filled like baskets of apples, for trees that are pruned, books that are read line by line with a child’s meticulousness . . . it’s the wisdom of every summer” (letter). Corrects the proofs of his translation of Kant’s *Anthropology* and of his homage to Bataille, who died the previous year (EW2, “A Preface to Transgression”). Reading Klossowski on Nietzsche. Takes notes on the relation between archaeology and critical philosophy.

The Quai d’Orsay [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] offers him the post as Director of the Institut Français in Tokyo, which he has wanted for a long time.

September

Is invited to a conference at Cerisy-la-Salle by the *Tel quel* group, who want “to take stock of the situation of literature after the *nouveau roman*.” Beginning of personal relations with members of this group (Sollers, Pleyne, Thibaudeau, Baudry, Ollier, and also Édern Hallier, who had broken with Sollers in 1962), on whose books he will write a number of articles.

October

Turns down the chance to move to Tokyo in order to stay close to Daniel Defert, who is preparing for the *agrégation* in philosophy. Abandoning the planned follow-up to *History of Madness*, which was to be on the history of penal psychiatry, he begins “a book on signs.” Intense work interrupts the rhythm of the late-night dinners with Roland Barthes in Saint-Germain-des-Prés; their relations become more distant.

November

Gives talks in Lisbon, where he sees Bosch’s painting *The Temptation of Saint Anthony*, and in Madrid. The 9th, a letter describing his viewing of *Las Meninas* in the Prado, the painting around which will crystallize the project of his “book on signs” (OT, chapter 1).

December

Re-reading Heidegger. Decides on a plan for *The Order of Things*.

1964

Long days researching at the Bibliothèque Nationale. In small school notebooks there follow reading notes, chapter plans, and drafts of articles. Reads *The Formation of the Concept of Reflex in the 17th and 18th Centuries* [untranslated] by Georges Canguilhem, who has become his “good teacher” since *History of Madness*.

Relations with Gilles Deleuze and Pierre Klossowski become regular; he also sees Jean Beaufret. In July, they get together with Karl Löwith, Henri Birault, Gianni Vattimo, Jean Wahl, Colli, and Montinari, who are editing a new edition of Nietzsche, at the conference on Nietzsche organized by Deleuze at Royaumont (EW2, “Nietzsche, Freud, Marx”).

April

Gives talks in Ankara, in Istanbul ("The disillusionment of the orient"). Visits Ephesus ("in the footsteps of Heraclitus . . . I have never seen anything so beautiful") (letter).

August

The 10th, "I have the feeling that I'm getting close to a reconversion towards a total non-writing. That would really liberate me" (letter). Enthusiastically reads *Under the Volcano* by Malcolm Lowry.

September

Because of the American bombings in the Gulf of Tonkin, Daniel Defert doesn't take up the civilian position in Vietnam which he had requested in lieu of his military service. He is assigned to Tunisia, where Foucault soon joins him.

The appearance, "in train station bookshops," as Foucault liked to say, of a highly abridged version of *History of Madness* [translated as *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, 1967] in a new paperback series from Plon, "Le Monde en 10/18." Intellectual circles are divided at this time on the wisdom of these low-priced intellectual series. Happy with this popular edition, which went through many reprints, Foucault was disappointed when the publisher refused to republish the complete version. Foucault breaks with Plon. Foreign translations of *History of Madness*, except the Italian edition from Rizzoli in 1963, are based on the abridged version [a complete English translation, *History of Madness*, was published in 2006. See HM].

October

The 18th: "I'm redoing my damn signs all day long" (letter).

Spends time with Deleuze, Vuillemin, Desanti, Klossowski. Gives a course on sexuality at Clermont-Ferrand. With the majority of the Faculty, he opposes the nomination of Roger Garaudy as professor in the Department of Philosophy; a member of the central committee of the Communist Party, people say he is being imposed on by his old schoolfriend, Georges Pompidou (who is now prime minister).

December

Publication, by Vrin, of the translation of Kant's *Anthropology*. The introduction, which had been the complementary thesis, is reduced to a three-page note on the text, with this closing sentence: "The relation between critical thought and anthropological reflection will be studied in a later work." This is the announcement of *The Order of Things*, which Foucault is still calling his "book on signs."

Holding a public lecture position at Saint-Louis University, Brussels, he gives a talk on "Language and Literature."

Christmas

Visits Tunisia. The first draft of the book on signs is completed.

1965

January

The 5th, watching a plane taking off from Djerba Island, “the ground shaking at the edge of the sea,” he scrawls on a postcard the words that will be the last sentence of *The Order of Things*.

Strong wish to go and live in the village of Sidi Bou Said, which looks over the Gulf of Carthage.

Participates, with Alain Badiou, Georges Canguilhem, Dinah Dreyfus, and Paul Ricoeur, in a series of philosophy debates for educational television and radio (for example, EW2, “Philosophy and Psychology”).

Appointed to the commission to reform the universities set up by Christian Fouchet, De Gaulle’s Minister of Education, he worries about the plan to multiply local universities without sufficient means. He prepares an alternative plan that makes complementary connections between these institutions within the framework of regional government, and which he submits to the prime minister’s office, where Étienne Burin des Roziers has become secretary general.

Rumors circulate that Foucault will be nominated as deputy director of higher education for the human sciences.

February

The 13th, “It wasn’t signs, but order that I was talking about” (letter about his book on signs).

April

The 4th, “Finally finished the thing. Three hundred pages re-written, in a completely different balance, since Sfax [city in Tunisia].” Writes the preface: “A general theory of archaeology which I’m happy enough with.” Plans to apply to the Collège de France in order to escape Clermont-Ferrand. Changes his mind, upon learning of the candidature of the historian Georges Duby.

May

The 2nd, Canguilhem excited about the manuscript of the “book on signs.” Foucault finds out that a campaign relating to his private life, led by certain academics, is the reason why he wasn’t nominated as deputy director of higher education.

The 14th, submits his manuscript to Lambrichs at Gallimard.

June

Roger Caillois sends him an enthusiastic letter about his manuscript and asks for a text for his own journal *Diogenes* (OT, chapter 2). Burin de Roziers confides that he and Malraux [Minister for Culture] have new plans for him. The 9th, upset by the intrigues

against his nomination, Foucault travels to Sweden and applies to Elisabethville – soon to become Lubumbashi, when the country takes the name Zaire – where the logician Gilles-Gaston Granger is teaching at the time. The sociologist Georges Gurvitch presses him to apply for a chair in psychosociology at the Sorbonne. Foucault decides not to, finding too much hostility. Another trip to Sfax and Sidi Bou Said.

August

Visits the Nicolas de Staël retrospective in Zurich. He goes to see the works by Klee in the Basel Museum. Thinks about asking for a posting to Abidjan [Ivory Coast].

September

Althusser sends Foucault his *For Marx*, with this dedication: “Here’s a few old things.”

October

Invited to the Department of Philosophy in São Paulo [Brazil] by the philosopher Gérard Lebrun, a student, like Jules Vuillemin and Louis Althusser, of Martial Guérout. There, he makes connections with the philosophers Gianotti and Ruy Fausto, the critic Roberto Schwartz, the poet Lupe Cotrim Garaude, and the psychoanalyst Betty Milan; he gives them a first taste of some chapters of *The Order of Things*. The planned speaking tour is ended by the shows of force that, week after week, consolidate the takeover by the generals, who will soon either sack or exile his friends.

1966

January

Creation at the École Normale, around Jacques-Alain Miller and François Régnauld, of the Epistemology Circle, under the double inspiration of Jacques Lacan and Canguilhem. Its publication, the *Cahiers pour l'analyse*, claiming to represent “all the analytic sciences: logic, linguistics, psychoanalysis, aims to contribute to a theory of discourse.” This circle responds to and differentiates itself from the creation, around Robert Linhart, of the Union of Young Marxist-Leninist Communists (UJCML), the first Maoist group among students.

While *The Order of Things* is in press, Foucault starts to reconsider the problems of method that he posed in that archaeology. “Philosophy is a diagnostic undertaking, archaeology is a method for describing thought” (letter).

Reads Whorf and Sapir. “No, that’s not it, the problem isn’t language, but the limits of sayability” (letter).

February

Accepts, with Gilles Deleuze, to oversee the publication in French of Colli and Montinari’s edition of the complete works of Nietzsche.

March

The 11–13th, the central committee of the French Communist Party, meeting in Argenteuil, declares, against Althusser, that “Marxism is the humanism of our times.”

The 28th, conference at the University Theater in Budapest. The planned conference on structuralism is thought, by the Hungarian authorities, to interest so few people that it is confined to the office of the rector. Foucault discovers that in eastern Europe, because of its origins in Russian and Prague formalist thought, structuralism functions as an alternative to Marxism. Foucault refuses to make the ritual visit to György Lukács, preferring to see the portrait of Jeanne Duval by Manet at the Museum of Fine Arts.

The 31st, his Hungarian contacts confide to Foucault how relieved they were to find in Aragon's journal *Les Lettres françaises* his long interview with Raymond Bellour, announcing the appearance of *The Order of Things*; now they will be less suspect in their own country (EW2, “The Order of Things”). Travels in the Puszta, to Debrecen: “I was rather moved to see that the theories of dear old Alth (Althusser) have traveled to the very depths of the Marxism of the steppes” (letter; EW3, “Interview with Michel Foucault”). Visits Bucharest.

April

Publication of *Les Mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines* [*The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*], in the series “Library of the Human Sciences,” which Pierre Nora has just started at Gallimard. His preferred title was “L'Ordre des choses” [“The Order of Things”], which was already used by Jacques Brosse in a book for which Bachelard wrote a preface; its reuse wasn't allowed. By persistence or forgetfulness, Foucault was later to use a chapter title from the same book to name a series: “Parallel Lives” (in which HB was published; FDE, no. 223).

May

Spends time with Derrida and Althusser. The 16th, Foucault states in an interview: “Our task is to free ourselves once and for all from humanism . . . it is in this sense that my work is political, insofar as all the regimes of the East and the West pass off their wares under the cover of humanism” (FDE, no. 37; FDE1a, 544). The first print run of *The Order of Things* is sold out in six weeks. The 23rd, *L'Express* introduces the book as the biggest revolution in philosophy since existentialism. From now on, the phrases “the death of man” and “Marxism exists in nineteenth-century thought like a fish in water,” circulate in the press as emblematic of the work.

The 26th, an enthusiastic letter from René Magritte. Beginning of a correspondence in which Foucault questions him about his interpretation of *The Balcony* by Manet. Magritte wants to meet Foucault at the end of the year.

June

From now on, the press comments as much on the sales figures as on the book itself. The sales figures are seen as a symptom, the book itself as a rupture. 1966 is one of

the great years for the human sciences in France: Lacan, Lévi-Strauss, Benveniste, Genette, Greimas, Doubrovsky, Todorov, and Barthes publish some of their most important texts. Perceived up to that moment as a localized method, structuralism is suddenly recognized as a movement.

July

At Vendevre, six hours a day writing replies to attacks on “the death of man.” “Even Jean Daniel after Domenach. Trying to say what philosophical discourse could be today” (letter). He works again on Husserl’s *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, but this time in French translation. “For the first time, I’ve taken to reading detective novels.”

Hyppolite’s comment about *The Order of Things*: “It’s a tragic book.” “He is the only one to have seen it,” confides Foucault.

September

Foucault decides to move to Tunis where he is offered, for the first time, a chair in philosophy (rather than psychology).

According to him, the media success clouded the reception of his work.

The dryness of the next book testifies to his wish to break with this kind of success. The 15th, François Mauriac devotes a part of his “Bloc-notes” to the anti-humanism of *The Order of Things* and concludes: “You would make Sartre likeable.” From now on, Foucault follows what is said about “the death of man” from a distance and very selectively.

October

The 1st, Foucault obtains leave from the university to spend three years in Tunisia.

Sartre, in the issue of *L’Arc* that is devoted to him, attacks structuralism, rejects the tendency of Foucault and Althusser to privilege structures over history, calls archaeology a geology which replaces transformations with stratifications, and concludes: “Foucault is the last rampart of the bourgeoisie.” The major intellectual journals maintain, right up to May 1968, the polemic against *The Order of Things: Les Temps modernes*, in January 1967; *Esprit*, in May 1967; *La Pensée*, in February 1968, etc.

November

Staying at the Hotel Dar-Zarouk, Foucault looks for a house on the wild slope of the hill over Sidi Bou Said. “I wanted to have an immediate rapport with the sea, absolute, without civilization” (letter).

The 12th: it’s the first time since 1955 that he is teaching philosophy. The course on “Philosophical Discourse” carries on from *The Order of Things*. Gives a public course on Western culture. “The theory of discourse is still a shambles, 396 pages to re-do” (letter).

The 16th, “I found yesterday, this morning, just now, the definition of discourse that I’ve needed for years” (letter).

December

Writes a preface for a new edition of *The Port-Royal Grammar*, initially planned by Seuil (FDE, no. 60).

Is amazed at the insight the Tunisian students have into Althusser: “It’s strange to see that what for us is pure theoretical discourse, here suddenly rises up into an almost immediate imperative” (letter).

The 9th, settles in under the long white archways described by Jean Daniel, who he met at this time, and which are the old royal stables in Sidi Bou Said. Forcing himself, according to Nietzsche’s vow, to become every day a little more Greek, athletic, tanned, ascetic, he begins a new stylization of his existence.

Christmas

Camping with donkeys and camels on the Tassili-n-Ajjer plateau, Southern Algeria.

1967

January

Les Temps modernes (no. 22) joins the attack. Foucault contents himself with a response by private letter to the questions which had worried him in Michel Amiot’s article “Michel Foucault’s Cultural Relativism”: “I decided not to provide the book with a methodological preface which would serve as a user’s guide. I’m not at all writing to you to give you this explanation, but from respect for the seriousness of the discussion and from real sympathy for your text.” He concludes: “Wishing to free history – at least the history of ideas – from a well-worn schema where it’s a matter of influence, advances, setbacks, discoveries, realizations, I sought to define the ensemble of transformations which serve as the rules of an empirical discontinuity.”

Occasional meetings with Chadli Klibi, at the time Tunisian Minister of Culture, future Secretary General of the Arab League.

The 31st: “I am fascinated by what’s happening in China. The hope of finishing (*The Archaeology of Knowledge*) by the spring is put back to next year.”

February

“History is, all the same, hugely enjoyable. One is less alone and just as free” (letter). Plan to write a text about the republication of Fernand Braudel’s book on the Mediterranean, maybe even to write a book on historiography which would be an opportunity for another archaeology of the human sciences, showing this time that “epistemes” are not a periodization of worldviews. Reading Dumézil, something he will keep up all his life, and Trotsky’s *The Permanent Revolution*, which he likes so much that he will come

to call himself a Trotskyite in 1968. His Tunisian students are, in effect, supplying Foucault with their interpretations.

March

The 14th, in Paris, gives a talk to the Cercle d'Études Architecturales [Circle for Architecture Studies], on "heterotopias," a repeat of a radio program on the same subject (EW2, "Different Spaces").

The 17th, at the Sorbonne, in Raymond Aron's seminar he presents the criteria according to which one can historically identify a cultural formation such as political economy across different epistemes. Raymond Aron adamantly wants to assimilate epistemes to *Weltanschauungen* [worldviews]. A debate which will contribute to the abandonment of the concept in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. Behind this epistemological discussion, the two protagonists' tactics in relation to the Collège de France are being fine-tuned. The arguments presented at Raymond Aron's seminar will be developed in the second interview with Raymond Bellour (EW2, "On the Ways of Writing History").

Attends the premier of *The Temptation of Saint Anthony*, at the Odéon Theater, a ballet by Béjart which uses the iconography that Foucault had highlighted in his study of Flaubert (EW2, "Afterword to . . .").

April

"I've stopped all writing to look a bit more closely at Wittgenstein and the English analytic philosophers" (letter). About the English analytic philosophers, he writes: "A style and level of analysis which I was floundering around looking for this winter. The barely tolerable anguish of this winter." At this time, Foucault is using the library of his colleague Gérard Deledalle, a rare, even unique specialist on John Dewey and American philosophy.

The 12th, *La Presse de Tunis* reports: "Every Friday afternoon, the biggest lecture hall of the University of Tunis is too small to hold the hundreds of students and visitors who come to follow the lectures of Professor Michel Foucault."

May

The journal *Esprit* dedicates a special issue to "Structuralism, ideology and methods." "Against the cold thought of a system which builds itself in the face of every individual or collective subject," Jean-Marie Domenach, editor of the journal, poses six questions to Foucault, of which he only agrees to answer the one on "the possibility of a political intervention arising out of a reflection on discontinuity and constraint." Irony of sorts, the long reply will appear in May 1968 (FDE, no. 57).

"I'm quite happy with the English analytic philosophers; they allow me to see how one can do a non-linguistic analysis of statements [*énoncés*]. To deal with statements in their functioning. But, they don't uncover that in which and that in relation to which they function. Perhaps an advance should be made in that direction" (letter).

Publication of *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* in Britain, with a preface by David Cooper, in the series "Studies in Existentialism and

Phenomenology,” edited by Ronald Laing, who had previously dedicated *The Divided Self* to Binswanger. This publication is followed by an article by Laing, “Sanity and Madness – The Invention of Madness” (*The New Statesman*, June 16, 1967). As a result, *Madness and Civilization* is put under the banner of anti-psychiatry in English-speaking countries.

Still being both pursued and thwarted at the Sorbonne, Foucault finally gives up on that and applies to the new university in Nanterre, where he is appointed to a chair in psychology in June.

He is also appointed as an examiner for the entry exam to the École Nationale d’Administration.

June

The 1st, meeting with President Bourguiba.

Reading Panofsky: article in *Le Nouvel Observateur*, for which he begins to write more frequently (FDE, no. 51).

From the 5th to the 10th, during the Six Day War, anti-imperialist demonstrations break out against the US embassy, as well as pogroms against Jewish businesses, which had probably been sparked off by the authorities in order to facilitate the arrest of its opponents. The activist students more and more frequently hold their meetings at Foucault’s apartment. Foucault notes: “They are sino-castrists.” “In view of the great concern” that President Bourguiba shows him, the Tunisian authorities quickly install a telephone line in Foucault’s apartment.

July

Returns to Venduvre: “There must be great powers in this little corner of the world, for me to feel more or less relaxed here” (letter).

“I’m getting to the bottom of Nietzsche. I think I am beginning to see why he has always fascinated me. An account of the form of the will to knowledge in European civilization, which has been ignored in favor of an analysis of the will to power” (letter).

August

The 15th, death of Magritte.

The 25th, finishes *The Archaeology of Knowledge*: “I still have to spend two or three months re-reading it this winter.”

October

Foucault, guessing that the Ministry of Education is delaying its approval of his appointment at Nanterre, goes back to Tunis for another year.

Release of Jean-Luc Godard’s *La Chinoise*, in which Anne Wiazemski, the pro-Chinese student, throws tomatoes at *The Order of Things*, a book which symbolized the negation of history, and therefore the negation of the revolution.

November

"I received a good questionnaire from *Cahiers pour l'analyse*," for a special issue on "Genealogy of the Sciences" (EW2, "On the Archaeology . . ."). Finishes "a little thing on Magritte" (EW2, "This Is Not a Pipe"). Promises Éditions de Minuit an essay on Manet to be called *Le Noir et la couleur*. From the 14th to the 19th, a short stay in Italy for the launch of the translation of *The Order of Things*, published by Rizzoli with an afterword by Canguilhem, "The Death of Man, or Exhaustion of the *cogito*." Meets Umberto Eco in Milan. Gives a talk on Manet. In Rome, meets Burin des Rozières, now French ambassador, who suggests he come to work as his cultural advisor, but this position is no longer of interest to Foucault.

December

Discovery of a lesion on his retina, which may be a tumor. "Long live the body which dies, nothing like it for getting rid of anxieties. I am editing. Fourth time in two years. I think I'm explaining myself quite well, excellent mood" (letter).

In the December issue of the journal *Preuves*, the historian François Furet remarks on a decline in ideology among French intellectuals, which he imputes to the triumph of structuralism over Marxism. "I will respond to that tangentially in my response to Domenach" (letter; see also FE, "Politics and . . .").

1968

January

Re-reading Beckett's work from 1950–53, and also Rosa Luxemburg.

The 15th, Alain Peyrefitte, Minister of Education and former fellow student from the École Normale, personally informs him of his appointment at Nanterre. On his way to Paris, Foucault meets a group of students from that university and is surprised: "Strange how these students speak about their relations with their professors in terms of class struggle."

February

A public lecture in Tunis on the Italian painting tradition, which is discreetly attended by Ben Salah, shortly to become prime minister. In France, the communist periodical *La Pensée* publishes three interviews that are critical of *The Order of Things*. A violent response from Foucault. The editors of the journal negotiate, through a series of letters, the attenuation of language that it had systematically taken from the arsenal of communist insults (FE, "Politics and . . .").

March

The 10th, *La Quinzaine littéraire* announces on its front page a Sartre–Foucault polemic. In fact, it's an attempt to provoke Foucault to respond to the comments by Sartre in the special issue of *L'Arc*. Foucault puts a quick end to this game (FDE, no. 56) [Foucault's

text is a condemnation of the publication, without his authorization, of FL, “Foucault Responds to Sartre”].

He is reading Che Guevara.

From the 15th to the 19th, demonstrations at the University of Tunis for the release of those students who have been imprisoned since the previous year. On the basis of photographs, the police arrest the main political leaders of the students, especially those from the Tunisian Socialist Study and Action Group, known as *Perspectives*, after the name of their journal. Some of them are tortured and charged with undermining state security. The activists who remain free secretly print their tracts in Foucault’s apartment, where they hide their Roneo duplicating machine. In agreement with them, he decides to stay in Tunisia to give logistical and financial support to their defense. He meets with President Bourguiba and the French ambassador, Sauvagnargues, but without success. He arranges for the young secretary of the National Higher Education Union, Alain Geismar, whom he doesn’t know, to come from Paris. He is criticized in France for not having made a dramatic exit from Tunisia.

The 22nd, the official beginning of the student movement at Nanterre. Foucault writes: “From here we look down on Nanterre.” Student demonstrations in Warsaw, Madrid, and Rome.

April

Travels by car along the Sirte coast and visits Leptis Magna and Sabrata in Libya.

May

From the 3rd to the 13th, street demonstrations in Paris, occupation of the Sorbonne, which expands to become an almost total general strike in France. Foucault remains stuck in Tunis. Maurice Clavel writes in *Ce que je crois*: “When I got to Paris on May 3rd, I bought the newspapers at the Gare de Lyon and, seeing the headlines about the first student riots, I said to my wife with a strange calm: that’s it, here we are, we’ve arrived . . . “Where?” she asked. Right in Foucault . . . because after all, wasn’t *The Order of Things* the formidable prediction of the geological rupture of our human and humanist culture, which was bound to occur in May ’68? I rushed to the offices of the *Nouvel Observateur* where, within a few minutes, I wrote five pages which started like this: a new Resistance has emerged today in Nanterre and at the Sorbonne . . . Did anybody think that the Death of Man would happen between the threshold and midnight, I am speaking of the publishers” [Clavel is referring to two leading publishers in philosophy and the humanities: Éditions du Seuil (threshold) and Éditions du Minuit (midnight)].

The 27th, in order to get to Paris, Foucault takes advantage of a special flight which happens to coincide with the meeting at Charléty Stadium of the leaders of the left, including Paul Mendès France, which Foucault attends.

June

The 16th, he writes from Tunis: “Here it’s a big mystery.” The Tunisian auxiliary police forces use a range of intimidatory practices to force Foucault to leave. At the end of

June, Foucault attends the last demonstrations and the meetings at the Sorbonne. Blanchot tells of how he spoke to Foucault at the Sorbonne without being sure if Foucault had recognized him (Maurice Blanchot, *Michel Foucault tel que je l'imagine*, Montpellier: Fata Morgana, 1986) [*Foucault/Blanchot*, New York: Zone Books, 1987]. Foucault never tried to meet him, saying he admired him too much to want to get to know him. The 30th, General de Gaulle's party convincingly wins the election organized by Georges Pompidou.

July

The Tunisian government sets up a State Security Court to try the students. Foucault decides to spend the summer in Tunisia.

September

Is contacted by Hélène Cixous to help in setting up an experimental university which Edgar Faure, Minister of Education, has decided to build, outside the Latin Quarter, in Vincennes.

The 9th, the trial of 134 student activists opens in Tunis. Foucault had handed information about their detention to French lawyers. However, the defense isn't given a chance to present its case. Ahmed Ben Othman is sentenced to fourteen years in prison, which he serves. The 30th, at his own request, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ends Foucault's secondment and he is reassigned to the University in Nanterre.

October

Foucault enthusiastically reads texts by the American Black Panthers: "They're developing a strategic analysis which is free of the Marxist theory of society" (letter). The 27th, on the boat trip back to Marseille, Foucault learns of the death of Jean Hyppolite. His widow sends him Hyppolite's collection of Beckett's work. He will bring their names together in his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France.

November

Parliament transfers a part of the state power over universities to councils of elected teachers and students; and replaces the division of knowledge into Faculties with multidisciplinary groupings. The new university in Vincennes is supposed to test out this organization of powers and knowledges. Edgar Faure, the new Minister for Education, wants Foucault to manage the experiment. He refuses to do this, confining himself to recruiting teachers for the Department of Philosophy, with the advice of Alain Badiou, who is close to Althusser at this time. With Serge Leclaire, a Lacanian psychoanalyst, he sets up the first Department of Psychoanalysis in a university. With the sociologist Jean-Claude Passeron, he wants to promote a multidisciplinary approach to science and politics, rather than a Faculty of Human Sciences. He gives Alain Badiou the task of trimming the manuscript of *The Archaeology of Knowledge*.

The press denounces the recruiters of the experimental university at Vincennes, most of whom are leftists.

December

He is appointed as Professor of Philosophy at the Experimental University Center of Vincennes.

1969

January

Official opening of Vincennes, a test for the university: for the political powers, which had assembled all the key players from literature and the human sciences, and for the student movement, which wants to test the extent of its autonomy. At the first conflict, the police intervene. Foucault takes part in the physical resistance to the police and in the overnight occupation of the buildings. He is arrested and spends the night in a police station with 200 students.

The 19th, Foucault takes part in a tribute to Jean Hyppolite at the École Normale Supérieure, along with Althusser, Suzanne Bachelard, Georges Canguilhem, François Dagognet, Martial Guérault, Michel Henri, Jean Laplanche, Jean-Claude Pariente, and Michel Serres. He writes the foreword for the publication of this tribute by Presses Universitaires de France, in January 1971. He contributes a text, which is his most important on the relation between Nietzsche and genealogy (FDE, no. 67; EW2, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History").

February

The 10th, Foucault is invited to the conference center at the *Mutualité*, to speak at a meeting protesting the expulsion of thirty students from the University. He is very happy to take part as a demonstrator and not as an intellectual. Sartre speaks at this same meeting, but their paths don't cross. Contat and Rybalka report that "At the meeting, Sartre came across a poster which said: 'Sartre, be brief.' The reception Sartre gets from the students at this meeting marks the starting point of Sartre's future development: for the first time he feels that he is directly opposed" (Jean-Paul Sartre, *Œuvres romanesques*, Paris: Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1981, p. xci).

At Vincennes, Foucault gives a course on "Sexuality and Individuality," which develops the research program announced in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* and which covers the history of heredity and of racial hygiene; and another course on "Nietzsche and Genealogy."

The 22nd, gives a talk at the Société Française de Philosophie, at the invitation of Henri Gouhier. He speaks about the function of the author, extending the work of *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. In this text, he makes clear his distance from both Derrida and Barthes. Published in the relatively obscure *Bulletin de la Société de philosophie*, the text is considered to be no different from Barthes' text on the death of the author and has little impact in France, compared to its career within literary theory in the US (FDE, no. 69) [partial translation, LCP, "What is an Author?"; for a later, modified, version, see EW2, "What is an Author?"].

March

The 13th, publication of *L'Archéologie du savoir* [*The Archaeology of Knowledge*] by Galimard. The dry descriptions of things he had said in previous works, and his way of differentiating himself from structuralism all frustrate expectations.

On his invitation to London to give some talks at the French Institute, he learns that the Quai d'Orsay [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] doesn't want him to talk at English universities, because it would be disagreeable if he were to publicly express his disapproval of the regulations governing universities (*Le Nouvel Observateur*, no. 227, March 17–23, 1969; also FDE, no. 65). He refuses to speak about philosophy to the usual audience for cultural relations events and instead opens up a free discussion with the British students about their concrete commitments. It turned out that he was never again to give a talk in England.

April

The 27th, General de Gaulle loses the referendum to promote regionalization and the participation of employees in company ownership, and he resigns.

Foucault's first visit to the university at Buffalo.

May

The 30th and 31st, at a conference on Cuvier, organized by Canguilhem at the Institute for the History of Science, Foucault discusses the problem of the author in scientific disciplines (FDE, no. 77).

July

Along with Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Jacques Le Goff, Gérard Genette, and Michel Serres, he takes part in a radio series on new historical methodologies.

August

The 4th, *Le Nouvel Observateur* reports that *Literatournaïa Gazeta*, journal of the Soviet Writers' Union, criticizes Foucault: "What annoys Foucault about Marxism is its humanism. Being the only source of revolutionary transformation in the world, Marxism is the authentic and real humanism of our time."

November

The 30th, a meeting of the professors of the Collège de France votes to rename the Chair in History of Philosophical Thought, held by Jean Hyppolite, into the Chair in the History of Systems of Thought. Following tradition, the name of the intended appointee to the chair is never mentioned during the vote. The proposal for the chair is presented by Jules Vuillemin: "The philosophical tradition of the project which I am presenting doesn't find its place in the Cartesian theory of the substantial union of thought and extension." Evoking, briefly, the history of concepts, Vuillemin declares: "As for con-

cepts, theoretical books describe them so abstractly that their date and their origin appear to be alien to their nature.” He concludes: “Abandoning dualism and founding a non-Cartesian epistemology demands more: to eliminate the subject while keeping thought; and to try to construct a history without human nature.” The same day a new Chair in Sociology of Civilization is also created. These two projects of course were intended for Foucault and Raymond Aron. Paul Ricœur and Yvon Belaval were also candidates for the chair in philosophy.

December

The 6th and 7th, the journal *L'Évolution psychiatrique* dedicates its annual two-day meeting to criticizing *History of Madness*.

1970

January

The new Minister for Education, Olivier Guichard, refuses to give national recognition to the degree in philosophy from Vincennes. Too many of the courses, he says, are devoted to politics and Marxism (FDE, no. 78).

The 21st, Gallimard publishes *Études de style*, a collection of essays by Leo Spitzer. Foucault translated the essay “Linguistics and Literary History” (*Linguistics and Literary History: Essays in Stylistics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948) under the title “Art du langage et linguistique.”

March

Is invited to the Department of French Literature at the State University of New York, Buffalo, which at the time was the center of French studies in the United States. Has difficulty getting his visa due to past membership of the French Communist Party. Gives talks on the search for the absolute in *Bouvard and Pécuchet*, and on Sade. Donald Bouvard, José Harari, and Eugenio Donato will go on to publish the modified version of “What is an Author?” which he presents there (EW2, “What is an Author?”). Forms friendships with Olga Bernal, head of the Department of French Literature, and with Mark Seem, who goes on to translate Deleuze. American universities are experiencing strong protest movements against research being carried out for the military. Foucault supports the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) movement, which faces many costly court cases. “In short, I haven’t left Paris for a second, not even by one centimeter” (letter). Gives a talk at Yale.

April

A trip through Faulkner country. Goes up through the Mississippi valley as far as Natchez, where he stays at The Elms, an historic home from the Spanish period.

The 12th, Foucault is nominally elected to the Chair in the History of Systems of Thought by a meeting of the professors of the Collège de France. On this occasion, he

publishes “Candidacy Presentation: Collège de France, 1969” (EW2). The Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, which has a consultative role, fails to ratify the vote.

The 30th, a so-called “anti-rioters” law introduces into French law the principle of collective legal responsibility, targeting the organizers of political demonstrations.

May

Writes the preface to the *Œuvres complètes* [Complete Works] of Bataille (FDE, no. 74). Gallimard hopes that the authority of the new professor at the Collège de France will protect it from censorship, which is extremely heavy at this time. For the same reason, Foucault writes in the press in support of *Éden, Éden, Éden* by Pierre Guyotat, which is also published by Gallimard and is prefaced by Michel Leiris, Philippe Sollers, and Roland Barthes (FDE, no. 79).

The 27th, the government dissolves the Gauche Prolétarienne (GP) [Proletarian Left], a Maoist non-Leninist movement which was born out of a fusion of the anti-authoritarian student-led Movement of March 22nd and the UJCML [Union of Communist Marxist-Leninist Youth].

June

In the now underground GP, Daniel Defert joins those who are working to maintain contact with the imprisoned activists and to prepare for their trials.

Publication, in *La Pensée*, of a long article by Althusser on state apparatuses, distinguished according to whether they use violence or ideology. Foucault is critical of this distinction, to which *Discipline and Punish* will later respond extensively.

The 17th, the nomination of Foucault to the Collège de France is ratified by the Minister of Education.

August

The 8th: “I had promised an afterword for the re-publication of *The Order of Things*, but now these things are of no interest to me” (letter). Re-reads Kravtchenko and the American historians of science.

September–October

Invited to Japan, where he is still known only for *The Birth of the Clinic* (translated in 1969) and *Mental Illness and Psychology*, translated in 1970 by Dr. Miyeko Kamiya, a psychiatrist and sister of Professor Maeda, holder of the Chair in French Civilization, both of whom he had met in Paris in 1963–1964. His works on literature had just been introduced by Professor Moriaki Watanabe. Gives three talks: “Manet,” “Madness and Society,” “Return to History.” He visits Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, and Kyoto (FDE, no. 82; EW2, “Madness and Society”; EW2, “Return to History”). He tells Moriaki Watanabe that he is writing a book on systems of punishment and the history of crime in Europe. Mikitaka Nakano, editor of the journal *Paideia*, prepares a special issue on the relation between philosophy and literature in his work. He wants to include an article by

J. Miyakawa on Derrida and Foucault, as well as Derrida's article "Cogito and the History of Madness." Foucault offers to respond to the article by Derrida.

Gallimard repurchases the rights to *History of Madness* and prepares to publish the complete version, which includes Foucault's analysis of the Cartesian "cogito" that had disappeared from the abridged version in 1964. This is the edition that will be translated into Japanese (HM, "Reply to Derrida").

On his return to Paris, Foucault reads the Stoics and Deleuze, who has just published *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense* (EW2, "Theatrum Philosophicum"). He writes a long text on Manet and painting, as well as an unpublished study on Andy Warhol's Marilyn Monroe series.

November

Gives a talk in Florence on Manet's *A Bar at the Folies-Bergère*, a painting which fascinates him as the inverse of *Las Meninas* by Velázquez.

December

The 2nd, inaugural lecture at the Collège de France. Foucault explicitly addresses the question of power and distinguishes between the critical and the genealogical projects.

From now on, every Wednesday at 5:45 p.m., for thirteen sessions a year, there will be a new course each year in which he will explore the hypotheses and the research materials of his future books. To an audience that is international from the start, he announces the theme of this first course as "The Will to Knowledge," which sets up an opposition between two opposing models: those of Aristotle and Nietzsche. On Mondays, at 5:30 p.m., he holds the seminar, which this year focuses on the beginnings of penal psychiatry in the early nineteenth century.

1971

January

Nostalgic for the lost luminosity of the Gulf of Carthage, Foucault moves to the top of a building with large windows at 285 rue de Vaugirard.

February

The 8th, on the occasion of a press conference with lawyers for the Maoist activists who are on hunger strike to obtain the status of political prisoners, Foucault announces the creation of the Groupe d'Information sur les Prisons [Group for Information on the Prisons] (GIP), for which he lists his home as the headquarters. In December 1970, a "popular tribunal," with Sartre as prosecutor, had tried to find out what caused and who was responsible for the mining accident at Fouquières-lès-Lens. Doctors presented evidence about miners suffering from silicosis. Daniel Defert suggested to the *Gauche prolétarienne* that they should convene a similar commission of inquiry into

the situation in the prisons, as a way of expanding awareness of the hunger strike which the activists had begun on January 14th. Foucault enthusiastically agrees to manage the activities. But he completely changes the strategy, removing any appearance of a tribunal, in order to make it into a social movement. He launches what he calls "intolerability inquiries," in which it's a matter of both collecting information about, and revealing, what is intolerable, but also of provoking this intolerability. On the advice of the magistrate Casamayor, he invites Jean-Marie Domenach and the historian Pierre Vidal-Naquet, who had denounced the use of torture during the Algerian War, to lead the project with him (FDE, nos. 86, 87, 88, 90).

The 21st, publication by Gallimard of *L'Ordre du discours* [*The Order of Discourse*], the text of his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, which restores passages that had been shortened or changed due to limitations of time.

The 28th, Foucault is attacked by George Steiner as "the mandarin of the hour," in the *New York Times Book Review*.¹

March–April

Across France, activists from the GIP have questionnaires secretly brought into prisons. Families bring fragments of information obtained from prisoners to Foucault's home.

April

A visit to Montreal, where Foucault is invited by McGill University. He is questioned about his experience with the GIP. Meets activists from the independent Québécois movements, the MDPPQ and the FLQ. Meets Chartrand, Robert Lemieux, and Gagnon and visits Pierre Vallières, author of *Nègres blancs d'Amérique*, in prison.

May

The 1st, Foucault, J.-M. Domenach and around ten members of the GIP are held at the gates of a prison as "agitators." A police officer hits Foucault and shouts: "Heil Hitler!" (FDE, no. 90).

The 20th, invited by his Tunisian friends, Foucault gives a talk on Manet at the Tahar Haddad Club. He makes a vain attempt to influence the authorities in favor of the detained activists.

The 21st, publication of the first pamphlet from the GIP, *Enquête dans vingt prisons* [*Inquiry in Twenty Prisons*], a collection of responses to the questionnaires arranged and prefaced by Foucault, without indication of his name (Champ Libre, "Intolérable" series).

The 29th, the journalist Alain Jaubert, who wanted to accompany an injured person in a police wagon after a demonstration relating to the French West Indies, is himself left bloodied at a hospital and is charged with hitting and injuring an officer. Foucault sets up a commission of inquiry into the facts with Denis Langlois, a lawyer with the Human Rights League, and presents the results of their investigations at a press conference (FDE, nos. 92, 93). The Jaubert case mobilizes journalists who more and more

have to confront police tactics. Creation of the Libération news agency, managed by Maurice Clavel, which will be the embryonic nucleus of the newspaper *Libération*. At the same time as the Jaubert case, Foucault meets Claude Mauriac through Maurice Clavel. There is at this time a convergence between certain left-leaning Gaullists and the extreme left (Claude Mauriac, *Le Temps immobile*, vol. 3).

June

Catherine von Bülow brings Jean Genet to rue Vaugirard; he is preparing a text in defense of the black American activist George Jackson, who has been held at San Quentin and Soledad for eleven years with no release date. Foucault and Genet decide to write the text together and they begin to meet frequently. Catherine von Bülow goes to the United States to visit Jackson and Angela Davis in prison.

In Paris, the “Maoists” want to organize a popular tribunal on the police, on the model of the popular tribunal at Fouquières-lès-Lens. Foucault expresses his disagreement on the question of popular tribunals in a debate with Pierre Victor (alias Benny Lévy), leader of the *Gauche prolétarienne*, and with André Glucksmann, both identified as “Maoists” by *Les Temps modernes* (PK, “On Popular Justice . . .”).

The 18th, the Minister of Justice, René Pleven, protests to the editor of *Le Monde* about the summary of the GIP brochures that had appeared in the newspaper on June 8th. However, he finds no error that would allow the GIP to be pursued in the courts.

July

The daily newspapers and radio are allowed into the prisons, a victory for the GIP, which is becoming popular in detention facilities. On the subject of the prisons, Foucault says: “This new preoccupation has come to me as a real escape from the weariness I was feeling in relation to literature.”

August

At Vendevre, Foucault does research on the history of judicial practices. Re-reads *Journal du voleur* [*The Thief’s Journal*, Jean Genet]. Genet, who says he has never re-read the book, asks anxiously, “Does it hold its own?”

The 10th, Foucault is contacted by lawyers for Christian Riss [a young activist] who had been shot at point-blank range by two police officers outside the Jordanian embassy, which was being attacked by demonstrators. Riss is dumped by the police beside a barrier. Foucault, Clavel, and Domenach hold a press conference. Clavel declares, “The Republic is in danger.” At this event, Foucault meets Thierry Mignon, a lawyer for Iranian dissidents. With Jean Genet, he plans to condemn the lavish celebrations that the shah is preparing in Persepolis.

The 21st, assassination of George Jackson in prison. Catherine von Bülow attends the funeral and, with Genet, Deleuze, Defert, and Foucault, in the collection *Intolérable*, she publishes “L’Assassinat de George Jackson,” a critique of the information released in the US.

September

From the 9th to the 13th, a prison revolt with hostage-taking at Attica prison in New York State.

The 21st and 22nd, in the Clairvaux prison in France, two inmates, Buffet and Bon-temps, take hostage and kill a guard and a nurse. Public opinion, in part, blames the contaminating influence of Attica, which is supposedly due to the flow of information into the prisons. The debate about maintaining the death penalty replaces, in the press, the denunciation of the situation in the prisons. Foucault will speak out publicly several times against the death penalty (FDE, no.113; FL, "The Anxiety of Judging"; EW3, "Governmentality").

October

Publication of *Habits neufs du président Mao* [*The Chairman's New Clothes: Mao and the Cultural Revolution*] by Simon Leys. Foucault is highly receptive to this critique, especially since the death in mysterious circumstances of Lin Biao. Very skeptical, he questions the filmmakers Joris Ivens and Marceline Loridan on their return from China.

The 27th, Djellali Ben Ali, a 15-year-old Algerian, is killed by a building caretaker in the Parisian neighborhood of La Goutte d'Or, in which thousands of North African migrants live. An ordinary crime, or an organized racist crime? The neighborhood ignites under pressure of the Palestine committees, which are jockeying with the Gauche Prolétarienne in an area that is under twenty-four-hour police control.

November

Begins the course "Penal Theories and Institutions" which outlines, from antiquity to the nineteenth century, the juridico-political matrices of certain types of knowledge. From 1970 to 1976, the courses at the Collège de France will constitute a complete series on the development of norms in disciplinary society. The Monday seminar on medico-legal expertise will see the "invention" of Pierre Rivière, a provincial case of parricide from the early nineteenth century, which Foucault had found in the *Annales d'hygiène*. The history of penal psychiatry was always a continuation of *History of Madness*.

The 7th, at La Goutte d'Or, a migrant demonstration on the theme of: "We will avenge Djellali." Foucault comes back from it convinced that the activists want a terrorist response. An armed response or a democratic response: this was a dilemma that the Maoist extreme left, which was the most active at this time, faced in several domains. Foucault regularly expresses his opposition to terrorism.

The 11th, he rents at his own expense the large theater at the Mutualité center, to hold a meeting on the prisons. Several thousand people crowd in to see a film made at Soledad and San Quentin prisons. The families of convicted criminals and former inmates speak in public for the first time.

The 27th, the Gauche Prolétarienne chooses, in this particular case, the "democratic way," which takes the form of a call from the intellectuals to the Arab workers. This is

the occasion for the first meeting, at La Maison Verte, a hall in La Goutte d'Or, of Sartre and Foucault, along with Jean Genet (Claude Mauriac, *Le Temps immobile*, vol. 3, p. 291). This is the occasion from which we have the photo in which can be seen, side by side, Sartre, who is very weak but untouchable by the police, and Foucault, speaking into a loud-hailer, beside Glucksmann and Catherine von Bülow. Foucault, Claude Mauriac, and several other intellectuals lead the Djellali committee, which has the task of leading the inquiry into the existence of a politically organized racism. They open an office in the neighborhood. Genet recounts to the Arabs his experience in the Palestinian camps, but doesn't want to "play at the intellectual by speaking out on French affairs; he prefers to be alongside Palestinians and Black Panthers, who are so much more outcasts that it makes him feel like he is here acting in his capacity as a poet." At the end of December, he distances himself from all this as he moves closer to the Communist Party.

Foucault is invited to Eindhoven by the Dutch Television Foundation for a debate on the question of human nature with Noam Chomsky (MFI, "Human Nature . . ."). Chomsky comments on this interview in *Language and Responsibility* (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1979).

December

The 4th, Foucault takes part in a demonstration by prisoners' families, organized by the GIP, outside the Ministry of Justice at Place Vendôme, against the collective punishments applied to inmates in reprisal for the events at Clairvaux. These reprisals and this external support are the starting point of thirty-five prison revolts during the winter of 1971–72. Notably at Toul, then at Nancy, which Foucault visits. A small group of Maoists around Robert Linhart, disagreeing with Foucault's supposed "ultra-left" positions, elicits more and more rebuttals from Sartre on the question of the prisons.

The 9th to the 13th, riots follow one after another at Ney de Toul prison. Foucault investigates the rituals of violence that distinguish the forms of rebellion undertaken by young and old inmates.

The 10th, release of the second GIP pamphlet, *Le GIP enquête dans une prison modèle: Fleury-Mérogis* [*The GIP Investigates in a Model Prison: Fleury-Mérogis*], produced by Jacques-Alain Miller and François Régnauld (Champ Libre).

The 16th, at a press conference in Toul, Foucault reads a deposition by Dr. Édith Rose a prison psychiatrist, "on what she has seen and heard during the exercise of her functions." For Foucault, this deposition is typical of the action of a specific intellectual (FDE, no. 99).

1972

January

The 5th, Foucault takes part in another meeting at Toul. Sartre sends a message denouncing the "regime which keeps us in a concentrationist universe" (*Le Monde*). The

15th, revolt at the prison in Nancy. Commenting on the history of the GIP, Foucault tells the *Nouvel Observateur*: “We had arrived with our questions on the cold and hunger, and the prisoners responded with other ones, those same questions which are today at the heart of the revolts and the demands: working conditions, legal protection of inmates inside prisons, the right to information, release and the abolition of the police record” (*Le Nouvel Observateur*, January 17, 1972, special issue: *Les Prisons de Plevén*).

The 18th, with Sartre, Michelle Vian – who now helps to maintain friendly relations between Sartre and the GIP, with whom she is an activist – Deleuze, Claude Mauriac, Jean Chesnaux, Alain Jaubert, a total of about forty people, Foucault organizes a sit-in in the lobby of the Ministry of Justice, in order to have the demands coming from different prisons heard.

February

The 25th, killing of the Maoist militant Pierre Overney by a security guard at the Renault factories in Billancourt. During the demonstration held that evening, Foucault is questioned by the police. In the following days, he drives Sartre to the factories in Billancourt once or twice. The 26th, a day of protests by the GIP at Nancy with men and women who had been imprisoned for supporting the Algerian National Liberation Front. They write: “The current revolt by a mass of prisoners, largely made up of young people who are sent to prison mostly because of social injustice, this revolt, we support it, we ask everybody to support it and we personally undertake to work beside these inmates to achieve their demands and to gain the dignity to which all people have a right, even when they are in prison” (*Le Nouvel Observateur*, March 6, 1972). The police crack down hard on the demonstrators.

March

The 8th, the Nouvelle Résistance Prolétarienne (NRP) [New Proletarian Resistance], an underground branch of the Gauche Prolétarienne, kidnaps a Renault executive in reprisal for the killing of Overney. There seems now to be a serious risk of terrorism in France.

Republication of *The Birth of the Clinic*, without the terms, concepts, and turns of phrase which had encouraged a structuralist interpretation, and with a marked attention given to the analysis of discursive formations.

Publication of *Anti-Oedipus*, the first volume of Deleuze and Guattari’s *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Foucault jokes to Deleuze: “We have to get rid of Freudo-Marxism.” Deleuze replies: “I’m taking care of Freud, will you deal with Marx?” In a special issue of *L’Arc* (no. 49) dedicated to Gilles Deleuze, there is a discussion in which the two philosophers focus on the question of power, which is becoming one of the major themes of political debate (FL, “Intellectuals and Power”).

Several groups are established on the model of the GIP: Group for Information on Health (GIS), Group for Information on Asylum (GIA), and later, Group for Information and Support for Migrant Workers (GISTI). Foucault works with the GIS on a manifesto on medicine. The Maoists set up truth and justice committees around a number of legal cases, thus replacing the plan for a tribunal on police bans.

Foucault returns to Buffalo and is greatly struck by the economic downturn and unemployment. Becomes interested in the political history of the New Deal. His American seminars are on “The Will to Truth in Ancient Greece: Hesiod, Homer, the Forms of Trial in the *Iliad*, *Oedipus the King* by Sophocles, and *The Bacchae* by Euripides,” and on the history of money.

April

The 7th, a talk in Minneapolis on “Cérémonie, théâtre et politique au XVII siècle” [“Ceremony, Theatre, and Politics in the 17th Century”] at the Fourth Annual Conference on 17th-Century Literature.

The 21st, he visits Attica prison (FL, “On Attica”) with J. K. Simon, a professor at Buffalo, and meets the Attica Defense Committee. He points out not only the repressive but also the productive functions of carceral power.

The GIP publishes *Cahiers de revendication sortis des prisons* [List of Demands from the Prisons], which carries out the transformation from revolt to a discourse of political demands. This list is prepared by Hélène Cixous and Jean Gattégno.

May

A series of discussions, up until September, on the history of community facilities; with the Centre d’Études, de Recherches et de Formation Institutionnelles (CERFI) [Centre for Institutional Study, Research and Training], which is run by Félix Guattari.

June

Republication by Gallimard, in the “Bibliothèques des Histoires” series, of the complete version of *History of Madness*, minus its original preface (HM, xxvii–xxxvi). Deleuze convinces Foucault to include the previously published “Madness, the Absence of an *Œuvre*” (HM, 541–549); to which he adds a rewritten version of the reply to Derrida which he had presented in Japan the previous year (HM, “My Body, This Paper . . .,” 550–574).

The 8th, trial of the Nancy revolt participants. The national press says: “It’s a trial of the penitentiary situation.” The extreme left press denounces Foucault: “The immortal author of the *History of Madness*, who as if by chance comes to us from Warsaw” (*Minute*). Ariane Mnouchkine transcribes the closing arguments of the trial and the Théâtre du Soleil mounts a dramatization, which is also staged in workers’ dormitories. Foucault and Deleuze play the roles of police officers.

Foucault is dismayed at the growing moralism which invades political discourse, especially in relation to the crime at Bruay-en-Artois, around which the Maoists mount a political campaign in April. Foucault goes there and speaks to the miners. He doesn’t publish anything. He meets François Ewald, who is teaching philosophy at Bruay, and who will become his assistant at the Collège de France from 1977.

September

Meets with Genet, who recounts his memories of Mettray [reformatory], while he is working on his “book about punishment” (*Discipline and Punish*).

October

At the invitation of the Department of Romance Studies at Cornell University, he gives talks on “Knowledge in Sophocles’ *Oedipus the King*,” on “Literature and Crime,” and on “The Punitive Society.”

Publication of a special issue of *La Nef* (no. 49), which, in the guise of an anti-medicine manifesto, publishes a summary of a roundtable discussion between the GIS and Michel Foucault. The GIS specifies that, like the other information groups, its objectives are: to uncover the secret which consolidates certain power structures; to break down the distance between researchers and subjects in the doctor–patient relation; and to oppose medicine for profit.

November

The 6th, beginning of the seminar on “Pierre Rivière and his Works” at the Collège de France: a collaborative effort to prepare the documents for publication.

The 24th, Foucault chairs a meeting at the Olympic Ice Stadium in Grenoble; in front of 1,500 people, he accuses certain members of the “underworld,” whom the militants of the Red Aid organization found it too dangerous to name, saying they are probably implicated in the racket-related burning of a dance hall, in which a large number of young people had died (FDE, nos. 112, 113).

December

The GIP decides to dissolve itself.

The 8th, publication of the first issue of the journal of the Comité d’Action des Prisonniers (CAP) [Prisoners’ Action Committee]. The released leaders of the recent prison revolts set up this first ever French organization of inmates. Foucault stays in the background. The autonomy of speech has been achieved: “For too long we have asked delinquents for their recollections, not their ideas.” At the same time, Dominique Éluard, Vercors, and Jean-Marie Domenach, with the support of Deleuze and Foucault, set up the Association de Défense des Droits des Détenus (ADDD) [Association for the Defense of the Rights of Inmates].

The 16th, a demonstration along the Grand Boulevards after the killing of Mohammed Diab, a migrant worker, in a police station in Versailles. Genet, Mauriac, and Foucault, who called for the demonstration, are once again arrested and, manhandled by the police, they spend a part of the night at Beaujon Hospital (Claude Mauriac, *Le Temps immobile*, vols. 2, 3, 9). Mauriac felt that the press spoke too much about the blows they had received, but Foucault responded: “We should say that we were hit more so that the Arabs would be hit less. We have to shout for the Arabs who cannot make themselves heard” (Claude Mauriac, *Le Temps immobile*, vol. 3, p. 430).

Foucault embarks on an analysis of power relations on the basis of “the most condemned form of war: not Hobbes, not Clausewitz, not the class struggle, but civil war” (letter).

Release of the film *Les Prisonniers aussi* [*Prisoners Also*], made by René Lefort and Hélène Châtelain for the GIP.

The 29th, a new law increases the role of judges in the oversight of the enforcement of punishments and allows certain convictions to be excluded from the police record. The abolition of the police record had been a demand of the GIP.

Foucault takes part in setting up the new newspaper *Libération*. He suggests the inclusion of a chronicle of workers' history in relation to contemporary events, and a column devoted to the gay movement (Claude Mauriac, *Le Temps immobile*, vol. 3, p. 422).

1973

January

Publication of the fourth GIP pamphlet, *Suicides dans les prisons en 1972* [*Suicides in the Prisons in 1972*] (Gallimard, "Intolérable" series), collected and introduced by Gilles Deleuze.

The 3rd, first lecture of the course on "The Punitive Society" (initially called, "The Disciplinary Society"), in which Foucault contrasts societies of exclusion with societies of internment.

February

At the request of Ahmed Baba Miské – later spokesperson for Polisario [the Western Sahara Liberation Front] – Foucault agrees to be the nominal editor of the journal *Tempête*, later *Zone des tempêtes*, in order to protect it from censorship (FDE, no. 121).

The 22nd, for the first issues of *Libération*, Foucault conducts a discussion with José Duarte, a sacked activist worker from the Renault-Billancourt factory (FDE, nos. 117, 123).

March

Writes a preface for an exhibition by the painter Rebeyrolle, whom he admires.² From his contacts with the Maeght Gallery, there emerges the idea of a study of Picasso's *Las Meninas*. The text was not published.

The 8th, in Claude Mauriac's words: "This is the first time I've handed out leaflets in the streets. Foucault replied, laughing, 'Me too'." They are handing out fliers for the Comité d'Action des Prisonniers (Claude Mauriac, *Le Temps immobile*, vol. 3).

The 12th, setback for the Union de la Gauche in the legislative elections.

Appearance of a pirated edition of fragments of the course on "The Punitive Society," a practice that begins to develop overseas also.

April

Foucault once again takes up the study – which he had begun while working on *History of Madness* – of the *lettres de cachet* at the Arsenal library.

The 2nd, writes the preface for Serge Livrozet's book, *De la prison à la révolte* (FDE, no. 116). Finishes a first draft of the book on prisons (*Discipline and Punish*).

May

Series of talks in Montreal ("It hardly seems like the restive Quebec of 1971") and in New York, where he works on Colquhoun and Bentham in the New York Public Library, "a library with nearly all the dead people in the world in the middle of a city with nearly all the living ones" (letter).

From the 21st to the 25th, visits the Pontifical Catholic University (PUC) in Rio de Janeiro. Some of his talks are published later under the title "Truth and Juridical Forms" (EW3). Has meetings with doctors and psychiatrists to discuss the history of social medicine. On this occasion, he sketches a history of hysteria. His Brazilian friends convinced him of the political action that could be taken on the basis of social medicine and of the nefarious influence of the American psychologist B. F. Skinner on their Brazilian colleagues – some of whom were collaborating with the police. Forms a connection with the philosopher and epistemologist Roberto Machado. The 30th, gives a talk at Belo Horizonte on psychiatric institutions, then visits some towns in Minas Gerais, and makes a long voyage down the Amazon from Manaus to Belém, a town for which he is to remain very nostalgic.

July

In Besançon, visits the Lip factory, which has been taken over by worker-management, a development seen as a continuation of the anti-authoritarian movement of the years 1968–1972. Foucault declares to his companions: "This isn't about an anti-authoritarian struggle, it's about unemployment." He visits the Ledoux saltworks at Arc-et-Senans (PK, "The Eye of Power"). In Vendeuvre, he gets back to work on his "book about punishments: the great technologies of individualization: clinical medicine, psychiatry, pedagogy, criminology" (letter).

August

The 10th, death of Jean Barraqué. Foucault has only seen him once since the 1950s.

September

Publication of the documents that were collected, studied, and annotated by participants in Foucault's Collège de France seminar, *Moi, Pierre Rivière . . .* [*I, Perre Rivière . . .*] (Gallimard-Julliard, "Archives" series). This book is a huge success, owing to the popularity at the time of provincial ethnologies.

October

The 12th, the Gauche Prolétarienne dissolves itself discreetly, thus marking the end of one form of leftism.

He is summoned by the judicial police as a co-responsible for the GIS leaflet *Oui, nous avortons* [*Yes, We Abort*], which argued in favor of the legalization of abortion (EW3, "Summoned to Court").

Sponsors two studies by CERFI, which is run by Félix Guattari, on the genealogy of normalizing facilities (in health and education) (EW3, “The Politics of Health . . .”); and on the analysis of the role of urban facilities in town planning (see, the *Annuaire du Centre coordinateur de la recherche urbaine pour la France* [*Journal of the Coordinating Centre for Urban Research in France*], 1973–74)

Publication of *Ceci n'est pas une pipe* [*This is Not a Pipe*] by the Fata Morgana press in Montpellier, a reissue of the homage to Magritte, along with two letters from the painter (Foucault's letters were sold with Magritte's studio, in London, in July 1987).

December

The journal of CERFI, *Recherches*, dedicates a special issue to “Équipements du pouvoir” [“Power Apparatuses”], a summary of the studies carried out under its influence.

1974

January

Explains to K. S. Karol, a journalist who had been imprisoned in the Soviet camps, his perplexity about China (FDE, nos. 133, 134).

Begins the course on “Psychiatric Power” and the seminar which will alternate its focus between eighteenth-century hospital architecture and medico-legal expertise in psychiatry since 1850.

March–April

Gives talks at the University of Montreal. In his apartment at Côte-des-Neiges [Montreal], he rewrites several parts of his “book on punishment.”

April

The 25th, the Portuguese Movement of the Armed Forces overthrows the regime of Marcel Caetano. The French intelligentsia warmly welcomes the so-called “carnation revolution.” Foucault, for his part, doesn't make the trip to Portugal (Claude Mauriac, *Le Temps immobile*, vol. 3, p. 531).

The 26th, the journal *Recherches* is prosecuted for “affront to decency by means of a book,” for having published the *Grande Encyclopédie des homosexualités* [*Grand Encyclopedia of Homosexualities*]. Deleuze and Foucault are called as witnesses. Foucault declares, from the stand: “When will homosexuality receive the same rights of expression as so-called normal sexuality?” (FDE, no. 138).

May

The 19th, election of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing as President of the Republic. The new president wants to inaugurate a “de-escalation” of political life, which he wants to extend also to relations with the intellectuals. Lucie Faure, first of all, and then Lionel

Stoléro, try to organize a meeting for him with Foucault, but Foucault continues to refuse.

June

Publication of the French translation of *The Gulag Archipelago* by Solzhenitsyn.

July

Apart from renewed prison revolts, social unrest is no longer so violent. Alain Badiou's very small Maoist group tries to move the struggle to the ideological domain, especially to film. Foucault contributes to this debate in *Les Cahiers du cinéma* (FL, "Film and Popular Memory"). He is very enthusiastic about the new German cinema (Schroeter, Sylberg, and Fassbinder). He had wanted Werner Schroeter to make a film of *Pierre Rivière*. He spends time with the Swiss director Daniel Schmidt, and he meets Fassbinder.

The 29th, a press release signed by Jean-Marie Domenach, Michel Foucault, and Claude Mauriac on behalf of the ADDD calls on the government to "discuss in the open the penitentiary system": "Four years ago the problem of the prisons was brought before the public by the political prisoners' strikes during the winter of 1970–1971. For four years, in relation to all these revolts, the authorities have blamed outside interference. They have arrested or questioned those 'responsible.' For four years, they have tried to stop the truth from emerging and have driven out the doctors and chaplains who, as at Toul, had the courage to speak. Nothing has changed today, not even the men who were responsible for the inertia back then and promise reforms now" (*Le Monde*, no. 9186, July 28–29).

August

The 26th, in Vendœuvre, Foucault finishes his book "on punishment." "My outcasts are incredibly familiar and repetitive. I want to work on other things: political economy, strategy, politics" (letter). René Allio, the filmmaker, suggests making a film of *Pierre Rivière*.

September

Discussion with legal practitioners on the intrusion of the human sciences into the judicial world (FL, "White Magic . . ."). The Veil law (January 17, 1975) legalizes the termination of pregnancy under some circumstances.

October–November

Organizes two seminars in Rio de Janeiro on "Urbanization and Public Health" and "Genealogy of Psychoanalysis within Psychiatric Practice in the 19th Century." He gives six talks, one of which, on nineteenth-century psychiatry, is given in the context of a course on social medicine at the State University. Only some of these talks have been published (EW3, "The Birth of . . .").³ "It's a matter of conducting an historical discourse, coded, the only way possible. To all appearances, things are harder now than last year, the recession is very worrying; people working in social medicine tell me that

you can't understand anything unless you see what kind of life those 26 million people (of the north-east) are living" (letter). He goes to Recife.

1975

January

The 6th, recommencement of the seminar, which he tries to restrict to a small number of researchers, on medico-legal expertise in psychiatric affairs; he plans to turn this into a publication. Broaches the question of "dangerousness" (EW 3, "About the Concept . . ."). Works on the Charcot archives at the Salpêtrière. On Wednesday the 8th, at 5:45 p.m., begins the course entitled "The Abnormals" on the annexation of abnormality by psychology.

February

Writes the catalogue essay for an exhibition by the painter Gérard Fromanger, who had just come back from China; on this occasion he did extensive research on the relation between painting and photography at the end of the nineteenth century, work which carried on the analyses of the image which he undertook around Manet.⁴

The 25th, his lecture at the Collège de France focuses on the Christian characterization of the body as flesh.

Publication of *Surveiller et punir, naissance de la prison* [*Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*], in the "Bibliothèque des Histoires" series at Gallimard. From now on, Foucault's political activities begin to influence the reception of his books. The historian Jacques Revel, writes in *Le Magazine littéraire* (no. 150): "We knew about his political engagements, his activities in the GIP. People were sort of expecting a militant book, but I'd say they are disappointed . . . The militancy of this book is not at all where one would have thought it to be. This is where, no doubt, the detour through history finds its critical function." There follows something of a silence on the part of historians. The left, which is attached to the central place given to the state in Marxist analysis, is cautious about the idea of micro-powers; they reproach the book for its nihilist vision, where there is room for neither resistance nor freedom. They denounce the inevitability of social control, the futility of the idea of reintegration, and the role played by the human sciences, as well as the book's more radical critique – even more radical than *History of Madness* – of the reforming measures of the Enlightenment. The book quickly gains an international audience.

March

The 5th, the Collège de France lecture focuses on the Christian technology of the government of individuals.

April

Foucault begins to spend time with Ilios Yannakakis. Having been a member of the Communist Party in Greece and Czechoslovakia, he teaches Foucault about the different dissident intellectual groups in eastern Europe (FDE, no. 155).

The 7th, *Le Nouvel Observateur* publishes a feature on “The High Priests of French Academia”: Lacan, Barthes, Lyotard, Foucault. “At the Collège de France, the old lecture theater, which doesn’t seem to have changed since Bergson’s time, is black with people, including the platform. When Foucault enters the arena, quickly, briskly, like somebody diving into water, he climbs over bodies to get to his chair, pushes back the microphone to make space for his papers, takes off his jacket, turns on the lamp and starts, at a hundred miles an hour. His voice is strong and clear, relayed by loudspeakers, which is the only concession to modernity in a room that is barely brightened by the dim light coming from stucco lamp shades. There are 300 seats and 500 people, crowded together, filling up the smallest free space. Foucault explains: “I promised myself I would address the concerns of the present. This year, I will explain how the notion of the abnormal has developed over the centuries. Next year, I think I will talk about political thought relating to the military. I always try to talk about subjects that can serve a maximum number of people. I provide them with tools which they can use later on in any way they please in their own fields, whether they are psychiatrists, psychologists, doctors, teachers, or whatever” (*Le Nouvel Observateur*, no. 543: 54).

April–May

First trip to California, at the invitation of Leo Bersani in the Department of French Literature at Berkeley. Two, unpublished, talks have been preserved: “Discourse and Repression” and “Infantile Sexuality before Freud.” He is invited to the universities at Irvine and Claremont. His interview with Deleuze, which is translated in the journal *Telos*, attracts many students (FL, “Intellectuals and Power”). Discovers the hedonistic culture developed by Californians around drugs, takes LSD at Zabriskie Point in Death Valley: “Drugs: a break with this physics of power, work, consumption, localization” (letter). He is fascinated by those small communities – Zen, vegetarian, feminist, homosexual – which produce styles of existence that he approaches with the same curiosity with which Max Weber had, in the past, approached the analysis of American sects.

On his return, Foucault resents the need to explain his career path in a book of interviews he is working on with the journalist Roger-Pol Droit. Disappointed, Foucault soon cancels the project, which he had hoped would be closer to a dialogue than an interview.

September

The filmmaker René Allio, whose film *Les Camisards* (1972) Foucault had liked, begins filming *Pierre Rivière* at the scene of the crime in Normandy, using people from the area. The stage has already captured *Pierre Rivière*, which has been played in many theaters. Foucault: “We’ve found an amazing boy, who lives alone . . . writes a journal” (referring to Claude Hébert). Claude Mauriac: “And who you are going to incite...” Foucault: “No, his mother is dead” (*Le Temps immobile*, vol. 3, p. 531). Foucault plays the role of a judge in the extended version, which was never released.

The 19th, Catherine von Bülow asks Foucault to take action against the imminent execution of eleven Spaniards who were fighting against the Franco regime. They prepare a protest in Madrid, with Jean Daniel, Régis Debray, Claude Mauriac, Costa-

Gavras, Jean Lacouture, Laudouze, a Dominican priest, and Yves Montand. According to Claude Mauriac (*Le Temps immobile*, vol. 3, p. 546), Foucault writes the following manifesto: "Eleven men and women have been condemned to death. They were condemned by special courts in which they were not granted the right to justice. Not the justice which demands proof before being condemned. Not the justice which gives the accused the right to defend themselves. Not the justice which guarantees the protection of law, no matter how serious the crime. Not the justice which protects the sick, or which prohibits the abuse of prisoners. In Europe, we have always fought for this justice." The signatories include Malraux, who had once been condemned to death in Spain, Pierre Mendès France, Louis Aragon, Jean-Paul Sartre, and François Jacob. Régis Debray has the manifesto translated into Spanish by Santiago Carillo, leader of the Spanish Communist Party.

The 22nd, at the Madrid Tower Hotel, Yves Montand reads the manifesto at a press conference. Plain-clothes police officers expel the journalists at gunpoint, take away the seven-member French delegation in a police van, and deport them from Spain. The international press meet them at Roissy airport [Paris]. Many demonstrations take place in towns all around France and overseas, but without managing to stop the execution of the militants.

The 27th, on the night of the demonstration outside the Spanish embassy in Paris, a Spanish student asks Foucault to give a talk on Marx. Foucault explodes: "Don't talk to me about Marx any more. I never want to hear that guy's name again. Go talk to the people who make that their trade. Who are paid for that. Who are the bureaucrats of that. As for me, I have completely finished with Marx" (Claude Mauriac, *Le Temps immobile*, vol. 3, p. 581).

The 29th, the appearance in *Le Nouvel Observateur* (no. 568, p. 41) of an appeal from the seven-member delegation: "Send a copy of the manifesto to every address in Spain that you happen to know." In the editorial of this issue, Jean Daniel writes: "When the seven friends organized this little commando operation in Madrid . . . they didn't know at the time that France had opposed a Dutch resolution to make representations to Franco. The press release that announced the departure for Madrid of our seven friends must have gone all around the world . . . It must have been read at the Élysée Palace by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. In a matter of minutes, France's position had changed. These seven intellectuals had succeeded, beyond their own expectations, in moving nine European countries to support the Spanish opposition."

October–November

Return to the University of São Paulo (October 5 – November 18): he gives talks on psychiatrization and anti-psychiatry. "Freud and Marx endlessly. Political activism is carried out by former union leaders and intellectuals" (letter). October 29th, a journalist called Herzog is killed in a São Paulo police station. At the university, Foucault reads a leaflet about this murder written by the students. A strike is held. Foucault has the feeling that he is being followed all the time. The French diplomatic service informs him that it is them, in order to protect him. Returns to New York, where he stays once again at the Roosevelt Hotel. "New York is unbearable after Brazil."

November

The 19th, at Columbia University he takes part in a debate on “Medicine, Violence, and Psychiatry”: “Forgive this digression which appears to be speaking only incidentally about mental hospitals and not about medicine at all. Except that a new character has been introduced in this new technique, which is now constantly present in the ritual of torture: the doctor. At doctor is now present at practically all the important tortures. His role is first of all to say what torture will be most effective, and, secondly, to give medical examinations to make sure that the patient is not a heart case, for example, and at risk of dying. Thirdly, the doctor administers various kinds of injections to revive the patient so that he can physically withstand the torture and, at the same time, suffer it psychologically in the harshest manner” (text established by Sylvère Lotringer and John Rajchman).⁵

Makes a proposal to the Collège de France that a Chair in Literary Semiology be established for Roland Barthes.

December

Publication in the journal *Cinématographe* of an interview on Pasolini’s film *Salò*. “A young man, Gérard Dupont, came and said: if you give me this interview I will get 500 francs. So I gave it to him, I said anything at all so he would get his 500 francs . . . I took the opportunity to finally say what I had on mind about Sade” (Claude Mauriac, *Un Certain Rage*, Paris, Grasset, 1977, pp. 34–35; EW2, “Sade: Sargeant of Sex”).

The 11th, in his review of *Discipline and Punish*, Gilles Deleuze emphasizes the role of political struggles between the writing of *The Archaeology of Knowledge* and this book: ‘A writer, no, a new cartographer’” (*Critique*, no. 343).

The 18th, Foucault takes part in a demonstration in favor of the creation of a labor union for soldiers.

1976

January

The 7th, first lecture of this year’s course, entitled “Society Must Be Defended.” From now on the lectures take place at 9:30 a.m., in order to discourage an excessively large audience. Foucault announces that he wants to bring to an end five years of research in which power mechanisms have been treated as mechanisms of repression. He tests the hypothesis that war is a model on which one can understand power relations. Meets the dissident Leonid Plioutch, who has arrived in Paris. The journalist K. S. Karol tells him he thinks it’s an urgent matter to dissociate the world of socialism from repressive Soviet society. Foucault replies: “I tell you, I wouldn’t even go that far any more.”

In his lecture on the 14th, Foucault says that “for roughly the last five years, it has been the disciplines; for the next five years it will be war, struggle, the army . . . Power can only be exercised through the production of truth.”⁶ Pasquale Pasquino and Alessandro Fontana undertake the translation of these two lectures, which appear in Italian

in a collection called *Microfisica del potere* [*Microphysics of Power*] (PK, “Two Lectures”). Some earlier texts, on justice, psychiatry, and medicine, were published in Germany under the same title (*Mikrophysik der Macht*, Berlin: Merve Verlag).

February

The 4th, supports a petition that was signed by a large number of intellectuals and the leaders of the Socialist Party, denouncing the French authorities’ silence on the violation of human rights in Iran.

March

The 29th, a talk at the University of Montreal during a week dedicated to discussing alternatives to the prison. “To the question about an alternative to the prison, one has to reply with an initial misgiving, an initial doubt or an initial burst of laughter, as you will; and what if we didn’t want to be punished by them or for those reasons or if we didn’t want to be punished at all? What if, after all, we couldn’t really tell what it means to punish?” (unpublished typescript). He announces his intention of writing a book on military institutions. Stops over in New York, from which he returns, according to Claude Mauriac, preoccupied with relations between the US and Europe.

May

Gives talks at Berkeley and Stanford.

June

A long interview with Alessandro Fontana and Pasquale Pasquino on the political significance of his works before and after 1968. This interview is included in *Microfisica del potere* (Turin: Einaudi, 1977) (EW3, “Truth and Power”).

July

Works with Michelle Perrot and Jean-Pierre Barouh on a republication of Bentham’s *Panopticon* (FL, “The Eye of Power”). Asks the Collège de France for a one-year sabbatical in 1976–77.

August

At Vendeuve, he finishes *The Will to Knowledge* (HS1). “I’m trying to draft the introduction using the *lettres de cachet*. For many years I thought I knew what I wanted to say, but the moment I try to retrieve it I realize it’s all gone” (EW3, “Lives of Infamous Men”). “I’ve been thinking again about studying political contestation in relation to knowledge and scientific institutions, from Oppenheimer to Chomsky in the US and the contemporary USSR” (letter). Considers moving to the Wilson Center in Washington, to which he has been invited.

November

The 1st, gives a talk in the Department of Philosophy at Bahia University [Brazil]. A critique of the juridical conception of power, of Marx and Freud, of social democracy,

and of state involvement in the field of sexuality. "Everybody is talking to me about the doe-eyed parricide (Pierre Rivière), I really like that, he's famous all around the world" (letter).

Another trip to Belém and to Recife with Roberto Machado. "You suddenly see this South American poverty which is completely different from what you see in the towns. You have the feeling that it goes on for thousands of kilometers."

December

Publication of *La Volonté de savoir* [*The Will to Knowledge*], the first volume of *Histoire de la sexualité* [*The History of Sexuality*, volume 1: *An Introduction*]. Foucault had conceived of this book as a manifesto in which it was a matter of taking a stand. As with *Discipline and Punish*, he frustrates public expectations, this time by criticizing the repressive hypothesis, which was dear to the liberation movements. The book is presented as an introduction to a six-volume history of sexuality, but Foucault confides that he doesn't intend to write them. He envisages changing his mode of writing: that form of rather anonymous speech, shrouded in the Pierre Rivière documents, had captivated him. This is how he wants to deal with hermaphroditism, or the question of true sex, using the documents about the Alexina B. case that he found in the *Annales d'hygiène*.

Also in 1975 Foucault had asked Gallimard to give an advance of 200,000 francs to René Allio so he could make the film *Pierre Rivière*. The publisher's lawyer had forced Foucault, who at the time had no additional obligations to them, to sign an exclusive contract of five years' duration. So Foucault decided that his next book (which was *The History of Sexuality*, volume 1: *An Introduction*), would be very short and that he wouldn't write another one for five years (something that many people have interpreted as a crisis in his thought).

1977

January

The 15th, publication of *La Vie des hommes infâmes*, which is an anthology of prison records from the Hospital at the Bastille, in *Les Cahiers du chemin*, Georges Lambrichs' journal: "Brief and strident words which the most unsubstantial creatures exchange with power" (EW3, "The Lives of Infamous Men"). From this anthology the project turns into a series, with the publication of the Herculine Barbin memoir by Gallimard (FDE, no. 223).

The 24th, talking about *History of Sexuality*, volume 1, *L'Express* writes: "This torch of progressive thought, at the forefront of the campaign for sexual liberation and the lifting of sexual repression, declares 'We're fed up with sex' . . . First of all, we have to swallow and digest this shock." Gilles Deleuze thought that the book increased the distance between them, even more than the episode of the *nouveaux philosophes*, which occurred at the same time and in which Deleuze had taken part (*Minuit*, no. 24, May 1977). He felt that Foucault thought he was hostile to his work and that Foucault was

moving in a new direction for which he needed support that he couldn't find in Deleuze. In fact, the *History of Sexuality*, volume 1, was more enthusiastically received in the feminist and gay movements than it was in intellectual circles. It is possible that this made Foucault even more attentive to what was emerging in these movements.

Writes the preface to Mark Seem's English translation of *Anti-Oedipus* (EW3, "Preface . . .").

In the US, a huge interest in Foucault's work develops with the translation of *Discipline and Punish*. Publication of *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, Selected Essays and Interviews by Michel Foucault* (Cornell University Press), edited by Donald Bouchard. This is a collection of texts from the period 1962–1972 on the relations between discourse, language, and literature.

February

The 8th, along with David Cooper he signs an appeal written by Victor Fainberg and the journal *Change* for the release of Vladimir Borissov from the special psychiatric hospital in Leningrad (PPC, "Confinement . . .").

March

In Moscow, publication of a translation of *The Order of Things*, which quickly enjoys a semi-alternative distribution throughout the Soviet bloc. The reception of the book is facilitated by the teaching of the Georgian philosopher Merab Mamardachvili.

The 23rd, the man who had killed Pierre Overney is executed by the Armed Nuclei for Popular Autonomy (NAPAP), which relaunches the debate about terrorism in France.

April

The left wins the municipal elections. Worried about a victory in the national elections, which it doesn't want, the French Communist Party urges a renewal of the Common Program for government.

The journal *Annales historiques de la Révolution française* publishes a series of historical studies of the prisons, which opens with a critique of *Discipline and Punish* by the historian Jacques Léonard. This provides an opportunity for a debate with the historians. Foucault will respond to this in "La Poussière et le nuage" ["Dust and Clouds"] (FDE, no. 277).

May

Writes the review of André Glucksmann's *Maitres penseurs* [Master Thinkers] for *Le Nouvel Observateur* (FDE, no. 204). Former leftists seem to be abandoning Marxism one by one. In an article in *Nouvelles littéraires* on June 10, 1976, their leader, Bernard-Henri Levy, groups them together under the name that is on everybody's lips: the *nouveaux philosophes*.

The 12th, the commission for the reform of the Penal Code invites Foucault to give his opinion on the articles of the Code that relate to sexuality.

The 19th, Foucault takes part in a retreat for the Magistrates Trade Union in Goutelas. With the possibility that the left could come to power in March 1978, Foucault criticizes the increased role of social regulation that the Socialist Party wants to give to judges and to the judiciary – as expressed in *Liberté, libertés* (1976), a collection edited by Robert Badinter.

June

The 17th to the 19th, at the Socialist Party convention in Nantes, Michel Rocard presents his distinction between two political cultures on the left: one, Jacobine, state-centered, accepting the alliance with the communists; the other, decentralizing and regionalist, refusing the alliance, and which will soon be called the “second left.”

The 21st, Leonid Brezhnev is welcomed to France by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, at the same time as the dissident movement is more and more in the news. André Glucksmann and Pierre Victor, Sartre's blind secretary, ask Foucault to organize a counter-demonstration. They invite the public to meet the dissidents from eastern Europe at the Récamier Theater. The invitation is given by Barthes, Bourseiller, Daix, Glucksmann, Foucault, Jacob, Mauriac, Sartre, and Schwartz. The dissidents include Leonid Plioutch, Dr. Stern, Vladimir Boukovski, Andreï Amalrik, and Natalia Gorbanevskaiia. Alexandre Galitch, accompanied by his guitar, retells, in Russian, stories that go around the Gulag from camp to camp. Solzhenitsyn had refused to take part in a demonstration with Sartre.

Foucault takes part in a street demonstration and a meeting at Pleyel Hall in support of the dissident Armenian filmmaker Parajdanov.

July

The 4th, a television broadcast on TF1 of a program on Maurice Clavel, who had invited to his house in Vézelay the *nouveaux philosophes*, as well as Philippe Sollers and Foucault.

Foucault signs a manifesto organized by Félix Guattari and twenty-eight French intellectuals against the repression of Italian “autonomist” workers who were described by Berlinguer as “untorelli,” or “plague-carriers,” during violent protests in Bologna. Nevertheless, Foucault doesn't take part in the protests that follow, in order not to appear to be supporting terrorism.

Einaudi publishes *Microfisica del potere*, translated into Brazilian and into German under the title *Dispositive der Macht*. These political texts will circulate widely amongst the “autonomist” groups in Italy and the “alternative” groups in Germany and will influence the political reception of Foucault's work. These texts appear in Australia under the title *Power, Truth, Strategy* (Sydney: Feral, 1979) and in the US under the title *Power/Knowledge* (New York: Pantheon, 1980).

August

Vendeuvre. Foucault writes on the Church Fathers. He goes to Bayreuth for the centenary *Ring*, produced by Patrice Chéreau and directed by Pierre Boulez, by whom he was invited.

September

Takes part in a “second left” forum on the left and social experimentation, organized by *Le Nouvel Observateur* and the socialist self-management journal *Faire*, at which, according to Edmond Maire, it’s a matter of “if not finding an alternative to the Common Program, at least throwing off the yoke of the dominant culture” (FDE, no. 207).

The 27th and 28th, the French Communist Party breaks with the Union of the left, a break which is interpreted as having been forced by the Soviet Union which fears its effect in the satellite countries.

September–October

The Italian journal *Aut-Aut* (no. 61) publishes an article called “Rationality and Irrationality in the Political Critique of Deleuze and Foucault,” in which Massimo Cacciari, an Italian communist philosopher, attacks *Discipline and Punish* and *Rhizome*, by Deleuze and Guattari, texts which are becoming more and more popular among the Italian extreme left.

October

An interview on madness and dissidence with the journal *Change* – which emerged from a break with *Tel quel* when this movement moved closer to the French Communist Party, and then to Maoism (PPC, “Confinement . . .”).

The 13th, an interview in Paris with S. Hasumi on power and knowledge, designed as a precursor to Foucault’s second trip to Japan (FDE, no. 216).

The 24th and 26th, a talk at a “Law and Psychiatry” symposium in Toronto at the Clarke Institute of Psychiatry, on “The Evolution of the Notion of the ‘Dangerous Individual’ in 19th-Century Legal Psychiatry.” This is a summary of his 1976 seminar at the Collège de France (EW3, “About the Concept . . .”).

November

The 16th, Klaus Croissant, a lawyer for Andreas Baader’s Red Army Faction, is extradited from France to the Federal Republic of Germany, where he is charged with aiding terrorism. Foucault protests against the conditions of the extradition; he is violently harassed by the police in front of the Santé prison (FDE, nos. 210, 211, 213, 226; EW3, “Letter to Certain . . .”).

December

Writes a preface for an inquiry into military tribunals that supports the movement in favor of the legalization of conscientious objection (FDE, no. 191).

Visits Berlin, West and East. Meets with the alternative movement at the Free University. A debate on the prisons. He is arrested by the Federal Police, along with Peter Gente and Heidi Paris, his editors at Merve Verlag, and Daniel Defert, because of the resemblance

between Heidi and the Red Army Faction militant Inge Viett, who was being hunted everywhere at the time (FDE, no. 217).

Publication of issue 70 of *L'Arc*, *La Crise dans la tête*, which is announced as a special issue on Foucault. Foucault rejects this personalization. In fact, the question posed by the special issue was whether Foucault supported the claim, made by the *nouveaux philosophes*, that modern totalitarianism derived from Enlightenment philosophy. The issue addressed some elements of the crisis in the dominant political ideology of the left.

Publication of *Politiques de l'habitat, 1800–1850* (Paris: Corda, 1977), a series of studies led by Foucault from 1975 to 1977 and carried out by a team of researchers attached to his chair: Jean-Marie Alliaume, Blandine Barret-Kriegel, François Béguin, Danièle Rancière, and Anne Thalamy.

An Iranian Maoist student tells him to watch out for events which, in the coming months, are probably going to occur in the religious centers of Iran.

1978

January

The 4th, starts the course entitled “Security, Territory, Population” which, after opening with the question of power, quickly moves on to the question of “governmentality,” which is as new for him as it is for his audience.

The 9th, start of the public seminar on the crisis of juridical thought at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and of a separate seminar on “The Genealogy of Societies of Security,” which is led by François Ewald. Foucault regularly expressed his desire to run a seminar restricted to a small group of researchers, even though the rules required that all teaching at the Collège de France should be open to the public. During the two years in which he worked on governmentality and liberal political reason, the small group of researchers from his seminar regularly met in his office; this is where the nominalist themes, developed by Paul Veyne, were discussed (“Foucault Revolutionizes History”⁷). Foucault and Veyne begin to have regular discussions around his new interest in Greek and Roman antiquity. He writes the preface to the English translation of Georges Canguilhem’s *The Normal and the Pathological*, in which he identifies a concept of the ethics of the intellectual as much as a philosophy of the concept.

He works on the second volume of *The History of Sexuality*, in which he plans to focus on the Christian idea of the flesh. It will be a genealogy of concupiscence that addresses the practice of confession in Western Christianity and the direction of conscience as it developed after the Council of Trent. The manuscript of this work will be completely destroyed. He considers founding a journal that would republish the best economic and political analysis from the international press, and he looks into getting finance for this project. Travels to Berlin with André Glucksmann and Catherine von Bülow for the so-called “Tunix” meetings, at which the alternative left looks for a new strategy. Seated beside Laing and Cooper, he doesn’t speak about anti-psychiatry, but about the political

role of intellectuals. In Hanover, he takes part in a demonstration in support of the political scientist Peter Brückner, who has been prohibited from teaching or speaking at his university.

February

A seminar on musical time at IRCAM [Institute for Research and Coordination in Acoustics and Music], with Pierre Boulez, Gilles Deleuze, and Roland Barthes.

The 1st, the lecture given on this day can be seen as the first lecture on the history of governmentality. This lecture will be published in Italy by the journal *Aut-Aut*, with the title "Governmentality" (EW3).

March

The 2nd, the socialist weekly newspaper *Politique-Hebdo* questions Foucault about his voting intentions in the upcoming legislative elections of March 12–19 (FDE, no. 227). Foucault replies that he doesn't have to publicly announce his electoral choices; for him, that would be to occupy a position of authority and not a position of critique. He will say the same thing on the occasion of the presidential elections of 1981. This withdrawal from electoral discussion lays the groundwork for the controversy which later erupts between Foucault and the socialists over the "silence of the intellectuals." At the same time, Maurice Clavel writes in *Le Quotidien de Paris*: "The May '68 demand to change life won't be achieved with the bloodless ideologies of a dead century" (March 2, 1978). The left fails in the legislative elections.

April

From the 2nd to the 29th, a second trip to Japan, organized by the French cultural attaché Thierry de Beaucé. Gives a talk at the Faculty of Liberal Arts, University of Tokyo, on "Sexuality and Power."

The 13th, discussion with specialists in Kyoto on Zen Buddhist mysticism compared to Christian mysticism. A presentation by Foucault on Christian pastoral care. He has been preparing for this trip for several months, and has read Demiéville, Herrigel, Watts, and Suzuki. In Fukuoka, he visits a psychiatric hospital and a prison, meeting magistrates and psychiatrists.

The 17th, discussion at the University of Kyushu on power, analyzed through practices in psychiatric hospitals and prisons in Japan and France. Travels to Hirado where the first Jesuits had arrived.

The 20th, a seminar with Moriaki Watanabe at the University of Tokyo on the *History of Sexuality*.

The 23rd, a stay in the Seionji Temple in Uenohara, at the foot of Mount Fuji. Practices Zazen postures under the guidance of a monk who had represented Japan in martial arts at the Munich Olympics.

The 25th, a roundtable discussion on Marxism with Ryumei Yoshimoto (FDE, no. 235), with whom he will maintain a correspondence on Hegel and Marx. Has discussions

with Ichio Asukata, president of the Japanese Socialist Party, who has just returned from China, about the experience of municipal management in Yokohama, Grenoble, and Bologna. Meets the political scientist Maruyama Masao.

The 26th, a televised interview on NHK about intellectual movements in France: "What interests me here is history and the limits of Western rationality. This question is inevitable because Japan is not in opposition to Western rationality."

Publication of *Vingt ans et après* (Paris: Grasset), by Thierry Voeltzel, a series of interviews on the pleasures and commitments of "a 20-year-old boy and an older friend," who readers assumed was Michel Foucault.

May

Since the "Foucault effect," to use the expression coined by Rovatti, editor of *Aut-Aut*, is so strong among the Italian extreme left, the Italian publisher Rizzoli, a shareholder in *Corriere della sera*, offers Foucault the chance to publish a regular opinion column, which Foucault turns down. As an alternative, he suggests forming a group of intellectuals to report on the world of ideas.

The 20th, the Society for the History of the French Revolution, of which Maurice Agulhon is president, organizes a discussion between Foucault and a group of historians, on the basis of Jacques Léonard's text on *Discipline and Punish*, which had appeared in *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*. The papers will be published along with two afterwords, by the historian Maurice Agulhon and Foucault, in *L'Impossible Prison* [*The Impossible Prison*] (FDE, no. 279).

The 27th, gives a talk at the French Society for Philosophy, which is published with the title "What is Critique?" in the *Bulletin de la Société française de philosophie*, in 1990. Foucault announced to Henri Gouhier, who chaired: "I hesitated for a long time over the title of this talk, but the only one that fits is *What is Enlightenment?*" His reading of Kant's minor works on history, especially in the Piobetta edition (Paris: Aubier, 1947), has become a constant habit, and one that remained with him until his last days.

Publication by Gallimard of *Herculine Barbin, dite Alexina B* [*Herculine Barbin*], a case of hermaphroditism, in the series "Parallel Lives." Starting from the descriptions in a psychiatric report, Foucault had found, from Île d'Oléron to La Rochelle, the locations and the archives of this story of the medico-legal determination of true sex. He thinks about using some similar cases to produce one of the volumes of the *History of Sexuality*. The young writer Hervé Guibert, whom he had met the previous year, turns the book into a script for a film in which Isabelle Adjani agrees to play the title role.

June

The 17th, Cavallari, the head of *Corriere della sera*'s Paris bureau, works out a program for the column on ideas with Foucault. Foucault suggests one by Susan Sontag on Vietnam, one by Alain Finkielkraut on the United States, one by Arpad Ajtony on Hungary, and one by Jorge Semprun on Spain.

July–August

Foucault is hospitalized for a few days at the Vaugirard Hospital, after being run over by a car in front of his apartment. As a result of this trauma to the cranium, without loss of consciousness, he suffers from migraines for almost one year. In 1980, at Sartre's funeral, he will say to Claude Mauriac: "Since then, my life has changed. The impact of the car threw me onto the hood and I had time to think: it's finished. I'm going to die. I was fine with that" (Claude Mauriac, *Le Temps immobile*, vol. 6).

August

Rizzoli responds positively to the program for the column on ideas, while the events in Abadan attract international attention to Iran. Foucault agrees to inaugurate the series. He sets about doing research on Iran.

September

The 16th, he arrives in Tehran, to which he has rushed following the massacre at Jaleh Square, in which the shah's troops shot at protesters. Foucault arranged the trip through Thierry Voeltzel and Iranian exiles who were close to Karim Sandjabi. With Claire Brière and Pierre Blanchet, journalists from *Libération*, he goes to the most troubled spots in the conflict.

The 20th, in Qom, the religious capital, he meets Ayatollah Shariat-Madari, one of the most important liberal religious leaders and a follower of the spiritual tradition of Shi'ism. His assessment strongly influences Foucault's view of events. Mehdi Bazargan, president of the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights, acts as their interpreter. Foucault meets representatives of most of the political groupings. At this time the Ayatollah Khomeini, who is in exile in Iraq, is still unknown in the West.

The 24th, on his return to Paris, he writes his first articles for the *Corriere della sera*, convinced, contrary to public opinion, that the shah's army, which is disintegrating in the face of the Islamist uprising, can no longer exercise political control.⁸ In Paris, meets Bani Sadr, just before the arrival of Khomeini into exile in France. Foucault is never to meet Khomeini.

October

The 16th, *Le Nouvel Observateur* publishes a translation of one of his articles from the *Corriere*, in which he uses the phrase "political spirituality" – an expression closely connected to his thinking about political and ethical subjectivation. It provokes anger on the left, except among the very youngest. There follows an extensive exchange of letters, both public and private (see *Le Monde*, letter from Claude Roy, September 1979).

November

Dr. Bernard Kouchner, Jacques and Claudie Broyelle, and Alain Geismar make an appeal for a "Boat for Vietnam" to help the boat people. They are supported by Sartre, Aron, Montand, Signoret, Foucault, Rocard, Clavel, Barthes, Ionesco. Support for the boat people introduces a new rift within the left intelligentsia.

Foucault undertakes a systematic rereading of Thomas Mann.

The 9th, Foucault's second trip to Iran. He tries to see the same people as on his first trip, so that he can follow the evolution of their views. He says he is concerned to know how, outside of Marxism, it is possible today to constitute the criteria that are essential for a collective existence. A trip to Abadan, where there is a strike at the oil refineries. Representatives of the People's Fedayeen explain to him their reasons for supporting Khomeini.

The 15th, returns to Paris, where he writes his final articles.⁹

The 19th, the Italian weekly *L'Espresso* publishes without permission a fragment of a text written for *Aut-Aut* as if it were part of a debate between Foucault and the Italian communist philosopher Massimo Cacciari and "other supporters of the Gulag." There follows a polemic with the Italian communists, which Foucault ends with a letter to *L'Unità* (FDE, no. 254).

December

Duccio Trombadori, a journalist at *L'Unità*, suggests a debate with Italian Marxist intellectuals and sends Foucault about a dozen pages of questions. Through a series of interviews, this becomes an intellectual biography of Foucault (EW3, "Interview with . . .").

The American Philosophical Association organizes a session on Foucault's work in Washington. Notable participants include Hayden White, Reiner Schurmann, Hugh Silverman, and Peter Caws.

1979

January

The 7th, he makes this note: "Not to pass universals through the shredder of history, but to pass history through a form of thought that refuses universals. What history then?"

The history of confession led him to study the early texts of the Church Fathers, Cassian, Augustine, and Tertullian. A new subject matter slowly emerges for the second volume of *The History of Sexuality: Confessions of the Flesh*. The study of the early Christian texts turns his genealogical research toward the Greek and Latin texts of late antiquity.

The 10th, beginning of the course entitled "Birth of Biopolitics," which in fact will focus on liberal governmentality. The Monday seminar, which is announced with the title "Method in the History of Ideas," focuses on the techniques of risk management in modern societies.

The 31st, he declares in his course: ". . . the state does not have an essence. The state is not a universal nor in itself an autonomous source of power. The state is nothing else but . . . a perpetual statification" (C-BB, 77).

February

The 1st, the triumphal return to Iran of Khomeini, who has been in exile in France, in Neauphle-le-Château, since October 1978. Bani Sadr suggests that Foucault should return to Iran which him, an invitation that Foucault declines.

March

The 6th, Foucault is attacked in the newspaper *Le Matin*, in the context of International Women's day, for his support of the Iranian Revolution.

The 14th and 15th, Foucault hosts at his home the Israeli–Palestinian colloquium organized by *Les Temps modernes* (no. 398, September 1979). Sartre had found it difficult to find a discreet location, because of fear of attacks.

The 17th, paramilitary groups begin to execute opponents of the new Iranian regime.

The 23rd and 24th, he attends two days of discussions on “Nuclear Energy and Energy's New Order.” He doesn't take part in the discussions and he refuses to visit a nuclear plant.

The 24th, publication of *Iran: La Révolution au nom de Dieu* [*Iran: Revolution in the Name of God*] (Éditions du Seuil), by Claire Brière and Pierre Blanchet. The book closes with an interview with Foucault who emphasizes the extent to which “the collective will of the Iranian people impressed him and that will wasn't articulated according to our schemas of revolution.” The book provokes several responses which concentrate their hostility on Foucault; even though most of the arguments attacked don't come from the afterword, but from the book itself. Foucault is very upset.¹⁰

The 26th, writes the preface for the French translation of Peter Brückner's *Ennemis de l'État* [*Enemies of the State*] (FDE, no. 256).

He asks Ronald Laing to write an article on the collective suicide of the Jones sect in Guyana, a sect that had planned to move to the Soviet Union.

April

The 1st, in the first issue of France's first homosexual newspaper *Le Gai Pied*, Foucault publishes an article in favor of suicide, for which he is criticized in *Le Monde* and other newspapers (FL, “The Simplest . . .”). Foucault is reputed to have come up with the punning title.¹¹

The 14th, he publishes an open letter to Mehdi Bazargan in *Le Nouvel Observateur*, in which he condemns the actions of the Iranian regime and tries to influence Bazargan, then prime minister of Iran, and thought to be himself opposed to terrorism.¹²

The 22nd, death of Maurice Clavel in Vézelay.

June

The 20th, side by side with André Glucksmann and Bernard Kouchner – who had fitted out the boat *Île de Lumière* as a hospital boat off the coast of Bidong Island [a Vietnamese

refugee camp in Malaysia] – Foucault organizes a press conference at the Collège de France, attended by Sartre and Aron, in support of increasing the number of Vietnamese boat people accepted into Europe, especially France.

August

The 17th, in a report on “Very Important People of the World,” in the Japanese magazine *Shukan Posuto*, Foucault declares: “The problem of the refugees is a harbinger of the great migration of the 21st century” (FDE, no. 271).

October

From the 10th to the 16th, he gives the Tanner Lectures at Stanford University. Under the title “Omnes et Singulatim,” he presents a summary of his work on governmentality (EW3). Discusses his work with Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, who plan a book “On the Ordering of Things: An Interpretation of Michel Foucault and Martin Heidegger.”

The 19th, he gives a talk at the University of Sacramento.

1980

January

Signs the petition against Georges Suffert, whose articles may have encouraged the assassination, on May 4, 1978, of the militant communist Henri Curiel, a brother of Foucault’s close friend Raoul Curiel.

Beginning of the course “On the Government of the Living,” in which his work turns to focus on truth-saying. The seminar focuses on liberalism. He plans to dedicate the following year’s seminar to nihilism in the late nineteenth century.

The 24th, he signs a manifesto in defense of the Polish “Flying University” movement, in the *New York Review of Books* (no. 21–22, p. 49).

February

Interview in *Le Monde*, in which he wishes to remain anonymous: Foucault is designated as “The Masked Philosopher” (EW1). Due to the illness of Sartre, Foucault is increasingly called upon to play the role of major intellectual, something he refuses to do. This desire for discretion will instigate the future polemic about the silence of the intellectuals.

March

The 26th, death of Roland Barthes as a result of a traffic accident.

April

The 19th, Sartre’s funeral. Foucault joins the enormous cortège which accompanies the philosopher from Broussais Hospital to the cemetery at Montparnasse.

May

Along with the lawyers Christian Revon and Jacques Vergès, Foucault prepares a manifesto for the so-called “free defense” movement. Article 2 declares: “It is not because there are laws, it is not because I have rights, that I have the capacity to defend myself; it is to the extent that I defend myself that my rights exist and that the law respects me. It is, therefore, the dynamics of the defense that gives a value to laws and rights that is, for us, indispensable. A right is nothing unless it comes to life in the defense which provokes it; and only defense gives valid force to the law.” And Article 3: “In the expression ‘defend oneself,’ the reflexive pronoun is all important. In effect, it’s a matter of inscribing life, existence, subjectivity in the very reality of the individual within the practice of law. To defend oneself doesn’t mean to take the law into one’s own hands. That would be to want to carry out justice oneself, that is, to identify with a form of power and then to carry out its action for one’s own part. To defend oneself, in contrast, is to refuse to play the game of these forms of power and to make use of law to limit their actions” (in *Pour la défense libre*, supplement to the journal *Actes*, no. 24–25, preparatory document for the court hearings on “free defense” at La Sainte-Beaume, May 23–26, 1980). According to Christian Revon, Foucault wrote this text.

July

Buys an old monks’ house in Verrue, close to Vendevre-du-Poitou, where he hopes to go and work with his friends.

August

Attends the final, triumphant performance of Chéreau and Boulez’s *Ring* at Bayreuth (EW2, “The Imagination . . .”).

Publication of Alan Sheridan’s *The Will to Truth* (London: Tavistock), the first full-length study of Foucault in English.

September

Publication of *Power/Knowledge, Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977* (Brighton: Harvester Press), edited with commentary by Colin Gordon, one of the editors of the British journal *Ideology and Consciousness*.

October

The 20th and 21st, invited by Berkeley’s Howison Lectures Committee to give two talks on “Truth and Subjectivity.” Eight hundred people are packed into Wheeler Hall to hear Foucault speak about the beginnings of Christian confession, while outside another seven hundred try to get inside. For the first time since the 1970s, the police have to intervene on the Berkeley campus (*The Daily Californian*, November 1, 1980). He leads a seminar on “Sexual Ethics in Late Antiquity and Early Christianity.” Gives most of these talks directly in English. In a *Washington Post* (March 15, 1981, p. 14) review of the books by Donald Bouchard, Colin Gordon, and Alan Sheridan, Leo Bersani describes this period: “I witnessed, a few months ago, the enlivening, if startling, spectacle of over

a thousand Berkeley students avidly listening to Foucault's lectures on the shift in hermeneutic strategies of the self from Seneca to the early Church Fathers. In those meticulous comparative readings of ancient texts, the attentive young audience might have recognized the work of an extraordinary scholarly scapegoat taking on himself the oppressive knowledge of our perhaps unnecessary selves and – sweet reminiscence of the much maligned '60s – clearing the field of self and perhaps even of sex for the sake, precisely, of new economies of pleasure."

November

In New York, in the context of the James Lectures, he runs a seminar in English with Richard Sennett, at the Institute for Humanities at New York University, which was partly published under the title "Sexuality and Solitude" (EW1).

The 16th, learns of the death of Hélène Althusser. He will visit Althusser at the psychiatric hospital, and later at his home, until the end.

The 17th and 24th, gives talks at Dartmouth College, on "Subjectivity and Truth" and "Christianity and Confession."¹³

Has many discussions with Michael Denney, a student of Hannah Arendt. He thinks he sees a change in the American homosexual community, in which the theme of friendship is beginning to replace that of sexual liberation (EW1, "Friendship . . ."). At the end of one talk, he asks the audience to accompany him to a demonstration after the murder of a gay man in Greenwich Village. At the invitation of Mark Blasius, he gives a talk at Princeton on "The Birth of Biopolitics."

December

Decides to stop giving his seminar at the Collège de France, but maintains the two-hour lectures which from now on will focus on the immediate research for his books.

1981

January

The 7th, under the title "Subjectivity and Truth," his course begins to investigate techniques of the self as modalities of self-government. As Chair in the History of Systems of Thought, he sponsors a monthly seminar on the sociology of law, co-organized by François Ewald. Foucault, who had hoped to develop some work on law, will participate in the seminar on philosophy of law that is held in 1982–83.

March–April

Refuses to support the last-minute petitions in favor of the election of François Mitterrand as president, according to the principle, which he often reaffirmed, that an intellectual is not an electoral director of conscience.

May

The 4th and the 25th, he invites France Fernando Henrique Cardoso, of São Paulo University, to the Collège de France to speak about “The emergence of new societies in the Third World.”

The 10th, on the evening of the presidential elections, he joins the crowd at Place de la Bastille, with the Rabinows. He refuses to make any comment to journalists who question him. To a young high school student who comes to tell him how difficult she had found his texts in philosophy class, he promises with a laugh: “Those were the woes of capitalism, now under socialism that’s all finished!”

Gives six lectures in the Faculty of Law at the Catholic University of Louvain, under the auspices of the Franqui Chair, on “Do Wrong, Speak the Truth: The Function of Confession in Justice.” Leads a seminar on the origin of “social defense.” On this occasion, he video-records a long autobiographical interview.

The 31st, in *Libération*, he recalls the role of the extreme left in the socialist victory and the way in which he had been able to work with them on certain projects, relating to the organization of health, psychiatry, and penalty.

June

In Geneva, with Bernard Kouchner and Yves Montand, he takes part in the creation of the Against Piracy Action (APA) Committee, in support of the boat people. He supports the right to intervene in international politics in the name of the “right of the governed” (EW3, “Confronting . . .”).

The 23rd, members of the Communist Party become government ministers (which he disapproves of).

September

The 30th, abolition of the death penalty in France.

October–November

Mark Poster invites him to the Davidson Conference Center in Los Angeles for a symposium on “Knowledge, Power, History: Interdisciplinary Approaches to the Works of Michel Foucault” (October 26 – November 6). Once again, he has difficulties acquiring a US entry visa, this time because the American administration believes he had harbored Khomeini. He meets members of the Frankfurt School, notable Leo Lowenthal and Martin Jay (see William Hackman, “The Foucault Conference,” *Telos*, no. 51, 1982).

To mark the occasion, *Time* magazine publishes a report on “France’s Philosopher of Power,” in which Foucault declares: “It is not so much power that interests me but the history of subjectivity” (*Time*, no. 46, November 16, 1981). He visits Berkeley, where there is a proposal to set up a Foucault–Habermas seminar, which could become

permanent. Habermas wants to call his part of it "Modernity." His critique of postmodernism contributes to orienting the reception of Foucault in Germany and the US.

December

The 14th, Claude Cheysson, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, announces that since the imposition of martial law in Poland by General Jaruzelski is an internal matter, France obviously will not intervene. Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault call for a protest: "The French government should not, like Moscow and Washington, pretend that the instigation of a military dictatorship in Poland is an internal matter which allows the Polish people to decide their own destiny. That is an immoral and untruthful claim . . . Are good relations with the French Communist Party, therefore, more important than the crushing of a workers' movement under the heel of the military? In 1936, a socialist government found itself confronted with a military putsch in Spain; in 1956, a socialist government found itself confronted with repression in Hungary. In 1981, the socialist government is confronted with a coup in Warsaw . . . We would like to remind it that it promised to support the obligations of international morality, against Realpolitik." This protest, which "proved to be a watershed" (*Le Monde*, July 27, 1983), is joined by several hundred intellectuals and, on December 23rd, the French Democratic Confederation of Workers (CFDT) suggests that they join in common cause, in the spirit of Solidarność [Solidarity]. The editor of *Le Monde*, Jacques Fauvet, reacted sharply against "these 'left-wing intellectuals' [sic] who haven't come to terms with May '81." Lionel Jospin, Secretary of the Socialist Party, attacks the authors of the petition on the radio. Jack Lang, the Minister for Culture, contrasts "the absolute loyalty of the Communist ministers with the typically structuralist silliness of the intellectuals" (*Libération*, December 23, 1981). The CFDT sets up a support committee for Poland. Along with two exiled members of the organizing committee of Solidarność and a Japanese representative from Sohyo [Japanese trade union] in Paris, Foucault spends several months looking after the accounts and the expenses of the support committee. "I felt like I was forcing him to waste precious time. For example, he was a member of our financial control committee. I remember his long reports, packed full of figures. I couldn't stop myself from thinking that he had better things to be doing" (Seweryn Blumsztajn, head of Solidarity in France).

Foucault is introduced to the filmmaker Werner Schroeter, to whom he confides: "I don't distinguish between people who make of their existence a work and those who make a work during their existence" (FL, "Passion . . .," p. 317).

1982

January

The 6th, start of the course on "The Hermeneutics of the Subject."

April–May

He protests against the arrest of Jacques Derrida in Prague. When Derrida is released, the two philosophers meet once again. Foucault regularly meets with Alexandre Adler,

specialist on the Soviet Union. He gives several interviews to promote the publication of works by Kenneth Dover and John Boswell on the history of homosexuality, works whose translation he had commissioned.

The 18th, in Grenoble, he gives a talk to the Department of Philosophy on the *Dream Interpretation* of Artemidorus, a work that has recently been retranslated by his friend André-Jean Festugière. This talk will become the first chapter of *The Care of the Self*.

In an interview with Gérard Raulet, he replies to the criticisms of Habermas (EW2, "Structuralism . . .").

May–June

With John Searle, Umberto Eco, Thomas Sebeok, and others, he takes part in the Third International Summer Institute for Semiotic and Structural Studies at the University of Toronto (May 31 – June 26). He leads a seminar on "Telling the Truth about Oneself." He examines the rules of confession from the point of view of spiritual transformation. He analyzes texts by Seneca ("On Tranquility of the Mind"), by Cassian (*The Institutes of the Cœnobites*), and by Augustine (*The Confessions*). He gives a talk on "The Care of Self in Ancient Culture." From now on, he works regularly on the Stoics. In an interview destined for the Canadian periodical *Body Politic*, he explains how his "sexual politics is different from the liberation movements" (EW1, "Sex, Power . . .").

June

He considers resigning from the Collège de France and earning his living from the permanent seminar that he is offered at Berkeley as well as from his publishing royalties.

July

He suffers from a persistent sinusitis.

August

The 9th, a bloody attack on Goldenberg, a Jewish restaurant on rue des Rosiers. From now on Foucault eats in this restaurant as often as possible as a sign of resistance against terrorism.

The 28th, the president's office announces a major arrest of international terrorists. Three Irish people are arrested in Vincennes by the anti-terror group established under direct presidential control. Foucault points out the irregularities of this event in the press (FDE, no. 316). This is the first blunder of the new government, the truth of which will be clearly revealed in 1985.

September

The 14th, invited to lunch by François Mitterrand at the Élysée Palace, with Simone de Beauvoir, Pierre Vidal-Naquet, etc., to talk about the Middle East, especially Israel. Foucault asks about Lebanon, the president replies: "It's stuffed." That evening he learns of the assassination of the president-elect [of Lebanon], Bachir Gemayel.

The 22nd, with Simone Signoret and the medical doctors Bernard Kouchner, Jacques Lebas, and Jean-Pierre Mauber from the humanitarian organization Médecins du Monde, he travels to Poland to escort a truck filled with medicine and other authorized supplies. Three thousand kilometers, during which they each take turns to drive the station wagon. They visit Auschwitz. They are not allowed to meet Lech Wałęsa. On their return, Simone Signoret and Foucault recount the events on television.

October

Publication of *Désordre des familles, lettres de cachet des archives de la Bastille* (Paris: Gallimard-Julliard, “Archives” series) [untranslated]. This is a co-authored book, without specification of contributions, by the historian Arlette Farge and Foucault.

October–November

He gives a seminar in the Department of Religion at the University of Vermont in Burlington, on “Technologies of the Self” (October 15 – November 5). The transcripts are published without being reviewed by him.¹⁴ He considers editing the material assembled for this seminar into a book on techniques of the self. He suggests a book called *The Government of Self and Others* to Éditions du Seuil.

1983

January

Under the title “The Government of Self and Others,” Foucault begins his course on *parrhesia*, the notion of truth-speaking in ancient culture, which will actually occupy him for two years.

February

Appearance at Éditions du Seuil of the collection *Des travaux* [Works], edited by Foucault, Paul Veyne, and François Wahl. It’s an old project of Foucault’s, to promote academic research outside of the mediatized circuits of general publishing. It’s in this collection that he plans to publish *Le Gouvernement de soi et des autres* [The Government of Self and Others], a work that would link together ethics and politics, and for which he had outlined several plans around Alcibiades, or the idea of care of the self and political life; Epictetus, on listening, writing, and the practice of the self; self and others.

March

At this time, the enormous manuscript of the second volume of the *History of Sexuality*, which he now calls *The Use of Pleasure*, is comprised of four sections:

- The Use of Pleasure, which itself is divided into two chapters: Concept and Principles; An Example – Dream Interpretation.
- The Practices of Temperance;

- The Culture of the Self;
- The Demand for Austerity, which is divided into three chapters: The Body; The Wife; Boys (EW1, “On the Genealogy . . .”).

From the 7th to the 22nd, Habermas is invited by Paul Veyne to give a series of talks at the Collège de France. Habermas and Foucault meet several times; Habermas recounts his intellectual biography, talks a great deal about Nietzsche, and inquires about the French Communist Party.

Publication of *Michel Foucault, an Annotated Bibliography*, by Michael Clark (New York: Garland Publishing). This is the first major bibliography of works by and on Michel Foucault, comprising close to three thousand entries.

Foucault reads Rosenzweig, and says he is disappointed. He confides to Bernard Kouchner his intention to stop writing and doing library research. Kouchner suggests that he should go on a mission with Médecins du Monde and offers him responsibility for the next “boat for Vietnam.”

April

Visits the retrospective Manet exhibition at the Grand Palais and confides to Roger Stéphane and Françoise Cachin, the exhibition curator, that he has a thick manuscript on Manet.¹⁵

April–May

Appointed Regent Lecturer at Berkeley. Gives a talk on the arts of the self and on writing the self. He records several discussions on the current state of his work with Paul Rabinow, Hubert Dreyfus, Charles Taylor, Martin Jay, Richard Rorty, and Leo Lowenthal, the last representative of the Frankfurt School. Part of these discussions are included in Dreyfus and Rabinow’s *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd edition, 1983).

May

Publication in *Le Débat* of an interview between Foucault and Edmond Maire [Secretary General of the CFDT] on the crisis that is gripping the union movement (FDE, no. 334). Foucault worked extensively to prepare his questions, reading internal documents from the CFDT, consulting economists, and also Simon Nora and Pierre Rosanvallon. This was the starting point for a series of discussions published under the title *La CFDT en questions* (Paris: Gallimard, 1984). Foucault continued to reflect on the union movement, on the system of social protection, and on the politics of health. He concluded: “Let us, rather, try to give sense and beauty to an effacing death” (EW3, “The Risks . . .,” p. 381).

July

The new government spokesperson, Max Gallo, explains to Foucault his concerns about the relations between the government and society. He wants to arrange a meeting

between the philosopher and the president. Foucault replies that “these tasks are up to the Socialist Party.”

The 26th, Max Gallo tries to remobilize the intellectuals, who have been absent since the controversy surrounding Poland, on the side of the Socialist Party. He publishes an article in *Le Monde* entitled, “Intellectuals, Politics, Modernity.”

The 27th, *Le Monde* begins an inquiry into what it calls “the silence of the intellectuals.” Foucault immediately informs the newspaper that he won’t be responding to this inquiry, since he doesn’t consider himself to have been silent, given his work alongside the CFDT since the imposition of martial law in Poland. The press seizes on the theme until the middle of August, particularly emphasizing Foucault’s withdrawal – a key case, according to the *Herald Tribune* – his silence, his long stays across the Atlantic, and the revelation that in 1981 he had refused the position of cultural attaché to the US (something Foucault thought was more an exile than a favor). He doesn’t speak publicly about this campaign until 1984 (FL, “The Concern . . .”).

Creation of the “Tarnier Academy.” Bernard Kouchner, André Glucksmann, Yves Montand, and a group of friends begin to have meetings with him in the amphitheater of the Tarnier Hospital, in order to focus on the international political situation.

Foucault suggests publishing a “white paper” on socialist politics. He poses the question: “Is there a problematic of government for the socialists, or do they only have a problematic of the state?” In the autumn, he suggests to his students in Berkeley that they do a history of governmentality from the 1930s. He reads the works of Jaurès, Blum, and Mitterrand.

August

The material for *The Use of Pleasure* is redistributed over two volumes; he also rewrites the preface (EW1, “Preface . . .”).

September

After drafting *The Use of Pleasure*, which he now thinks is complete, he travels in Andalusia, from Grenada to Cordoba.

October–November

Foucault is once again invited to Berkeley, where, in six talks, he traces the history of *parrhesia*, from the tragedies of Euripides through the crisis in the ancient democratic institutions. He gives two talks at Boulder and at Santa Cruz. Returns extremely fatigued and thinner.

Robert Badinter, who is Minister of Justice, publishes an interpretation of *Discipline and Punish* that draws on Rusche and Kirchheimer, in the Freudian journal *L’Âne*. Foucault makes his disagreement known to Badinter. This is the start of a relation between the two men that slowly takes form in a plan for a research center in philosophy and law, which Foucault wants to function as a base for the researchers who are working with him, and which François Ewald will manage.

Considers the possibility of not giving his course at the Collège de France. Tries not to cause concern to his entourage. Undertakes to translate, with Martin Ziegler, Norbert Elias's *Die Einsamkeit des Sterbendes* [*The Loneliness of the Dying*].

December

The 29th, he consults Jean-Paul Escande, who recommends several detailed pulmonary examinations.

1984

January

After a course of antibiotics, he regains his vitality. He writes to Maurice Pinguet: "I thought I had AIDS, but an intensive treatment has set me back on my feet."

February

Once again fatigued, he begins his course at the Collège de France on *parrhesia*. Until the end of March, he is correcting the proofs of the second volume of *History of Sexuality*.

March

The group of Berkeley students with whom Foucault intends to work on the transformations of governmentality in the 1930s, send him a plan written by Keith Gandall, David Horn, and Stephen Kotkin, which proposes to study how Western societies had reconstructed, after the First World War, a program for social life, a new economic planning, and new political organizations. They plan five studies on the emergence of a new political rationality: the Welfare State and progressivism in the United States; fascism and the organization of leisure in Italy; state welfare in France and urban experimentation in the colonies; the construction of socialism in the USSR; Bauhaus architecture and the Weimar republic.

He has regular consultations at the Tarnier Hospital, where his doctors have the impression that his only question is: "How much time do I have left?" In 1978, speaking of the death of Philippe Ariès, he had talked about "the play of knowledge and silence that the sick person accepts in order to remain in control of his secret relation to his own death."

The 10th, while correcting the proofs of *History of Sexuality*, he receives a visit from Claude Mauriac and some representatives of workers from Mali and Senegal who have been evicted from their lodgings by the police and are asking for his help. He writes several letters on their behalf.

April

Re-reads Kafka's *Journal* and gets back to work on the manuscript of *The Confessions of the Flesh*. At his last lecture on *parrhesia*, he mentions changes he will have to make in his interpretation. Jacques Lagrange hears him saying: "It's too late."

The 6th, Foucault gives a party at his place in honor of William Burroughs, who comes with the poet Bryon Geysin. This will be his last party.

May

Publication of a special issue of the *Magazine littéraire* on Foucault, on the occasion of the publication of volumes 2 and 3 of *History of Sexuality*. Here he speaks out on the "silence of the intellectuals" (FL, "The Concern . . .").

The 14th, publication of *The Use of Pleasure*. He sends a text to *La Revue de métaphysique et de morale* for its special issue on Georges Canguilhem. Having promised an original text, all he can do is send them a corrected version of the text he had given to the 1978 English edition of *The Normal and the Pathological*: "I can't do any more work on this text, if you find stylistic errors, don't hesitate to correct them" (letter to the editor).

The 29th, agrees to be interviewed at his home by André Scala, a young philosopher who is close to Gilles Deleuze. Foucault, exhausted, speaks for the first time about the importance of his reading of Heidegger. He is not able to edit this interview and he entrusts its definitive form to Daniel Defert (FL, "The Return of . . .").

June

The 3rd, Foucault has an attack and is hospitalized by his brother, Denys, at Saint-Michel Hospital, which is close to his home.

The 9th, he is transferred to La Salpêtrière, to the neurology unit which overlooks the old buildings in which Charcot had worked.

The 10th, he is placed in intensive care.

The 20th, during a remission, he receives the third volume of *History of Sexuality*, *The Care of the Self*.

The 25th, at 1:15 p.m., the death of Michel Foucault.

The 29th, after a short ceremony at La Salpêtrière, his body is taken to Vendevre-du-Poitou, where it is buried, in the presence of close friends, family, and locals.

Contrary to a tenacious legend and also contrary to French medical tradition, which maintains confidentiality on the cause of death, at the request of his family a communiqué giving a clinical description of AIDS is published by Professor Castaigne and Dr. Sauron: "Michel Foucault was admitted on June 9th 1984 to the unit for illnesses of the nervous system at La Salpêtrière, in order to carry out additional examinations which were made necessary by neurological symptoms that were complicating a septicemic condition. The examinations revealed the existence of areas of cerebral supuration . . . An extreme aggravation removed all hope of therapeutic intervention, and death occurred on June 25th at 1:15 p.m."

Michel Foucault had written, prior to leaving for Poland in September 1982, a final will to be opened "in case of accident." It comprised only three recommendations, including: "Death, not invalidism" and "No posthumous publications."

Notes

- 1 "Monstrosities in Criticism," *Diacritics* 1:1 (Fall 1971), pp. 57–60; "Foucault Responds," *Diacritics* 1:2 (Winter 1971), p. 60.
- 2 "The Force of Flight," in J. Crampton and S. Elden, eds., *Space, Knowledge, Power: Foucault and Geography* (Aldershot: Ashgate Press, 2007), pp. 169–172.
- 3 See also "The Crisis of Medicine or the Crisis of Antimedicine?," *Foucault Studies* 1 (Nov. 2004) (<http://www.foucault-studies.com>). Translated by Edgar C. Knowlton, Jr., William J. King, and Clare O'Farrell.
- 4 "Photogenic Painting," in G. Deleuze, *Gérard Fromanger* (London: Black Dog Publishing, 1999), pp. 81–104.
- 5 See FL, "Schizo-Culture: On Prison and Psychiatry," p. 172. This published version is slightly different from the one Defert gives in the "Chronologie."
- 6 FC-FDS, 21–22. Strangely, the second sentence is omitted from the English translation, C-SMD, 23–24.
- 7 Paul Veyne, "Foucault Revolutionizes History," in A. Davidson, ed., *Foucault and his Interlocutors* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), pp. 146–182.
- 8 J. Afary and K. B. Anderson, *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism*, tr. Karen de Bruin and Kevin B. Anderson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). For the series of four articles, see pp. 189–209.
- 9 "The Revolt in Iran Spreads on Cassette Tapes" and "The Mythical Leader of the Iranian Revolt," tr. Karen de Bruin and Kevin B. Anderson, *ibid.*, pp. 216–220, 220–223.
- 10 "Iran: The Spirit of a World without Spirit. Foucault's Conversation with Claire Brière and Pierre Blanchet," tr. Alan Sheridan, *ibid.*, pp. 250–260.
- 11 The phrase *gai pied* (literally "gay foot") is a homophone of *guépier* (hornet's nest).
- 12 "Open Letter to Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan," in Afary and Anderson, *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution*, tr. de Bruin and Anderson, pp. 260–263.
- 13 "Subjectivity and Truth" and "Christianity and Confession," in S. Lotringer, ed., *The Politics of Truth* (New York: Semiotext(e), 2007), pp. 147–191.
- 14 See, L. Martin, H. Gutman, and P. Hutton, *Technologies of the Self* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988).
- 15 *Manet and the Object of Painting*, tr. Matthew Barr. (London: Tate Publishing, 2009).

2

History of Madness

COLIN GORDON

"The madman on his crazy boat sets sail for the other world, and it is from the other world that he comes when he disembarks."

Michel Foucault, *History of Madness*, 11

"There is no establishment of truth without an essential positing of otherness; the truth is never the same; there can be truth only in the form of the other world and the other life."

Michel Foucault, *The Courage of Truth*, 165

The *History of Madness* (HM) is Michel Foucault's first major work, his longest single work, and the work that established his reputation in France. Thirty years after its publication, France's leading mediaeval historian, Jacques Le Goff, described Foucault as "the philosopher who proved himself here one of the great historians of our time," and this book as "a pioneering masterpiece of historical anthropology and a still unequalled model of interdisciplinary study" (Laharie 1991: vii). Although Foucault subsequently corrected and criticized it in various ways, it always remained, through successive redescriptions, an integral component or stage in the later accounts he gave of his intellectual enterprise. It is a work in which (even more strikingly when read in company with its companion, posthumously published doctoral text, Foucault's introduction to his translation of Kant's *Anthropology*) one can discern the matrix and anticipation of every phase of his subsequent work, down to the most recent posthumous publications which are continuing to expand our understanding of his overall project. Whereas for a time Foucault's successive displacements of perspective seem to present themselves as shifts away from the starting point, later it seems more that the curve of the spiral leads back to recurrences and new contrapuntal resonances of his opening themes, now within a more ample, complex and extensive

conceptual topology, whose challenges and possibilities we are still in the process of exploring.

How today should one read, or write about *History of Madness*? It should be simply said, first of all, that it is a book which, after decades of notoriety, misrepresentation, and neglect, merits a careful and complete reading, with a due degree of attention to its stated aims, declared methods, and conceptual structure, as well as to its affective dimensions, which later commentary is perhaps too eager to treat as matter for deprecation or denigration. It is perhaps more advantageously read with some understanding of the field of adversarial relations and adversities in which it originally positions itself, and has become positioned through subsequent discussion and controversy. As a book that in its full form has been – at least in the Anglophone world – long unavailable and largely unread, it might finally find its audience as one of the works of what a younger generation of readers has taken to calling the “new Foucault,” the Foucault of the lectures published and translated since the millennium, through which a fresh, rich, and unfamiliar perception of his intellectual venture has become newly available.

The intensification of political questions around psychiatry – the revelation of the role of Soviet psychiatry in the persecution and repression of dissidents, and the uptake of anti-psychiatric ideas in the 1960s by sections of Western leftism – is commonly supposed to have supervened only in the years after the writing of HM, giving polemical notoriety to a work whose critical perspective on the historical beginnings of psychiatry, set against the background of the large-scale deployment of administrative internment in early modern Europe, originally springs, it is often supposed, more from literary-philosophical romanticism than a political analysis. However, in a radio interview given in 1961 we already find Foucault commenting:

I was struck very recently to read in the press about the new Soviet legislation, and I believe the general policies in Soviet countries, against “social parasites” [. . .] and I found it striking that this legislation coincided closely in its terms with our equivalent legislation of the seventeenth century: as though the moral and social order of bourgeois mercantilism and the social and moral order of contemporary socialism were based on identical principles.¹

It is unlikely that it did not already occur to Foucault, when he coined in HM the term “The Great Internment” to designate the measures initiated by the French royal authorities in 1656, that the phrase might act as a reminder of more recent events: these parallels will have appeared more flagrant and provocative a decade or more later, following the publication of Solzhenitsyn’s *The Gulag Archipelago*.² In a discussion in 1977, after the furor caused by the anti-communist and anti-Marxist writings of André Glucksmann and the “nouveau philosophes,” Foucault implicitly endorses their use of his work to make precisely that *rapprochement*: “Like all political technologies, the Gulag institution has its history, its transformations and transpositions, its functions and effects. The internment practiced in the Classical Age is in all likelihood a part of its genealogy” (PK, 135). More than is usually noted, as we shall see further below, the political Foucault of later years is already fully present in HM; and HM is a text that still speaks to our political realities.

Goals and Methods

The 1961 preface to HM, part-translated in the 1964 abridged English translation *Madness and Civilization*, omitted from the 1972 and subsequent French editions, is without doubt one of the most arresting texts Foucault wrote. Among its fireworks and paradoxes, a few simple, deceptively modest, and easily overlooked words concisely and accurately encapsulate what is undertaken in the following 600 pages: “a structural study of the historical ensemble – notions, institutions, judicial and police measures, scientific concepts – which hold captive a madness whose wild state can never be reconstituted” (HM, xxxiii). What conception of structure or structural method does HM deploy? We can discern at least two.

In the introduction to Book 2 of HM (omitted from the abridged translation) Foucault distinguishes four distinct components or forms of consciousness of madness: (1) the critical: the normative judgment which distinguishes and sanctions madness in its difference from reason or sanity; (2) the practical: an attitude of collective demarcation and exclusion of the deviant from a group; (3) the enunciative: the act of recognizing individuals as mad and identifying them as such; (4) the analytic: reflection on the nature and forms of manifestation of madness. In a given period and culture, each of these elements can be separately characterized and the coordination and coherence of these components can vary. Foucault thinks that the experience of madness in the Classical Age is characterized by a dissociation between the first two elements, on the one hand, and the latter two on the other. Indeed, bifurcations and dissociations within the experience of madness are something which Foucault represents here as highly characteristic of the Classical Age.

Readers of Foucault will recognize four-part analytical and descriptive formalisms of this kind as a recurring feature in his studies – as in the schemas for characterizing discursive practices in *Archaeology of Knowledge*, and the forms of ethical problematization in *The Use of Pleasures* and *The Care of the Self*. In his last lecture series, dealing with the government of the self and others and the courage of truth, Foucault presents a four-part typology of roles and styles of veridiction – the prophetic, the sage, the technical-pedagogical, and the parrhesiastic. Again, the relations between these modes or components are shown to vary between epochs. In Hellenistic antiquity, the modes of the sage and parrhesiast are closely linked, while being disjoined from both the prophetic and the expert modes; in the medieval Christian period, there is a reconfiguration of the forms of veridiction, with the rapprochement of the prophetic and the parrhesiastic on the one hand, exemplified in the Franciscan and Dominican preaching orders, and a converse linkage between the modes of the expert and the sage, in the person of the university teacher.

A somewhat different structural idea which emerges a little later (HM, 250), midway through Book 2 and its chapters on diagnostic and therapeutic doctrines of the Classical Age, and to which Foucault remained attached for at least some time afterwards, is the notion of a synchronic structure that is common to distinct strata of components of a culture or society, without being attributable to a causal action in either direction by one instance upon another; in this case, the notion of a structural homology between the elimination of unreasonable conducts from the space of social visibility, and rea-

son's intellectual reduction of unreason to a state of mere error, nullity, vacuity and non-being, a structural form shared "in discourse and decree, in words as well as watch-words." Foucault evidently thought at this time – as he did at least up to the writing of *Archaeology of Knowledge* – that there could be a common methodological ground here between his archaeological approach and the methodological orientation towards synchronic structures of the Annales school, and in particular Fernand Braudel, within mainstream history.

In the 1961 preface, just before Foucault's formulation of his "structural" investigative program, there is a significant authorial avowal and disavowal. Foucault writes (HM, xxxii) that he would have liked to write a history of "madness itself," of madness in its natural state before its capture by knowledge or reason; then he says that such a project is impossible, because (Foucault expresses the point through some lines from a poem by Char) the object it seeks is always found to have escaped us. So he abandons the impossible transgressive project, and instead undertakes a possible one, set out in the terms we have cited. So far, one might think, so straightforward. Foucault no doubt had a reason to mention in his preface the impossible project that he had chosen not to attempt, the obvious reason being that it remained the inspiration of an effort by more mundane labor to shift the parameters of historico-conceptual inquiry. But this was not straightforward enough for some readers. Jacques Derrida's celebrated 1964 critique of HM focuses relentlessly on Foucault's words about "a history of madness 'itself'" – for all the world as though this had remained the actual project of Foucault's book. Ian Hacking, writing in his 2005 foreword to HM, suggests, with playful Borge-sian ingenuity, that at least the 1961 edition of the book, with its 1961 title and preface, actually is "a history of madness 'itself'," and became a quite different book with a quite different object only in 1972, when Foucault, while leaving the 600-page body of his text almost totally unmodified, deleted the preface and removed the words "Unreason and Madness" from the title. It is true that, a little before 1972, Foucault had published in *Archaeology of Knowledge* his own self-critical remarks distancing himself from some perceived deficiencies of HM, which had "given much too great and enigmatic a role to what it termed an 'experience', thereby showing how close one remained to positing an anonymous and general subject of history" (HM, 16) – a severe and (as indicated above) in truth largely unwarranted autocritique which almost suggests that, along with some others, Foucault himself might (like others) have been fazed by Derrida's adroit misconstruction of his intentions. A few years later, as we will discuss below, Foucault reopened the dossier of HM in a way that both reaffirms and redevelops some of the abandoned affective and investigative business of the 1961 preface.

After Foucault formulates in the 1961 preface the "modest" version of his project, there follows immediately another (in some readings) problematic challenging commitment – to return to the "obscure common root," a postulated original or primal moment prior to the tragic division between a state of sanity and a state of madness. This has not uncommonly occasioned a reading of the historical narrative structure of HM which I believe to be mistaken, namely that the period of European history at which Foucault's narrative begins, the later Middle Ages, represents the point of the supposed primal and chaotically undifferentiated encounter between reason and madness.

It is clear, however, that Foucault is not looking here for the historical moment of beginning of the history of madness. (The same might not be true with regard to the history of unreason. Foucault makes the remark that the *logos* of Greek philosophy has no opposite in the way that unreason, for the modern West, is the opposite of reason.) It might be much more plausible to see the “root” postulate as a methodological device, akin to and a precursor of the thought-experiments Foucault later proposed in his genealogies of governmentalities and regimes of truth – the “nominalism” expounded (with acknowledgments to Paul Veyne) in the 1979 lectures, illustrated precisely by the thought-procedure of “supposing that madness does not exist,” and the “anarchaeology of knowledge” in the 1980 lectures, with its methodological postulate that no form of sovereign power will be presumed to be legitimate. The purposes of these different thought-experiments have a common core which is in turn a manifest and defining feature of Foucault’s entire oeuvre – uncovering the diversity and contingency of historical forms of knowledge, experience, and practice.

Some clarification may be in order at this point about Foucault’s position regarding the medical status of madness and its treatment. He wrote that *Birth of the Clinic* was not a book against medicine; neither is its predecessor *Madness and Civilization*. (Canguilhem [1986], however, wrote that *Birth of the Clinic* was devastating because it identified a scientific revolution in clinical medicine that had never occurred in its psychiatric or psychological specialties.)

Foucault’s core narrative tells how a space of correctional administrative internment that takes in the insane, but is not dedicated to them or their treatment, mutates into a specialized institution accredited with curative powers accomplished though a regime of moral management. The liberating and humane credentials of this regime are pointedly questioned, their scientific foundations indicated to be flimsy, and their clinical efficacy implied to be questionable. While Foucault’s narrative stops at the very beginnings of psychiatry, its indications about what will follow are not comforting. Even so, it does not appear that the purpose of this narrative is to problematize all possible forms of care, including at least limited and pragmatic elements of medical care, of mental disturbance or disorder, nor to disqualify all consideration of feasible alternatives to the status quo.³ HM clearly acknowledges that forms of mental medicine exist outside of and before psychiatry, in other forms and in other ages and cultures, at least as far back as classical antiquity: Foucault cites the opinions and practice of Cicero, Soranus, Pliny and Caelius Aurelianus.⁴ The first wave of late medieval foundations of hospitals for the insane begins in Spain – Valencia (1409), followed by Saragossa, Seville, Toledo, and Valladolid. Foucault suggests that their inspiration came from outside the European province, from perhaps more advanced and less aggressively exclusionary societies: Islamic therapeutic practices such as those of the twelfth-century asylum in Cairo, knowledge of which was brought back by the Brothers of Mercy from the Middle East. “A sort of spiritual therapy was carried out there, involving music, dance, and theatrical spectacles and readings of marvellous stories. The therapy was directed by physicians, and they decided when to bring it to a close in the event of success.” Commenting on the Saragossa hospital founded in 1425, whose “wise order” he notes to have been admired centuries later by Philippe Pinel, co-inaugurator of the proto-psychiatric model of moral treatment, Foucault writes, “Life there followed the rhythm of a garden, with the usual season concentration on harvests, trellising and

grape and olive picking" (HM, 117). Commenting on these late-medieval foundations, Foucault sees a new emerging status of the insane, "grouped together in something resembling a new specific unity, isolated by a practice that was no doubt ambiguous as it isolated him from the world without exactly granting him a medical status" (HM, 118). The Islamic hospitals of Cairo, Fez, and Baghdad, like other branches of Islamic science and medicine, have been thought to have drawn on the legacy of Hellenistic texts and practices of Soranus and others, which in the psychotherapeutic domain involved a combination of spiritual, environmental, somatic, occupational, and social remedies; all recognizable elements of "alternative" therapeutic repertoires in the twentieth century.

A History of Limits

The next remarkable formulation in this preface which merits attention, both as a guide to reading HM and as formulating, perhaps with unique explicitness, an ongoing dimension of inquiry within and beyond Foucault's own work, is this:

We could write a history of *limits* – of those obscure gestures, necessarily forgotten as soon as they are accomplished, through which a culture rejects something which for it will be the Exterior . . . To interrogate a culture about its limit-experiences is to question it at the confines of history about a tear that is something like the very birth of its history. (HM, xxix)

Avatars of the "Exterior" which are then mentioned include the Orient, the domain of dreams, sexual prohibitions, and, "finally and firstly," madness. If HM may have to some degree inspired British and American anti-psychiatrists, this passage could also have part-inspired Edward Said's *Orientalism*.

It makes a good deal of sense to read HM in the light of this comment, as a history of the other, the forms of its delineation as other, of its exclusion, its expulsion and/or closure into dedicated spaces of otherness. (Foucault gave a radio talk in 1966 sketching a part-playful, part-serious project for the study of what he termed "heterotopias" – "other spaces," spaces of the other or of otherness, among which he numbered gardens, cemeteries, asylums, prisons, brothels, retirement homes, museums, libraries, and boats.⁵) In this guise, HM inaugurates Foucault's historical ethnography of Western reason, and might be considered a sibling text to that near-contemporary work of ethnography which inspired a generation of pioneering historians such as Peter Brown, Mary Douglas's *Purity and Danger* [(1966). Chris Philo, the author of the most thorough exploration of the heterotopian spatial dimensions of HM, using comparative data from England and Wales, has justly remarked that it is one of the founding modern texts for the interest in alterity, the other and the forms and practices of its objectivation, and the countervailing pride of "legitimate difference" which have been a constant strand of critical thought and culture for the past half-century (Philo, forthcoming). It may have been one of the harbingers of the concern with "social exclusion" as a theme and problem of governmental policy that developed in France in the 1970s and 1980s and spread very prominently to the UK in the 1990s, and of a concurrent

development in political and ethical sensibility inclined to valorize the “inclusionary” and sanction the “exclusionary” tendencies and effects of social institutions, attitudes, and practices. It is worth taking note here that the sense Foucault gives in the above-cited passage to the term “limit-experience” is actually different from its use – designating personal experiences of extremity, impossibility, or the vicinities of death – by the writers Georges Bataille and Maurice Blanchot, who were important references for Foucault at this time, and in which one biographer, James Miller, sought for the key to all his work.⁶ Foucault uses the term here instead to designate the way a society experiences and defines its limits. Such a history of limits, HM shows at various points, is among other things a history of fear. By extension, and consequently, it is a history of the government of fear, and of government through fear. (See the chapter “The Great Fear,” HM, 353–380; on fear in the moral treatment of the insane, see HM, 326, 483).

Exclusion 1: leprosy

Both the structure and scope of HM can be usefully understood in terms of this project. The history of madness is enframed here as a series of episodes within a wider, multiple history of limits and exclusion. The narrative of HM begins with the story of leprosaria as the first dedicated Western spaces of exclusion, and the hypothesis that madness inherits at the end of the Middle Ages both the built institutional spaces formerly occupied by lepers, and something of the forms of exclusionary treatment and status applied to the medieval leper.

R. I. Moore’s *The Formation of a Persecuting Society* (2nd edition 2007), a work that acknowledges HM as one of its indirect inspirations, postulated a common pattern in the concurrent emergence and intensification from the eleventh century of practices and policies to detect, stigmatize, pursue, persecute, and segregate a number of categories of persons considered dangerous to communal well-being and order, including heretics, Jews, lepers, male homosexuals, and female prostitutes. Moore’s study merits our brief attention here as one of those that, working independently, appears to both vindicate Foucault’s approach and complement his analyses at a number of points. Moore challenges the conventional historical assumption of perennial popular prejudice and hostility against the target groups in question, and the supposition that organized persecutions were initiated and fueled by pressures from below. He focuses on the evidence of methodical organization and technique in the conduct of persecutions – notably, the techniques and methods (which one might also term the power/knowledge) of inquisition. He identifies as their probable prime movers and agents a class of “new men,” the literate servants and technicians of royal and ecclesiastical government, equipped with “the new engines of power, the abacus, the syllogism and the legal maxim” (2007: 167): “In the history of power, persecution was part of the process of intensification” (2007: 169).

Moore does not include the mad among the principal target categories of persecution in this period; like Foucault, he does not discern a pattern of organized persecution or generalized segregation of the insane in medieval society,⁷ nor (contrary to some subsequent myths) does it appear that the insane were stigmatized or persecuted as heretics, witches, or those possessed. The symbolic status of lepers was, as Foucault had also commented, and somewhat in the same manner in which Foucault remarked on

the status of the medieval mad, profoundly ambivalent: physically segregated and excluded, dispossessed of property rights and civilly dead, the leper had also been “granted the special grace of entering upon payment for his sins in this life.” Leprosy was a penitential condition and the prescribed life of the leper, organized in a leper house modeled on the monastery, was a life of penance: “the strict rules governing the conduct of leper houses were in part a reflection of the idea that lepers constituted a quasi-religious order” (Moore 2007: 59). When the mad, and other interneers, inherit these buildings reassigned to the Hôpital Générale, they inherit a similar regimen, as indicated in Foucault’s documentary appendix reproducing the daily *horarium* of the Salpêtrière for 1721 (HM, 655–656).

Foucault’s chapter on “The Great Internment” bears a laconic and unattributed, in fact biblical and Augustinian, epigraph: “*Compelle intrare*.” In the Gospels of Matthew and Luke, Christ tells the parable of a rich man, who, vexed by the dilatory response of friends he has invited to a feast, instructs his servant: “Go out quickly into the streets and alleys of the town and bring in the poor, the crippled, the blind and the lame,” and then, in addition, “Go out into the highways and along the hedges, and compel them to come in, so that my house may be filled.” Augustine of Hippo later found in this text and the specific phrase *compelle intrare* a divine remit for the coercion he wished to apply to the Donatian sect of heretics, in order for them to be “compelled to enter” the orthodox Church. The preamble to the French royal decree of 1657, the act of internment establishing the Hôpital Générale of Paris, reproduced in the documentary appendix to HM, concludes by declaring: “we consider these beggars to be living members of Jesus Christ, and not useless members of the State, and act here in such a great work, not through any concern with Policing, but motivated solely by Charity” (HM, 652). Foucault’s epigraph juxtaposes the muscular law of inclusionary hospitality, the will that a house be full, and the coercive normativity of true faith, thus implicitly posing for us the enduring question of whether to wish that our reason, or its republic, should be a church. It is also a reminder, one of many in HM, of a theme extensively revisited in his later work, including the most recent posthumous publications, that the Western history of exclusion, like the histories of correction and confession, are deeply interwoven with the history of Christianity. Foucault’s recently published and forthcoming work (notably the 1984, 1980, and Louvain lectures) adds substantially to the available fraction of his unfinished work on the Christian genealogy and archaeology of knowledge, power and ethics, and HM is among the key earlier works that can be profitably revisited in this new light.⁸

Theology and police

In one of the crucial passages of HM (55–62) – directly following his pages juxtaposing the mutation in philosophy between Montaigne and Descartes, by which reason affirms its immunity from the imminent and incessant hazard of madness, with the mid-seventeenth-century laws and decrees establishing the internment of the idle poor in Paris and across Europe, Foucault describes the mutation in Reformation theology that desacralizes the status of the poor. The pauper (of which the mad person could be considered a subtype) is no longer the image of the suffering Christ, and his poverty may rather be the just sign of divine retribution (Calvin); works of charity to the poor

are no longer necessities for salvation (Luther). Poverty, “[F]rom being the object of a religious experience and sanctified . . . became the object of a moral conception that condemned it” (HM, 57). The Counter-Reformation, after some initial reluctance, soon follows suit, accepting the transfer of the government of the poor to secular foundations which manage poverty as a problem of moral and social order: “since the creation of the General Hospital and the charitable bureaux, God no longer appeared in a poor man’s rags” (HM, 60). The newly founded house of internment dispenses both charity and punishment, depending on the moral merit and docility of the pauper. The virtuous poor “submitted and conformed to the order that was imposed on it”; the undeserving “rebelled and tried to escape that order.” “The former accepted internment, and found its repose there; the latter resisted it, and thereby merited its condition” (HM, 59). The mad, Foucault notes, might find themselves, according to their perceived attitudes, interned either among the “good paupers” or among the “bad paupers” (HM, 60). They would thus fall under a regimen – destined to outlive the Classical Age – where docility might become a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for cure.

Foucault does not fully explore in HM how the Pauline and humanist prestige of madness and folly for Christ came to be withdrawn from fools and mad people in early modern societies, at the same time as the claim to similitude with Christ came to be withdrawn from the poor. Religious war, the repression of heresy, and the confession-alization of Reformation and Counter-Reformation states appear to have shifted the theological balance back toward the assimilation of madness and sin, including the arch-sin of heresy.⁹ In a brilliant, untranslated article published in 1969, Foucault maps the complex alliances and competitions of powers and knowledges (royal, ecclesiastical, inquisitorial; juridical, medical, theological) around seventeenth-century cases of possession, heresy, and witchcraft, and the motives of reason of state pushing towards the partial reclassification of heresy (Protestant or Jansenist) as a manifestation of a disordered reason, and the partial reclassification of possession and sorcery as simulation, again assimilable to insanity – a rationalizing reclassification that disqualifies, disenchants, and annuls a symbolic danger, without deculpabilizing the reclassified offender.¹⁰

Exclusion 2: the correctional world and the poor

Foucault’s chapter on the ‘Great Internment’ is liable to be (and has been) seriously misunderstood if it is read as an account of a program of systematic internment specifically targeting the insane. It is indeed clear from his account that such a program did not exist in the early modern period, either in France or elsewhere. It was rather that the insane were swept up in an administrative dragnet taking in the idle, vagrant, and mendicant poor, along with various sanctioned forms of disordered and disorderly life. The history here is of multiple superposed limits, of very diverse heterogeneous categories united in their space of exclusion, and of the consequences of that agglomeration. The great, extraordinary following chapter “The Correctional World” catalogs these categories of the interned: venereal patients, sodomists and other debauchees, blasphemers, attempted suicides, sorcerers and witches, alchemists and soothsayers, libertine freethinkers (some of these ceased only in the course of the Classical Age to be crimes subject to the death penalty; some acts, which ceased to be crimes because they

were no longer officially deemed to be possible, such as sorcery, were redefined as misdemeanors of imposture). It reflects on the manner in which their cohabitation with one another and with the insane in the shared places of internment contributes to the formation of a composite modern moral profile of mental abnormality. This is also, in Foucault's account, a contributing cause to a slow mutation of the status of unreason attributed to the insane, which migrates gradually from the category of error – an error of reason which may in itself be morally innocent – to the category of a fault of conduct, a fault rooted in the culpable will, whose recalcitrance it will be the vocation of the asylum to subdue.

The most numerous category of the interned, whose status as an object of policy was the greatest factor in the making and unmaking of the great internments, were the poor, and internment was first and foremost an economic policy for the government of poverty; a policy of the early modern state of police, whose making and unmaking are integral to the narrative of HM, and are again later considered in his governmental-ity lectures of 1978–79. Foucault cites Voltaire: “you still haven’t found a way to force the rich to make the poor work? Evidently you have not even reached the first elements of ‘police’” (HM, 62). Among all the elements of failure and scandal that lead to the discrediting of police internment – economic, political, and moral – Foucault picks out a cluster of issues relating to the presence of the insane as a largely unsegregated subgroup within the promiscuous space and populations of internment. The mad are disruptive – incapable of work, recalcitrant to discipline; their presence is experienced as a supplementary torment by the other interned; subjected to harsh, inhuman restraint, their condition is a scandal and a contagion within and beyond the institution; they are objects equally of fear, revulsion, and humane sympathy. The cause of reform calls for a separate, segregated, specialized internment – but an internment whose fitness and necessity is affirmed with undiminished urgency.

The historical beginning of modern psychiatry, seen against this background, is the moment when the space of internment, the notorious and discredited symbol of a cruel and wasteful tyranny, is purified, rehabilitated and reinvested with a therapeutic vocation and capability: an “other space” that now acquires the role and virtue of a space and place of truth, a space where medical power is exercised – in a manner only apparently equivalent to that of clinical or physical sciences – to ensure the production, manifestation, and avowal of truth.¹¹

Exclusion and the genealogical enterprise: the moment of psychiatry

Foucault himself afterwards, and in this case without any tincture of self-criticism, recognized the theme of exclusion as a distinctive focus of HM. In a 1981 interview, given at the time of his Louvain lecture series entitled *Mal faire, dire vrai: Fonctions de l'aveu*, Foucault situated exclusion among the structuring principles applying respectively to different arenas of truth and subjectivity:

The institutional practice through which one sees the question of truth taking shape in relation to madness is internment or hospitalization. The question of the history of madness is the relation between exclusion and truth. In the case of criminality, the problem was the institution of the prison as not simply exclusion, but as a correctional procedure.

Here it is through the project of reform and rehabilitation of the prisoner that the question of truth poses itself. In the case of sexuality, the question of truth is posed through the practice of confession. Exclusion-madness-truth; correction-prison-truth; sexual conduct-confession-truth. We have here three series. (Interview with André Berten: [Foucault, forthcoming])

Of course, as Foucault abundantly shows in these lectures and elsewhere, the genealogies of psychiatry, penality, and sexuality are thoroughly intertwined; already in HM, the historical *a priori* of the asylum is found to consist in a particular synthesis of exclusion, correction, and confession. HM is also the first in Foucault's work of a series of three "births," each tracing the advent of an institution, a power, and a knowledge, each centered on the same historical setting and period, which happens to be revolutionary France. HM's penultimate chapter and narrative climax is entitled "Birth of the Asylum"; Foucault's next book is *Birth of the Clinic*; the subtitle of his *Discipline and Punish* is *Birth of the Prison*.

Alterity, exclusion, internment could be the signature thematic series of HM. The designation of an other does not, as such, entail its exclusion, nor its internment. HM deals with the intricate, serial permutations of these historical contingencies. One could encapsulate the narrative of HM (borrowing some of Foucault's later vocabulary) in the following terms: the early modern period places pastoral-penitential enclosure in the hands of secular government; in the psychiatric asylum, its vocation is specialized, its space is medicalized, and the registers of exclusion, correction, and confession/*aveu* are brought into a clinical synthesis. In this space two new personages with their respective role, status, and capability encounter each other, personages whose formation and interaction are coterminous with the formation of the new space: the mentally ill patient, and the alienist.

A Politics of the History of Madness

The last words of the 1961 preface to HM are an unattributed quotation from René Char's poem of wartime resistance, *Partage formel*: "Companions in pathos, who barely murmur, go with your lamp spent and return the jewels. A new mystery sings in your bones. Cultivate your legitimate strangeness" (HM, xxxvi). These lines, with their affirmation of difference, could have had various resonances for Foucault and his contemporary readers.¹² Speaking at a conference commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of HM, Foucault's mentor and thesis supervisor Georges Canguilhem (1992) recalled his own experiences as a *maquis* medical officer, treating wounded fugitives who were being sheltered in the psychiatric community hospital in Saint-Alban led by François Tosquelles, (then a Republican exile from Catalonia, a location of innovations in psychotherapeutic practice pre-dating the Spanish Civil War), which served intermittently as a refuge for a number of Resistance writers (as other French asylums served as hiding places during the Occupation for Jews, homosexuals, and gypsies). Saint-Alban was the forerunner of the minority post-war French current of 'institutional psychiatry', the therapeutic community movement led among others by Félix Guattari, co-

author with Gilles Deleuze of *Anti-Oedipus*, the book which Foucault commended as an “introduction to the non-fascist life.”¹³

The wartime period of French psychiatry had another, darker side – never directly evoked in Foucault’s work – which had become public knowledge soon after the Liberation and which left a long legacy of guilt and recrimination: during the period (1940–44) of the Occupation and Vichy around 45,000 inmates of French asylums had been allowed to die of starvation and malnutrition (Bueltzingsloewen 2007). Subsequent historical analysis appears to have refuted the allegation of a deliberate Vichy policy of eugenic extermination, dictated by the Third Reich or inspired by the example of its exterminations; but for at least part of the Occupation a *de facto* policy was applied which the principle of biopolitics later formulated by Foucault, “faire vivre et laisser mourir” (“make live and let die”), appears to effectively describe. The perceived obligation of psychiatry to “assume” or take moral responsibility for its own history thus carried an unusually and dangerously sharp edge in post-war France – an obligation that became no less problematic in the prolonged post-war absence of any significant institutional reform. Proponents of alternative forms of institutional therapeutic practice, inspired by Tosquelles among others, cited the experience of the war years and the impression that asylums were barely distinguishable from concentration camps. Critical voices within psychiatry, including Georges Daumezon and Roger Gentis, warned that the Occupation evidenced the risk of a contemporary society reverting to a quasi-genocidal regime of internment. The older legacy of *ancien régime* internment and its pertinence for the contemporary politics of the asylum were not themes newly coined by Foucault in 1961. Georges Daumezon, a psychiatrist-historian and pro-reform professional activist, wrote in *Esprit* in 1952 – referring back explicitly to the wartime famine of the French asylums – “the reality remains: the socio-economic structure which makes the psychiatric hospital the successor of the Hôpital Générale of Louis XIV, the institutions in which we agglomerate, always hopefully at the lowest cost, a society’s always more numerous misfits” (Bueltzingsloewen 2007: 415).

All of this well-founded and well-developed sense of *mauvaise conscience* may account for a part of the striking vehemence of attacks on Foucault’s book that began to emerge during the 1960s from those within or close to the psychiatric and psychotherapeutic professions. Jacques Derrida, himself not a psychiatrist but a philosopher and the husband of a psychoanalyst, appears to have read HM as an existential threat to psychiatry in just this sense, and his startlingly ferocious words – seldom noticed by the many commentators on the “Foucault–Derrida controversy” – may perhaps have provided ammunition for the professionals’ subsequent attacks: “Is it enough to confiscate under lock and key the instruments of psychiatry . . . The psychiatrist is only the delegate of this order . . . it is perhaps not enough to imprison or exile the delegate, to deprive him in his turn of the right to speak”; “a powerful gesture of protection and internment”; “violence of a totalitarian and historicist style”; “structuralist totalitarianism”; “the origin and very sense of what one calls violence and which makes all straitjackets possible” (Derrida 1967: 57–8, 85, 88; my translation). Alongside, or indeed among, the progressive proponents of a psychiatry wishing to “assume” responsibility for its questionable political antecedents or compromised recent responsibilities as impulses for reform, a majority position in French psychiatry seems to have formed

by 1971 (when Foucault was invited or summoned to defend himself before a national conference organized by a psychiatric journal, and – having failed to present himself at this event – was afterwards charged by its leading figure, Henri Ey, with the crime of “psychiatricide”) that Foucault’s style of genealogical analysis was an act of violence against the honor of a scientific profession.¹⁴ When Foucault, a year later, suppressed his 1961 preface in the reprinted edition of *HM*, disclaiming the authorial right to control the reading and use of his text, his real point may have been to declare his unavailability for inquisitorial investigations on such charges, while refusing either to disavow or generically endorse challenges to the psychiatric institution which invoked the support of his text.

As Foucault afterwards commented, nothing is more indicative of the peculiar and problematic epistemological status of psychiatry’s scientific claims than the belief – transparently evident, for example, in Derrida’s comments – in an immediate linkage between the continued existence and credentials of a profession and the conservation of a positive, progressive narrative about its historical beginnings; the sense that a certain official and corporate genesis-narrative is an integral component of professional and scientific legitimacy (Foucault 1994: 666). It is not unreasonable to wonder whether even at the present time the academic sub-specialty of psychiatric history has entirely emancipated itself from this system of imperatives. In *HM*, pertinent discussions can be found of psychiatry’s relation to history that form an important and still relevant strand, continued by Foucault and others in later work, of its political analysis.

In *The Formation of a Persecuting Society*, R. I. Moore signals his dissent from the “classical deviancy theory” initiated or inspired by the sociology of Durkheim in which the identification and repression of deviancies operates as a spontaneous social mechanism, “excluding some to reinforce the unity of the rest” (2007: 100). Moore is here echoing a comment made by Foucault in *HM*, taking issue with an earlier twentieth-century, progressive-minded school of psychiatric history and sociology of early modern social control, for whom “the meaning of confinement can be reduced to an obscure social mechanism that allowed society to expel heterogeneous or harmful elements . . . confinement was merely the spontaneous elimination of the ‘asocial’” (*HM*, 78). This initial, spontaneous reflex came, according to this group of thinkers, to be extended and perfected, in a continuous progressive development, through the subsequent elaboration of a positive clinical science of the abnormal. Foucault comments, “The fact that the internees of the eighteenth century bear a resemblance to our modern vision of the asocial is undeniable, but it is above all a question of results, as the character of the marginal was produced by the gesture of segregation itself” (*HM*, 79). Hence, “to rewrite the history of that process of banishment is to conduct the archaeology of an alienation” (*HM*, 80). Foucault comments on the writers of this school, whose leading figure was the psychiatrist Paul Sérieux, that their goal was “to ‘rehabilitate’ the confinement practiced under the Ancien Régime, and destroy the myth of the Revolution delivering the mad” (*HM*, 604). As to the idea of psychiatric science as the legitimate heir of internment, “a sort of orthogenesis . . . progressing from group consciousness to positive science” (*HM*, 79), he adds in a footnote, “Strangely, this rather naïve methodological presupposition, common to all the authors in question, is also to be found in Marxist authors when they touch on the history of

the sciences" (HM, 604). As Robert Castel notes, in his subsequent (1976) continuation of the nineteenth-century narrative of HM in *The Psychiatric Order*, the Sérieux school (who were interested in policy as well as history) taxed the post-revolutionary Pinel school with a certain laxity. Classical alienism had postulated too narrow a definition of the populations to be taken in charge. The category of the "abnormal" must not be limited to that of the mentally ill. A more complete and diversified range of internment institutions was required to accommodate those sections of the population that did not belong in a prison or asylum, but could also not be safely left at liberty (Castel 1976: 188–90, 285).

Foucault returned to the genealogy of the abnormal, and of the asylum, in his lectures of 1973–74 and 1974–75, with some further criticisms of HM which, given a reading of the latter, may seem less sweeping than they sound. He had already set out in 1961, on a broader canvas and with no less conceptual depth and robustness than in any of his later works, a genealogy of "normal man," in terms very prescient of his analyses in the governmentality lectures, and beyond: the history of a problematic of plural modes of subjectification (the fine legal criteria of competence and responsibility, the coarser police criteria of dangerousness and order) in Western culture, and the challenges and effects of their superposition.

The psychopathology of the nineteenth century (and perhaps our own too, even now) believes that it orients itself and takes its bearings in relation to a *homo natura*, or a normal man pre-existing all experience of mental illness. Such a man is in fact an invention; and if he is to be situated, it is not in a natural space, but in a system that identifies the *socius* to be the subject of law . . . at the meeting point between the social decree of confinement, and the juridical knowledge that evaluates the responsibility of individuals before the law. (HM, 129–30).

The genealogy extends onward into the mid-nineteenth century and the emergence of theories of degeneracy which were to underpin the progressive program of the Sérieux school and their allies in other countries, and a new synthesis of legal and normalizing orders would be proposed that Foucault later mapped in "The Problem of the Dangerous Individual" (1978).

As Foucault and then Castel show, it was not initially a straightforward matter for liberal government to vest professional medical diagnosis with the capacity to suspend a subject's civil liberty. Once this problem had been solved, the demand for and offer of additional contributions by mental medicine toward social order and public hygiene became, as it has remained, prolific. This takes place through an analysis of modernity in which – as expounded in the remarkable concluding pages to the chapter on "The Great Fear" – Enlightenment ideas that were part of the conditions of possibility of "moral treatment" come to be transmuted, inverted, and in Foucault's expression, "entirely betrayed" (HM, 378).

Foucault remarks here that nineteenth-century psychiatry did not, as the well-meaning twentieth century has supposed, relapse into positivist ignorance of the social dimension of its vocation. But where the Enlightenment incriminates modern urban luxury and idle affluence, the nineteenth century denounces proletarian degeneracy and idle poverty. By an "inversion of historical analysis into social critique," the

degenerate insane poor now appear not as casualties of progress, but as the residue of evolution. Madness is now “the stigmata of a social class which has abandoned the forms of bourgeois ethics; and at the very moment when the philosophical concept of alienation acquires a historical meaning through the economic analysis of labour, the medical and psychological concept of alienation frees itself totally from history, to become instead moral critique in the name of the compromised salvation of the species” (HM, 378). In later discussions, Foucault cites a French expert in “social defence,” who in 1890 commended to his Russian colleague the use of Siberia for establishing penal labor colonies (PK, 224ff). Some nineteenth- and twentieth-century carceral inventions, as Foucault comments elsewhere, have older roots; the account in his chapter on “The Proper Use of Liberty” of the Enlightenment’s critiques of internment and its penal proposals or utopias (which, apart from not mentioning Bentham, directly prefigures *Discipline and Punish*) cites the Girondin revolutionary Brissot de Warville’s plan for “the best of all possible worlds of evil,” an institution in which criminals would be worked to death in the manner yielding the greatest benefit to society (HM, 428–429).

In the 1970s, with the reprinting of HM and alongside the archive project, Foucault resumed work on his long-promised sequel to HM. Research that might have underpinned this new volume was presented in his lecture series *Psychiatric Power* (1973–74) and *Abnormal* (*Les Anormaux*, 1974–75). One reason why this project was not completed may have been a degree of unease or malaise – which Foucault did not feel in relation to the question of the prison – in relation to the contemporary French politics of psychiatric institutions and practices, where Foucault was widely encouraged or expected to assume a leading role as a campaigning intellectual, but was manifestly reluctant, or unwilling, despite continuing private engagement and apart from intermittent public interventions, to fulfill this demand (Castel 1976). Nonetheless, both in his review of Castel (1977) and the concluding remarks to his *Abnormal* lectures, Foucault develops and further sharpens the diagnosis already set out in HM of psychiatry’s early proclivity for theories of degeneracy and social defense, promoting the detection, exclusion, and even elimination of a wide range of categories of the dangerous or unfit. *Abnormal* explicitly credits psychiatry with the invention of this form of what Foucault terms state racism. Foucault’s review of Castel’s book points to the contemporary potential in Western societies, following the generally acclaimed elimination of the asylum, for the implantation across the social body, in its place, of new expert interventions for the detection and prevention of potential deviances. The lecture course also specifically focused attention on the problematic para-legal functioning of psychiatric expert assessment in penal justice.

Lives and archives: affect, ethics, politics

The 1961 preface, asking and answering the question of what a history of madness can be, begins by asking what place, if any, is accorded to the voices of madness within “the great reasonable calm of history”: “What weight might they have, in the face of the few decisive words that wove the becoming of Western reason, these vain words, these dossiers of indecipherable delirium, juxtaposed by chance to the words of reason in prisons and libraries?” (HM, xxxi). On his method of working he comments: “Beyond

any reference to a psychiatric ‘truth’, the aim was to allow these words and texts, which came from beneath the surface of language, and were not produced to accede to language, to speak of themselves. Perhaps, to my mind, the most important part of this work is the space I have left to the texts of the archives themselves” (HM, xxxiv–xxv). When the reprinting of HM was agreed with Gallimard in 1972, it was planned to publish an accompanying volume of its sources in the new Gallimard series “Archives.” In 1977 Foucault published an introduction to this planned volume under the title “The Lives of Infamous Men.” In this, one of Foucault’s most personal and brilliant shorter texts, which Deleuze considered a masterpiece, he reflected back on the writing of HM.

A long time ago, I made use of documents like these for a book. If I did so back then, it was doubtless because of the resonance I still experience today when I happen to encounter these lowly lives reduced to ashes in the few sentences that struck them down. The dream would have been to restore their intensity in an analysis. Lacking the necessary talent, I brooded for a long time over the analysis alone. I considered the texts in their dryness, trying to determine their reason for being, what institutions or what political practice they referred to, seeking to understand why it had suddenly been so important in a society like ours to “stifle” (as one stifles a cry, smothers a fire or strangles an animal) a scandalous monk or a peculiar and inconsequential usurer. I looked for the reason why people were so zealous to prevent the feeble-minded from walking down unknown paths. (EW3, 158)¹⁵

The planned volume appeared in 1982, co-edited with Arlette Farge, as *Le Désordre des familles*, consisting essentially of a compilation of letters, interspersed with sections of commentary, transcribed from the police archives and addressed to the king by private individuals among his subjects, requesting the executive internment, on grounds of immoral or scandalous conduct, of an identified individual, often a member of their family. In “Lives of Infamous Men,” Foucault acknowledges and answers certain reproaches directed at his work from areas of the left and by proponents of history “from below.” “I will be told: ‘That’s so like you. Always with the same inability to cross the line, to pass to the other side, to listen and convey the language that comes from elsewhere or from below; always the same choice, on the side of power, of what it says or causes to be said. Why not go listen to those lives where they speak in their own voice?’” He replies,

But first of all, would anything remain at all of what they were in their violence or their singular misfortune had they not, at a given moment, met up with power and provoked its forces . . . The brief and strident words that went back and forth between power and the most inessential existences doubtless constitute, for the latter, the only monument they have ever been granted: it is what gives them, for the passage through time, the bit of brilliance, the brief flash that carries them to us. (EW3, 161–2)

There is more to this, as both “Lives” and *Désordre* richly show: the stridency of the captured words from below is not so often the voices of the obscure deviants whom power smites and excludes, but denunciations of these individuals by other, equally modest, subjects, appealing against them for redress through the police powers of a benign sovereign. The history of limits is mapped here through capillary, not altogether one-sided, transactions between power and ordinary lives.

Cynic Enlightenment

Foucault's introduction to Book 3 of HM is a commentary on Diderot's story *Rameau's Nephew* (which was first published in a German translation by Goethe and almost immediately became the subject of a key passage in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*). For Foucault, Diderot's text signals an early sign of the breakdown of the Classical Age's social disqualification and marginalization of unreason, and the reappearance in new, modern guise of the personage of the fool, through the entertaining and provocative impertinences of an indigent, disreputable hanger-on of polite society, performative of an unreason that the reason of the respectable cannot altogether disavow because his inanity too recognizably mimics and mirrors that of the society which harbors it. Rameau's nephew is a social figure ahead of his time – an empty-headed truth-teller, an impertinent critic of Enlightenment. In Foucault's particular perspective, he also foreshadows the dangerous modern paths of writing and thought outside the pacified zone of "anthropological sleep," the paths of Holderlin, Nerval, Nietzsche, Roussel, and Artaud, explorations of limit-experiences of unreason at risk of the hazard of madness.

Rameau's Nephew is again mentioned in Foucault's last lecture series of 1984, in an implicit evocation of his first book (and of Hegel) that opens up powerful potential links and resonances between his early and final explorations, and perhaps, again, between philosophy and madness. (Plato described the Cynic philosopher Diogenes as "a Socrates gone mad"). The mention occurs in a rapid review of the forms of sequel in Western culture to the Cynic style of philosophical life and public truth-telling, in the course of which he refers to Diderot's text as a turning point in the history of reflection on Cynicism in the West (C-CT lecture, February 29, second hour). Foucault's main examples of Cynic legacies in this brief but intriguing digression are the lifestyle of the itinerant mendicant medieval preaching orders – and of the heretic preachers whom they combated – and the lifestyles of revolutionaries and modern artists. One of the leitmotifs of the Cynic theme and its Christian and Western sequels in Foucault's final lecture series is the involvement of the idea of a true (because truth-telling) life – which makes the Cynic philosopher an alternative ruler of the world – with the ideas of "other life" and "other world." (The French text, almost untranslatably, subdivides each of these themes into "autre vie" and "vie autre," "autre monde" and "monde autre" – the former denoting numerical, the latter qualitative, otherness.)

These echoes and recapitulations might prompt us to consider whether further links and synergies may be found between the findings of early and so-called final Foucault, and between his analyses of the practices of government of the self and of others. There is an almost fixational recurrence through Foucault's work of the theme of the Cartesian meditation, from HM via the lectures on governmentality and the courses on the care of the self and the philosophical life. The Classical and Cartesian Age, in which the praise of folly falls silent, is the same period that Foucault finds characterized by the receding of the philosophical theme of the care of the self and of philosophical spirituality, that experimental assaying of self in the manner of Montaigne which was also reason's skeptical probing of its own unreason (HM, 45–47; C-HS, 251). How might Foucault's last lecture series reconnect with his first book? A

brief answer – already suggested through this chapter’s epigraphs – might be that *The Courage of Truth* deals with alterity as a positive value within Western culture in the context of conceptions of the government of the self and the philosophical life, while HM deals with alterity as a metacultural thematic of exclusion, and with the history of styles of government of the other in and through forms of exclusion. Future study should throw more light on the interactions and crossovers of these stories. But, just as HM is not a book simply written against reason and in praise of madness, the last lectures are not a simple commendation of the Cynic model of scandalously true and veridical life, the alternative realms of Dominican and revolutionary being – like the seductions and tyrannies of unreason – each not being without its own intrinsic costs and dangers.¹⁶

Notes

- 1 Radio interview with Pierre Sandhal (20 Sept. 1961), IMEC Archives; cited in Artières and Bert (2011: 231–231). See also Kharkourdin (1999: 297) on the Soviet “law against idlers” adopted in 1961, which “allowed administrative bodies to sentence any individual not legally registered at any job to forced labour.”
- 2 It does not seem out of the question that the chapter title “Le Monde correctionnaire” alludes to David Rousset’s *L’Univers concentrationnaire* (1946).
- 3 On the day in early June 1984 when Foucault was taken ill and admitted to hospital for the last time, he had been due to attend the funeral of his friend Françoise Castel, a psychiatrist, co-author with Robert Castel and Ann Lovell of *The Psychiatric Society* (1982), and a leading campaigner, alongside Franco Basaglia and others, in the European Network for Alternatives to Psychiatry.
- 4 For Soranus, see HM, 313 (reference omitted in the index to this edition).
- 5 Foucault (2009). Philo (2004) is subtitled, borrowing a phrase from HM, “The Space Reserved for Insanity”: here as elsewhere, a geographical sensibility proves to yield some of the most fruitful recent reading of Foucault’s work.
- 6 Experiences of modern art and writing conducted at the edge of unreason and at the risk of madness, from Holderlin to Artaud and Roussel, are, however, an important archaeological theme within the last chapters of HM, which suggest that their condition and hazards are side-effects of the dogmatic and normative reign of the human sciences.
- 7 While the treatment of the medieval mad as described by Foucault (and others) may not qualify as organized persecution in the sense analyzed by Moore, it encompasses, alongside some access to protective accommodation and (mainly domiciliary) medical treatment, practices of confinement, punishment, ostracism, and lethal neglect.
- 8 For a comprehensive recent survey, see Chevallier (2011).
- 9 For a discussion of shifts in Counter-Reformation Spain toward the moral and theological disqualification of madness, see Tausiet (2009).
- 10 Foucault, “Médecins, juges et sorciers au XVII^e siècle” (FDE1a, no. 62, 781–794). See also Foucault “Les Déviations religieuses et le savoir médical” (FDE1a, no. 52, 652–663; translated omitting discussion as “Religious Deviations and Medical Knowledge” in RC, 50–56), on the medicine, theology, and law of demonic action, heresy, and witchcraft.
- 11 Following on from and extending HM, for the asylum as “place of truth,” see especially *Psychiatric Power*; for avowal in psychiatry and justice, *Mal faire, dire vrai*; for manifestation of truth – not directly psychiatric – see the 1980 and 1984 lectures.

- 12 For commentary, see Philo (forthcoming), and Kelly (2003), whom Philo cites. Another of Foucault's key early influences, the novelist and critic Maurice Blanchot, encapsulated his wartime years in the following words: 'The call to irregularity. The limit-experience. Opposition to the occupation and the Vichy regime. Underground activity' (quoted in Hill 1997: 12).
- 13 Foucault appears never to have commented on the institutional psychotherapy movement, nor on Guattari's clinical work or other publications (Mauro Bertani, personal communication, 2012).
- 14 When Paul Patton and I interviewed Foucault in 1978, he remarked, as he had done in an earlier interview, that he was continuing to receive a stream of angry letters from psychiatrists.
- 15 Despite this rueful assessment, "The Correctional World," the chapter, long unknown to English-language readers, in which these individual Bastille documents are cited and analyzed, is unquestionably one of the most powerful and original in HM.
- 16 Special thanks for information, advice, correction and encouragement to Mauro Bertani, Graham Burchell, Philippe Chevallier, Chris Falzon, Paul Patton, and Chris Philo.

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The Order of Things

PATRICE MANIGLIER

An innocent reader approaching *The Order of Things* (OT) for the first time might wonder about the relation between the text's title and its subtitle: *An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*.¹ What does the project of making ourselves, as human beings, an object of science have to do with the way in which things are ordered? As we will come to see, if we are able to answer this naive question, we will already have understood the essential intentions of OT.

We must begin by recalling that the word archaeology designates an attempt to show that something – which is usually considered as timeless, inevitable, substantial, unquestionable – has in fact very precise historical conditions of possibility: that it can be dated and therefore appears more contingent than was initially believed. For instance, Foucault tries to show that “Man” (i.e. the Human) isn't simply a *thing* that has been waiting for all eternity for scientific knowledge to take it as an object (as it did eventually in the human sciences) and for philosophical speculation to take it as a source of value (as it did in the various versions of “humanism”); rather, it is a particular concern which arose as a consequence of precise transformations affecting the practice of empirical knowledge at a particular date. In other words, it is not the case that human beings have always been anxious to produce a scientific discourse about their own nature. In fact, it is only recently, from the end of the eighteenth century onward, that the human has become an object of concern and interest, at least for some human beings.

It should also be added that the purpose of any such archaeology is never purely contemplative: it is also an attempt at undermining the foundations of pseudo-eternal concepts (such as Man, Madness, Prison, etc.) by proving that, since they have not always been considered as simply inevitable givens, they can also in turn give way to something else – that what is born can die. OT is itself no exception to this feature of archaeology that goes beyond the contemplative: it is an attempt to overcome the

A Companion to Foucault, First Edition. Edited by Christopher Falzon, Timothy O'Leary, and Jana Sawicki.
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concept of “Man” as a necessary foundation for philosophy and as a legitimate object for scientific knowledge. It is oriented toward a new philosophy, freed from the Kantian dilemma which Foucault takes to have organized philosophy up until now.

Our question about the title can therefore be reformulated as follows – what does the emergence of “Man,” as an object of scientific concern and interest, have to do with the “order of things”? The answer is simple: Foucault’s hypothesis in this book is that the form of self-knowledge that we call the “human sciences”² is a consequence of a displacement and reframing of the way we conceive of the relations between things. In OT, Foucault recounts the birth and imminent death of Man as an object of study for science and philosophy. He does this by writing the history of a series of different orderings of things, focusing on three major periods: the Renaissance, the Classical Age, and modern times, and providing some hints about what we would call today the “postmodern” moment. Foucault identified this last period with the structuralist movement, which was at its peak in France when the book was published in 1966. For Foucault, therefore, not only is it simply not the case that our conception of Being is relative to our human condition, as the Copernican turn in philosophy argued; his point is, on the contrary, that this very notion of “Man” is dependent on a particular transformation in the history of Being.

However, the mere formulation of this hypothesis opens up a whole series of questions. First, is it true that Man has only become an object of concern in the late eighteenth century? Hasn’t it always been a philosophical and even scientific theme? Secondly, if Man has indeed only recently become an object of theoretical interest, is Foucault’s description and explanation of this process correct? Thirdly, why should we overcome the concept of “Man” – what’s wrong with it after all? Is Foucault’s criticism of this “anthropological” paradigm really convincing? Fourthly, in what sense was structuralism deemed to help us overcoming the limitations of this paradigm? And finally, has Foucault himself, in OT, successfully avoided falling back into the very anthropological framework whose contingency and limits he tried to make apparent?

In the course of the following pages, we will try to answer to some of these questions, mainly by giving a sense of how Foucault tells the story of the birth and death of Man in relation to the history of the orderings of things. In closing, we will respond to a certain number of objections which have been made to the book.

What is “Man”?

The idea that “Man,” as a scientific object and as a source of value, has only existed since the end of the eighteenth century seems at first highly implausible. Didn’t Descartes write a *Treatise of Man*? Didn’t Locke and Hume write about “human understanding”? Don’t we find attempts in Plato and Aristotle to define the essence of Man, and more generally, isn’t Man a matter of concern in all civilizations and at all times?

Of course, the word “Man” here is equivocal. For Foucault, “Man” does not designate a particular thing but rather a particular *question*. It is the emergence of the *problem* that Man seems to raise for the very idea of science that can be dated. Today, we tend to think that there is a problem inherent in making the human an *object* of scientific knowledge, simply because we humans are also the *subject* of science. It is very common,

for instance in the philosophy of the human sciences, to consider that the idea of treating the human just like any other scientific object is overly *reductive*. For this reason the epistemology of the human sciences opposes, as is well known, “understanding” and “explaining” as two incompatible methodological approaches.³ Strange as it may sound, this question didn’t seem to exist for Descartes, Locke, or Hume. The human may have occupied a privileged position in the hierarchy of things – whether because it had a soul in addition to a body, that it was the image of God among the creatures, that it had the capacity of remembering itself, or for many other such reasons – but not because it was both a subject and an object of knowledge at the same time. “Man,” in the sense Foucault uses the concept in OT, means this duality, this split between the subject and object of knowledge. Of course, many thinkers throughout history defined humanity as an essentially split or dual entity (e.g. Pascal: Man is both an angel and a beast). But the duality that is in question for Foucault is not metaphysical but epistemological, and it does not refer to the addition of two elements but rather to an internal division. Therefore Foucault’s worry could be rephrased, though in a somewhat impertinent way: how did such clever people as Descartes, Leibniz, or Hume fail to perceive the oddity of a possible scientific object that would at the same time be the object *for whom* there are objects in general? Why was it necessary to wait until Kant before the problem was raised in these terms? Is it simply because Kant had a more penetrating intelligence?

Foucault’s answer is that, for thinkers of the Classical Age, that is for authors writing from the early seventeenth century approximately to the time of the French Revolution (1789), the fact that there are objects of knowledge in the world – the fact that things offer themselves to be known – doesn’t depend on any particular object (Man), but is rather a part of their nature: they are, by essence, knowable. This can be seen in the way knowledge was conceived and practiced by them. Foucault tries to demonstrate this by drawing on the one hand from texts by Descartes and other philosophers, and on the other hand by comparing these with three domains of empirical knowledge: “general grammar,” “natural history,” and “analysis of wealth.” In doing this, he tries to reconstruct not so much the Classical idea of knowledge (in the sense of some explicit articulate discourse about it) as the list of requirements, implicit in the very practice of empirical domains, that an object has to fulfill in order to become an object – that is, to enter the realm of that about which it is possible to make true or false statements. This list of “conditions,” which qualifies something as a potential object of knowledge, is what Foucault famously called an “episteme.” Although this short characterization opens up more issues than it clarifies, we can provisionally accept it and wait until a better understanding of this concept emerges in the course of our analysis.

Foucault’s point about the Classical Age can be articulated as follows: the nature of the Classical episteme implies that knowledge should be conceived as a species of *representation*. The word “representation” is used by Foucault in a technical sense, it is a concept he creates to capture what he thinks characterizes the Classical episteme: a representation is that which is *in itself about something else* (comparable in that sense to what Brentano later called intentionality). This means both that a representation is about something else and that it *manifests itself* as being about something else. Foucault finds an illustration of this idea in a famous line of Port-Royal *Logique*, a Cartesian handbook in logic, where Arnauld and Nicole take as their first examples of signs the map and the portrait. These clearly manifest the fact that they are about something

else: no one would conflate the portrait of the king with the king himself, nor the map of Italy with Italy itself (OT, 71; FMC, 78–79). When its being about something else is obvious and essential to a sign, this sign is a representation.

But, what happens when the fact that a representation is about something else becomes uncertain, when a representation may be thought of as something which is first of all *in itself* and then only secondarily *about something else*? Now, the notion emerges that representations only exist *for* someone and only as long as they appear *to* someone. The representativeness of representations falls outside of representations; it is to be found in something we now call the subject. Hence the distinctively modern questions emerge: is this “subject” itself an object in the world, like an animal that, perhaps due to the particular configuration of its brain, has the fantastic ability to secrete representations? Or is it something outside of the world, irreducible to any particular object since it is the very condition for speaking of any “object” whatsoever, as Kant would have it? This is, of course, the organizing dilemma of modern philosophy. It generates, along the divide between the empirical and transcendental strategies, both the range of positivistic trends and the various idealist currents of modern philosophy.

Order and Representation

Before looking in detail at the modern configuration, I would like to emphasize an aspect of Foucault’s demonstration which in my view has been underestimated in the literature. Foucault’s purpose is indeed to make apparent a correlation between this conception of knowledge as Representation and a particular conception of Being as such – Being as Order. The reason why Classical thinkers “believed” (not necessarily in an explicit form, this belief being reconstructed by Foucault as a presupposition apparent in the manner in which they talked about things as potential objects of empirical knowledge) that things only exist and are *what* they are because of their position in an ordered network of other things, is that they “believed” that knowing them was representing them. In other words, an “episteme” is both an ontology and an epistemology, and the history of knowledge that Foucault advances in OT is therefore also a history of Being in the Heideggerian sense.

Let’s look more closely at the Classical conception of Being. Order, like Representation, is a very precise concept. It means (1) not only that things are positioned in a certain order, but that they are defined – *constituted* both in their existence and essence – by this position, that is, *as positions*;⁴ and (2) that their relations do not result from the projection of an external grid onto them, but derive from their nature, which is to organize themselves and through this to provide the resources necessary to conceive of their relations. This is why Foucault could see in Descartes’ well-known idea – that measure can be reduced, ultimately, to order – the threshold of the Classical Age. This means that it is possible to reduce a procedure which implies an appeal to a third term (to compare two things on the basis of their size, i.e. to measure them, seems in the first instance to involve referring both of them to a third thing, a standard, e.g. the meter) to a procedure which, as Descartes says, only requires the consideration of the two “outer terms”: “I can recognize, in effect, what the order is that exists between A

and B without considering anything apart from those two outer terms” (Descartes, *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, VI, in OT, 59; FMC, 67). One only needs to pick out among the terms the simplest one, the one which can be conceived by itself, and then to define all the other terms as gradually differing from the first term by their relative distance from it.

But how does this ontology of Order account for the conception of knowledge as Representation? Three remarks will help us to explicate the relation between these two concepts. First, this Order, being immanent to itself, doesn’t require that it be said or imagined in order to be what it is. This is in contradistinction to the Renaissance world (as Foucault reconstructs it in the second chapter of OT) where, since things are what they are by virtue of their resemblances with other things, whilst these resemblances are themselves marked by resemblances of another kind, the identity of a thing is consequently always to be interpreted, deciphered, decoded. Foucault wants to show that, just as the conception of knowledge as *Interpretation* was grounded in a conception of Being as Resemblance, the conception of knowledge as *Representation* is grounded in a conception of Being as Order. While, in the case of Renaissance ontology, things were always both interpreted and interpreting, both signs and signs of signs, in the case of the Classical Age things and signs belong to two different realms. Things are *present* whilst signs come second and only serve to *re-present* them: things themselves being entirely what they are without need of signs. Secondly, we must remark that just as things are ordered, so are their representations; and furthermore, that a sign can refer to a thing for no other reason than because it occupies the same position in the network of representations as the thing does in the network of things. In other words, signs and things are related not by one-to-one resemblances but by a structural homology.⁵ Thirdly, and most importantly, the very notion of Order as *immanent* implies that it represents itself within itself. Indeed, each term X has its identity reduced to “how different it is from the standard term A”: X is a determinate-non-A, and X and Y differ by their being more or less different from A. The whole set of things is thus projected onto the shades of their difference from one primary term. In this sense, we can say that the whole network is folded onto itself and represented within itself.

Since neither Foucault nor the literature after him is very clear on this point, let’s make it as explicit as possible. (1) Let two things be given, A and B: the only thing we know about them being that they are distinct. (2) To acquire some knowledge about them, we project the identity of B on A such that B is (now) a *determinate non-A* (i.e. a certain way of being different-from-A, a certain degree of differing-from-A). This new term, the “determinate-non-A,” is the *representation* of B in A. We now have four terms: A, B, the *identity* of A with itself, and the determinate different-from-A. The formula of representation is given in the following homology: the relation between A to B is identical to the relation between identical-to-A and different-from-A. (3) The relation between the identical-to-A (A’) and the different-from-A (B’) can itself be represented by identical-to-the-identity-of-A-with-itself and different-from-the-identity-of-A, etc. In other words, an ordered system of things represents itself by generating within itself an ordered system of representations, but this system in turn represents itself *ad infinitum*.

We can illustrate this mechanism through the example of a black and white photograph, or, even better, a red and white one. The rich qualitative spectrum of colors can

be projected into one of its subsets – in doing so, all the differences are now expressed as different degrees of distance from a standard nuance of red up to pure white. But, once this new scale is given, it is still possible to project the variety of shades of red into another smaller subset of nuances: of course, the differences will become less obvious to the human eye, but, if the spectrum is continuous, the procedure can be repeated *ad infinitum*. Similarly, the Classical Order consists in reducing all the rich qualitative diversity of the world to the shades of one quality, and to repeat this reduction within itself, *ad infinitum*, thus committing itself to the metaphysical principle of continuity.⁶

The bulk of the first part of OT is dedicated to showing that these notions of representation and order account for the way languages, organisms, and economic exchanges were conceived of as potential objects of knowledge in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is the possibility of finding this correlation between order and representation at work in parallel in three diverse domains of empirical investigation that allows Foucault to speak of the “episteme” of the Classical Age. There is no room here to give any sense of both the subtlety and the compelling power of his analysis; the reader will find in Gutting a good summary of these chapters (Gutting 1989). Our purpose here was only to explicate what Foucault meant when he wrote that, for the Classical Age, the representability of things is part of their nature and isn’t incumbent to one particular thing among them (i.e. Man).

History and Systems

The archaeological question about the emergence of Man can now be reformulated: What happened to the *mode of being* of things such that knowledge could no longer be construed as Representation? Foucault’s answer focused on two words: *History* and *Organization*. In the modern episteme, *to be* no longer means to occupy a position in a series of shaded tones of a single quality; instead, to be is to belong to a temporal sequence, i.e. to be historical (OT, 236–237; FMC, 230–232). But Foucault also claims that things have been historicized only because, more profoundly, they have ceased to be apprehended in atomic terms and started to be defined as bundles of relations, i.e. organisms or “Organizations.” The typically modern historical ontology that equates Being with Time would thus rely upon an ontology of beings as systems. Yet what exactly is the relation between the two concepts of History and Organization and how does it account for the emergence of Man?

The connection between history and system is particularly apparent in linguistics. In the Classical Age, languages were compared on the basis of their representational function: the way the words represented the ideas determined their organization, i.e. grammar, while the differences between languages were differences between techniques of representations. At the end of the eighteenth century, with the “theory of inflections” (OT, ch. 7, §4), grammatical systems are granted an intrinsic structure autonomous from their representational function. Their internal complexity was no longer a function of the complexity of what they have to convey, but rather (1) of the particular language they descend from (for instance French and German will inherit some traits of Indo-European) and (2) of the laws of linguistic evolution, which apply blindly to part or all of syntactic systems regardless of meaning. Therefore, comparison

between languages is not mediated by one hypothetical perfect language in which representations are supposed to be perfectly represented, as if each historical language actualized one possibility of this unique Language of Representation. Comparison will now proceed directly from one particular isolated language to the other, and if there happens to be an analogy between them it is not taken as evidence of an underlying perfect language but only of the contingent historical link between them. This is indeed the program of Historical and Comparative Grammar as it reigned over the nineteenth century, from Bopp to Saussure and Bloomfield. It triggered many speculations about the sort of being that should be granted to these strange objects called languages, which could neither be reduced to mere tools in the hands of human beings – since their evolution was obviously not controlled by the human will but rather followed objective laws that could only be discovered by linguists – nor, at the same time, could their existence be aligned with stones or planets since they only existed in the human activity of speaking. Although Foucault doesn't make any explicit reference to them, the debates between the German philologists Max Müller and August Schleicher on the one hand, defending the objectivist thesis, and the American linguist William Dwight Whitney on the other, representing the institutionalist side, show that Foucault was right in thinking that the new linguistics made the very *being* of language problematic.

Foucault tries to show that a similar shift, though distributed in two phases (redefining the objects first as systems and then historicizing them), has been at work in economics and biology as well as in linguistics; or, rather, that these three disciplines came into existence under these modern names along with this shift. In the same way that no particular language can play the role of the perfect language – a language capable of capturing the differences between all other languages – no particular commodity can express all the relations (of exchange) between other commodities. The value of a thing is not assessed by how much of some particular thing (gold or land) you are ready to give up for it; instead, it involves something which doesn't belong to the realm of objects: human labor and the time of production. Things become comparable on the basis of something that doesn't belong to their realm. Similarly, the identity of a species will no longer be defined by the repetition and the combination of a certain number of characters which are visible on the surface of the organisms; it will be defined by the way these elements are combined, by their Organization, hence by something which is not in itself given to be represented. The relation of analogy between these organizations will ultimately (with Darwin) be considered as traces of the fact that one descends from the other.

In all these domains the logic of Representation collapses; that is to say, the differences between things can no longer be expressed in terms of degrees of identification with one particular thing among them. Things lose their power to represent themselves on an immanent basis, which means that no single one of them is powerful enough to account for the entire field of differences. What makes things thinkable, i.e. comparable, isn't *part* of what they are. Reality is not bound to be represented; if it is represented, it can only be thanks to some contingent feature of one particular being, which will of course be Man.

Correlatively, instead of having their identity defined by their relations to one another, things now *are* systems of relations; they are endowed with an interiority of their own, which is not entirely apparent in their relations to one another. As such, their external

relations to one another depend on the *form* of their own internal relations (i.e. their “structure”). Comparison therefore becomes the art of analogy: “the link between one organic structure and another can no longer, in fact, be the identity of one or several elements, but must be the identity of the relation between the elements” (OT, 236; FMC, 230). The *fact* of analogy can no longer be explained as a necessary consequence of the nature of things, since there is no *intrinsic* reason why things should relate to one another, their identity coming from their internal structure rather than their position relative to other things. This is why analogies, explains Foucault, are to be conceived as traces of *succession* (OT, 236; FMC, 230). Indeed, the only way to account for the conceptual relations between essences (that is, of the similarities between things) is that one’s existence derives from the other. The “order of things” is now reducible to actual, existential relations like “X gave birth to Y” or “Y took its being from X.” This is why, for the modern period’s ontology, *to be* is both to be an organized system of relations and to be historical.

The Anthropological Circle: Between the Empirical and the Transcendental

It may seem, however, that we have not yet answered our question: Why does this ontology of history and organization imply the emergence of this strange entity, Man, i.e. that being in which beings are made representable?

First, it must be recalled that, insofar as beings are now defined as organizations, they have an interiority of their own, a sort of existential depth: they are primarily *in themselves* and then only secondarily in relation *to* others and *for* others. Knowing them is therefore necessarily an operation that is extrinsic to their essence and that, as a consequence, can express only the relations of the knower to them: “instead of being no more than the constancy that distributes their representations always in accordance with the same forms, they turn in upon themselves, posit their own volumes, and define for themselves an *internal* space which, to our representation, is on the *exterior* [. . .] The very being of that which is represented is now going to fall outside of representation itself” (OT, 259–260; FMC, 253)

Secondly, and correlatively, not only do things retreat into their own interiority, but representations also acquire an autonomous form of existence, one that is no longer merely derivable from what they represent: “living beings, objects of exchange, and words, [. . .] abandoning representation, which had been their natural site hitherto, withdraw into the depths of things and roll up upon themselves in accordance with the laws of life, production, and language” (OT, 341; FMC, 324). This means that languages, living beings, and commodities are juxtaposed with other things, being on the same plane they are endowed with the same objectivity, existing in the same manner as stones or planets. They no longer constitute a transparent grid overlaid upon the world, but rather a world on its own.

We can quickly see, however, that these objects are guilty of double dealing: they are at the same time real entities among others in the world and conditions under which things in general can become objects of representation. They are both in themselves and about something else. This is why these particular entities are so important for the

constitution of Man as the name for the object-subject of knowledge. Foucault's thesis is the following: "Man" is not the direct object of any unified science, but rather the surface effect of the superimposition of these "three empiricities" – Language, Life and Labor. Man is that being "who lives, speaks, and works in accordance with the laws of an economics, a philology, and a biology, but who also, by a sort of internal torsion and overlapping, has acquired the right, through the interplay of those very laws, to know them and to subject them to total clarification" (OT, 338; FMC, 321). Man is both that entity which is constituted by life, labor, and language taken as active forces, as objective powers, and that which is able to take these forces themselves as theoretical objects.

A third explanation would focus on the sort of reflexivity that is intrinsic to any historicist ontology. Indeed, *if* the nature of things is always the outcome of some largely contingent history, *and if* the being of knowledge systems is on a par with that of other things, the conclusion follows that knowledge itself has a history; or, rather, is part of its own object. A complete knowledge of the world will also need to include the story of how it came to be known and why in this or that particular form. This knowledge obviously discovers at the same time that it is conditioned by its own history and therefore cannot claim to have direct access to any eternal and universal reality. In other words, in the modern period's historicist ontology, knowledge is both self-relativizing (it discovers itself as part of its own domain of investigation) and finite (it cannot claim to have a direct and unconditioned access to reality).

However, the decisive factor in the advent of the anthropological paradigm is the recognition of the instability of the philosophical consequences of these new empiricities. Indeed, it seems to imply that what makes us capable of knowledge can itself be made an object of knowledge, that you can tell the scientific story of how a particular species became capable of science in the course of evolution. However, such a story invites the immediate retort that if scientifically discovering the structure of the mind that makes science possible involves X or Y, you must have already granted X and Y (otherwise you would not be proceeding scientifically). In other words, X and Y are both epistemic *principles* that cannot be called into doubt and *facts* about the world that would remain as contingent as everything that is a matter of empirical discovery must be. This problem, which has become familiar to analytic philosophy in the wake of Quine's "naturalized epistemology," was of course already at the heart of Kant's invention of the transcendental strategy in philosophy.

It may be thought, however, that thanks to this strategy Kant escaped the anthropological circle, which would in fact only impose itself on the various positivist trends in modern thought, as Béatrice Han-Pile (2010) has argued. However, one of the main interests and certainly the original intention of OT is to prove that no version of the transcendental turn in philosophy – he was certainly thinking of phenomenology, dominant in France after the war through Sartre and Merleau-Ponty – can escape the anthropological circle. Not only does Foucault clearly state that transcendental philosophy became possible thanks to the particular "torsion" characteristic of the "three empiricities" ("The new positivity of the sciences of life, language, and economics is in correspondence with the founding of a transcendental philosophy," OT, 265; FMC, 257), but he also affirms that it didn't solve the problem. Rather, transcendental philosophy simply reformulated the duplication at work in these three odd objectivities as a difference between "empirical" and "transcendental." This is certainly one of the most

controversial points in the book and many commentators have denied that Foucault provided any satisfactory argument for this thesis (Gutting 1989: 222–223; Han-Pile 2010: 133).

There is not enough space to answer this objection thoroughly here. However, I would like to sketch at least the outline of a reply. Even if we grant that the subjective principles of knowledge cannot be reduced to any objective features (e.g. to a particular shape of the brain, a social organization, a communication tool, etc.), we will still be left with the problem of the relation between this pure disembodied transcendental subject and that particular object that, at the same time, we are. Is this relation itself a pure fact, or should it be founded in principle too? The remark may be reformulated as follows: there remains among the objects one which seems special, and even unique, because it seems to bear some intimate relation with the transcendental capacity: this object is “Man.” “Man” is neither the pure normative subject of science nor its contingent factual object, it is rather the fact that both are, in some obscure sense, *the same* – we are both empirical and transcendental. Far from being a solution, this is only the beginning of the problem that will be worked through across the entire period of modern philosophy, from Hegel to Merleau-Ponty, including Husserl and Heidegger.

Foucault is here drawing from his earlier work on Kant’s *Anthropology* that he translated and wrote an introduction for as part of his doctoral thesis in 1961 (Foucault 2008).⁷ There, Foucault could see formulated for the first time the particular problem that Man constituted for transcendental philosophy. Kant extricated himself by defining his anthropology as “pragmatic”: he would not study Man as an empirical object, nor would he simply recognize in Man the pure freedom of the metaphysical “I”; rather, he studied it as that part of nature that can be *used* in order to progressively become what we *must* be, i.e. free autonomous agents. However, he could see that the same objects could be given a transcendental and an “anthropological” content, e.g. the faculties, the “ego” or the senses. “Man” doesn’t designate any particular empirical object, but rather the instability of the philosophical consequences that derive from this “empirico-transcendental doublet” – “It is probably impossible to give empirical contents transcendental value, or to displace them in the direction of a constituent subjectivity, without giving rise, at least silently, to an anthropology – that is, to a mode of thought in which the rightful limitations of acquired knowledge (and consequently of all empirical knowledge) are at the same time the concrete forms of existence, precisely as they are given in that same empirical knowledge” (OT, 270; FMC, 261).

However, two questions arise here. One is whether there is any alternative to the anthropological paradigm and therefore whether we can do away with the concept of “Man” (OT, 351; FMC, 333). After all, one might simply bite the bullet and accept, with Merleau-Ponty, that philosophy, though unable to provide any absolute ground for knowledge and condemned to formulate principles which are both transcendental requirements and empirical facts, has nonetheless a perfectly legitimate task. That task would be to make explicit these conditioning structures, to go as far as possible in the exposition of what *happens* to function as a condition for us, knowing that this is an interminable task. If Foucault does not accept this solution, it is because he thinks that there is a way out of the empirico-transcendental doublet. The second question concerns Foucault’s own method and whether he himself evades the sort of dilemma he reconstructs so cogently.

Structuralism as a Way Out of the Anthropological Circle

Foucault sketches an alternative to the anthropological paradigm at the end of the book, in particular in his analysis of the three “counter-sciences” – ethnology, psychoanalysis, and the “pure theory of language.” In spite of Foucault’s later denials, his contemporaries were right to take OT as a structuralist masterpiece. We know that Foucault wanted to subtitle his book an “archaeology of structuralism” and it is clear that, by “psychoanalysis,” one must here recognize Lacan, and by “ethnology,” Lévi-Strauss, whilst the “pure theory of language” alluded more vaguely to structural semiotics. All, according to Foucault, have the power to “dissolve man” (OT, 413; FMC, 391). Why?

The first reason is that they entirely break with the representational paradigm, favoring instead a decidedly non-representational conception or rather *practice* of knowledge. Indeed, the Unconscious for Lacan is not an object with regard to which psychoanalysis would provide a body of accurate, descriptive information; it is, rather, a gap in the discourse of the subject which cannot be objectified, but one that can nonetheless be experienced and that manifests itself in transformations of the structure of discourse. Lacan famously defined the Unconscious as a “non-being,” insisting that unconscious contents don’t stand on the other side of the curtain of consciousness but only exist indirectly, in slips of the tongue, dreams, or symptoms.⁸ It is also true that Lacan refused the idea that the purpose of the cure was to make the patient become conscious of some repressed content; it is rather to confront her with the “real,” i.e. the unsymbolizable. In this sense, Foucault is perfectly right to say that “the contents of consciousness articulate themselves, or rather stand gaping, upon man’s finitude” (OT, 408; FMC, 386), and this finitude is not so much represented as presented, directly, in the cure. Psychoanalysis is not a scientific body of knowledge which would deploy a list of general laws, but a *practice* in which the subjective truth is both experienced (and not simply represented) and singular (and not general), arising from the transference. Lévi-Straussian anthropology is similarly an experimental and relative practice. As Lévi-Strauss writes in the *Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss*, anthropological knowledge is not so much a theoretical enterprise of the description of others as a practical exercise in self-detachment: the “objects” of the ethnographers are not facts about the world to record and explain, but rather parts of himself “that the individual subject would have to pull painfully away from himself, if the diversity of mores and customs did not present him with a prior fragmenting” (Lévi-Strauss 1987 [1950], 32–33).

In general, we can say that both psychoanalysis and anthropology show that there is indeed a *truth about the subject* and yet that this truth is not objective. This doesn’t mean that it is an a priori truth that is only available to a form of reflective inquiry, as transcendental philosophy would have it. Instead, it is *experimental* in the sense that it only manifests itself in the actual *transformations* of the subject,⁹ whilst it is *relative*, not in the sense that it is relative *to* a subject, but in the sense that it defines itself within a system of variants to which it itself belongs – just as the anthropologist redefines her own kinship system as part of a broader range of alternative kinship systems to which it relates in an ordered way. The secret of structuralism would therefore be to provide the means to conceive of the relativity of knowledge without having to attribute it to

any ambiguous “subject-object.” Similarly, it conceives of a form of change which evades the historical framework: indeed, Foucault insists that ethnology, by comparing “modern” and “non-modern” societies, exposes the transformations under which a culture starts perceiving itself as historical (see OT, 410–411). He alludes here to Lévi-Strauss’ attack on Sartre in the final chapter of the *Savage Mind*, in which he argued that history is merely the modern form of the myth and therefore a variant of symbolic thought.

Another reason for structuralism’s capacity of overcoming the anthropological circle, although one in which Foucault is less confident, is that structuralism in a certain sense re-establishes the identity between Being and Sense which characterized the Classical Age. While modernity introduced a split between the fact that things exist and the possibility that they can be made sense of – and was therefore forced to invent this particular thing *through which* and *for which* everything becomes meaningful (Man) – structuralism promises a new reconciliation between ontology and semantics. Foucault writes: “In the firmament of our reflection there reigns a discourse – a perhaps inaccessible discourse – which would at the same time be an ontology and a semantics. Structuralism is not a new method; it is the awakened and troubled consciousness of modern thought” (OT, 226; FMC, 221).

It is well known that the meaning of a particular term, for structuralism, is not the result of its association with an intelligible notion, but rather the result of its opposition to other terms. In consequence, it is quite right to say that the semantic aspect of a sign is not isolated from its determination as a term, i.e. from its being posited as a being. It is the way terms are related – i.e. their *structure* – that makes them meaningful, and not an extrinsic act of the mind adding content to a speechless being. Equally, in the *Savage Mind*, Lévi-Strauss tries to show that “symbolic thought” is not a prelogical form of thinking but a kind of knowledge that uses the sensible to understand the sensible, a “science of the concrete” that aims at “a speculative organization and exploitation of the sensible world in sensible terms” (Lévi-Strauss 1966 [1962]: 16). The *Savage Mind* even ends with the idea that the unity of meaning and being that characterized traditional cultures “is restored to us, thanks to the discovery of a universe of information [...] whose messages, while in transmission, constitute objects of the physical world and can be grasped both from without and from within” (1966 [1962]: 267). Structuralism would therefore show that, if meaning is not representational, then Being is not purely meaningless.

There are other reasons why structuralism appeared to Foucault at the time, and rightfully so, as the promise of a break with the anthropological circle. But what we have just said is hopefully enough to give at least some meaning and support both to the idea that “man is neither the oldest nor the most constant problem that has been posed for human knowledge” and to the “wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea” (OT, 422; FMC, 398). It is now time to consider, in conclusion, some of the major objections that have been made to OT.

Reply to Some Objections

OT has remained until today Foucault’s most criticized book. It made Foucault famous, but the violence of the reactions it provoked at the time of its publication rivaled its

success.¹⁰ Moreover, its author himself seems to have eventually repudiated it, saying in a 1978 interview: “*The Order of Things* was a kind of formal exercise for me . . . *The Order of Things* is not a book that’s truly mine; it’s a marginal book in terms of the sort of passion that runs through the others” (EW3, 267). Although it is impossible to respond to all the objections made to OT, I will consider here some which make apparent the most severe misunderstandings.

One of the types of objection is factual: it would dispute the accuracy of Foucault’s interpretations of particular authors, books or concepts (for examples of such criticisms, see Gutting 1989: 175–178). There are definitely many disputable claims in OT, and, as a historian of linguistics, it would be easy for me to show that Foucault deeply misinterpreted Saussure when he aligned his conception of the sign as constituted by a signifier and a signified with Port Royal’s (OT, 74; FMC, 81). However, I would argue that the important question is not whether Foucault’s claims happen to all be correct or not, but rather whether Foucault’s entire reconstruction is interesting and useful for historians, and it is my conviction that it is. It has indeed proved to be so in various domains, such as the history of statistics (Hacking 1991), of painting (Arasse 2001: ch. 6), of literature (Marin 1975), and even of mathematics (Vinciguerra 1999, 2007). However, since this is not the place to show that OT can and has been productive in any particular subfield, I will consider some more principled objections.

One key objection bears on the status of the “episteme” and challenges the apparent ambition held by Foucault to provide, for each period, a description encompassing everything that was written during that time, not only in the empirical sciences but also in literature (as with Cervantes and de Sade), art (as with Velázquez) and various other practices (such as economics). This totalizing ambition is apparent in sentences like the following: “In any given culture and at any given moment, there is always only one *episteme* that defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge, whether expressed in a theory or silently invested in a practice” (OT, 183; FMC, 179). Isn’t such a recklessly ambitious enterprise dealt a fatal blow when it stumbles upon so many counter-examples? There will always be authors, texts, or practices that seem to anticipate later periods or, on the contrary, retain some traits of earlier ones. For instance, one could argue that the naturalists Harvey and Lavoisier possessed the same concept of *function* as Cuvier’s (see Burgelin 2009), or, conversely, that twentieth-century analytical philosophy seems completely indifferent to the problem of “Man” (Gutting 1989: 222). Was Foucault himself really unaware of this problem, especially as he named the chapter on the Renaissance the “prose of the world,” a book title borrowed from Merleau-Ponty? A generalized and graphic version of this objection was formulated by Jean-Luc Godard (cited in Eribon 1991: 156 n. 3), when he said that he made films in order to prevent anyone in the future from saying, like Foucault, that, if they were not made it is because they were impossible. This formulation has the merit of drawing our attention to the precise meaning of the central concept of *episteme*. According to Godard, it obviously means something like the mental walls of an era – walls from which no individual mind can escape, since they define what can and cannot be conceived at a particular time in a particular society without *exception*.

However, as faithful to Foucault’s own words as this interpretation may seem, it is certainly not the most charitable one. If we pay attention not so much to what Foucault

says about what he does, but to what he actually *does*, then it is clear that his project is not to explain retrospectively why the past *had* to be how it was, but rather to get around a present *illusion of impossibility* – for instance, the belief that no coherent conception of knowledge is imaginable which doesn't involve the concept of Man. His reconstruction of past “systems of thought” is not intended as a totalizing description of a series of past states of affairs, but rather as a critical exercise undertaken on oneself in the present so as to get rid of one's own prejudices. When in the preface Foucault mentions the sheer impossibility “of thinking *that*,” in relation to Borges' tale of the Chinese Encyclopedia, it is not to record it as a fact merely to be explained, but rather as a challenge to be taken up. The systematic nature of the description is motivated and justified by the effort to provide an alternative view, which must be both coherent and exotic enough to challenge the current, hegemonic view which presents itself as insurmountable. Foucault's approach is very similar to that of an anthropologist, as he actually occasionally called himself.¹¹ It is an effort to distance oneself from oneself, as he famously characterized his own work at the end of his life (in the preface of HS2 and in “What is Enlightenment?,” EW1). Just as the reconstruction of a particular system of thought by an anthropologist doesn't describe the state of mind or the brain configuration of every single individual belonging to that society (being rather a way of taking the measure, in one's own conceptual world, of the displacement imposed on it by an alternative way of life¹²), so Foucault's work does not need to be true of every particular piece of discourse in a given period. Rather, it will be enough if it decenters both the author and the reader from their own self-understanding by realizing the possibility of another way of thinking. The purpose of this exercise in self-estrangement is to make us more open to a transformation that we are undergoing. This self-estrangement will help us diagnose in a precise way an event that remains opaque to us, even though it is already announced in some signs of the times. In OT, this event is precisely what he calls the “death of Man,” and its signs occur in the structuralist mutation of the soon-to-become-demised “human sciences.”

Most of the other common objections to Foucault's project can also be answered by this distinction between a *descriptive* understanding of the concept of episteme and a *critical* one. Thus, it has been objected that if it were true that we are dependent on a particular system of thought characteristic of the society of our time, it would be impossible for the archaeologist to reconstruct any past system of thought. Foucault's enterprise would therefore be self-refuting.¹³ However, if the description of the episteme doesn't refer to any particular fact about the present or past world, but rather functions as a heuristic tool aimed at characterizing more clearly and even encouraging an imminent change, it is not only unsurprising that we have access to other ways of thinking but it is the very purpose of the archaeological enterprise to accompany such a process of self-estrangement. It only makes sense to turn back to past forms of ourselves if we are in the process of becoming different, on the verge of changing dramatically, even though we are not quite clear yet about what is happening to us.

Likewise, Foucault was accused of making the process of change mysterious. Between two epistemes there is a mutation which Foucault notoriously refuses to explain. Instead, he contents himself with recording the fact of the mutation. However, it would be wrong to believe that Foucault is only interested in reconstructing stable systems while leaving transformative events outside of the scope of his analysis. Indeed,

precisely the opposite is the case: his description of the “systems of thought” is entirely dependent on how they can appear as transformations or variants of one another. In his letter to Michel Amiot (recently published in Artières 2009), Foucault claimed he utilized a “transformational method”: “One can not say that I have established a lawless discontinuity, but I tried to define the set of transformations which work as a *law* to an empirical discontinuity.”¹⁴ He explains that, for example, while he starts from the discontinuity between Jussieu and Cuvier, his entire effort consists in an attempt at *qualifying* the obvious mutation that occurs between them. To do this he reconstructs two “theoretical models allowing [him] to describe the state A and the state B on each side of the cut.” The important thing to note here is that Foucault’s method implicitly reduces historical reality to pure variations. For instance, if Foucault retains from the Classical Age Descartes’ conception of order, it is not because all classical thinkers would abide by it effectively, but because it is necessary to situate the Classical Age in a system of transformation in which it coexists with the Renaissance, modern times, and structuralism. Therefore, far from being the irrationalist manifesto it has often been accused of being, OT is an attempt to elevate the brute facts of discontinuity into understandable transformations. True, it does not explain the mutations, but this is because it holds that there is something at least more urgent to do, and this is to describe them properly, “to define the passage” as he put it in his letter to Amiot.

Finally, Foucault’s own evolution is sometimes taken as the strongest objection against OT. The commonly received view is that OT has been overcome by Foucault himself: while the archaeological method is supposed to share with structuralism the idea of the autonomy of language, Foucault would later introduce the notion of genealogy in order to go beyond this paradigm and investigate the power relations that underpin those linguistic practices to which he had restricted his analysis at the time of OT. He himself declared that he moved from the paradigm of language to the paradigm of war (FDE3, 145; EW3, 116); and that he did this in order to supply the explanatory framework that was missing in OT. However, Deleuze (1988) has shown that it is possible to give another interpretation of the introduction of the notion of power in Foucault’s work: not as a way of moving out of language in order to describe the active forces which shape the linguistic world “from below,” but as an attempt to radicalize the transformational method itself. First, the genealogical analysis introduces more dimensions into the comparison (not only words and paintings but also institutions and gestures), while still aiming to re-describe these systems as differential entities defined by their position in a set of correlated transformations (like the one which associates the passage from Interpretation to Representation to the passage from Resemblance to Order, and so on). Secondly, since power is characterized by its instability, to describe things in terms of power relations is to describe them at the level of their highest mutability – *and not* to explain this instability away by reducing it to some underpinning necessity.

But what could our response be to those who, in the wake of Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982), for example Han (2002), argue that OT is still taken in by the anthropological paradigm that it describes? It is indeed the case that the archaeological method implies treating statements as mere facts and thus risks falling back into a form of positivism. And, as with all positivism, Foucault’s discourse would then be split between having to both dismiss the illusion that language is produced by meaning and having

to endorse this illusion for himself as a producer of a scientific discourse. However, once again, this objection only holds if we understand the archaeology as pretending to an objectivist scientific discourse. If it is taken instead as a critical exercise, then it is clear that the archaeologist is not a neutral, disengaged observer in the world of discourses; rather, he is a militant mind trying to free himself from the repetition of a structure (in this instance, the anthropological circle). According to this interpretation, OT can be read as an attempt by Foucault to get around the philosophical opposition between hermeneutics and positivism and thus to disentangle the anthropological circle, all in the hope of a new way of thinking whose premises he perceived in structuralism. It is not the work of a disinterested scientist (if such a being has ever existed), but of a passionate philosopher. In this respect, notwithstanding Foucault's declarations, OT is not such a great exception within the body of his work.

In conclusion, if OT has to be overcome, it seems that it should be on grounds slightly different from those usually advanced. However, isn't this very idea that an author necessarily overcomes his own work itself an evolutionist idea, and, as such, directly opposed to the archaeological method? Foucault's disenchantment with his work may be better explained by the ambiguity that structuralism represented for his generation. There is no doubt that OT is indeed a structuralist book, that it uses a structuralist method in order to diagnose what is at stake in structuralism.¹⁵ However, it is also a fact that all of the major thinkers of the 1960s in France both embraced and rejected structuralism in a span of a few years (with the exception of Derrida whose "deconstruction" consisted in doing both at the same time). OT belongs to structuralism in this respect too, since it has been treated with the same ambivalence, both admired and dismissed. The deep reason for this ambivalence, which seems to be part of structuralism's very identity, may be that it used the concept of *system* to diagnose *events*: a real event is that which affects the very structure of a system. Many readers believed this amounted to treating change as an illusion, while actually it aimed at providing a deeper understanding of such change. OT was a victim of the same misunderstanding. Now that the polemics about structuralism are behind us, we can recognize OT for what it was and is: an extraordinary contribution to the history of philosophy, the only book by Foucault in which he takes philosophy directly as his object and applies his own archaeological method to itself. By its richness and its ambition, it remains a monument of twentieth-century thought.

Notes

- 1 Whilst the title of the book in French is different (*Les Mots et les choses*, literally *Words and Things*), it happens here that the translation is more faithful to the author's intentions than the original, since Foucault's first choice in French was *L'Ordre des choses*, which he was prevented from adopting by his publisher because another book had already been published with this title.
- 2 Although the expression "human sciences" is less common in English than it is in French, it covers approximately the same range of disciplines as the notion of "social sciences": it is defined by its opposition to the "natural sciences" and includes attempts at producing scientific knowledge about properly human phenomena, such as language, culture, society, and the like. In OT, the expression is used in a more specific sense, and includes mainly three

- disciplines: sociology, psychology, and the “science of literature and mythology” – all three are born at the end of the nineteenth century (see OT, chapter 10). Linguistics and economy are not part of the “human sciences” proper, which on the contrary derived from them, while ethnology and psychoanalysis are already outside of the field.
- 3 This opposition was first formulated in German at the end of the nineteenth century, as between *Naturwissenschaften* and *Geisteswissenschaften*, in the context of the debate against positivistic methods applied to history, most noticeably by Wilhelm Dilthey and his followers such as Max Weber, Heinrich Rickert, and, more recently, Gadamer or Habermas. This opposition is key to the understanding of phenomenology, which elaborated and expanded the opposition.
 - 4 It is very likely that Foucault’s conception of “order” is inspired here by Cassirer’s reading of modernity, in particular as it is laid out in *Structure and Function* (1923).
 - 5 There is little doubt that this conception of knowledge was indeed dominant in Cartesian and post-Cartesian philosophy. One might think of Descartes comparing in his *Dioptrics* the ideas of the minds with the pictures in perspective that don’t have to *resemble* their object but only need to be related to them by a rigorous rule of projection, or alternatively of Spinoza’s famous theorem “the order and the connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things” (*Ethics*, Part II, Proposition 7).
 - 6 On the Continuum as a metaphysical requirement in the Classical Age, see OT, 224; FMC, 219: “One can see in this principle of continuity the metaphysically strong moment of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thought.”
 - 7 If he never published this academic work, which came out only recently, it is precisely because he followed the advice, given to him by the jury, to turn it into an autonomous essay – which became OT.
 - 8 “Ontically, then, the unconscious is the elusive” (Lacan 1998: 32). “The gap of the unconscious may be said to be pre-ontological [. . .] it does not lend itself to ontology. [. . .] [It] is neither being, nor non-being, but the unrealized” (1998: 30–31).
 - 9 It may be worth remarking here that this problem of the relation between *truth* and *subjectivity* will become explicitly central to Foucault’s later work. In fact, it is one of the unifying threads of Foucault’s entire work, from his early interest in *psychology*, which OT keeps traces of, to his late interest in ethics: what is subjective truth?
 - 10 The key reviews of *The Order of Things* that appeared in France at the time of its publication have been recently edited in an important volume; see Artières 2009.
 - 11 In an interview with Pierre Dumayet on *Les Mots et les choses* on June 15, 1966, he talks about his work as an “ethnology” of his own culture. This interview is available online in French, but to my knowledge has not been published in either French or English. (<http://www.ina.fr/art-et-culture/litterature/video/I05059752/michel-foucault-a-propos-du-livre-les-mots-et-les-choses.fr.html>).
 - 12 For such a definition of the “anthropological concept of concept,” see Viveiros de Castro 2003.
 - 13 The first formulation of this objection is due to the French philosopher Michel Amiot (1967). The text is all the more interesting that Foucault appreciated it enough to reply personally to the author with a letter which has been published along with the text in Artières 2009.
 - 14 “On ne peut pas dire que j’ai établi une discontinuité sans règle, mais j’ai cherché à définir l’ensemble des transformations qui servent de *règle* à une discontinuité empirique” (Artières 2009: 137–138).
 - 15 Foucault says this explicitly in an interview published in Tunisia 1967 (FDE1, no. 47). It may be worth reminding the reader that this “transformational method” is the one Lévi-Strauss uses throughout the four volumes of the *Mythologiques*.

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On the Powers of the False

Foucault's Engagements with the Arts

JOSEPH J. TANKE

This essay is concerned with some of Michel Foucault's writings on art, notably the essay he composed on René Magritte in 1967 (revised and republished in 1973 as *Ceci n'est pas une pipe*), and the recently published lecture on Édouard Manet, *La Peinture de Manet*, which was delivered at the Tahar Haddad Cultural Club in Tunisia on May 20, 1971.¹ Out of concerns for space, I will not deal with the memorable and important essays he devoted to Gérard Fromanger, Paul Rebeyrolle, and Duane Michals, occasional pieces which demonstrate that even if visual art never became one of Foucault's central preoccupations, it nevertheless remained a serious and lifelong interest.² Here, I am interested in the analyses of painting Foucault conducted during the period in which he was developing the philosophical methodology known as archaeology. Both *This is Not a Pipe* and the lecture on Manet are marked profoundly by the goals of archaeology, familiarity with which helps us to understand some of the moves that Foucault makes throughout these discussions.

It is also my contention in this essay that, despite archaeology's strong epistemological orientation, that methodology gives rise to a form of seeing that suspends the imperatives for the production of meaning that accrue around works of art. Some of the consequences of this suspension are explored in the final section of this essay where I describe archaeology as giving rise to an artistic-philosophical thought that operates outside of the bounds of truth and falsity. As such, I contend, it is particularly well suited for approaching the artistic products created during and after the breakup of *mimesis*, the European cultural paradigm that articulated strong connections between art – considered as representation – and reality. One of Foucault's most significant claims is that modern painting should be understood as throwing off the dictates of representation. This means, among a number of things, that art can no longer be understood or judged in terms of how well it approximates things in the world. Modern art, according to Foucault, is the sundering of truth as *adequatio*. As a method con-

A Companion to Foucault, First Edition. Edited by Christopher Falzon, Timothy O'Leary, and Jana Sawicki.
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cerned less with the supposed meaning of the work and more with tracing its dynamic functions, archaeology, I will claim, enables us to attend more fully to what I term the “madness of the surface,” the dash and dance of line, form, color, and force. Archaeology achieves this by refusing to place these “events” under the burden of truth, cultivating instead a blank stare that aims to become ever more responsive to the dynamic happening of these visual forces.

The elaboration of this point of view should not blind us to the fact that archaeology is primarily a methodology designed to produce edifying results, that is, knowledge about how the practices, discourses, and visual configurations of one historical period differ sharply from those of another. Even though archaeology rejects a number of traditional approaches to the history of art, it nevertheless enables us to gain a better sense of works of art in their historical specificity. In this respect, archaeology shifts the locus of truth and knowledge from individual works to the more general configuration to which they belong. It is this perspective that is developed in the first section of this essay and carried through to the discussions of Manet and Magritte in the second section. Attending to both of these directions, the first of which we might label “cognitive” and the second of which we can understand as “aesthetic,” will not only enhance our understanding of Foucault’s approach to visual art; it will permit us to elaborate a theoretical model that works to illuminate the historical significance of works of art, and which allows us to contemplate their formal majesty.

Archaeology and Painting

Archaeology is a method of historical analysis that attempts to isolate instances of heterogeneity in the general system of rules governing what can be seen and said, or what Foucault called the “discursive formation” (*formation discursive*) (AK, 31–39). The basic unit of this analysis is the “statement” (*énoncé*) (AK, 79–87). It is important for Foucault to distinguish the statement from both sentences and propositions; the statement always does something more than what can be described from a hermeneutic or logical point of view. It is a historically specific constellation of words and non-discursive elements that achieve some real effects, usually either the reproduction or contestation of the existing regularities found within a discursive formation. Attending to the historical existence of the statement means that the archaeologist construes discourse as an event, attempting to reconstitute the functions it carries out, the conditions that must be in place in order for it to operate, and the effects generated by it within a discursive formation. The point of archaeology is to describe how a statement functions with respect to the rules for the formation of discourse, that is, to determine if it confirms a set of existing rules or if it inaugurates a new set of rules.

At the end of the methodological treatise *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault asks about the possibility of exploiting these resources for the analysis of non-discursive fields. “[C]ould one conceive of an archaeological analysis that would reveal the regularity of a body of knowledge, but which would not set out to analyze it in terms of figures and sciences? Is an orientation toward the episteme the only one open to archaeology?” (AK, 192). This is tantamount to asking whether it is possible to apply archaeology to groups of practices that, while admitting of a certain regularity, bear

little resemblance to discourse. Foucault confesses that he is not sufficiently advanced in his thinking but nevertheless sketches three possible extensions. The one relevant to our undertaking is what Foucault called an “archaeology of painting” (AK, 192–195).³

In conceiving of this archaeology, Foucault was no doubt thinking of the study of Manet, *Le Noir et la couleur*, that in 1966 he agreed to complete for Éditions de Minuit.⁴ As with the well-known essay on Magritte, the work on Manet was to use the vantage point defined by archaeology in order to describe the differences separating Manet’s canvases from the conventions that preceded them. As Foucault explained in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, such an analysis would treat these paintings as embodied “knowledges,” complete with their own regularities and moments of transformation (AK, 192–195). Extrapolating from what we know about archaeology more generally, we can say that the aim would be to isolate the moments at which these paintings ceased to be governed by the rules of a previous artistic formation, themselves generating a new series of assumptions for the practice of painting. Starting with individual works of art, the archaeologist attempts to discover moments of discontinuity at the level of what is seen and to articulate those discontinuities by means of a comparison with a different historical period. In its application to painting, archaeology is a type of seeing that attempts to remove from seeing the sense of self-evidence that attaches to it. It attempts to build into each act of looking a more robust historical sense.

The lecture on Manet is instructive in this regard. There, Foucault compares two different epochs of painting, the Quattrocento and the modern, in terms of three variables: the distribution of space within a composition, the different handlings of light characteristic of each period, and the manner in which the viewer is situated before a canvas. In general, the Quattrocento is structured by the demands of representation. It is a “game of evasion” (*jeu d’esquive*) designed to hide the fact that a painting resides upon a flat surface, one struck by real light, and in front of which the viewer must negotiate his or her position (FPM, 23). Quattrocento painting conspires to mask its constitutive limitations. It replaces the flat space of the canvas with the illusionary space of representation; it often includes within the represented scene a light source that rivals or replaces the natural light striking the canvas *in situ*; and, by means of a play of line, lighting, and perspective, the Quattrocento creates an ideal position from which the representation should be viewed. As historians of the Renaissance explain, the development of single-point perspective “not only creates a space inside the picture, but positions the viewer in a space before the painting as well, dictating a position out from the painting on a center line” (Paoletti and Radke 1997: 205). One thinks here of Foucault’s excursus on the place of the king in *Las Meninas*, that point in front of the canvas on which all the internal dynamics of the representation converge. One reason why this image is so striking – and so puzzling philosophically – is that it effectively exploits the conceits of Baroque painting to dramatic effect: it places the king and queen (visible in the mirror at the back of the painting), the painter (the actual painter Velázquez as he worked away on this composition), and the viewer (the visitors to the Prado) in the same position.

From an archaeological point of view, what is important to take account of is the way in which the interplay of these three elements – space, represented light, and the place of the viewer – give rise to a distinctive visual experience, one in which representational space displaces the material place of the tableau. Whereas Quattrocento

painting masked its material conditions, modern painting calls attention to the fact that painting is *something* capable of representation. According to Foucault, Manet is the first artist to foreground the material limitations upon which representative painting relied. In his works, the flatness and materiality of the support, the external light that strikes the canvas in the room in which it is hung, and the need for the viewer to locate him or herself before it become an inescapable part of the viewing experience. As such, he makes it possible for painting to surpass mere representation, and instead to be practiced as the play of line, color, gesture, and force.

These points will be developed further in the section on Foucault's characterization of modern painting below. The point here is to see how archaeology prepares the way for a type of viewing focused upon historical discontinuities. Its aim is not to compose new histories of style and influence, but to see how certain paintings themselves contain new rules for the distribution of painting's material properties. Foucault is clear that he does not view Manet as having invented non-representative painting; rather, he describes him as having initiated the momentum that made it possible for painting to surpass representation. Foucault's argument is that in calling attention to the capacities of representation within the representation itself, Manet places painting on a new plane. Foucault thus describes Manet's work as fundamentally different from that which preceded it, describing the result as a "tableau-object" or "painted-object" (*tableau-objet*, *peinture-objet*):

The invention of the tableau-object, this reinsertion of the materiality of the canvas in what is represented, it is that . . . which is at the heart of the grand modification introduced by Manet into painting and it is in this sense that one can say that Manet disrupted . . . all that was fundamental in Western painting since the Quattrocento. (FPM, 24)

Instead of attempting to arrive at an interpretation of a work's meaning, archaeology asks us to consider the work's place within a historico-visual tapestry. Archaeology does this in order to allow us to see how it departs from a previous visual order. It is thus designed so that we might watch certain tableaux work against the pictorial conventions of those that precede them. In this respect, the archaeology of painting is predicated upon a dynamic understanding of art. Just as the statement in archaeology proper was considered as a function, the art object is construed as a reversal of forces. For archaeology, art operates according to a game-like logic, one in which art's rules are continually being challenged, and in some instances altered, by the emergence of new objects.

As should be apparent, archaeology is at odds with many customary art-historical approaches. In the first instance, it replaces the hermeneutic question – What does this work of art mean? – with an archaeological one: What does this work of art do? This stems from Foucault's general suspicion regarding commentary, which he contends constructs an ever deeper fictional level in order for a work's different and conflicting strands to be reconciled. For him, commentary is methodologically problematic in that it is difficult to systematize the means by which one would move between a given work and the artist's intentions. By way of contrast, Foucault explains that the archaeology of painting "would not set out to show that the painting is a certain way of 'meaning' or 'saying' that is peculiar in that it dispenses with words. It would try to show that, at

least in one of its dimensions, it is a discursive practice that is embodied in techniques and effects" (AK, 194).

It should be stressed that in developing archaeology in this direction, Foucault was attempting to avoid squeezing visual art into a linguistic idiom. One runs the risk of reinstating commentary if he or she construes the painted-event as simply another form of meaning. Foucault thus issued plenty of warnings against equating the visual with the discursive. His thought, as many have noted, is unique in that it grants the visual a certain amount of autonomy. It attempts to isolate the regularities operative in our ways of seeing, while recognizing that the relationship between the visual and the discursive is shifting. On a certain reading, this is what is at stake in the analyses carried out in *The Order of Things* and *The Birth of the Clinic*. Both books describe the processes, both discursive and non-discursive, which delimit the visual field and allow for it to be translated into language. As Foucault notes at the opening of *The Order of Things*, such a task is infinite, particularly when one considers works of art. In front of *Las Meninas* he writes, "[T]he relation of language to painting is an infinite relation. It is not that words are imperfect, or that, when confronted by the visible, they prove insuperably inadequate. Neither can be reduced to the other's terms" (OT, 9). Foucault continues, speaking ostensibly about the more general stakes of archaeological analysis: "[I]t is in vain that we say what we see; what we see never resides in what we say. And it is in vain that we attempt to show, by the use of images, metaphors, or similes, what we are saying; the space where they achieve their splendour is not deployed by our eyes . . ." (OT, 9). Any archaeology of art, therefore, would not construe artistic products as simply discursive events by other means. It would resist the carelessness with which many talk about the "*language* of art."

While archaeology grants a relative amount of autonomy to each domain, it recognizes that their boundaries are constantly shifting, subject to both historical mutations and practical innovations. This is one of the issues at stake in Foucault's analysis of Magritte. Foucault argues that Magritte's painting *La Trahison des images* (*Ceci n'est pas une pipe*) of 1929 is a refutation of Classical painting's separation principle (NP, 32–35). This principle dictated that linguistic and visual signs function separately within the space of the tableau. It does not mean that words never enter the space of the image, but that when they do so they are fundamentally different from the visual forms therein. The "grammars" of seeing and saying are essentially different, such that images move the viewer on the basis of resemblance, while language functions through differences. In short, archaeology asks us to be more sensitive to the historically shifting relationships between seeing and saying.

As a methodology, archaeology is thus designed to avoid the ahistorical tendencies in certain quarters of art criticism and theory. In particular, it can be viewed as a corrective to the dominant practice of artistic formalism. By formalism, I intend the attention applied by curators, critics, and historians to the internal arrangement of a work's material properties. Formalist approaches to painting, for example, construe the relationship between space, form, color, and canvas as providing the definitive grounds for the interpretation of a work. While many of these approaches produce powerful readings of individual works of art, they often both neglect the social contexts to which these works belong, and fail to produce an account of how the works in question differ from those which precede and follow it in the history of art.

Some superficial resemblances between Foucault's arguments regarding Manet and the work of Clement Greenberg might produce misunderstandings regarding the philosopher's relationship with art-critical formalism. Both authors find in Manet's paintings a flattening out of pictorial space and a newfound emphasis on materiality. As is well known, Greenberg contends that this movement should be understood as painting's rediscovery of its essence. Through a labor of self-purification, painting purges itself of elements borrowed from other arts. For Greenberg, modernism is thus not a break with the art of the past; it is the continuation of painting's traditional vocation. Greenberg explains:

I cannot insist enough that Modernism has never meant anything like a break with the past. It may mean a devolution, an unraveling of anterior tradition, but it also means its continuation. Modernist art develops out of the past without gap or break, and wherever it ends up it will never stop being intelligible in terms of the continuity of art. (1982: 9)

There are at least three points to be made regarding the relationship between archaeology and formalist analysis. Despite the fact that Foucault, much like critics such as Greenberg, attends first and foremost to the work's material properties, the skepticism he voiced in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* regarding linguistic formalism should give us pause regarding placing him in the formalist camp. Foucault contends that formal analysis falls short of what he envisions for archaeology in that the former cannot account for how a discourse, or here a work of art, occupies a given place with historical necessity. Instead of treating a discourse or painting as something that has actually occurred, that is, as an event, formalist analysis remains trapped in the elaboration of possible combinations. Foucault thus contends that formalism never accounts for why a statement or painting occurs when and where it does. According to Foucault, archaeology attempts to show "why [a discourse] could not be other than it was, in what respect it is exclusive of any other, how it assumes, in the midst of others and in relation to them, a place no other could occupy" (AK, 28). To say that formalist methodologies lack a sense of history is not to say that they cannot be used in constructing historical narratives; Greenberg, in fact, has inspired one of the most abiding accounts of the past two hundred years of art. It is, rather, to claim that formalism fails to relate the distributions present in individual works of art to the discursive formation that allows one to grasp those works in terms of their historical uniqueness.

Second, as was explained above, archaeological analysis is oriented toward discontinuity and rupture. It is of course possible that an aesthetic formalism could also assume such a direction. With respect to the specific case of Clement Greenberg, however, Foucault's method leads to a dramatically different series of conclusions regarding art and history. Whereas Greenberg strives to create a narrative of continuity between two different periods, Foucault's archaeologies attempt to establish how these periods are shaped by different rules of formation. As we will see in the section on modernity below, this leads to an unconventional grouping of artists and styles, one at odds with many art-historical narratives.

Finally, care should be taken to note the specifically archaeological sense Foucault assigns to some of the notions that populate many others' writings on art. For example, it is quite common to claim, as Foucault does, that modern art is "non-representational."

What his thought offers, however, is a sense of how this aesthetic quality is connected with the broader transformations shaping Western thought at the start of the nineteenth century. Starting with Manet, painting ceases to concern itself with its traditional representational task, undertaking an interrogation of finitude comparable to what *The Order of Things* located in the sciences of man. Just as Western knowledge comes to occupy itself with that which resides beyond representation, discovering positivities such as individuality, finitude, the invisible, and materiality, modern painting too immerses itself in an investigation of that which is thought to underpin representation. In this sense, “post-representational” means that painting investigates the conditions of representation in a manner similar to the way European thought from Kant to Heidegger attempts to think that which resides outside of mental representation. Manet’s canvases open up a visual interrogation of representation similar to the Kantian critical project, thereby escaping the fate of simple representation. By means of abstraction, gesture, and force, they explore that which resides beyond representation. Archaeology thus allows us to understand how painting too is informed by the broader transformations taking place within Western knowledge. Therefore, by making recourse to the modern *episteme* and the positivities that it defines, one can further distinguish Foucault’s account of modernity from the one offered by Clement Greenberg.

Archaeology, then, is a method of historical analysis that, when applied to art, refuses the unreflective slippage between the visual and the discursive. It recognizes that the visual is itself thoroughly historical, produced by means of a dynamic exchange between different artistic products in the archive. It attends primarily to instances of singularity and heterogeneity, that is, those moments in which a given work departs from a previous system of conventions. It uses a comparison with a prior system of regularities in order to illustrate what is at stake in these transformations. And, as such, it calls upon us to attend to what works of art do, rather than what they may mean.

The Specificity of Modern Painting

Having elaborated the archaeological point of view, we are now in a position to see more clearly how, for Foucault, modern art can be distinguished from that which preceded it. As has already been indicated, Foucault views Manet as having inaugurated the “profound rupture” (*rupture profonde*) that renders possible a specifically modern form of painting (FPM, 22). In archaeological terms, this means that he credits Manet with having created a series of painted-events that transform the rules for the formation of painting. For Foucault, Manet fundamentally altered the practice of representation in Western art, creating a new series of assumptions regarding the technical and aesthetic means for carrying out the painter’s craft.

The 1971 lecture on Manet makes this argument by means of a canvas-by-canvas analysis of Manet’s oeuvre. As such, it is one of the most extended applications of archaeology to painting that we have at our disposal. Despite their extraordinary richness and the series of idiosyncratic observations that they contain, we cannot follow each of Foucault’s discussions here out of a concern for space. Instead, our aim in this section is to highlight the archaeological dimensions of his approach, so to better isolate

its role in *Ceci n'est pas une pipe*. Reading these two contributions together, one gains a better sense of the way in which Foucault, throughout his writings on art, was attempting to offer a diagnosis regarding artistic modernity.

Perhaps it goes without saying that the works of Manet and Magritte are stylistically very different. Nevertheless, their works can be said to inhabit a similar archaeological space inasmuch as they were fashioned in opposition to the same set of assumptions regarding representational painting. It would be a mistake, however, not to take account of how the operations each exploited for breaking with this direction were indeed very different. One can argue in fact that with Manet and Magritte we have two clear alternatives to representation, both of which have a long legacy in twentieth-century art. Manet's break with representation spawns experiments with abstraction, whereas Magritte belongs to the figurative movement extending from Surrealism through to Pop Art and Hyperrealism. In the latter, the representative function of painting is continually thwarted through the creation of scenes and images that overtake the real. As Foucault notes, there is a direct connection between the simulacra created by Magritte and the dis-identified serial images of Andy Warhol: Campbell, Campbell, Campbell, Campbell (NP, 54). In describing the different strategies for contesting the inheritance of Classical painting, we must not fail to recognize how these different approaches belong to the same general space of non-representational art. Foucault stresses, in a number of places, that these are works that are distinct in that they can no longer be assessed in terms of a correspondence with an external object. Painting that refuses to be ruled by the dictates of representation is painting which prefers a fictive space to one dominated by painting's supposed relationships with the world.

As has already been indicated, Manet's canvases are the first wave of an assault upon the conventions of Classical painting. According to Foucault's account, they deliberately recall and incorporate the arrangements of space, light, and the viewer's position, with the aim of surpassing them. For example, Manet's *Le Bal masqué à l'Opéra* (1873–74), at first glance appears to be a highly representational work. It depicts a large group of well-dressed revelers. The title and the subject of the work suggest that this scene takes place in an open space fit for cavorting; however, as Foucault notes, the figures in the foreground deny viewers access to the scene's depths. They themselves function more as packets of volume and color than as figurative elements. The composition itself, Foucault suggests, reinforces the overall sense of flatness, in part because of the expectations we inherit from Classical painting. With a scene such as this, one anticipates that one's gaze will luxuriate in an illusory three-dimensional space. Frustration mounts, however, when that gaze encounters the obstacles that Manet has erected. The participants' top hats, in near-perfect alignment, serve as a barrier, halting vision's advance. These hats reduplicate the horizontal wall at the back of the room, one that presses the participants forward to further emphasize the flatness of the surface. There is one place, nevertheless, where vision's desire for open space finds a refuge: as the crowd skips past, a temporary clearing opens up at the bottom left corner of the canvas. For Foucault, this space is a "sort of irony," for what we gain a glimpse of is the dancers' feet (FPM, 26–27). After having been confronted with an insistence on flatness, we are given just enough depth to signal that the rules of painting have changed. Our experience of painting is thus marked by a self-consciousness regarding representation.

Foucault describes one of Manet's most infamous canvases, *Olympia* (1863), as the active displacement of the lighting schemes characteristic of Quattrocento painting. He illustrates this by means of a comparison with Titian's *Venus of Urbino* (1539), a composition said to be deliberately referenced by Manet in order to heighten the effect of his own work. Foucault's approach shirks many of the customary questions regarding precisely what Manet intended when he replaced the goddess of love with a common prostitute. His presentation takes for granted knowledge of the scandal that greeted the work's debut at the Salon of 1865. This reflects a methodological decision on Foucault's part: rather than speculate about the moral outrage regarding the meaning of the work, he wants to show how "the moral scandal was only a maladroitness of formulating something which was an aesthetic scandal" (FPM, 39). For Foucault, the image was disruptive not simply because of its shocking content, but because of the way Manet exploited the tableau's formal properties to implicate the viewer in *Olympia*'s nudity. Specifically, what Manet creates is an experience where the voyeurism implicit in many such scenes can no longer be denied. Whereas Classical painting relied upon an internal light in order to allow the viewer to forget his or her position before the canvas, and thus to take a certain distance from its content, Manet extends the real light of the room to draw an equation between the viewer and the means by which *Olympia*'s nudity becomes visible.

Despite a much-remarked upon sensuality, Titian's composition was, in Foucault's estimation, ultimately coy about its handling of the female form. Its lighting scheme muted its voyeurism. Light enters from the upper right of the room, sweeping to the left, gently enveloping the woman's body, and thus rendering her visible. Importantly, this "principle of visibility" is separate from the viewer stationed directly before the canvas (FPM, 39). This is how Foucault expresses the point: "if the *Venus* of Titian is visible, if she gives herself to the regard, it is because there is this luminous source, discreet, lateral and golden which surprises her . . . despite us [the viewers]" (FPM, 40). One can argue, then, that the spectator simply happens upon this encounter between light and flesh, and that the scene suggests an accidental encounter from which it is possible to tactfully withdraw.

Manet, on the other hand, does not deny the obvious: paintings of this variety are composed in order to feed viewers' more prurient interests. One might even argue that Manet's work functions as a critique of the role that such pleasures play in the practices of representation, giving the lie to ideas of disinterested pleasure. According to Foucault, Manet achieves this by taking apart the illusionistic space of representation. *Olympia* is lit by a "violent light" that strikes the scene at a perpendicular angle, one which directs and intensifies the viewer's gaze (FPM, 40). This new principle of visibility, the real light of the room taken up and extended within the canvas, creates an identification between the means of rendering nude and the viewer's regard. "She is only naked for us because it is we who render her nude and we render her nude because, in looking at her, we light her up, we illuminate her, because, in any case, our gaze and the lighting do one and the same thing" (FPM, 40). Foucault even claims that as a result of this identification, we are "necessarily implicated in this nudity and we are, up to a certain point, responsible for it" (FPM, 40). Whereas Titian maintained a distinction between the principle of visibility and the place of the spectator, Manet collapses the two. This is in part what Foucault means by "aesthetic" when he describes the moral scandal as

resulting from the transformations of formal elements carried out by Manet. The handling of light fundamentally alters our relationship with scenes such as this, raising the inevitable questions about the intersections of gender, race, commerce, and art. It is a good example of the dynamic Foucault isolated in his final lecture course, when he described modern art in terms of its capacity to create aesthetic challenges that impact culture more generally (C-CT, 177–190). With respect to Manet, the point is to show how a subtle, formal shift can carry the viewer over the threshold of the modern.

An even more radical displacement of the viewer is at work in Manet's *Un bar aux Folies-Bergère* (1881–1882). The work was exhibited in the Salon of 1882, and immediately recognized as a masterpiece, in large part because the composition captures the energy and excitement of the dancehall. For Foucault, this dynamism results from a complex series of incompatibilities that complicate the viewer's position before this image. Manet, in a sense, forces his viewer to dance with this image. Once again, a comparison with *Las Meninas* is warranted, if only because Foucault viewed *Un bar* as the "inverse" of the Baroque masterpiece (Defert 2001: 49). Like *Las Meninas*, Manet's composition exploits a mirror in order to put in play the viewer's position; however, rather than closing the representation, here the mirror destabilizes the scene, forcing the viewer to choose between a series of incompatible positions.

It is important to note that the mirror occupies the entire background of the composition, flattening out the space of the canvas, and, importantly, depicting what is in front of the barmaid as behind her. This substitution of foreground for background is not seamless, and indeed the gesture creates a number of distortions. The greatest slip-page occurs between the server and her reflection, situated slightly to the right of the space she occupies. As Foucault notes, in order for this reflection to be placed to the right of the canvas, it would be necessary for the painter and viewer to move right. The face of the server, however, greets us at a perpendicular angle, halting this movement. The first incompatibility thus indicates that there are two rival viewing positions before this canvas, the one required by the woman's solicitous gaze and the other by her presence in the mirror. This central inconsistency is compounded by the "incompatibility of presence and absence," which for Foucault is created by the gentleman at the right of the canvas (FPM, 44–46). On the one hand, he is included in the mirror's reflection; on the other hand, the frontal depiction of the server carries no trace of his presence. Her gaze greets the viewer unencumbered, as it is lit by a light arriving from outside the canvas. Such would be impossible if the gentleman were positioned in front of her, as the mirror suggests.

While Quattrocento painting supplied a single point from which to view the unfolding of representative space, Manet creates a series of incompatibilities that force the viewer to grapple with his or her position before the canvas. Not only does his painting deny us an ideal vantage point, it forces the viewer to choose between a number of different and competing positions. This negotiation impresses upon viewers the fact that painting resides in a post-representational space, one in which the flat surface of the canvas becomes unavoidable. Again, it should be noted that this is not the standard flattening out of the picture plane described by Greenberg. It is representation acquiring a form of self-awareness regarding the regularities that structured Classical painting. This self-reflexivity is what, according to Foucault, makes it possible for painting to supersede representation. Modern painting begins with this investigation into the

conditions and limits of representation, and it takes flight with an affirmation of that which resides beyond them.

The Belgian Surrealist René Magritte also surveyed the terrain beyond representation. He created a number of visual events designed to throw off the shackles of Classical painting, thereby creating a specifically modern visual experience. In this respect, his work can be said to occupy an archaeological space similar to that of Manet, one which Foucault gauges throughout his essay *Ceci n'est pas une pipe*. Many have failed to notice the archaeological dimensions of Foucault's text, perhaps because of its rigorous fascination with the games played by Magritte's images. Foucault, however, is less interested in cracking any one particular puzzle than he is with diagnosing the historical position occupied by Magritte's art, one whose "formulation is in some sense given by *Ceci n'est pas une pipe*" (NP, 54). Foucault regards many of Magritte's most famous canvases as operations designed to thwart representation, or as clever indications that painting's referential capacity has been defused. And he insists that we cannot understand the significance of that famous canvas unless we see how it operates upon the two principles that structured Classical painting: the separation principle and the idea that resemblance implies reference. According to the separation principle, "verbal signs and visual representations are never given at once" (NP, 32–33). It thus calls for treating the linguistic and the plastic as separate functions, and, within the space of the canvas, makes possible the subordination of one to the other. A general suppression of linguistic reference defines Classical painting as primarily a mute, visual experience. By means of the second principle, that resemblance implies affirmation, speech creeps back into the picture. "Let a figure resemble an object . . . and that alone is enough for there to slip into the pure play of the painting a statement [*énoncé*]" (NP, 34; translation modified). Thus, despite the subordination of language to the image, resemblance functions discursively, culminating in the statement, "What you see, it is that" (NP, 34; translation modified). The main idea that Foucault calls our attention to is that, in the interplay of these two principles, representational painting points, however indirectly, to something external to it.

When we look archaeologically, we see that Magritte attempts to silence the referential function associated with resemblance. He pursues this by creating exacting similitudes that mime the affirmations lurking in resemblance, while remaining closed upon themselves. Foucault describes these canvases as "nonaffirmative," showing us how Magritte conspires to silence reference itself. Take, for example, *Les Liaisons dangereuses* (1936). The painting depicts a nude woman posing awkwardly before an imagined viewer. She uses a mirror in an attempt to shield the most delicate parts of herself; however, in a dramatic twist, the same mirror reveals her backside. The exposure takes place despite the fact that the shiny surface of the mirror is directed out at the viewer, and that the nude's posterior is given cover by a blank wall. Foucault, in a clever analysis, argues that this canvas indicates that post-representational painting has a complicated relationship with its "model." It expresses the fact that painting no longer stakes itself on subjects beyond itself. As Foucault explains, modern painting, and Magritte's work in particular, must be thought according to the contortions by which it erects itself as its own model (NP, 51–52). Foucault: "Through all these scenes glide similitudes that no reference point can situate: translations with neither point of departure

nor support" (NP, 52). The similitude, then, is resemblance purged of all affirmation except self-affirmation.

The celebrated painting *La Trahison des images* (*Ceci n'est pas une pipe*), enacts a similar series of operations, and ultimately comes to inhabit the same nonaffirmative space. Foucault's hypothesis is that Magritte achieves this by creating a calligram, taking it apart, and scattering its fragments throughout the painting. Calligrams are poems that try to capture their objects twice, by means of discourse and through the figural arrangement of words on the page. Despite their apparent conflation of word and image, traditional calligrams ultimately respect their essential difference, leaving the viewer/reader to sort seeing from saying through different modalities of attention. The unmade calligram, on the other hand, sows confusion. Here, it is not immediately evident that one is in the presence of a calligram. The tableau appears as a simple yet exacting rendering of a pipe accompanied by a phrase that appears to contradict it. As Foucault notes, however, contradictions exist only at the level of language, and, no, "this" is not "a pipe." Our malaise stems from the ineluctability with which we connect the painted pipe with the phrase below it. Foucault describes this arrangement as having the appearance of an object lesson, explaining that despite our better judgment, cultural conventions cause us to bring the image and text together. In defiance of the separation principle, Magritte here forces the question of whether one is reading or viewing. His strategy for accomplishing this involves attacking the ground upon which one would stand in order to separate the visual or discursive aspect of the calligram. As Foucault explains, "Magritte knits together verbal signs and plastic elements, but without referring them to a prior isotopism" (NP, 53). Whereas Classical painting was founded upon a strict separation of linguistic and plastic elements, Magritte causes them to crash into one another. Prompted by Foucault's questioning, the "written" elements begin to resemble painted pipes, while the "painted" pipe becomes a confused piece of writing forgotten as such. A hyper-affirmative space coupled with the promise of reference holds the "viewer" in suspense. Phantoms of the pipe appear everywhere, and, still, there is no pipe, for representation has been outstripped.

Between Manet and Magritte, we see the destiny of modern painting unfold. Both create paintings that progressively relinquish the attempt to capture external objects, or, said differently, which refuse to be ordered by the external world. Despite very significant stylistic differences, the archaeological look reveals how a common suspicion regarding the principles and aims of representative painting gives rise to two countervailing tendencies within the history of art. Manet excavates the conditions of possibility for painting's representative function, ultimately transmuting it into the play of color and gesture on canvas. Magritte's surfaces perfect the similitude as the image that never refers beyond itself. These exacting renderings are not foreign to the project initiated by Manet, despite the fact that Magritte worked assiduously to erase the material traces of the painter's craft. It can be said that these ambiguous visual experiences are an emplotment of Manet's rupture, a rupture which first made it possible for painting to concern itself with itself. Magritte's constructions no doubt benefit greatly from occurring at a historical point where the imperatives of representation had already been greatly weakened. Across his work, Magritte is thus able to develop a series of games in which painting celebrates its freedom.

Thinking Painting in an Extra-Moral Sense

It is no accident that after these encounters with modern art, Foucault dedicated himself to a theoretical consideration of the simulacrum. One opportunity for him to do so was the short yet important review of Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition* (1968) and *The Logic of Sense* (1969), "Theatrum Philosophicum" (EW2, 343–368). The essay praises Deleuze for confronting philosophy's hostility to the pleasures of the false. While the essay is largely devoted to developing Deleuze's genealogical displacement of Platonism's games of truth and falsity, one senses in it Foucault's longing for a philosophical form of thought liberated from the obligations of representation, one more attuned to the functions of the modern image. The a-categorical thinking Foucault champions here has little to do with the exacting genealogies for which he is well known. Under the influence of Deleuze, but also, I would submit, his encounters with the works of artists like Manet and Magritte, Foucault speaks somewhat ahistorically about a thinking not content simply to mirror the world, but one which seizes it, perverts its, and creates it afresh.

One of the precursors Foucault cites for this form of thought is Andy Warhol (EW2, 362). It is fair, therefore, to describe this project as one of developing an artistic-philosophical form of thought. According to Foucault's presentation, such a thinking would be motivated less by epistemological or historiographical concerns for "getting it right," and more by the promise of the thought-adventures lurking in simple acts of perception. As Foucault describes it, the first step in the creation of this aesthetic thought is the cultivation of a mute fascination. Here, an immersion in the force of gesture, the dance of line, and the trickery of the simulacrum comes to occupy the space once held by dialectics. This fascination outstrips the impulse to weigh, measure, and appraise. Thinking of Deleuze, Foucault describes this as an immersion in stupidity, contrasting blank fascination with categorical thought:

To think in the form of categories is to know the truth so that it can be distinguished from the false; to think a thought "acategorically" is to confront a black stupidity and, in a flash, to distinguish oneself from it. Stupidity is contemplated: the look [*le regard*] penetrates its domain and becomes fascinated; one is supported by an amorphous fluidity; one awaits the first leap of an imperceptible difference, and with the empty look [*le regard vide*], one spies, without fever, the return of the light. (EW2, 361–362; translation modified)

As we see, thought, in the second instance, breaks from this immersion in stupidity through the detection of its own difference. This more passive judgment can be distinguished from traditional notions of aesthetic judgment, for it does not stem from a subject assessing his or her subjective experience, but from the difference operative in the impersonal activity of thought as such. Forming itself upon that which is customarily excluded from the domain of serious thinking, this sensible-thought forces the subject to relinquish its hold on thinking. The barely perceptible separation that distinguishes thought from matter ultimately allows thought to surpass its object in the detection of its own difference. The recovery of thought, however, is only apparent, for the thinking that results can hardly be measured according to the dictates of truth. This is philosophy unmoored from representation. This is philosophy as intoxication.

I do not wish to suggest that archaeology is this artistic-philosophical thinking. The two positions are in fact dramatically different orientations. Despite being united by the goal of seeing differently, archaeology aims at knowledge, while a-categorical thought seeks to be set in motion. Such a “thought” commits itself to the insane flight of material, while archaeology attempts to compose accurate and exhaustive descriptions of the separations that define different historical formations. In my estimation, archaeology remains one of the most rigorous means for conducting historical inquiry and the systematic analysis of art. Artistic thinking does not share this passion for knowledge, seeking itself to create experiences that overtake that which is present. It nevertheless remains an essential and ineffaceable aspect of any encounter with art.

The artistic-philosophical thought that forms itself on the surface of painting is itself dependent upon the modern revolution in art and aesthetics, the one through which art first began operating outside the strictures of *mimesis*. As a methodology, archaeology is particularly adroit at following that which ceases to be governed by the real. Its vantage point makes it possible to suspend the ruthless will to truth that manifests itself before the work of art. It enables us to contemplate works of art outside of the games of truth and falsity. Bracketing the hermeneutic question – what does this mean? – is, in this sense, a necessary precondition for any perspective that would exploit the dynamic nature of art. It allows us to attend to the dynamic nature of these productions without hastily subordinating them to the real. As such, it creates the space in which a responsive artistic-philosophical thought might develop.

What I hope to have shown is that across Foucault’s engagements with visual art there are two related but different tendencies at work, both of which are predicated upon modern art’s essential resistance to truth as correspondence. While archaeology gauges the individual work’s distance from the dictates of representation, it attempts nevertheless to compose an edifying historical account regarding how sets of artistic regularities differ from one another. To achieve this, the archaeologist finds it necessary to suspend questions regarding the work’s meaning. He or she attends instead to what the work of art does – both with respect to the history of painting and to those who stand before it. From the archaeological suspension of meaning, it is possible to elaborate a form of thinking based on the rush of the simulacrum and the flight of the imaginary. This philosophical creation responds to the event of the phantasm with the advent of thought.

There are indications that Foucault viewed both endeavors as little more than a *divertissement*, a reprieve from the meticulous labors of genealogy:

What pleases me precisely in painting is that one is really forced to look. It is my rest. It is one of the rare things on which I write with pleasure and without battling with anybody. I believe I have no tactical or strategic relationship with painting. (FDE1a, 1574)

And yet one would be mistaken in concluding that Foucault was not sensitive to the political capacities of art. With respect to a series of paintings by Paul Rebeyrolle, Foucault affirmed that “Painting has at least this in common with discourse: when it makes a force pass . . . it is political” (FDE1a, 1269). He goes on to argue that this is precisely one of the hallmarks of post-representational art. Its objects are forces that remove the viewer from the grip of the everyday, making possible what we have been

describing as artistic-philosophical thought. It is here, in this remove, that the viewer recognizes his or her freedom from the customary laws of association. In this sense, modern art and the imaginative flights it sustains are one of the basic preconditions of a politics of refusal, and a necessary moment in the re-elaboration of ourselves.

Notes

- 1 Foucault, *La Peinture de Manet* (2004). An English translation, by Matthew Barr, has recently been published *Manet and the Object of Painting* (London: Tate Publishing, 2010). Throughout this essay, I will be quoting my own translation of the French edition.
- 2 These are artists discussed by Foucault that I have dealt with in other places. See, for example, Tanke (2009). In that work, I hope to have shown that even though Foucault produced no essays on par with *Ceci n'est pas une pipe* in the late 1970s and early 1980s, his interest in visual art remained relatively constant up until his death in 1984.
- 3 The other two archaeologies that Foucault describes are an analysis of "sexuality" that would be intended to show how practices and articulations of sexuality are governed by certain regularities that proscribe its manifestations, and an archaeology of political behaviors and discourses designed to show how, as knowledges, they are already inscribed in a network that determines their possible functions.
- 4 A great amount of mystique surrounds this book, prompted largely by Gilles Deleuze's references to a "destroyed manuscript." See, Deleuze (1988: 58). It is my considered opinion that nothing as substantial as a manuscript ever existed and that any of the sketches compiled in the fall of 1970 have been lost or destroyed. We can presumably gain a glimpse of this project from the 1971 lecture and the remarks regarding Manet scattered throughout Foucault's corpus. See also Foucault 1998 and 2001.

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Discipline and Punish

ALAN D. SCHRIFT

Michel Foucault published *Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison* in February 1975 in the Éditions Gallimard series “Bibliothèque des Histoires.” It was his first major work since *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969) and the first since his election to the Chair in the History of Systems of Thought at the Collège de France in 1970. When it appeared, it confirmed Foucault’s position as a major force on the French intellectual scene and to this day it remains perhaps his most influential work. In this essay, I will review (1) the context in which Foucault wrote this work; (2) its structure and central themes; (3) its initial reception; and (4) its general place in Foucault’s oeuvre and its influence.

I

On February 8, 1971, just nine and a half weeks after delivering his inaugural address at the Collège de France,¹ Foucault, along with Jean-Marie Domenach (the editor of *Esprit*) and Pierre Vidal-Naquet (a distinguished historian, well known for his early opposition to the French army’s use of torture in Algeria), announced the formation of the organization Groupe d’Information sur les Prisons (GIP). At the Saint-Bernard de Montparnasse Chapel, Foucault read the following announcement of its purpose:

There is no one among us who is certain of escaping prison. Today less than ever. Police control is tightening on our everyday life, in city streets, and on the roads; expressing an opinion is once again an offense for foreigners and young people, and antidrug measures are increasingly arbitrary. We live in a state of “custody.” They tell us that the system of justice is overwhelmed. That is easy to see. But what if the police are the ones who have overwhelmed it? They tell us that the prisons are overcrowded. But what if the population is over-imprisoned? There is very little information published about prisons; it is one of the

hidden regions of our social system, one of the dark compartments of our existence. It is our right to know. We want to know. That is why, with magistrates, lawyers, journalists, doctors and psychologists, we have created an association for information about prisons.

We propose to let people know what prisons are: who goes there, and how and why they go; what happens there; what the existence of prisoners is like and also the existence of those providing surveillance; what the buildings, food, and hygiene are like; how the inside rules, medical supervision and workshops function; how one gets out and what it is like in our society to be someone who does get out.

This information is not going to be found in the official reports. We will ask those who, for one reason or another, have some experience with prison or a connection with it. We ask them to contact us and tell us what they know. We have composed a questionnaire they can request. As soon as we have a sufficient number of results, we will publish them. (Eribon 1991: 224)

The final line of the announcement noted: "Anyone who wants to inform, be informed or participate in the work can write to GIP: 285, rue de Vaugirard, Paris-XV." 285, rue de Vaugirard was Foucault's own address, and he, along with his partner Daniel Defert, would go on to be the real intellectual and political force of GIP, which would remain a focus of his attention until its dissolution in December 1972.

In 1971, prisons were a site of political unrest in France, as they were in the United States.² Among the issues at the time in France, beyond the generally intolerable situation of life within the prisons, were the frequent imprisonment of journalists from leftist and other anti-government papers, the treatment of leftist activists, many of whom were engaging in hunger strikes to be treated as "political" rather than "ordinary" criminals, and the general sense that the police, both inside and outside the prison, were taking the law into their own hands. In an interview in July 1971, when asked about the events that led him to found GIP, Foucault addressed in particular the recent hunger strikes: "Last December, some political prisoners, *gauchistes* [members of the Gauche Prolétarienne] and Maoists, went on hunger strike to struggle against the general conditions of detention, whether political and common law. This movement began in the prisons and developed outside them. It was from that moment that I began to take an interest" (FDE2, 204).

The intention of GIP was not so much to reform the prisons as to shine a light on the operations of the prison system, to gather information from those who knew firsthand how the prison system worked: judges, social workers, psychiatrists, and guards, but also prisoners, ex-prisoners, and their families. It is with respect to the latter groups – prisoners, ex-prisoners, and their families – that the work of GIP can be seen to intersect with Foucault's own intellectual project, for a recurrent theme in his work is the examination of the discursive practices and institutions that function so as to marginalize certain groups – the mad, the sick, the criminal – by withdrawing from them the power to speak and refusing to grant them access to discourse. Foucault acknowledged as much in the interview just cited, in response to a question about GIP's objective: "We would literally give voice to the prisoners. It is not our intention to do the work of a sociologist or reformer. It is not proposing an ideal prison" (FDE2, 204).³ Here we might recall the opening questions of his inaugural address, where he asks "What is so perilous, then, in the fact that people speak, and that their speech proliferates? Where is the danger in that?" And these questions give rise to a hypothesis that

Foucault suggests will guide his future work at the Collège: “in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed by a certain number of procedures, whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality” (DL, 52).

While Foucault was participating actively in all of the activities of GIP,⁴ he was also introducing the prison into his research, and from 1971 until 1975, questions surrounding the prison were the focus of his lecture courses at the Collège: 1971–72 on *Théories et institutions pénales* (*Penal Theories and Institutions*); 1972–73 on *La Société punitive* (*The Punitive Society*); 1973–74 on *Le Pouvoir psychiatrique* (*Psychiatric Power*); and 1974–75 on *Les Anormaux* (*Abnormal*). Gilles Deleuze, who joined GIP soon after it was formed, reflected back on Foucault’s work at the Collège as a “forum for experimentation” that resulted in *Surveiller et punir* (Deleuze 2006: 273). Shortly after Foucault disbanded the GIP, he completed the first draft of *Surveiller et punir* in April 1973, and in August 1974 he completed the final draft (FDE1, 73–74). Because of Foucault’s visibility at the time as a social activist for prison reform, *Surveiller et punir* was received not just as a socio-historical or philosophical analysis but even more as a work of radical social criticism.

II

Few readers will forget the opening pages of *Discipline and Punish*, where Foucault reproduces in excruciating detail the *Gazette d’Amsterdam*’s account of the public execution of Robert-François Damiens the regicide on March 2, 1757. This is followed immediately by an 1838 timetable that scheduled the days of the residents in the House of Young Prisoners in Paris. These two documents, separated by eighty-one years, represent two distinct penal styles, and Foucault’s task in *Discipline and Punish* is, in part, to highlight the differences between them and draw attention to the mechanisms of discipline that emerged with the birth of the prison. To accomplish this task, Foucault charts the transformation from punishment as a public spectacle in which the force of the sovereign is imposed on the body of the criminal in a way that both exacts a measure of compensation to the state and also serves as a lesson to the public, to punishment as a political tactic that seeks to change behavior. To do so, Foucault suggests in the opening chapter, will in fact chart the transformation from punishment as imposed upon a body to punishment as a “technology of power” that works through the mediation of the soul to subject and train the body (DP, 23; unless otherwise indicated, all references will be to the English translation). Reversing the traditional understanding of the relationship between body and soul, Foucault claims that “the soul is the prison of the body” (30), and so to tell the story of the birth of the prison will be at the same time to provide “a genealogy of the modern ‘soul’ ” (29). The objective of this book, Foucault writes, is to provide “a correlative history of the modern soul and of a new power to judge” (23). Insofar as Foucault first introduces many of the signature terms associated with his philosophical positions – body, power, soul/subject – in the opening chapter, it will be worthwhile to review the central ideas and methodological suggestions he puts forward in this chapter before looking at some of the details of his account of the birth of the prison.⁵

Where the body of the condemned had been the focus of the earlier approach to punishment, modern penalty is directed not primarily at the body, but at the soul. This explains both the gradual elimination of punishment as a public spectacle and the turning of attention from the acts that the criminal has performed to the thoughts and acts of will that motivated the criminal's behaviors. With the beginning of the nineteenth century, the criminal is transformed from a body to be tortured to an object to be known. Where the judicial system had no interest in knowing why Damiens sought to assassinate Louis XV, a half-century later the law sought to judge not only the crime but the criminal's soul: the process sought to discover not only what he did but *why* he did it. And to do so required the construction of the modern subject as an object to be studied and known, which is why *Discipline and Punish* will be not only a "history of the modern soul and of a new power to judge" but also "a genealogy of the present scientifico-legal complex form from which the power to punish derives its bases, justifications, and rules" (23).

To achieve these ends, Foucault proposes rules to guide the inquiry into punishment. First, to regard punishment as a complex social function, which means to attend to both its repressive and its positive effects. Second, to regard punishment as a political tactic, which means to not analyze punishment only as a consequence of violations of the law but also as a positive exercise of power with its own specific techniques. Third, to treat the history of penal law and the history of the human sciences as sharing some "common matrix" or deriving from "a single process of 'epistemological-juridical' formation," which is to say, to examine the "technology of power" as the principle that underlies both the humanization of the penal system and the knowledge of man (23). And fourth, to examine whether the introduction of the soul on to the scene of penal justice and the introduction of a scientific discourse of criminology are not themselves consequences of a transformation of the investment in the body itself by relations of power (24).

Following these rules and studying the transformation of punishment informed by an apparatus (*dispositif*) of discipline and guided by "a political technology of the body" allows this work to move beyond a mere history of punishment by leading us to understand "in what way a specific mode of subjection [*assujettissement*] was able to give birth to man as an object of knowledge for a discourse with a 'scientific' status" (24). Here, let me break for a moment from my review of the opening chapter to draw special attention to this last quote because I think it presents a significant challenge to the commonplace division of Foucault's thought into an archaeological, a genealogical, and an ethical period. Such a periodization typically situates *Discipline and Punish* as the central text in the genealogical period. But the appearance of "man as an object of knowledge for a discourse with a 'scientific' status" might very well serve as a description of *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, which is a privileged text of the so-called archaeological period. And the focus on *assujettissement* – translated as "subjection" or "subjectivation" or "subjectification" – is typically referenced as one of, if not *the*, central theme of Foucault's so-called "ethical" period. That Foucault here describes the project of *Discipline and Punish* in this way should give pause to this now almost canonical periodization of his work. And, as will be seen below, he will return to the conjunction of "man," "power-knowledge," "subjection," and "discipline" in the closing pages of *Discipline and Punish*.

Returning now to the first chapter, following these methodological rules will, in addition to revealing a “political technology of the body,” also allow the study of the history of systems of punishment to proceed as a “‘political economy’ of the body” which treats the body as “directly involved in a political field [insofar as] power relations have an immediate hold on it; they invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, emit signs” (25). This political investment is intimately bound up with the body’s economic utility: the body becomes a useful force only if it is a productive body. But productivity alone is insufficient for economic utility, as the body must be both productive *and* subjected. Contrary to the simplistic Marxian account, subjection is not only obtained by the instruments of violence and ideology; there is, rather, a complex “micro-physics of power” that works to discipline the body physically, but more subtly than with brute violence (26). And so we return to the prison, whose task is discipline and whose power works both negatively (correction) and positively (making more useful).

To study this micro-physics of power requires a new way of thinking about power, and Foucault runs through several of the ways we should now treat power: as a strategy rather than a property; as something exercised rather than possessed; as existing in relations rather than in things or persons; as in tension rather than contractually mediated; as operating at all levels of the *socius*, not just in the relations between state and citizens, or between classes, or between superiors and subordinates; as functioning in specific ways, specific to their modalities and mechanisms; as not univocal, but unique to their field of specificity and a function of their deployments and their effects (26–27; Foucault’s discussion here should be compared to the discussion of how to think about power in the chapter on “Method” in HS1). To study power will also require rethinking the relation of power and knowledge insofar as traditional accounts of that relation understand knowledge to exist outside of the corrupting effects of power and its interests. For Foucault, on the other hand, “power produces knowledge . . . power and knowledge directly imply one another,” and where there is one, there will be the other (27). Because power and knowledge directly implicate one another, power-knowledge relations,

are to be analyzed, therefore, not on the basis of a subject of knowledge who is or is not free in relation to the power system, but, on the contrary, the subject who knows, the objects to be known and the modalities of knowledge must be regarded as so many effects of these fundamental implications of power-knowledge and their historical transformations. In short, it is not the activity of the subject of knowledge that produces a corpus of knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but power-knowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse it and of which it is made up, that determines the forms and possible domains of knowledge. (27–28)

To rethink power as a “political anatomy” of the “body politic” will thus require abandoning the following traditional ways to think about power (many of which are the privileged categories of Marxist analysis): the violence–ideology opposition; the metaphor of property; the models of contract or of conquest; the opposition between interested and disinterested knowledge; and the primacy of the subject. Giving up these assumptions will allow us to rethink the “body politic” as “a set of material elements

and techniques that serve as weapons, relays, communication routes and supports for the power and knowledge relations that invest human bodies and subjugate them by turning them into objects of knowledge" (29).

And rethinking power relations in this way will disclose the genealogy of the modern soul, not as an illusion or product of ideology but as born out of methods of punishment, supervision, and constraint. Foucault ends this first chapter by arguing for the *contemporary* relevance of his return to the past and the emergence of the mechanisms of disciplining the subject. This non-corporal soul is not a substance, but it is also, unlike the soul of Christian theology, not merely a fiction. Just as Nietzsche had argued, in *On the Genealogy of Morality*, that the Christian soul, while a constructed fiction, could and did have very real effects, Foucault claims that the modern soul is "real" insofar as "it is the element in which are articulated the effects of a certain type of power and the reference of a certain type of knowledge, the machinery by which the power relations give rise to a possible corpus of knowledge, and knowledge extends and reinforces the effects of this power" (29). Whether understood as the psyche, personality, subjectivity, or consciousness, liberating this soul has been the goal of all forms of humanism. But, Foucault notes ominously, this "soul is the prison of the body," an "effect and instrument of a political anatomy" that inhabits the object which the human sciences seek to know – modern man – and who is "already in himself the effect of a subjection [*assujettissement*] much more profound than himself" (30).

Following this opening theoretical setting of the issues, the remainder of Part I ("Torture") and Part II ("Punishment") trace the transformation through the two mechanisms of punishment that precede discipline and the birth of the prison. The second chapter, "The Spectacle of the Scaffold," offers an account of the punitive "logic" behind "torture" (*supplice*). Torture was a technique of punishment involving three criteria: it must produce a measured amount of pain that must be greater than the pain caused by the act being punished; this pain must be regulated through the practices of torture following specific rules (number of lashes, amount of time on the wheel, etc.); and the torture must enact a ritualized marking of the body of the victim as an expression of the sovereign power that punishes. These practices were directed toward a specific goal: the production of the truth, which in this judicial context meant a confession that would be both the definitive proof of guilt and the criminal's acknowledgment of responsibility for the crime. The confessed criminal was thus the "living truth" (38) of the crime, a truth first ascertained in secret via the machine of judicial torture (*la question*) and then re-enacted again in public in order to be legible for all via the ritual of the scaffold and public torture (*la supplice*). This public display of punishment functioned as a means of publishing the truth for all to see: "A successful public execution justified justice, in that it published the truth of the crime in the very body of the convicted man" (44). And why was such a publication of the truth necessary? Because public execution was both a judicial and a *political* ritual, one in which the power of the sovereign is manifested (47): because all crime is an attack upon the sovereign, all punishment is the right of the sovereign to take revenge for the assault upon him. Public execution does not re-establish justice by returning the scales of justice to their proper balance; it reactivates power by making everyone once again aware "of the unrestrained presence of the sovereign" (49).

In revealing truth and displaying power, torture, like all mechanisms of punishment, is animated by a truth–power relation (55). And it is a change in this truth–power relation that explains why public torture and executions were eliminated.⁶ When the power of the sovereign reigned supreme, public torture was a clear statement of that power. But by the second half of the eighteenth century these public executions were becoming dangerous for the sovereign, as the role assigned to the main character in these executions was transferred from the condemned to the people, whose presence was required for the spectacle to function as the display of power it was. The people were there as witnesses, but they were not just spectators, and their participation was often welcomed, as they insulted and attacked the condemned man. As the secure position of the sovereign weakened, however, the people's place in the procedure became ambiguous; where the gallows speech had been a cautionary tale offering the people an example of a life gone wrong, now the gallows speech was frequently not confessional but accusatory and confrontational. The condemned would mock authority and could occasionally gain the people's sympathies, especially as the revolution approached and crimes against property were replacing crimes against persons. So, contrary to a simple narrative of the increasing "humanism" of the Enlightenment – a narrative Foucault challenges throughout *Discipline and Punish* – it was not for humane reasons, but for reasons of political expediency that public executions were eliminated: the crowds could no longer be controlled.

Part II turns from torture to punishment, beginning with an examination of the protests against public executions that increased in the second half of the eighteenth century. These protests came from two sides: while the Enlightenment philosophers protested that public executions were barbaric, lawyers, politicians, and other legal functionaries argued that they were potentially disruptive, suggesting that if the people watched the sovereign spill blood, it was only a matter of time before the people called for blood, the blood of the sovereign or his functionaries. What results is sovereign revenge giving way to criminal justice and an appeal to humanism insofar as even the worst of criminals shares with all men a "human nature." Crimes were now to be judged in terms of a measure of the humanity still present in the criminal, and the criminal was to be punished accordingly. As the right to punish "shifted from the vengeance of the sovereign to the defense of society" (90), the justification for punishment shifted from looking backward (retribution) to looking forward (deterrence), and the rules governing punishment now functioned as punitive signs that would serve as obstacles that should inhibit future criminal activity. There is no question, for Foucault, that punishment became more humane during this period, but the new notion of "leniency" was motivated less by the moral arguments of the *philosophes* than by principles of efficiency and "a calculated economy of the power to punish" (101). And what is produced with this move to leniency is a shift in the point of application of the power to punish, from the body to the mind, "or rather a play of representations and signs circulating discreetly but necessarily and evidently in the minds of all" (101). This project of penal reform results in two distinct ways in which criminals are now objectified: on the one hand, the criminal as enemy of all, as outlaw, as violator of the social contract, as abnormal; on the other hand, the criminal as a soul whose immorality can be measured and corrected and controlled by a calculated economy of punishments,

whose “‘mind’ [is] a surface of inscription for power,⁷ with semiology as its tool; the submission of bodies through the control of ideas” (102).

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, imprisonment was only a particular punishment for a specific sort of crime. But by the early nineteenth century, incarceration became the dominant form of punishment, which leads Foucault to ask what explained the rapid rise of the prison as the preferred mode of punishment. The traditional explanation for the birth of the prison – that a number of innovative models of incarceration were devised in the United States, England, Holland – is rejected by Foucault because it doesn’t really explain anything insofar as these innovations were themselves a response to already recognized social needs. The question to ask, therefore, is: What set of beliefs suddenly made these models acceptable, even appealing? Foucault’s preliminary suggestion is that these new models addressed a number of problems that punishment was now expected to respond to: they were directed toward the future; they intended not to efface crime but transform the criminal (through obligatory labor); they offered the possibility of constantly supervising the prisoner; they provided an efficient institutional apparatus for altering “minds”; and finally, insofar as these new models also were motivated by the same set of beliefs that were giving rise to the human sciences, they provided for the establishment of procedures for acquiring knowledge about the individual prisoner – his past, his thoughts, his progress. Instead of focusing on the crime committed, this new corpus of knowledge that the prisons were now understood to produce “took as its field of reference . . . the potentiality of danger that lies hidden in an individual and which is manifested in his observed everyday conduct” (126). And with this new knowledge came a new goal for punishment: correction. Through the techniques of correction, what would be produced was no longer the juridical subject “but the obedient subject, the individual subjected to habits, rules, orders, an authority that is exercised continually around him and upon him, and which he must allow to function automatically in him” (128–129). The prison as an administrative apparatus for the deployment of disciplinary power thus challenges the two other technologies of power to punish – monarchical power and juridical power – for hegemony. And the question Foucault concludes Part II with is this: at the end of the eighteenth century, all three ways of organizing the power to punish were present. How do we explain the fact that the third way, that of the prison, came to prevail?

In Part III, Foucault turns at last to the central theme of his investigation: the emergence of discipline as a new technology of power. Following the classical age and the *ancien régime*, discipline seeks to create a body that is both useful and intelligible, manipulable and analyzable (136). Which is to say, disciplinary power seeks to produce bodies that are *docile*, “that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved” (136). Such bodies would, of course, be beneficial to the ever-expanding forces of capitalist production, but that in itself is not Foucault’s focus. Instead, he attends to the techniques by which discipline invests power in the body, what he calls “a ‘new micro-physics’ of power” (139). Included among these new techniques are various ways of distributing individuals in space (enclosure, partitioning, assignment to dedicated spaces or individual cells, etc.); managing individuals’ activities (the extension of the timetable, regimenting gestures, routinizing performance of tasks, etc.); the introduction of exercises to maximize individual efficiency; and the combining of individuals to produce composite forces.

From these somatic techniques which discipline the individual physically, Foucault turns next to the means of training by which “discipline ‘makes’ individuals”: hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and the examination (170). Through various procedures that compare, that rank, that hierarchize, that judge, that select or exclude, that, in all senses of the word, *examine*, the modern individual is no longer called upon as a subject required to obey the law but is produced instead as an individual who is required to conform to the *norm*. The norm, and the range of normality that surrounds it, does indeed homogenize the population who must submit to the disciplines, insofar as the power of normalization works through the functioning of various examinations that operate within the school, the military, the hospital, or the factory. At the same time, normalization also “individualizes by making it possible to measure gaps, to determine levels,” and thereby “the norm introduces, as a useful imperative and as a result of measurement, all the shading of individual differences” (184). This individualization, Foucault shows, will be *documented* – whether in the medical case study, the military or school record – and so the writing of real lives, once restricted to kings and heroes, will now become applicable to all as the techniques of disciplinary power transform all human bodies into individuals. In fact, “a ‘power of writing’ was constituted as an essential part in the mechanisms of discipline,” and the various documentary techniques that accompany the multifarious processes of examination play an essential role in making the individual into a “case” (189, 191; see also C-PP 48–52, where Foucault emphasizes more strongly the essential role writing plays within discipline).

What Foucault concludes from his analysis of the normalizing function played by the mechanisms of discipline in the construction of the modern individual is that in addition to the negative terms with which power has been traditionally described (exclusion, repression, censorship, etc.), we must also acknowledge the productivity of power: “it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production” (194). That is to say, the modern individual is what he or she is by virtue of comparison with, conformity to, and differentiation from the norm, and it is this individual’s individuality itself that is produced through the disciplinary power that examines and judges it.

Part III concludes with Foucault’s introduction of an image that for many of his readers will become their lasting impression of the microphysics of disciplinary power and, more generally, of the genealogical dimension of his thought: Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon.⁸ Written in 1787, the title of Bentham’s work is worth noting in full: *Panopticon; or, The Inspection-House: Containing the Idea of a New Principle of Construction applicable to any Sort of Establishment, in which Persons of any Description are to be kept under Inspection; And in Particular to Penitentiary-Houses, Prisons, Houses of Industry, Work-Houses, Poor-Houses, Lazarettos, Manufactories, Hospitals, Mad-Houses, and Schools*. Foucault follows Bentham’s lead here, highlighting the significance of the Panopticon for the penitentiary *in particular* while never losing sight of the fact that this disciplinary apparatus can and has extended well beyond the prison’s walls.

The Panopticon is a model of architectural efficiency: a circular structure, at the center of which will be placed a tower. Along the periphery, individual cells will be arranged with a large window that opens to the center and a smaller window in the

rear that allows backlighting to illuminate the cell from one end to the other. The result will be that the inhabitant of the cell will be permanently visible, under permanent surveillance. The central tower, on the other hand, will be shaded and lit in such a way that those within will not be visible to the inhabitants of the cells. So, at one level, we have an architectural structure that will permit a supervisor to see all without being seen by anyone under surveillance. But this is in fact the genius of the Panopticon: insofar as the inhabitants of the cells come to believe that they are under constant surveillance, this disciplinary machine will work as well without a supervisor as with one. Foucault notes this as the “major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power” (201). Taking a page from Nietzsche’s argument, in the Second Essay of *On the Genealogy of Morality* (§16), that the origin of the “soul,” like the origin of bad conscience, can be traced to the turning inward of one’s instincts that follows an inability to discharge them outwardly – what Nietzsche calls the “*internalization of man*” – Foucault suggests that the prisoner, because permanently visible, begins a regime of perpetual self-surveillance that results in the *internalization* of the supervisor. The Panopticon thus leads to panopticism, and the disciplinary machine leads to the disciplinary society and the production of the modern individual who, by internalizing the supervisory gaze of the other, takes all the disciplinary tasks of society upon itself and forces itself to conform to social norms without any external authority imposing those norms. Bentham’s preface opens: “Morals reformed – health preserved – industry invigorated – instruction diffused – public burthens lightened – Economy seated as it were upon a rock – the Gordian knot of the Poor-Laws not cut, but untied – all by a simple idea in Architecture!” This list of benefits would be made possible by “A new mode of obtaining power of mind over mind, in a quantity hitherto without example.” Is it therefore surprising, Foucault concludes Part III, “that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?” (228). Together these disciplinary machines deploy the techniques of a power-knowledge regime that produces and distributes individuals around a norm, all the while making sure that departures from this norm are identified in order to be corrected.

In the fourth and final part, Foucault turns to the functioning of the prison in terms of the emergence of detention as the privileged form of penalty. The deprivation of liberty was never, he notes, an end in itself; rather, from the outset, detention was conjoined with the “technical function of correction” whose goal was the transformation of individuals (233). He also notes, in the early pages of Part IV, and with an obvious gesture to the controversies of the day regarding prison reform, that prison reform is as old as the prison itself. The prison as an institution was, from the beginning, recognized to be a failure; it did not succeed, as the recidivism rates made clear, in transforming criminals into productive contributors to society. “And yet one cannot ‘see’ how to replace it. It is the detestable solution, which one seems unable to do without” (232; cf. 277).

To this seemingly peculiar state of affairs, Foucault suggests we pose a different question: not “why do we continue to maintain an institution that has from its very beginnings been seen to be a failure?” but “what is served by the failure of the prison?” (272). And to answer this question leads Foucault from an investigation of the prison as a site for the detention of offenders to the site where we witness the fabrication of the delin-

quent. Where the juridical system was framed by the opposition between law and illegal practices, the carceral system will be framed by a different, “strategic” opposition: illegality and delinquency:

For the observation that prison fails to eliminate crime, one should perhaps substitute the hypothesis that prison has succeeded extremely well in producing delinquency, a specific type, a politically or economically less dangerous – and on occasion, usable – form of illegality; in producing delinquents, in an apparently marginal, but in fact centrally supervised milieu; in producing the delinquent as a pathologized subject. (277)

The prison, Foucault tells us, “cannot fail to produce delinquents” (266). But what is the delinquent? He is a type, a sub-species of non-normalizable humanity, of humanity that cannot but fail to follow the norms. He is the object of the science of criminology, the “correlative of the penitentiary apparatus . . . a biographical unity, a kernel of danger, representing a type of anomaly” (254). The carceral system has successfully substituted the delinquent for the offender, and in so doing has created a class of managed, controlled, useful, and profitable illegalities. Prostitution, arms trafficking, illegal sale of alcohol, drug trafficking: all of these activities make use of agents produced by the prison who, after their release, are supervised by the extended police apparatus and exemplify the functioning of “useful delinquency.” In these examples, we see forms of delinquency that represent “a diversion of illegality for the illicit circuits of profit and power of the dominant class” (280). Other forms of delinquency serve more explicitly political functions as informers, *agents provocateurs*, the eyes and ears of the police apparatus in locations where the police themselves cannot go. Delinquency is thus both a product of the prison system and an integral part of that system, comprising one of the three components of the police-prison-delinquency ensemble: “Police surveillance provides the prison with offenders, which the prison transforms into delinquents, the targets and auxiliaries of police supervisions, which regularly send back a certain number of them to prison” (282).

The carceral system, Foucault argues in the final chapter, did not remain restricted to the prison. Instead, “the carceral archipelago [the reference here is no doubt to Solzhenitsyn’s *Gulag Archipelago*, which was published in the West in 1973] transported this [penitentiary] technique from the penal institution to the entire social body” (298). What results is the emergence of a disciplinary society that is governed no longer by laws but by norms. We have become a society of judges, and “The judges of normality are present everywhere. We are in the society of the teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the educator-judge, the ‘social-worker’-judge; it is on them that the universal reign of the normative is based; and each individual, wherever he may find himself, subjects to it his body, his gestures, his behavior, his aptitudes, his achievements” (304). The panoptic functioning of this new power to judge has given rise to the extension of the examination from specialized institutions (the school, the hospital) to the whole of society. By means of constant and omnipresent examination, the disciplinary power of the carceral system

required the involvement of definite relations of knowledge in relations of power; it called for a technique of overlapping subjection [*assujettissement*] and objectification; it brought

with its new procedures of individualization. The carceral network constituted one of the armatures of this power-knowledge that has made the human sciences historically possible. Knowable man (soul, individuality, consciousness, conduct, whatever it is called) is the object-effect of this analytical investment, of this domination-observation. (305)

This carceral network, and all of the disciplinary mechanisms attached to it, will return in Foucault's next work, the introductory book to his history of sexuality *La Volonté de savoir* (*The Will to Knowledge*), as he narrows the domain in which the powers of normalization are exercised. *Discipline and Punish*, on the other hand, closes both abruptly and provocatively, as Foucault suggests that instead of punishing transgressions of some central law, these carceral mechanisms exercise their normalizing power over transgressions against "the apparatus of production – 'commerce' and 'industry'" (308). Referring, no doubt, to the work he began with GIP and the continuing attempts at prison reform in France, Foucault suggests that resisting the forces that "permit the fabrication of the disciplinary individual" will involve more than reforming the way prisoners are treated. For we are all this "disciplinary individual," we are all "the effect and instrument of complex power relations, bodies and forces subjected to multiple mechanisms of 'incarceration'" (308). As we engage and resist these powers of normalization and the formations of knowledge related to the disciplinary individuals that we have become in modern society, "we must hear the distant roar of battle" (308).

III

While Foucault may have written *The Order of Things* with the intention that it would only be "read by about two thousand academics who happen to be interested in a number of problems concerning the history of ideas" (PPC, 99), he had different expectations about the audience for *Discipline and Punish*. As already noted, when *Discipline and Punish* first appeared, it was received less as the latest work from a professor at the Collège de France than as a work of social criticism by a well-known social activist. As a consequence, its publication was widely noted in major French cultural venues: selections appeared in *Le Nouvel Observateur* in the week before it appeared, while the French daily *Le Monde* marked its publication with two pages of coverage on February 21, including an interview with Roger-Pol Droit and a review by Christian Jambet. The next three weeks saw largely favorable reviews appear in weekly news magazines *L'Express* (February 24–March 2), *Le Nouvel Observateur* (March 3), and *Le Point* (March 10) and the bimonthly *La Quinzaine littéraire* (March 16). This was followed, in June, with an issue of *Magazine littéraire* in which the "Dossier" was devoted to his work, and which included an interview with Foucault (FDE2, 740–753; PK, 37–54) as well as an important positive appraisal of his work's relevance for historians by the historian and future president (1995–2004) of the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Jacques Revel.

In many of these early reviews, their authors acknowledge both the scholarly erudition as well as the timely intervention of the work. Jean-Paul Enthoven, writing in the March 3 issue of *Le Nouvel Observateur*, is typical of these reviews. Foucault's book, he writes, "possesses virtues other than those that ordinarily come from his complete

erudition, his prodigious sense of the archive or the baroque splendor of his writing.” It also brought to its readers questions about the most current events, demanding that they listen to the uproar coming from the rioters at the prisons at Toul or Lille, and from the others who “filled barracks, colleges, prisons and other *écoles normales* of pure discipline” (Artières 2010: 60).

The year ended with a special issue on Foucault in the important literary journal *Critique*, with three long articles on *Discipline and Punish*, including the first major essay on Foucault’s work by François Ewald – who soon after became Foucault’s assistant at the Collège de France – and a glowing review by Gilles Deleuze. Deleuze’s essay, which was republished with only minor alterations as the second chapter of his 1986 book on Foucault, also notes the contemporary political relevance of the analysis of the prison, but Deleuze’s review highlights the theoretical importance of Foucault’s microphysics of power. Foucault appears as “A New Cartographer” – the chapter’s title, which Deleuze takes from one of Foucault’s first interviews after the publication of *Discipline and Punish* (FDE2, 725) – who by offering us a new diagram of how power functions makes it possible, finally, for something new to emerge in the wake of Marx – a new constellation of the relations between power, law, and the state (Deleuze 2006: 30). In so doing, Foucault also “overcomes the apparent dualism” of power vs. knowledge that some saw in his earlier books, which to some supported the “error . . . that consists in thinking that knowledge appears only wherever the relations between forces are suspended.” Instead, Foucault makes clear that “There is no model of truth that does not refer back to a kind of power, and no knowledge or even science that does not express or imply, in an act, power that is exerted” (Deleuze 2006: 38–39).

Turning briefly to this work’s reception in English, not surprisingly, the initial reaction to *Discipline and Punish*, as with Foucault’s earlier works, came not from philosophers but from historians, sociologists, criminologists, and literary theorists. Historian Hayden White was one of the few to review the work before it appeared in English translation in 1977. Writing in *The American Historical Review*, White appreciates the brilliance of Foucault’s text, while at the same time taking note of its flaunting the “traditional . . . standards of [historical] scholarship.” With some irony, White continues, “the book is a scandal, lacking in ‘original research’ and making only the merest gesture toward modern scholarship in the field of penology.” But to judge Foucault’s work by these conventional standards, White presciently goes on, “would be wrong – or at least a ‘category mistake.’ For it belongs to that genre of speculative essays of which Nietzsche’s *Genealogy of Morals* is an example. It will remain seminal long after more conventional studies of criminality and penal institutions have been forgotten” (White 1977: 605–606).⁹

After the English translation of *Discipline and Punish* appeared in 1977, it was fairly widely reviewed in non-academic venues like *The New Republic*, *The Nation*, *New York Times Book Review*, and *Times Literary Supplement* (which also reviewed the French publication in 1975), as well as *Time* and *Newsweek*. Reviews in scholarly journals, on the other hand, were far less common: between 1977 and 1980, reviews appeared in eight journals of sociology (including *The American Journal of Sociology*, *Sociology*, *Sociology and Social Research*, and *Sociological Review*), seven journals of criminology and law (e.g. *International Journal of Criminology and Penology*, *New England Journal of Prison Law, Crime and Delinquency*), only four history journals (e.g. *Journal of Modern History*,

Eighteenth Century Studies), four journals of literature (including *Diacritics*, *Stanford French Review*, and the *Dickens Studies Newsletter*), three journals of religion, and several journals more difficult to classify (e.g. *Partisan Review* and *The Humanist*). Among philosophy journals, *Discipline and Punish* was reviewed only in *Telos*, first after its French publication in 1976 and again together with reviews of *Language*, *Counter-Memory*, *Practice* and *La Volonté de savoir* in 1978.

While most of these reviews take note, in some way or other, of “the extraordinary force of the prose” (Barham 1979: 113) or the “dazzling . . . range of historical sources and . . . the analytical skill with which they are made to yield up their secrets” (Ferguson 1978: 271), many remain profoundly skeptical of Foucault’s main theses (when they can identify them) or the practical relevance of his work. Sociologist and criminologist David F. Greenberg, for example, responds to Foucault’s thesis that a class of delinquents was created as “distinct from the ‘respectable’ working class” in order to split the working class in two” (one might, however, ask whether this was Foucault’s thesis), that “It is here that Foucault stretches incredulity. That an international bourgeoisie conspired to divide the working class by inventing the prison is unbelievable” (Greenberg 1979: 141). Typical of many of the reviews in journals of criminology, Professor of Law Richard Singer acknowledges the broad scope of Foucault’s analysis but cautions “There is much that is wrong or half wrong with this work, but that may be due in large part to the massive task the author has taken on. This is surely a book to be read, and to be reckoned with, by all scholars of crime and punishment; it is, however, not one intended for the practitioner of the imprisoning process” (Singer 1979: 379).

IV

The initial reviews notwithstanding, it is difficult to overstate the influence of Foucault’s *Discipline and Punish*. As already noted, it was very well received when it first appeared: some 8,000 copies were sold in 1975, and by 1987 sales were approaching 70,000 (Dosse 1997: 254). It was translated into German and Spanish in 1975, Italian in 1976, English, Japanese, Norwegian, and Portuguese in 1977, and to date into thirty languages, including fourteen other European languages as well as Chinese, Korean, Thai, Lithuanian, Latvian, Ukrainian, Russian, Farsi, and Turkish. In the decades after its English translation, many would regard it as the central Foucauldian work for both his critics and his proponents. For critics like Jürgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer, or Nancy Fraser, it showed most clearly the failure of Foucault’s normative theory, as it provided no clear normative justification for choosing what relations of power to resist or why one should even resist at all.¹⁰ Other critics saw Foucault’s position as hopeless, even nihilistic, arguing that because power was everywhere, there was no escaping it.

Foucault’s defenders, on the other hand, found these criticisms to miss the point. Against the former, they responded that if a normative justification for action demanded appeal to some form of transcendent moral standard, then there could indeed be no normative justification for resistance. But that was precisely what Foucault was arguing against by demanding that any justification for resistance must appeal to the immanent

conditions presented by the existing power relations themselves. And against the latter accusation, Foucault's defenders replied that precisely because there was no getting outside of relations of power, resistance was internal to all relations of power as a permanent possibility. Foucault himself addressed both of these criticisms in one of his final interviews.

My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to hyper- and pessimistic activism. I think that the ethico-political choice we have to make every day is to determine which is the main danger. (EW1, 256)

For Foucault's proponents, *Discipline and Punish* was a groundbreaking work that opened up a range of new possibilities. For some, it made clear Foucault's position as one of the great heirs, if not *the* great heir, to Nietzsche's reflections not only on genealogy as a method but on the constructed nature of the human subject, and a wide array of scholarship exploring the Nietzschean connection with Foucault's thinking has followed (see work by Michael Mahon, Keith Ansell-Pearson, and myself, among others). For others, Foucault drawing attention to the disciplining of bodies opened up a range of scholarly inquiries, and a great deal of important scholarship resulted, in particular in terms of the disciplining of women's bodies (see e.g. the work of Susan Bordo, Sandra Bartky, and Jana Sawicki, among others). It is also important to note that the English publication of *Discipline and Punish* was followed the next year by the English translation of the first volume of Foucault's *History of Sexuality*, and together these two works gave rise not only to a wide variety of studies that reappraised how we should understand the contemporary exercising of power relations (e.g. by William E. Connolly and Thomas Dumm) but also, a few years later, to an entirely new field of inquiry – queer theory (see, in particular, the early work of Judith Butler). Whether or not one accepts all, or even most, of Foucault's claims in his account of the birth of the prison, one conclusion that it would appear difficult to avoid accepting is this: Foucault's account in *Discipline and Punish* of the mechanisms of discipline have transformed irrevocably the way scholars in the humanities and social sciences understand and think about how relations of power are exercised in modern and contemporary Western societies.

Notes

- 1 Foucault's address on December 2, 1970 was published February 21, 1971 as *L'Ordre du discours* by Gallimard.
- 2 It is perhaps worth recalling that George Jackson, a Marxist, author, and member of the Black Panther Party was shot to death by prison guards in California's San Quentin prison under unclear circumstances on August 21, 1971. And the prison riot at the Attica Correctional Facility in Attica, New York erupted on September 9, 1971, in part prompted by prisoners' demands for better living conditions, and in part in response to what the more politically motivated prisoners thought had been the political execution of George Jackson.
- 3 Gilles Deleuze notes this as well in an interview given after Foucault's death: "It's an oversimplification, but the goal of the GIP was for the inmates themselves and their families to

- be able to speak, to speak for themselves. That was not the case before. Whenever there was a show on prisons, you had representatives of all those who dealt closely with prisons; judges, lawyers, prison guards, volunteers, philanthropists, anyone except inmates themselves or even former inmates. . . . The goal of the GIP was less to make them talk than to design a place where people would be forced to listen to them, a place that was not reduced to a riot on the prison roof, but would ensure that what they had to say came through" (Deleuze 2006: 277).
- 4 Foucault's activities surrounding GIP are chronicled in FDE1, 37–43, and discussed in all of Foucault's biographies; see Eribon 1991: 224–234; Macey 1993: 257–289; Miller 1993: 185–194. See also Bourg 2007: 79–95.
 - 5 It is important to note that this is the first appearance of these themes – body, power, subject – in Foucault's published works. He had in fact introduced and discussed these themes in the 1972–73 Collège lectures on *The Punitive Society* and the 1973–74 lectures on *Psychiatric Power*. See, for example, the lecture of November 21, 1973, where Foucault says that "Discipline is that technique of power by which the subject-function is exactly superimposed and fastened on the somatic singularity" (C-PP, 55). Earlier, Foucault had spoken in detail on these themes in a series of lectures he presented May 21–25 at the Pontifical Catholic University in Rio de Janeiro, subsequently published as *La Vérité et les formes juridiques* (FDE2, 538–646); *Truth and Juridical Forms* (EW3, 1–89).
 - 6 In the 1978–79 lecture course on *The Birth of Biopolitics*, Foucault emphasized the role played by the production of truth in the birth of the prison; the question at issue, he says, is: "how this veridictional practice . . . began to install the veridictional question at the very heart of modern penal practice . . . which was the question of the truth addressed to the criminal: Who are you? When penal practice replaced the question: 'What have you done?' with the question: 'Who are you?' you see the jurisdictional function of the penal system being transformed, or doubled, or possibly undermined, by the question of veridiction" (C-BB, 34–35; cf. 36–37) What he is calling "veridiction" are what he elsewhere calls "regimes of truth," the procedures that determine the rules concerning what is to count among the true.
 - 7 That Foucault's language here recalls that of Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus* – published three years before *Discipline and Punish* – is no coincidence; in a footnote toward the end of chapter 1, Foucault writes that "In any case, I could give no notion by references or quotations what this book owes to Gilles Deleuze and the work he is undertaking with Félix Guattari" (309).
 - 8 Foucault's discussion here follows and expands upon his initial exposition of Bentham's Panopticon on November 28, 1973, in his fourth lecture in the series on C-PP; see esp. pp. 73–78.
 - 9 To see an example of the sort of treatment that makes this category mistake, see the very critical review of *Surveiller et punir*, "L'Historien et le philosophe," by Jacques Léonard in Artières 2010: 223–250. For an interesting discussion of Foucault's reception by "disciplinary historians," see Megill 1987.
 - 10 For representative essays by Habermas, Taylor, and Walzer, see their contributions in Hoy 1986; for Fraser, see her essays on Foucault in Fraser 1989, especially "Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusions," pp. 17–34.

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Reading *The History of Sexuality*, Volume 1

RICHARD A. LYNCH

The History of Sexuality, volume 1: *An Introduction* may be the most widely read of Foucault's texts in English – for many, to be sure, it is the first book by Foucault that one is likely to read. (As the title tells us, after all, it is “an introduction” – not to mention that it is about sexuality, raising the possibility that there might be something titillating inside.) Despite its popularity, however, it can be easily *misread*, and *The History of Sexuality*, volume 1 (henceforth HS1) is far from an ideal introductory text to Foucault. It is nonetheless an indispensable text in Foucault's oeuvre – not only for a theoretically sophisticated understanding of the construction of sexuality and the exercise of power (two key themes of the work), but also for an understanding of the evolution and “stakes” of Foucault's own thought.

This essay consists of two parts. The first part attempts to situate and assess HS1. Thus, HS1 constitutes a turning point in Foucault's thought: it presents Foucault's mature articulation of disciplinary power while also opening up new analyses of biopower and, in a more radical turn, bringing certain ethical problematics to the fore. As such, its reframing of sexuality has been profoundly inspirational for thinkers and activists alike. The much shorter second part briefly presents HS1's argument through analyses of each part and chapter.

First, some historical context: HS1 was completed in August 1976 (and published in December 1976), immediately following the completion of Foucault's 1976 course at the Collège de France, *Society Must Be Defended*, and one year after his prior book, *Discipline and Punish* (which is frankly a much better introduction to Foucault). The themes of HS1 had been anticipated several years earlier: in the closing pages of *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969; Foucault's last book prior to *Discipline and Punish*), Foucault noted that “I can readily imagine – subject to a great deal of further exploration and examination – archaeologies that might develop in different directions. There is, for example, the archaeological description of ‘sexuality’” (AK, 192–193). He antici-

pated in 1969 that “[s]uch an archaeology would show, if it succeeded in its task, how the prohibitions, exclusion, limitation, values, freedoms, and transgressions of sexuality, all its manifestations, verbal or otherwise, are linked to a particular discursive practice” (AK, 193), and (quite interestingly, as we shall see) he described this project as “[a]n analysis that would be carried out not in the direction of the episteme, but in that of what we might call *the ethical*” (AK, 193, my italics). Indeed, recalling these earlier projections (even though Foucault’s thought had largely evolved beyond the archaeological frame articulated in 1969), Foucault notes in HS1 itself that “[t]he history of the deployment of sexuality, as it has evolved since the classical age, can serve as an archaeology of psychoanalysis” (HS1, 130).

Although HS1’s English subtitle is *An Introduction*, the original French subtitle was quite different: *La Volonté de savoir*, that is, “the will to knowledge.” This subtitle invokes Nietzsche’s famous phrase, “the will to power”; and as we shall see, part of the work of HS1 is to tie sexuality to practices of truth and knowledge. This subtitle also echoes earlier themes in Foucault’s work – his first course at the Collège de France (in 1970–71, just after *The Archaeology of Knowledge*) was entitled *Leçons sur la volonté de savoir* (*Lectures on the Will to Knowledge*) – though this course focused on ancient Greek texts. Moreover Foucault’s more recent work in the mid-1970s had been devoted to articulating a continuum of what he called “power/knowledge”; thus the French subtitle situates the book’s project within that context.

The English subtitle is not without some descriptive merit, however. HS1 was envisioned as the first volume in a six-volume series examining nineteenth- and twentieth-century discourses and practices related to sexuality. As such, it was intended to provide an overview and framework for the later, more focused and empirically grounded, volumes, thus functioning as a sort of introduction. The anticipated subsequent volumes were listed on the back cover: *The Body and the Flesh*; *The Children’s Crusade*; *Woman, Mother, Hysteric*; *Perverts*; and *Population and Races* (cited in Macey 1995: 354). Throughout HS1, we are given glimpses of what these volumes would have explored. The last four of these five themes are enumerated as “four great strategic unities which, beginning in the eighteenth century, formed specific mechanisms of knowledge and power centering on sex” (HS1, 103–104). The first theme, “flesh,” represents a pre-history and context for the emergence of these four “specific mechanisms”; “flesh” traces the evolution of the Christian and later psychiatric and psychoanalytic practice of confession – itself a theme that figures largely in this first volume.

Hence, the domain we must analyze in the different studies that will follow the present volume is that deployment of sexuality: its formation on the basis of the Christian notion of the flesh, and its development through the four great strategies that were deployed in the nineteenth century: the sexualization of children, the hysterization of women, the specification of the perverted, and the regulation of populations. (HS1, 113–114)

These subsequent volumes were never published. Yet HS1 does offer very short condensations of what would presumably have been developed in much richer detail in those volumes. For example, with respect to the sexualization of children, Foucault notes how “the pedagogical institution . . . has multiplied the forms of discourse on the subject [children’s sexuality]; it has established various points of implantation for sex;

it has coded contents and qualified speakers” (HS1, 29). While HS1 is often quite schematic (as befits an introductory overview), more detailed analyses of several of these themes were articulated in a number of Foucault’s courses at the Collège de France. Particularly useful in this regard is his 1975 course, *Abnormal*.

Why weren’t the subsequent volumes published? Foucault addressed this question in a 1984 interview:

By programming my work over several volumes according to a plan laid out in advance, I was telling myself that the time had now come when I could write them without difficulty, and simply unwind what was in my head, confirming it by empirical research.

I very nearly died of boredom writing those books. . . . When you know in advance where you’re going to end up, there’s a whole dimension of experience lacking . . . So I changed the general plan . . . (PPC, 47–48; FDE4, 730 [no. 357])

Karl Marx once colorfully explained why an important text (*The German Ideology*) had not been published: “when we received the news that altered circumstances did not allow of its being printed [w]e abandoned the manuscript to the gnawing criticism of the mice all the more willingly as we had achieved our main purpose – self-clarification” (Tucker 1978: 5–6). Foucault is saying something quite similar – completing the subsequent volumes as planned was no longer useful to him, because writing the first volume had reoriented his thinking in different directions.

This change in general plan was quite significant. Following HS1, Foucault did not publish another book for almost eight years, until the months just before his death in 1984. What did finally appear were billed as volumes 2 and 3 of *The History of Sexuality*, but these were radically different than what Foucault had initially envisioned, as they focused instead on ancient Greek and Roman practices. These last two volumes, one could say, leave his history of sexuality doubly incomplete: the original project remains unfinished, and the final volumes represent only a partial presentation (focused on sexuality) of the new lines of research that he was investigating through those ancient practices.

Despite its English subtitle, I have suggested, HS1 is *not* a good first or introductory text for readers of Foucault. There are, I think, four interconnected reasons for its particular difficulty: first, its schematic character (it wasn’t meant to stand alone); second, the rhetorical strategies that Foucault employs in it (the text often shifts voices, and indeed begins in an only subtly marked ironic voice); third, the multiple projects or trajectories that it is attempting to articulate (these include critique of the “repressive hypothesis” and an elaboration of the discursive “deployment of sexuality” and sex as a vehicle for “the truth about ourselves,” as well as an articulation of Foucault’s theory of power, and the emergence of new concerns about populations that push Foucault to rethink his analysis of power) – all of these are concepts whose theoretical and historical presuppositions are often inexplicit (part of the work to be done in later volumes would have been to spell out those presuppositions); and fourth, new tensions and trajectories that are only beginning to emerge as Foucault presents his analysis. In short, there are simply too many different issues being juggled in this text, if one doesn’t already have some sort of Foucauldian framework within which to situate them. As Foucault puts this in HS1,

This history of sexuality . . . is, I realize, a circular project in the sense that it involves two endeavors that refer back to one another. . . . Hence it is a question of forming a different grid of historical decipherment by starting from a different theory of power; and, at the same time, of advancing little by little toward a different conception of power through a closer examination of an entire historical material. (HS1, 90–91)

The structure of Foucault's argument in HS1 is to challenge something that has been "taken for granted" as "received wisdom"; to reveal it to be in actuality only a partial understanding (at best) or (at worst) entirely misguided; and to offer a new framework or perspective that (sometimes radically) recasts our understanding of what's really going on. This is what Foucault calls a "circular," and what we could call a "bootstrapping,"¹ project: the new framework is needed to see why the old, accepted view is mistaken; but it only becomes possible through the recognition of the accepted view's errors. To make this case, Foucault often shifts voices and perspectives from one that articulates the "accepted" view to one that shows it to be a basic misunderstanding. This structure shapes the overall arc and argument of the book. Writ large, in HS1 Foucault is challenging the accepted idea that sex – and, through sex, society more generally – has been repressed and must be "liberated." On the contrary, the last two centuries have seen an explosion of discourses about sex, discourses that have increasingly been brought under techniques of control and discipline, specifying individuals and regulating their conduct. Foucault thus directly challenges both psychoanalysis and a number of contemporary political theories. He discusses – and recasts the importance of – Sigmund Freud at several points. Another implicit, though unnamed, target of Foucault's criticism is critical theorist Herbert Marcuse's *Eros and Civilization*, which essentially puts forth this "repressive hypothesis." This structure – challenging and reframing, altering our understanding of, accepted ideas – repeats itself even in more detailed analyses subsumed within the larger arc (hence the multiple trajectories present in the text). Within his analysis of the "repressive hypothesis," for example, two apparently antithetical discourses on sex – the Christian confession and pornography – are not opposed, but treated as parallel, related practices.

This structure frames Foucault's larger, underlying concerns, too. His analyses of the repressive hypothesis, and of discourses about sex more generally, serve to reveal two critical, interrelated frameworks that shape these very discourses – truth and power. (Here we find some of Foucault's most significant and lasting contributions to political theory, sociology, and other disciplines.) Indeed, "sexuality" is defined twice: first as a correlative function of truth (in Part III) and later as a correlative of power relations (in Part IV).

HS1's first definition of sexuality is as a function of truth:

It is this deployment that enables something called "sexuality" to embody the truth of sex and its pleasures.

"Sexuality": the correlative of that slowly developed discursive practice which constitutes the *scientia sexualis*. The essential features of this sexuality are not the expression of a representation that is more or less distorted by ideology, or of a misunderstanding caused by taboos; they correspond to the functional requirements of a discourse that must produce its truth. (HS1, 68)

Foucault's discussion of truth in HS1 is focused on the practice of confession, from the Christian pastoral to the psychoanalytic couch – techniques for “extracting the truth from sex” that he here terms “scientia sexualis.” “Truth” becomes a critical underlying, “structural” element that conditions how sexuality and practices like confession of one's sexual thoughts and desires can take shape and how they can function to define “who one is.” And we can see in this definition how sexuality is defined first by challenging accepted views (ideology, taboo), and then recasting it in a new framework (a discourse's functional requirements). But HS1's discussion of truth is clearly incomplete and unfinished; in fact, both negative and positive forms and practices of truth-telling (*parrhesia*) will become a central subject for Foucault's work over the next decade.²

We see the same structural or rhetorical motif in HS1's second definition of sexuality, as a correlative of power relations:

Sexuality must not be defined as a stubborn drive, by nature alien and of necessity disobedient to a power which exhausts itself trying to subdue it and often fails to control it entirely. It appears rather as an especially dense transfer point for relations of power . . . Sexuality is not the most intractable element in power relations, but rather one of those endowed with the greatest instrumentality. (HS1, 103)

And again:

Sexuality . . . is the name that can be given to a historical construct . . . a great surface network in which the stimulation of bodies, the intensification of pleasures, the incitement to discourse, the formulation of special knowledges, the strengthening of controls and resistances, are linked to one another, in accordance with a few major strategies of knowledge and power. (HS1, 105–106)

In short, “sexuality is the set of effects produced in bodies, behaviors, and social relations by a certain deployment deriving from a complex political technology” (HS1, 127). Here Foucault is grounding sexuality in another key underlying phenomenon – power relations. (Indeed, both of these definitions are ultimately interrelated; more precisely, sexuality is a function of the complex interplay of truth and power, or what Foucault calls “power/knowledge.”) In order to define sexuality as an effect and correlate of power relations, Foucault has to recast our understanding of the basic modes of how power is exercised: power is not top-down, or principally a form of repression, but emerges, from micro-interactions, and is profoundly productive, constitutive of our very identities. Thus a number of traditionally accepted views of power – liberal, Marxist, and psychoanalytic – are challenged and critiqued as only partial, limited analyses that can be resituated and explained within the framework of Foucault's new understanding of power as productive and disciplinary. This new understanding of power is the most significant contribution of Foucault's “genealogical” period to political philosophy. As Nancy Fraser (a not uncritical reader of Foucault) observes, “Foucault's most valuable accomplishment consists of a rich empirical account of the early stages in the emergence of some distinctively modern modalities of power. This account yields important insights into the nature of modern power, and these insights,

in turn, bear political significance" (Fraser 1989: 17–18). HS1, along with *Discipline and Punish*, represents an absolutely essential articulation of this reconceptualization of power. As Leo Bersani notes, "It is the original thesis of his *History* [HS1] that power in our societies functions primarily not by repressing spontaneous sexual drives but by producing multiple sexualities, and that through the classification, distribution, and moral rating of those sexualities the individuals practicing them can be approved, treated, marginalized, sequestered, disciplined, or normalized" (Bersani 1995: 81).

What is most striking, however, is that the critical, challenging/reframing structure of HS1's argument applies not only to others' views (about sex, truth, or power), but also to Foucault's own analyses, which are in the process of evolving within HS1 itself. Herein lies HS1's real value for readers of Foucault. Like *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, HS1 marks the culmination of one major strand or "period" of Foucault's thought, while also revealing the tensions that will (perhaps) lead to a rupture and will allow new directions or frameworks to emerge. *The Archaeology of Knowledge* marked the fulfillment of what has been termed Foucault's "archaeological" period – it represents Foucault's fullest theoretical articulation of a certain approach to problems that took discursive structures as the framework for analysis; but in it can already be recognized a shift towards "genealogy," to analysis framed not exclusively by discourse but instead by analysis of the power relations embedded in both discursive and non-discursive relations and within which those discursive and non-discursive relations are immersed. This genealogical study of power relations, and in particular the emergence of a modern form of power that he termed "disciplinary power" out of an older model of "sovereign power," was the dominant leitmotif of Foucault's work throughout the mid-1970s, culminating in *Discipline and Punish* and HS1. So HS1 articulates the theoretical completion of one model and "period" – the second, "genealogical" period – but it simultaneously brings out the very tensions that will supersede this model, and give rise to the third, "ethical" period. As Marx interpreted history (to again make a comparison with Marx), "[n]o social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed; and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of the existence have matured in the womb of the old society itself" (Tucker 1978: 5). The internal contradictions or tensions of one order lead to the emergence of another. So it is with the development of Foucault's thought: his recognition of tensions or instabilities within his analyses forces that analysis to evolve, and sometimes prompts radical breaks or shifts. But in the case of HS1, we can actually see the emergence of *two* new directions for analysis – a major reconfiguration of his analysis of power and a shift towards ethical concerns as the frame for his analyses.

First, in HS1 Foucault is literally in the process of rethinking his analysis of modern power – of recognizing that it is not fully articulated according to the disciplinary model that he had developed over the last several years, but that there is a second, macro-level, directed at populations. And so he introduces the term "biopower" to describe this new mode. These two modes are not yet clear and distinct, however. At some points in HS1, Foucault's discussion amalgamates elements that will be separated into one and the same technology or mechanism – for example, "[At] the end of the eighteenth century . . . there emerged a [singular] completely new technology of sex . . . sex became a matter that required the social body as a whole [biopower], and virtually all

its individuals [disciplinary power], to place themselves under surveillance” (HS1 116, my brackets). At other points, they are almost distinct – consider this early observation: “Through the political economy of population there was formed a whole grid of observations regarding sex” (HS1 26). Foucault still speaks of macro-level populations in terms of the disciplinary techniques of hierarchical observation. But a few sentences later, he adds:

In time these new measures would become anchorage points for the different varieties of racism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It was essential that the state know what was happening with its citizens' sex, and the use they made of it, but also that each individual be capable of controlling the use he made of it. Between the state and the individual, sex became an issue . . . (HS1, 26)

Here he is, in at least a rudimentary way, distinguishing between the macro-level that will constitute state-knowledge and certain forms of racism and the micro-level of individuals' own use of sex. And although they are not developed in detail, these connections – tying these macro-forms of power (and sexuality itself) to racism – have also been quite productive for subsequent political theory.³

Later in HS1, Foucault's discussion of power as the “domain” of sexuality in Part IV is still cast in almost exclusively disciplinary terms. It is, in fact, his most condensed presentation of disciplinary power – though its import extends beyond that one mode of power. But when he turns to the “periodization” of sexuality later in Part IV and especially in Part V, he gradually shifts his discussion to focus on this second form, as he introduces “population” as a key element and target of biopower's operation: “because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population” (HS1, 137).

In short, Foucault's understanding of how power operates is undergoing a significant reconfiguration – his analysis of micro-level power in terms of discipline is being supplemented with an analysis of macro-level power in terms of populations, biology, and life. This budding reformulation emerges as tensions that are present but not yet fully resolved in HS1. We can see the directions he is moving in the final, March 11, lecture of his 1976 course at the Collège de France:

From the eighteenth century onward (or at least at the end of the eighteenth century onward) we have, then, two technologies of power which were established at different times and which were superimposed. One technique is disciplinary; it centers on the body, produces individualizing effects, and manipulates the body as a source of forces that have to be rendered both useful and docile. And we also have a second technology which is centered not upon the body but upon life: a technology which brings together the mass effects characteristic of a population. . . . Both technologies are obviously technologies of the body . . .

What is more, the two sets of mechanisms – one disciplinary and the other regulatory – do not exist at the same level. Which means of course that they are not mutually exclusive and can be articulated with each other. (C-SMD, 249, 250)

A little bit later in this lecture, Foucault offers sexuality as an example of how these two mechanisms are interwoven:

On the one hand, sexuality, being an eminently corporeal mode of behavior, is a matter for individualizing disciplinary controls that take the form of permanent surveillance . . . But because it also has procreative effects, sexuality is also inscribed, takes effect, in broad biological processes that concern not the bodies of individuals but the element, the multiple unity of the population. Sexuality exists at the point where body and population meet. And so it is a matter for discipline, but also a matter for regularization. (C-SMD, 251–252)

Sexuality is but one of a few examples that Foucault very briefly sketches in this lecture – its fuller development was to have been effected in the series that HS1 inaugurated. And this is far from Foucault's final word. This rethinking will take form over the next several years, and is the guiding theme for his 1978 and 1979 Collège de France courses, *Security, Territory, Population* and *The Birth of Biopolitics* (both of whose titles refer to this second, macro-form of power). We can see the evolution of his understanding of macro-power very clearly delineated in the revisions he made to an essay that was published twice, first in 1976 and again in 1979 (FDE3, 13–27 [no. 168] and FDE3, 725–742 [no. 257]). The second half of this essay, “The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century,” is virtually identical in the two versions, but the first half has been entirely rewritten. That first half of the 1976 version frequently employs an extremely awkward, almost tautological, neologism – “noso-politics” (PK, 167ff; FDE3, 14ff) – to refer to new technologies of public health; its awkwardness reflects, I think, Foucault's own lack of theoretical clarity. In the 1979 version, however, this neologism has been dropped and the essay reorganized as a much clearer discussion in terms of populations and the kind of power specifically aimed at them – the very ideas that Foucault is initially struggling to grasp in 1976, through the writing of HS1: “The politics of health emerged in the course of the eighteenth century, at the intersection of a new economy of assistance and a management of the social body in its materiality including the biological phenomena proper to a ‘population’” (FDE3, 731). So Foucault is, in HS1, in the process of complicating his analysis of modern power, as he comes to recognize that macro-level power relations are not simply reducible to the micro-level phenomena he has already identified.

The second major recasting and reorientation of Foucault's thought that can be recognized in HS1 is even more revolutionary than his rethinking of power: HS1 marks (often inexplicitly, unconsciously) the inauguration of Foucault's final “ethical” period, as it foregrounds issues that will become central problems (questions of identity and “telling the truth about oneself”) and even represents an early attempt to find a framework within which he can engage in ethical analysis.

Foucault's research in the 1980s is marked by a constellation of themes related to truth and subjectivity – which we can already see in HS1, but which are themselves recast, allowing new elements or capacities to emerge. His work in the “genealogical” period of the 1970s emphasized (or overemphasized) how discourses constitute our identities, how we are disciplined and regulated, specified and normalized by and through power relations; Foucault's later work will explore the implications of the freedom (itself a necessary condition for the possibility of power relations) to resist and to create oneself. Thus the theme of “aesthetics of existence” will be, for Foucault, a profoundly “ethical” exploration. It is perhaps unsurprising that these themes are

present *in utero* in HS1, just as an emerging concern with power relations can be recognized in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. But we can hear the harbinger of Foucault's ethical turn quite explicitly near the very end of the book in one of HS1's most famous, evocative, and puzzling passages:

It is the agency of sex that we must break away from, if we aim . . . to counter the grips of power with the claims of bodies, pleasures, and knowledges, in their multiplicity and their possibility of resistance. The rallying point for the counterattack against the deployment of sexuality ought not to be sex-desire, but bodies and pleasures. (HS1, 157)

Foucault invokes this trope of "bodies and pleasures" again just two pages later in the book's penultimate sentence, in a distinctly utopian vision (a vision that echoes the closing image of *The Order of Things*):

[O]ne day, perhaps, in a different economy of bodies and pleasures, people will no longer quite understand how the ruses of sexuality, and the power that sustains its organization, were able to subject us to that austere monarchy of sex, so that we became dedicated to the endless task of forcing its secret, of exacting the truest of confessions from a shadow. (HS1, 159)

This trope, though difficult to interpret, gestures toward an ethical project. It can be read in a "merely" personal and political vein, as Robert Nye does:

[Foucault] was not willing to engage in narrow or confrontational identity politics, which offended him both personally and philosophically. On the other hand, he had no desire to repudiate his own (homo)sexual self, and so he applied himself to the delicate task of reconfiguring a new kind of identity out of the wreckage of the one he had spent a considerable part of his life trying to escape. The famous passages at the end of *Volonté de Savoir* about "bodies and pleasures" were his first efforts to deal with this problem intellectually. (Nye 1996: 235)

But, especially given the analysis of power and knowledge at the core of HS1, this interpretation seems to miss its more profound implications. Elizabeth Grosz asks three questions that get at those deeper implications:

[I]s it that bodies and pleasures are somehow outside the deployment of sexuality? Or are they neuralgic points within the deployment of sexuality that may be strategically useful in any challenge to the current nexus of desire-knowledge-power? Why are bodies and pleasures a source of subversion in a way that sex and desire are not? (Grosz 1994: 155–156, cited in McWhorter 1999: 111)

David Halperin observes that "bodies and pleasures represented to Foucault an opportunity for effecting, as he says earlier in the same passage, 'a tactical reversal of the various mechanisms of sexuality,' a means of resistance to the apparatus of sexuality" (Halperin 1998: 94–95). Halperin correctly identifies one route that Foucault will develop along his ethical trajectory: exploring the systemic possibilities, and our capacities, for resistance to power relations. (Foucault had earlier speculated in his 1974

Collège de France course about pleasure as a source or site of patients' resistance in insane asylums (C-PP, 162–163.) One particular form of Foucault's subsequent exploration of pleasures-as-resistance will be in sado-masochistic practices, which explicitly thematize power relations as a part of the enactment of pleasures.⁴ This will in turn lead to other analytical trajectories (such as friendship), many of which he explored in interviews given to gay magazines.

Although Foucault's reference to bodies and pleasures as ethical resources in HS1 may be problematic, even unsustainable, what is important about the suggestion is its opening up of the ethical domain. In effect, Foucault was asking what sorts of subjectivities were possible before "desire" became constituted as a defining force in the Christian West. When the final two volumes of the history of sexuality appear in 1984, *The Use of Pleasure* (Volume 2) opens with an introduction that describes how his work has been reoriented. He first notes that "[i]t seemed appropriate to look for the forms and modalities of the relation to self by which the individual constitutes and recognizes himself *qua* subject" (HS2, 6), rather than how we are constituted through power relations. These later volumes will focus on ethics, understood not as a "moral code" ("a rule, a law, or a value" – elements analogous to the conception of power that Foucault had rejected in HS1), but rather as what could be described as an ethical "attitude": "self-formation as an 'ethical subject'" (HS2, 28).

What we *can* hear, in HS1, then, is the process of thinking at work – as it seems to have solved one problem, new ones emerge. As such, in retrospect it can seem unsurprising that Foucault did not complete the originally projected series, and that his research would move in such different directions following this publication. In a 1982 interview Foucault asks, "If you knew when you began a book what you would say at the end, do you think that you would have the courage to write it?" (TS, 9; FDE4, 777 [no. 362]). So just as *The Archaeology of Knowledge* marked the end of an analytical project whose organizing concept was "discourse," HS1 marks the culmination of a trajectory whose framing theme was power. Thus HS1 presents Foucault's most condensed articulation of disciplinary power and his initial grappling with its complement, biopower, while also introducing the tensions that inaugurate a new ethical trajectory.

Foucault's work – and HS1 in particular – has been profoundly inspirational. I will offer just one example. He observes in HS1 that "[o]ur epoch has initiated sexual heterogeneities" (HS1, 37), and HS1 has played an important role in the political struggles on behalf of these heterogeneous identities. If the contemporary gay rights movement "began" at the Stonewall Inn on Christopher Street in Greenwich Village in 1969, a new epoch was born in the 1980s in the face of the AIDS epidemic. HS1 constituted an important inspirational source and intellectual toolkit for the activists who organized ACT-UP, the AIDS Coalition To Unleash Power, in response to the crisis.⁵ As David Halperin notes, "The most obvious impetus for gay activists to find political inspiration in *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*, has come, of course, from AIDS" (Halperin 1995: 27). He elaborates: "it would be difficult to imagine a more powerful or urgent demonstration than the AIDS crisis of the need to conceptualize sexuality, after the manner of Foucault, as 'an especially concentrated point of traversal for relations of power'" (Halperin 1995: 27, quoting HS1, 103, translation modified by Halperin). Further, "it would also be difficult to imagine a better illustration than the public response to AIDS

of the mutual imbrication of power and knowledge” (Halperin 1995: 27). Third and finally, “AIDS has focused attention on the modalities of what Foucault calls, in *The History of Sexuality, Volume I*, ‘bio-power’ – specifically on the state’s administration of the technology for producing and regulating life” (Halperin 1995: 27–28). Halperin concludes:

ACT UP – which has led a kind of uprising of the sick against their doctors, insurers, health care providers, blood banks, public welfare administrators, prison wardens, medical researchers, drug vendors, and media experts, not to mention their employers and landlords – would seem to furnish a perfect example of a strategic power reversal, a form of resistance made possible by the very apparatus of power/knowledge it was invented to resist. (Halperin 1995: 28–29)

* * *

Having highlighted the core ideas and importance of HS1, let us now take a closer look at how it presents these ideas. HS1 is divided into five parts, each seemingly self-contained, with very little ancillary matter and no introductory or concluding sections. The reader is thus plunged immediately into the discourse with very little to condition or predetermine one’s reception of the text. (Herein lies much of its difficulty.) Nevertheless, through some repetition and some linear development of the argument and perspective – befitting what Foucault has described as a “circular project” (HS1, 90) – the themes that I have already addressed come into focus. Part I, “We ‘Other Victorians,’” presents the “false, accepted view” that Foucault will criticize, and proposes his alternative. Part II, “The Repressive Hypothesis,” develops Foucault’s argument against the repressive hypothesis in two steps – first, by showing that discourse about sexuality has undergone a veritable explosion, incited in a variety of contexts; and second, by delineating how this incitement to discourse serves to specify and individualize us. He also acknowledges an important question: he does not yet know what the ultimate aim is of all these individualizing, controlling techniques. The rest of the book is, in part, an attempt to formulate at least some provisional hypotheses that could address this question. Part III, “*Scientia Sexualis*,” the most schematic and problematical part of the book, locates sexuality as a problem of knowledge, of truth. Part IV, “The Deployment of Sexuality,” arguably the heart of the book, articulates the new framework – of power relations – that allows us to understand how and why the repressive hypothesis was mistaken. Part V, “Right of Death and Power over Life,” attempts to pull the larger argument together, while considering a few outstanding objections. Some of the tensions that will push Foucault to abandon the proposed six-volume project and reconfigure his thinking about power and ethics can be most clearly recognized in this final part.

We “Other Victorians”

“For a long time, the story goes, we supported a Victorian regime, and we continue to be dominated by it even today” (HS1, 3). This is the opening sentence of HS1. Part I, a very short ten pages in length, opens by articulating a view that, as will later become

clear, Foucault wants to criticize – indeed, by articulating the view whose rejection gives the book its overall arc and theme – that discourse about sex has increasingly come to be repressed and prohibited. But since we have been thrown immediately into the discussion, it is not readily apparent that Foucault means to challenge this claim. Indeed, many readers have initially mistaken this part to be articulating Foucault's own view, not a view he rejects; it has thus been a source of much confusion. Nevertheless, we are given a few clues to let us know we ought to be suspicious of the claims made here. Our clue in this first sentence is the qualifying phrase "the story goes" – raising a note of caution or skepticism, flagging that this is not necessarily a view Foucault shares. Other similar markers are to be found as Foucault's presentation of this view continues: "it would seem" in the next paragraph; "Everyone knew," "we are told," and "We are informed" in the pages that follow.

Foucault then shifts voice to note several reasons why "[t]his discourse on modern sexual repression holds up well" (HS1, 5). Its story coincides chronologically with the rise of capitalism and a work ethic, thus making it "an integral part of the bourgeois order" (HS1, 5). It also confers what Foucault calls a "speaker's benefit": "If sex is repressed, that is, condemned to prohibition, nonexistence, and silence, then the mere fact that one is speaking about it has the appearance of a deliberate transgression. A person who holds forth in such language places himself to a certain extent outside the reach of power; he upsets established law; he somehow anticipates the coming freedom" (HS1, 6). Thus the task of HS1 is to examine "not only these discourses, but also the will that sustains them [a "will to knowledge"] and the strategic intention that supports them [techniques of power]" (HS1, 8). Three kinds of serious questions or doubts – all of which structure the analysis and the alternative framework that Foucault is attempting to elaborate – can be raised about the "repressive hypothesis": historical questions (Is sexual repression truly an established historical fact?), historical-theoretical questions (Is power really essentially repressive?), and historico-political questions (Is the critical discourse that articulates the repressive hypothesis really liberatory – as the speaker's benefit would have it – or is it rather "in fact part of the same historical network as the thing it denounces (and doubtless misrepresents) by calling it 'repression'" (HS1, 10)?) Corresponding to these three doubts, Foucault proposes three hypotheses:

[1] [S]ince the end of the sixteenth century, the "putting into discourse of sex," far from undergoing a process of restriction, on the contrary has been subjected to a mechanism of increasing incitement; [2] that the techniques of power exercised over sex have not obeyed a principle of rigorous selection, but rather one of dissemination and implantation of polymorphous sexualities; and [3] that the will to knowledge has not come to a halt in the face of a taboo that must not be lifted, but has persisted in constituting – despite many mistakes, of course – a science of sexuality. (HS1, 12–13, my brackets)

The object of these studies, "in short, is to define the regime of power-knowledge-pleasure that sustains the discourse on human sexuality in our part of the world" (HS1, 11). This regime of power-knowledge-pleasure is the underlying framework that Foucault will attempt to articulate, a framework that has been occluded by the discourse about "repression."

The Repressive Hypothesis

Each of Part II's two chapters presents one half of the argument against the "repressive hypothesis": discourse about sexuality has undergone a veritable explosion; and this incitement to discourse serves to specify and individualize us by implanting a variety of perversions.

Chapter 1, "The Incitement to Discourse," opens, as did Part I, in unmarked ironic voice, restating the repressive hypothesis. But it quickly shifts and Foucault unambiguously states its conclusion: discourses are not being repressed but are proliferating, especially within the exercise of power:

There was a steady proliferation of discourses concerned with sex – specific discourses, different from one another both by their form and by their object. . . . But more important was the multiplication of discourses concerning sex in the field of exercise of power itself: an institutional incitement to speak about it, and to do so more and more; a determination on the part of the agencies of power to hear it spoken about, and to cause it to speak through explicit articulation and endlessly accumulated detail. (HS1, 18)

The clearest example of this growth is the Christian pastoral. Its scope expanded until it constituted "the nearly infinite task of telling" of one's desires and thoughts (HS1, 20). And this pattern was repeated – not repudiated – by the Marquis de Sade and in pornographic texts like the anonymous *My Secret Life*. These techniques were also "supported and relayed by other mechanisms" (HS1, 23): first, the "public interest" – "police" or proto-biopower – exemplified by "the emergence of 'population' as an economic and political problem" (HS1, 25) with sex as a central concern; second, concern about children's sex, as regulated in secondary schools and other pedagogical and medical institutions (Foucault here also mentions Little Hans, a 1909 case study by Freud); and third, in psychiatry, illustrated by the case of Charles Jouy – a case that Foucault had discussed in greater detail in his March 19, 1975 lecture at the Collège de France (C-AN, 291ff). What all this shows us is that the growth of discourses is not merely a quantitative expansion, but also "a dispersion of centers from which discourses emanated, a diversification of their forms, and the complex deployment of the network connecting them" (HS1, 34).

Chapter 2, "The Perverse Implantation," analyzes these new discourses about sexuality in terms of the power relations that are exercised through them, arguing that these discourses are best understood as disciplinary techniques that specify and normalize individuals not through interdiction or repression, but through four particular kinds of operation: children are subjected to increasingly complete surveillance; individuals are specified according to types or "identities," hence the constitution of the "homosexual" and other "perverts" as personages, not mere aberrations; as can be seen in the medicalization of sexuality, these discourses "proceeded through examination and insistent observation" (HS1, 44); finally, these discourses constitute a network that interconnects the various perversions and sexualities into a single grid of power and knowledge. Thus, "[t]he growth of perversion is not a moralizing theme that obsessed the scrupulous minds of the Victorians. It is the real product of the encroachment of a type of power on bodies and their pleasures" (HS1, 48). And yet, Foucault notes, he

still does not know what the ultimate aim of these new discourses and types of power is. (HS1, 37).

Scientia Sexualis

Part III, the most schematic and problematical of all the parts, locates sexuality as a problem of knowledge, of truth. Here, Foucault attempts to illustrate the “will to knowledge” in the West that “constructed around and apropos of sex an immense apparatus for producing truth” (HS1, 56) – beginning with the confessional in the Middle Ages and continuing through contemporary psychoanalytic practice – by means of a contrast between “two great procedures for producing the truth of sex” (HS1, 57). In an *ars erotica* (which, he suggests, could be found in China, Japan, India, Rome, and the Arab Muslim societies) “truth is drawn from pleasure itself,” not from a compulsion to constantly speak the truth (HS1, 57). A *scientia sexualis*, on the other hand, is characterized by “procedures for telling the truth of sex which are geared to a form of knowledge-power strictly opposed to the art of initiations and the masterful secret: I have in mind the confession” (HS1, 58). The confession, whether limited to select brethren of the Church, or made universal (as it became in the seventeenth century) or endowed with the credibility of science (as in the nineteenth century) is the paradigmatic example of the truth-telling of a *scientia sexualis*. Thus, sexuality is charged with two tasks: “we demand that sex speak the truth,” and “we demand that it tell us . . . the deeply buried truth of that truth about ourselves” (HS1, 69). In sum, with the confession, “we are dealing not nearly so much with a negative mechanism of exclusion as with the operation of a subtle network of discourses, special knowledges, pleasures, and powers” (HS1, 72). And so the task now confronting a history of sexuality is to “define the strategies of power that are immanent in this will to knowledge” (HS1, 73) – the project for Part IV. The important point is that the confession functions as a technique that fuses knowledge and power about sexuality through the creation and telling of truths about oneself and one’s desires.

Foucault’s contrast between an *ars erotica* and a *scientia sexualis* is clearly a rudimentary, underdeveloped image. Janet Afary and Kevin Anderson criticize it, in fact, as a form of “Orientalism”: “If Orientalism means stereotyping the East and its way of life (either by glorifying it or vilifying it), if it means romanticizing the exotic sexuality of the East (heterosexual or homosexual), then Foucault was probably an Orientalist” (Afary and Anderson 2005: 20). But Foucault very quickly realized that this comparison was too facile, too simplistic, and abandoned it. In a lecture given in Japan in 1978, Foucault acknowledged that the analysis in this part of HS1 was only a sketch; in this lecture he did use the phrase “scientia sexualis” again, but explicitly avoided its contrasting term, “ars erotica” (RC, 118–119; FDE3, 556–557 [no. 233]).⁶ Furthermore he develops the contrast much more explicitly as a series of transformations and displacements within the West – between ancient Greek and Roman societies and later Christian ones. Developing this contrast in a more substantive way, and refining and complicating this over-simple comparison, will be one part of the task for much of Foucault’s work in the 1980s.

The Deployment of Sexuality

Part IV, the core of the book, articulates the new framework of power relations that constitute what he terms “the deployment of sexuality.” It thus defines the general perspective through which his analyses are grounded – the “circular” or “bootstrapping” project that HS1 is trying to accomplish. Each of four chapters focuses on one aspect of the project: its objective, its method, its domain, and what Foucault terms its “periodization.”

Chapter 1, “Objective,” opens with a contrast between the new disciplinary conception of power as techniques of individualization with a conception of power as “the law” or “repression.” Whether one begins with repression (as does Freud) or the law (as does Lacan), one is still working with the same underlying conception of power, which Foucault calls the “juridico-discursive” conception. This juridico-discursive view has certain characteristics: power is conceived as fundamentally negative (it operates through rejection, exclusion, etc.); power takes the form of a rule, or law; this law functions through prohibition, or interdiction; these interdictions have the logical form of a censorship; and at all levels power’s apparatuses are uniform and consistent. Power has been understood in this negative way, Foucault suggests, because this masking of its true methods and techniques serves to make it tolerable and accepted. But Foucault’s objective in HS1 – his circular project in which he must posit an alternative to expose the errors in the accepted view – is to construct a different “definition of the specific domain formed by relations of power,” and “a determination of the instruments that will make possible its analysis” (HS1, 82). The new techniques of power that Foucault has been describing cannot be understood according to this older juridico-discursive conception.

So the next task, in chapter 2, “Method,” is to define what this new form of power is. Foucault distinguishes it from three mistaken accounts (liberal accounts of the state, psychoanalytic accounts of the rule, and Marxist accounts of class domination) and defines it as:

the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies. (HS1, 92–93)

This is clearly a dense passage. Indeed, this passage articulates Foucault’s analysis of modern power – encompassing both disciplinary power, which he understands quite well, and the newly emerging biopower, which he is just coming to grasp. From this definition, several corollaries or “methodical rules” can be enumerated: first, power is immanent in other kinds of relations (like relations of sex, and relations of truth); second, power is not static, but constitutes “‘matrices of transformations’” (HS1, 99); third, power is constituted through both micro-tactics and macro-strategies, the inter-

play of the local and the global (anticipating a clearer distinction between disciplinary and bio-powers); and finally, power is not uniform or univocal but rather is constituted by “a multiplicity of discursive elements” (HS1, 100). This is, in sum, a “strategical model” of power, in contrast to the juridico-discursive model based on law.⁷

Given this understanding of power, sexuality – the “Domain” (chapter 3) of this study – must be understood not as a psychic drive but as “an especially dense transfer point for relations of power” (HS1, 103), in other words, as constituted by and through power relations. Here Foucault is able to delineate the scope of the anticipated volumes to follow: “four great strategic unities which, beginning in the eighteenth century, formed specific mechanisms of knowledge and power centering on sex” (HS1, 103). They are, as we have seen, the hysterization of women’s bodies, the pedagogization of children’s sex, the socialization of procreative behavior, and the psychiatrization of perverse pleasure (as well as a fifth volume on confession and “flesh”). These four strategic unities constitute the “deployment of sexuality” which arises to displace an older “deployment of alliance” or kinship systems. This deployment of sexuality recasts the role of the family in society, making it, too, a transfer point for discourses and techniques that control our sexuality – moreover, he notes, “[t]his was the context in which psychoanalysis set to work” (HS1, 112). Proposing an answer to the question from Part II about the ultimate aims of this incitement to discourse, Foucault suggests that “[t]he deployment of sexuality has its reason for being, not in reproducing itself, but in proliferating, innovating, annexing, creating, and penetrating bodies in an increasingly detailed way, and in controlling populations in an increasingly comprehensive way” (HS1, 107).

What, then, is the scope, or “Periodization” (chapter 4) of these analyses? Chronologically, two key ruptures mark its emergence: “around the middle of the sixteenth century, the development of procedures of direction and examination of conscience; and at the advent of the nineteenth century, the advent of medical technologies of sex” (HS1, 119). But the deployment of sexuality is effected differently in the bourgeois than in the working classes: it developed first and most rigorously among the bourgeois, and only spread to workers as it became more biopolitical, targeted at populations through birth control and public health “for the sake of a general protection of society and the race” (HS1, 122). Though the deployment of sexuality does not function as a form of repression, the origins of the theory of repression can be seen in the deployment of sexuality’s extension to the working classes (HS1, 127–129). We have thus come full circle: Foucault has refuted the repressive hypothesis, constructed his alternative hypothesis, and has now offered an explanation, in terms of his new hypothesis, for the repressive hypothesis’s first appearance.

Right of Death and Power over Life

Part V opens by situating this history of sexuality within a chronologically broader analysis of power relations – analysis that Foucault had undertaken in more detail in his 1974 Collège de France course and in *Discipline and Punish*. Namely, it situates the emergence of the deployment of sexuality with respect to the transformation of older (but not yet entirely effaced) sovereign forms of power into the modern forms

of disciplinary power and (as he emphasizes here), the macro-forms of biopower. Sovereign power was marked by the right to compel one's subjects' death – indirectly, through war (the sovereign's subjects put themselves at risk of death in battle), to defend country or royal person; and directly, through execution, if the sovereign or the laws have been threatened or broken. Beginning in the eighteenth century, however, this “right of death” was replaced by a “power over life” through administration – the biopolitical regulation and control of birth rates, of diseases as a problem of public health, etc. “[O]ne would have to speak of *bio-power* to designate what brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life” (HS1, 143). Here sex becomes the “transfer point” or “pivot” between disciplinary controls of individuals' bodies and biopolitical regulation of the “social body.” And the transition to this new model of “power over life,” the transition from a deployment of alliance to a deployment of sexuality, has several very important, disturbing consequences: first, norms become much more important as vehicles for the exercise of power (both disciplinary and biopolitical) – thus creating what we could call “a normalizing society” (HS1, 144); second, eugenics and “racism in its modern, ‘biologizing,’ statist form” gain techniques that strengthen and *seem* to justify them (HS1, 149).

HS1 opened by presenting the mistaken, if dominant, view that “[f]or a long time, the story goes, we supported a Victorian regime, and we continue to be dominated by it even today” (HS1, 3). Foucault closes by noting that in fact, “We, on the other hand, are in . . . a society ‘with a sexuality’: the mechanisms of power are addressed to the body, to life, to what causes it to proliferate, to what reinforces the species, its stamina, its ability to dominate, or its capacity for being used” (HS1, 147). The dynamic interplay that this situation imposes upon us – between power and freedom; between bodies, life, subjectivity, and truth – emerges in HS1 as unresolved problems that will guide Foucault's thinking for the next decade, that is, for the remainder of his life.

Notes

- 1 “Bootstrapping” is defined in the *Oxford English Dictionary* as “To make use of existing resources or capabilities to raise (oneself) to a new situation or state; to modify or improve by making use of what is already present.” (“bootstrap, v.” *OED* online, <http://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/21553> (accessed March 24, 2011).)
- 2 He explicitly takes up the theme of confession, for example, in a 1981 lecture series given in Belgium, *Mal faire, dire vrai: Fonctions de l'aveu* (*Do Evil, Tell the Truth: Functions of the Confession*), in his last two courses at the Collège de France (C-GSO and C-CT) and in a 1983 lecture course at the University of California (FS). The related practices of self-examination are also a continuing focal point for Foucault's continuing study of sexuality and truth after HS1.
- 3 Examples include Mendieta (2002) and McWhorter (2009).
- 4 This line of inquiry is most explicitly (but not exclusively) discussed in a 1982 interview for the gay magazine, *The Advocate*, “Sex, Power, and the Politics of Identity” (DE358, in EW1, 163–173). This exploration opens up the possibility for ethical relations that cannot be reduced to, or exhaustively analyzed in terms of, power relations – see Lynch (1998) for the development of this opening.

- 5 A brief history of ACT-UP in New York is available in Stoller (1998), whose title – “Foucault in the Streets: New York City Act(s) UP” – is illustrative of the inspiration Foucault’s work has had on this movement.
- 6 The term “ars erotica” does come up again in an interview conducted on the last day of Foucault’s 1978 trip to Japan. But it was introduced by Foucault’s Japanese interlocutor, who wished to contrast ancient and modern Japanese society, and Foucault characterizes his notion of an “ars erotica” as rudimentary (FDE3, 525–526 [no. 320]).
- 7 For a much fuller elaboration of the analysis of power in this chapter of HS1, see Lynch (2011).

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From Resistance to Government

Foucault's Lectures 1976–1979

PAUL PATTON

Until the appearance of *Il faut défendre la société* in 1997, Foucault's publications could be divided into a scholarly series of published books and a series of essays, occasional writings, and interviews. Deleuze and others argued that the interviews formed "an integral part of his work" alongside and complementary to the published works (Deleuze 1988: 115). According to this view, Foucault's oeuvre was comprised of, on the one hand, historical studies of a particular archive and, on the other, diagnoses of the present (Deleuze 2007: 352; see also Le Blanc and Terrel 2003: 12). The reason that Foucault attached so much importance to interviews was that these allowed him to spell out the relationship between the historical problematization carried out in his books and the practical problems or fault lines in the present that were not simply the context in which these were written but the real purpose of these studies:

Discipline and Punish deals with the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries but can in no way be divorced from today's prisons and the Information Group set up by Foucault and Defert after '68 . . . What he's really interested in is our present-day relation to madness, our relation to punishment, our relation to power, to sexuality. Not the Greeks, but our relation to subjectification, our ways of constituting ourselves as subjects. (Deleuze 1995, 106)¹

Deleuze's argument has some merit. Foucault regarded his genealogical and archaeological studies as a means of working on the limits of the present, a way of responding to problems identified by disparate social movements seeking to challenge particular forms of exercise of power: the power of men over women, of parents over children, of psychiatrists and doctors over the mentally and physically ill, of penal authorities over convicted criminals, of administrators over the population at large, and so on (EW3, 329).² However, he rarely comments on current events in his published books and the relationship of his historical studies to present-day problems is largely indirect and implicit. It is primarily in interviews that he elaborates on the implications of these studies for thinking about the problems raised by social and political movements.

A Companion to Foucault, First Edition. Edited by Christopher Falzon, Timothy O'Leary, and Jana Sawicki.
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Since 1997, this neat two-series partition of Foucault's work has been further complicated by the publication of his lectures at the Collège de France. This is a further series of texts, of a different kind to both the published works and the interviews and occasional writings. The lectures provide a third textual stratum alongside the books and interviews and occasional writings. They include early drafts of historical analyses that sometimes found their way into books. For example, some elements of his 1972–73 course *Penal Theories and Institutions* reappeared in *Discipline and Punish*, just as parts of the final lecture of his 1975–76 course *Society Must be Defended* reappeared in the final chapter of *The History of Sexuality*, volume 1. However, much of the material in lectures remained in the form of exploratory exercises, tracing out problems, posing and sketching answers to questions that never found their way into the scholarly corpus of Foucault's published work. The lectures include a rich field of hitherto unpublished material, such as the discussions of liberal and neoliberal techniques of government, of the government of self and others, or of *parrhesia*. As a result, the lectures not only fill in some of the gaps between his published works and allow us to follow in greater detail the evolution of his thought, they also present us with elements of an enlarged range of possible critical responses to the present.

At the same time, Foucault's courses were more than just his unpublished notebooks or mere records of his intellectual workshop. They were public lectures involving the conduct or presentation of research in a different form. Frédéric Gros argues for the superiority of the courses as expressions of the essence of philosophy, in a Platonic sense of the term (Gros 2011). François Ewald, Foucault's assistant at the Collège de France, argues that

The course is a particular form, not reducible to the exposition of a work in development. Each year tells a story that the auditors will follow assiduously. Each course concentrates a singular alchemy: the will to share a given research but also a dramatisation, the production of a story that will unfold over three months, week after week, keeping the auditors in suspense. (Ewald 2011: 51)

Like his published books, Foucault's lectures sought to engage with the social, political, and intellectual present in which they were presented. In some respects, they did this more frequently and more directly than the published books. In this sense, they are closer to the interviews. According to Ewald,

if Foucault's courses were so successful, this was not only because of the subject matter they dealt with but also because of the way that, through the subject matter and the manner in which he dealt with it, one had the impression of a reading of the present [*une lecture de l'actualité*]. A particular diagonal between very erudite studies and the present which was the real value of the courses for those who followed them. (Ewald 2011: 51)³

Michel Senellart elaborates further on the different aims that defined Foucault's courses and the corresponding levels on which they functioned. On the one hand, they pursued the program of research outlined in his inaugural lecture and reiterated in the course summaries published each year in the Annual Report of the Collège. The inaugural lecture, "The Order of Discourse," presents this program as an inquiry into the

morphology of the Western will to knowledge and the particular forms of exclusion that accompanied different kinds of knowledge. On the other hand, the courses pursued a series of interventions in the social and political context in which they were written, thereby introducing the field of events (*l'événementiel*) into the order of theoretical discourse. Senellart suggests a degree of tension between these two aims, or rather “a certain play between two distinct modes of historico-philosophical problematisation” (Senellart 2011: 151). The overall result was that Foucault’s courses were subject to a triple constraint: that of developing the program of research outlined in his inaugural lecture, that of being somehow linked to the stakes of particular current political struggles, and, finally, that of not disappointing the public.

The Crisis in 1976

By January 1976, when he began his 1975–76 course *Society Must Be Defended*, Foucault had become disillusioned with his previous attempts to reconcile these conflicting aims. These lectures marked a turning point, a culmination and questioning of his approach to the courses up to this point. The opening lecture begins with the statement of an intellectual crisis. Foucault says that he has had enough and would like to bring to a close the series of projects that he has pursued in preceding years. He presents these in a disparaging light as mere fragments of research: some remarks on the history of penal procedure, elements of the intellectual and institutional history of psychiatry in the nineteenth century, reflections on sophistry and on Greek coins, the outline of a history of sexuality or of knowledge about sexuality, and so on. All this, he suggests, has become very repetitive, “always falling into the same rut, the same themes, the same concepts” (C-SMD, 3). He connects this intellectual crisis to “changes in the conjuncture” but he also offers principled objections to any attempt to provide some unifying framework for the disparate and fragmentary studies undertaken up to this point. He reiterates his conviction that the effectiveness of the various kinds of “subjugated knowledges” that he has spent so much time reactivating has to do precisely with their discontinuous, particular, and local character (C-SMD, 6). But he also rejects the systematizing option on the grounds that all of his research at the Collège has taken place under the rubric of the study of the effects of power bound up with the institution and the order of discourses. To seek to confer a unitary status on his own genealogical researches would be to attempt to appropriate some of the power associated with established and recognized forms of knowledge. To pursue the path of systematization would risk the kind of participation in the existing hierarchy of power and knowledge that he attributes to those (Althusserian) Marxists who sought to show that Marxism was properly a science. It would contradict the aims of his critical project in relation to the will to knowledge, which he had outlined in his inaugural lecture and restates here as the effort to “identify what is at stake when knowledges begin to challenge, struggle against, and rise up against the institution and the power- and knowledge-effects of scientific discourse” (C-SMD, 12).

Senellart argues that, after a sabbatical year in 1976–77, Foucault developed another method of constructing his courses. Up to this point he had viewed his lectures as primarily the presentation of research already undertaken. This way of approaching

them, combined with the desire not to disappoint his extensive public, had led him to spend more and more time on the preparation of the lectures at the expense of time spent on “real” research (C-SMD, 2). From 1978 onwards, he begins to use the lectures as a forum for the conduct of research. The relationship between the “time of the library” and the “time of the exposition” is fundamentally altered so that the lectures become an occasion for reading and working through primary texts (Senellart 2011: 152). Hence the emergence in the course of the lectures of new concepts and orientations that modify the direction of what follows, as happened after Foucault’s discovery of “governmentality” in 1978. Hence the disparities that opened up between the title and the content of the lectures, as happened in 1979 with lectures on *The Birth of Biopolitics* that say almost nothing about biopolitics. Hence, too, the recurrent failure to follow up on issues that had been promised further treatment. Further differences in his manner of preparation included the reduced reliance on a fully written text and much greater reliance on notes and summary indications, and an increasing attention to the primary texts themselves in the course of the lectures (Senellart 2011: 153).

There are other dimensions to the changes in the style and content of Foucault’s lectures from this point onwards. One of these involved an increasing concern to question many of the concepts and ways of thinking that had informed his earlier lectures and publications. Foucault sought to redefine himself as a “negative theorist,” less concerned to elaborate a theoretical edifice than to “think otherwise” than he had done previously (Senellart 2011: 153). During the period from 1976 to 1979 this involved a wide-ranging rethinking of the terms of his political thought and activity up to this point. This self-critical project is evident both in the concepts deployed and the questions posed in the course of the lectures, and also in the character of his responses to current events and the intellectual and political milieu in which they were delivered. Consider three examples of such responses:

During the first half of the 1972 course, Foucault devoted considerable time to a long discussion of the “bare-foot” revolt in Normandy in 1639 and the mechanisms of repression deployed in response. These lectures were delivered against the political background of the activities of the French Maoist movement, the arrest and incarceration of militants, and plans to initiate revolutionary tribunals that would give effect to “popular justice.” Foucault’s aim was to outline a genealogy of the division between political and common law criminality in order to show that this was not so much constitutive of the state system of repression as a product of that system. In other words, the repressive state apparatus was not just directed against delinquency but also against the struggle of the people against state power (Senellart 2011: 150).⁴

Foucault’s 1975–76 lectures represent another kind of intervention in the political present in which they were written. They outlined a genealogy of the historico-political discourse that took war to be a permanent feature of social relations, “the ineradicable basis of all relations and institutions of power” (C-SMD, 49). Foucault locates the emergence of this discourse in the writings of Levellers and Diggers during the English Civil War. He points to its reappearance in France at the beginning of the eighteenth century, in the writings of French aristocrats such as Henry de Boulainvilliers engaged in a rearguard struggle against the establishment of absolute monarchy. He surveys the reappearance of this form of history once more in the nineteenth century, first in the writings of historians of the revolutionary period, such as Sieyès, Augustin Thierry,

Montlosier, and Guizot, and then later in the writings of biological racists and eugenicists. Among its distinguishing features, this kind of history relied upon a binary division of the social field as involving struggle between contending groups, races, or nations. As such, this “political historicism provided the discursive framework in which emerged some of the defining themes of politics in the twentieth century, including state racism, class war and the idea of revolution” (C-SMD, 111).

1975 and 1976 were the years in which the Marxist orthodoxy that had sustained radical political movements in France since the 1960s began to crumble and fall apart. Soviet dissidents, “new philosophers,” and others raised questions about the Soviet Gulag and the nature of power in existing communist societies. These were also years in which a significant number of those in the European extreme left began to take up arms. This led to assassinations and kidnappings by groups such as the Italian Red Brigades and the German Red Army Fraction. While the recourse to armed struggle was largely avoided in France, this was not because many were not tempted. Foucault’s questions about the model of war and its implications for political activity were not unrelated to the ideas that informed this temptation. His first lecture on January 7, 1976 pointed out that the inversion of Clausewitz’s aphorism concerning the relation between war and politics carried the implication that, ultimately, the settlement of political conflict came down to a “trial by strength in which weapons are the final judges” (C-SMD, 16). His lecture of January 28 quotes a letter from Marx to Engels in 1882 that identifies the French historians who wrote about race struggle as the source of their ideas of class struggle, in order to suggest that the idea of revolution and the history of revolutionary practice is indissociable from this form of “counterhistory” that presented the social order as an ongoing war between races or classes: “Where would the revolutionary project, the revolutionary idea, or revolutionary practice be without the will to rekindle the real war that once went on and which is still going on, even though the function of the silent order of power is to mask and smother it . . . ?” (C-SMD, 79). Questions such as these served to reinforce the doubts being raised among former militants about the desirability of revolution or the recourse to arms (Le Blanc and Terrel 2003: 22).

Foucault’s 1978–79 lectures on neoliberal governmentality represent a quite different kind of political intervention into a changed political context. These lectures were delivered in the aftermath of the French legislative elections in March 1978, at which the Union of the Left narrowly failed to win a majority. Efforts to rethink the political orientation and strategies of the French left with a view to its anticipated electoral victory, and the subsequent electoral failure, provide the background against which he raised a question about the nature of socialist governmentality at the end of his fourth lecture: “What would really be the governmentality appropriate to socialism? Is there a governmentality appropriate to socialism?” (C-BB, 94). His answer was that if there was such a thing as socialist governmentality, it remained to be invented. In part, his interest in neoliberal governmentality lay in the fact that it provided a historical example of the reinvention of liberal governmentality. Recent commentators have made much of his association with elements of the so-called “Second Left,” a minority current within the Socialist Party with links to the *Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail* (CFDT).⁵ The anti-statist “self-management” approach of this current shared some neoliberal concerns about the role of the state in governing social and economic life. It

may well be an exaggeration to suggest that Foucault's 1979 lectures "should be read as a strategic endorsement of economic liberalism" (Behrent 2009a: 567; 2009b: 25). Nevertheless, the principle of abandoning techniques of discipline in favor of purely economic means of governing the behavior of individuals is one that Foucault appears to endorse (Patton 2010: 212–214). Similarly, in a 1983 interview with the editor of a collection of essays on social security, produced by the CFDT, he offers qualified support for a form of social security that allows for "richer, more numerous, more diverse, and more flexible relationships with others and ourselves, all the while assuring each of us real autonomy" (EW3, 366). While he does not explicitly invoke market-based models, he does talk about the need to attain "an optimal distance between a decision taken and the individual concerned" (EW3, 373). He also endorses the principle that individuals should be responsible for their choices, while at the same time insisting that he does not endorse "that savage liberalism that would lead to individual coverage for those who have the means to pay for it, and to a lack of coverage for the others" (EW3, 379).⁶

Foucault's lectures on neoliberal governmentality are punctuated by a polemic against the "state phobia" shared by many in the French left during this period. This phobia involved an essentialist conception of the state as endowed with an inherent tendency to expand and dominate civil society and a corresponding suspicion of state power. Foucault objects that this conception allows for political analysis derived from first principles and avoids the need for empirical and historical knowledge of contemporary political reality. Part of his reason for undertaking these analyses of the principles of neoliberal government is the fact that the post-war German state, which was founded on precisely these principles, served as a model for the reforms to public policy proposed in France during this period. At the very least, he argues, the quest for a distinctively socialist governmentality should be informed by knowledge of present political reality. More generally, these lectures reflect a shift in political perspective and the kind of critique that Foucault now considers appropriate. In contrast to the widespread suspicion of the state among many on the left, he has no fundamental objection to government or to the institutions and policies that this implies. As he explained in a lecture to the Société Française de Philosophie the previous year, the critical attitude that he now considered to underpin his "historicophilosophical" analyses of the present did not ask why we are governed at all but *how* we are governed. The critical question posed was "how not to be governed *like that*, by that, in the name of these principles, in view of such objectives and by means of such methods, not like that, not for that, not by them?" (WC, 384). This shift in critical perspective was indicative of broader changes in the political climate as well as the evolution of Foucault's own thought during this period. In the remainder of this essay I will focus on the corresponding developments in his thinking about power as these are displayed in the lectures between 1976 and 1979.

Foucault's Re-examination of Power 1: The Diagnostic Question

Ewald comments that, with the publication of Foucault's courses, we can see more clearly their distinctive mode of construction, including

The beginning, where Foucault still searches for his theme, and where he devotes time to the reprise and synthesis of themes from the preceding year, themes that he will not hesitate to abandon or transform in the light of what really becomes the object of his interest and what he then begins to dig into with passion, with a palpable tension that is not released until the end of the last course of the year. (Ewald 2011: 51)

Following the critical reflections on his overall research project and the manner in which it has been pursued up to this point, Foucault specifies the aims of his 1975–76 course *Society Must Be Defended* by means of a nested series of questions. At the highest level, his question is: what is power? At the next level down, this general question branches into a historically specific, diagnostic question and a conceptual question about the nature of power. The diagnostic question asks, in historically situated terms, what is the form of power that has reigned supreme in the West since the collapse of Nazism and the retreat of Stalinism (C-SMD, 13). In the course of these lectures, Foucault offers two distinct answers to this question. The first, in the second lecture, argues that Western societies are ruled by a complex combination of disciplinary power and a democratized version of sovereign power:

on the one hand, a legislation, a discourse and an organization of public right articulated around the principle of the sovereignty of the social body and the delegation of individual sovereignty to the State; and we also have a tight grid of disciplinary coercions that actually guarantees the cohesion of that social body. Now that grid cannot in any way be transcribed in right, even though the two necessarily go together. A right of sovereignty and a mechanics of discipline. It is, I think, between these two limits that power is exercised. (C-SMD, 37)

A second answer to the diagnostic question comes in the final lecture of this course when he argues that a new, non-disciplinary technique of power emerged towards the end of the eighteenth century: “something that is no longer an anatomo-politics of the human body, but what I would call a ‘biopolitics’ of the human race” (C-SMD, 243). This new technology of power is addressed to populations rather than individual bodies. It involves efforts to control the fertility and reproduction of the population, efforts to impose forms of public hygiene and to control the natural and urban environments directly affecting the lives of human beings, and measures to deal with old age, accidents, and infirmities of various kinds. It is not a matter of training individual bodies but of different mechanisms to regulate and control “life and the biological processes of man-as-species” (C-SMD, 246–247). In contrast to the old sovereign power of taking life, what emerged was a power that sought to sustain and develop the conditions in which human life could persist and flourish. This new modality of power was different from but not incompatible with disciplinary power:

We are, then, in a power that has taken control of both the body and life or that has, if you like, taken control of life in general – with the body as one pole and the population as the other. (C-SMD, 253)

These are not the only answers Foucault gives to the diagnostic question posed above. In his first lecture of the 1977–78 course, *Security, Territory, Population*, he

outlines a more refined account of the particular technology of power exercised over the conditions of life. In contrast to both juridical and disciplinary mechanisms, security mechanisms are applied to populations rather than to individuals or groups. They deal with probable rather than actual events and seek to respond to these on the basis of calculations of cost and in terms of a norm of acceptable outcomes rather than a binary division between the permitted and prohibited. He acknowledges that there is no simple succession of juridical, disciplinary, and security mechanisms in the history of modern government. All three have been present in differing degrees, and what changes in a given period is the “system of correlation between juridico-legal mechanisms, disciplinary mechanisms, and mechanisms of security” (C-STP, 8). At this point, he toys with the idea of a further answer to the diagnostic question by asking whether it might be the case that “the general economy of power in our societies is becoming a domain of security?” (C-STP, 10–11).⁷

After the shift of focus from mechanisms of security to the forms and rationalities of government in the 1978 lectures, Foucault offers further epochal claims about the nature of power. He insists on the unique character of pastoral power as it developed within European Christianity and its difference from political power up until the end of the eighteenth century, but also on its role as a prelude to the modern forms of state government that developed from this point onwards. Its role in the constitution of modern Western subjectivity makes pastoral power “one of the decisive moments in the history of power in Western societies” (C-STP, 185). While he does not claim in these lectures that modern power is essentially pastoral, subsequent occasional writings come close to advancing this kind of claim. For example, in “The Subject and Power,” he describes contemporary state power as a unique combination of totalizing and individualizing power, in part because of the degree to which it has integrated and transformed the techniques of Christian pastoral power. The contemporary state, he suggests, can be seen as “a modern matrix of individualization, or a new form of pastoral power” (EW3, 334).⁸ In the second lecture of his 1978–79 course, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, he discusses the idea of “frugal government” as this term was used in the eighteenth century to mean government that does not govern too much. Foucault equates this with liberal government and comments that “actually at this moment we are entering what could be called the epoch of frugal government” (C-BB, 28). While he does not make a similar claim with regard to neoliberal government, he does note at one point in 1979 that this had already become “the program of most governments in capitalist countries” (C-BB, 149).

Foucault's Re-examination of Power 2: The Conceptual Question

Foucault approaches the conceptual question in his 1976 lectures by suggesting that our understanding of power has long been permeated by a form of economism. Both the juridical, contractarian conception of sovereign power and the Marxist conception share a certain “economism” in their understandings of power, although this takes a quite different form in each case. The juridical conception understands sovereign power as analogous to the commodity form in so far as it is built from rights that are possessed by individuals and that can be delegated or transferred. In so far as the

Marxist conception regards power as a means to reproduce class domination and associated relations of production, “political power finds its historical *raison d’être* in the economy” (C-SMD, 14). Foucault groups these two approaches to power in order to seek alternatives to both varieties of economism. To answer the question whether the analysis of power can be divorced from any reference to the economy, he considers two potential bases of a non-economic analysis of power: firstly, the idea that power is something that exists only in being exercised, and secondly the idea that power is primarily a relation of force.

These two theses immediately raise further questions to which we find ready-made, widely accepted answers. If power is something that exists only in its exercise, in what does that exercise consist? How is power exercised? The first widely accepted answer, which Foucault calls Reich’s hypothesis, is that power consists in repression: “Power is that which represses. Power is that which represses nature, instincts, a class or individuals” (C-SMD, 15). The second widely accepted answer, which he calls Nietzsche’s hypothesis, follows from the second thesis according to which power is ultimately a relation of force: this is the idea that power is essentially a matter of struggle or conflict between opposing forces: “Power is war, the continuation of war by other means” (C-SMD, 15).⁹ Together, these two hypotheses form the principal alternative to the economic approach to power outlined above: the war-repression schema in opposition to the contract-oppression schema. Foucault admits that in his discussions of power in previous years he sought to apply the war-repression schema.¹⁰ Nevertheless, at this point in 1976, he has reached the conclusion that both elements of this schema need to be modified and perhaps ultimately abandoned (C-SMD, 17). He proposes to devote the following one or two lectures to a critical re-examination of the idea of repression. This promise is not kept, apart from some brief remarks about the sources of the concept of repression at the end of the second lecture and the beginning of the third. *The History of Sexuality*, volume 1, published later the same year, develops a more detailed argument against the repressive hypothesis. The real focus of the 1976 lectures is the hypothesis associated with Nietzsche:

I would like to try to see the extent to which the binary schema of war and struggle, of the clash between forces, can really be identified as the basis of civil society, as both the principle and motor of the exercise of political power. Are we really talking about war when we analyze the workings of power? Are the notions of “tactics,” “strategy,” and “relations of force” valid? To what extent are they valid? Is power quite simply a continuation of war by means other than weapons and battles? (C-SMD, 18)

In raising these questions, it is clear that Foucault is directly challenging his own thinking about power up to this point. The “micro-physics” of disciplinary power outlined in *Discipline and Punish* relied extensively on the militaristic language of “tactics,” “manoeuvres,” and “strategies.” It presupposed that power relations are grounded in relations of force and that one should take as the model for power relations “a perpetual battle rather than a contract regulating a transaction or the conquest of a territory” (DP, 26). *The History of Sexuality*, volume 1, which was not published until after these lectures in December 1976, famously argued that “power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they

operate” and that the condition of possibility of all power relations must be sought in “the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power” (HS1, 92–93). The same passage offered a more nuanced view of the usefulness of battle as the model for power relations, suggesting that the difference between war and politics was not a difference in kind but a difference of strategy whereby the force relations present in a given society could be played out either in the forms of war or of politics.¹¹

It is surprising that *The History of Sexuality*, volume 1, continues to rely on the language of forces and strategies, given that the text was not finalized until after the 1976 lectures in which he explicitly questioned the applicability of concepts such as antagonism, rivalry, or confrontation and struggle between contending parties to the analysis of power (Defert 1994: 49).¹² Comments in interviews during this period indicate that he was actively questioning this aspect of the war-repression schema during this period. For example, in the “Truth and Power” interview, which took place in June 1976, he rehearses some of the questions raised by the assimilation of power to war and comments that “it’s astonishing to see how easily and self-evidently people talk of warlike relations of power or of class struggle without ever making it clear whether some form of war is meant, and if so what form” (EW3, 124). Similarly, in “The Eye of Power” interview conducted around the same time, he comments on the frequency with which people use the term “struggle” without questioning what is implied by this term: “Is the relation of forces in the order of politics a warlike one? I don’t personally feel prepared to answer this with a definite yes or no” (PK, 164).

Perhaps one reason that Foucault continued to rely on the language of war in talking about power is that, at this point, he had not settled on any alternative. The 1975–76 lectures do not provide one. After having raised questions about power at the outset, Foucault is still searching in the third lecture for a more precise specification of the conceptual question: what is the role of concepts related to war and the conduct of war in the analysis of power? He reformulates the question in terms of the search for a theory of domination, or the forms of domination, rather than a theory of sovereignty. He does not at this point question the assumption that relations of power culminate in systems of domination. Rather, he asks: how does domination operate, by what techniques and by means of what effects of subjugation are relations of domination established and maintained? In particular, he asks whether the concept of war and war-like relations provides an appropriate framework for the analysis of power relations:

To what extent can a relationship of domination boil down to or be reduced to the notion of a relationship of force? To what extent can the relationship of force be reduced to a relationship of war? (C-SMD, 46)

Here, too, there are both conceptual and historical questions in play. It is Foucault’s answer to the historical rather than the conceptual question that occupies the bulk of his 1975–76 course and becomes the real focus of the lectures that follow: “How, when, and why was it noticed that or imagined that what is going on beneath and in power relations is a war?” (C-SMD, 47). Daniel Defert rightly insists that the bulk of this course is not about war, the analysis of power, or racism: it is concerned with the emergence of a form of analysis in terms of war and race (Defert 2001: 59). In contrast, the

conceptual questions ask whether concepts derived from the conduct of warfare such as strategy and tactics provide adequate instruments for the analysis of power relations (C-SMD, 47). These are not answered in the 1975–76 lectures. However, the conditions of a negative answer are established in the final lecture when he identifies a new kind of power directed at populations rather than individuals or groups and employing different mechanisms that seek to maintain regularity in the conditions that sustain human life. As commentators point out, the effects of biopower and the means by which they were achieved are not readily explained by reference to binary relationships of domination or violent struggle between contending forces.¹³

The breakthrough in Foucault's conceptual analysis of power, and the beginnings of an answer to the conceptual questions raised in 1976, occurs two years later in his 1977–78 lectures, *Security, Territory, Population*, when he begins to analyze in more detail the technologies of biopower. Mechanisms of security do not involve direct confrontation between contending forces, but forms of action on a population, where this is supposed to be a natural phenomenon subject to various kinds of regular behavior: economic, demographic, epidemiological, and so on. As such this kind of power required knowledge of the relevant dimensions of the behavior of populations. The new sciences of statistics and political economy no longer considered a population as a collection of subjects of right but as “a set of processes to be managed at the level and on the basis of what is natural in these processes” (C-STP, 70). Together, these mechanisms of security and the forms of knowledge associated with them represented a shift from a political order characterized by the exercise and maintenance of sovereignty to one characterized by government. Henceforth, it is in terms of government rather than war that Foucault understands the exercise of power.

The lecture of January 18, 1978, devoted to proposals put forward in the middle of the eighteenth century to deal with the problem of grain shortage, shows what is at stake in the analysis of power as government rather than war. Grain shortage was a threat to governments since it could lead quickly to revolt on the part of a population deprived of food. Previously, it had been dealt with by regulations intended to prevent such shortages from occurring: price controls, prohibitions on hoarding, limits on the export of grain, and control of the extent of land under cultivation. From the end of the seventeenth century politicians and their economic advisors became aware that the free circulation of grain was a better mechanism to ensure food security. Proposals such as those put forward in 1763 by Louis-Paul Abeille recommended the removal of restrictions on hoarding, on the export and import of grain, and on the extent of land devoted to its production (C-STP, 35–44). These measures are aimed at the security of food for the population at large, but they work through the decisions of individual producers, merchants, and consumers by allowing the free circulation of goods. As components of a market mechanism of security, they do not involve the direct confrontation and struggle of contending forces, as suggested by the schema of war. Nor do they involve direct action upon the forces of individuals and groups in the manner of disciplinary techniques. Rather, they ensure food security by establishing conditions under which market incentives would cause individuals to act in ways that address any problem of shortage. Foucault returns to the market mechanism for ensuring food security in the final lecture of the 1978 course, in order to suggest that it pointed towards a new, liberal form of government. Rather than the regulative mechanisms

favorable by the eighteenth-century science of police, this involved the integration of freedom into the art of government. Certain kinds of freedom had to be respected, and failure to do so amounted to “ignorance of how to govern properly” (C-STP, 353).

This new form of government becomes the subject matter of his 1978–79 lectures, *The Birth of Biopolitics*. Liberal government as it emerged during the eighteenth century sought to adjust the exercise of state power to the realities of the market. As such, it depended on the existence of freedoms such as the freedom to trade, the freedom to exercise property rights, freedoms of discussion and expression, and freedom from monopolies. Such freedoms are not given but must be produced. Liberal government did not simply endorse freedom but established limitations, controls, and various forms of coercion to ensure the kinds of freedom needed for the effective operation of markets. In the early twentieth century, state intervention to maintain market economies developed to a point of crisis in liberal governmentality where the forms of regulation themselves came to be seen as a threat to the very market freedom they were supposed to protect. Foucault’s lectures on neoliberalism analyzed the response to this crisis that sought to redefine the role of government by insisting on the importance of competition as the essence of markets and the real objective of government policy. Neoliberalism reinvented the aims as well as the techniques of liberal government and sought to extend the reliance on market mechanisms to areas of civil and social life that were previously exempt: “a state under the supervision of the market rather than a market supervised by the state” (C-BB, 116).

Foucault’s lectures on liberalism and neoliberalism do not reflect on what he later called the “conceptual requirements” of studying this kind of power. The closest he came to a definitive statement and response to the conceptual questions posed in his 1976 lectures was in “The Subject and Power,” published for the first time in English in 1982 (EW3, 326–348). This text reiterates his insistence, in *The History of Sexuality*, volume 1, and elsewhere, that the analysis of power relations and the forms of its exercise requires not so much a theory of power as an “analytics” that would provide the concepts required for the analysis of particular modalities of power. The bare object of study, namely power, does not provide a sufficient basis for an adequate conceptualization: “We have to know the historical conditions that motivate our conceptualization. We need a historical awareness of our present circumstances” (EW3, 327). In these terms, we can read the second part of this text, entitled “How is Power Exercised?,” as setting out the conceptual requirements for the study of liberal governmental power.

Foucault begins by distinguishing power relations from relations of communication and from the power exercised over things through the exercise of particular physical, technical, or organizational capacities. All of these may be involved in a given social institution or activity, but the specificity of power relations is that these involve action upon the action of others:

In effect, what defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action that does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, on possible or actual future or present actions. (EW3, 340)

This understanding of power relations as action upon the field of actions open to others is significantly different from Foucault’s earlier conception of power relations as a

matter of conflict or struggle between opposing forces. The most important differences include, firstly, the fact that the parties to relations of power are now conceived as agents endowed with a degree of freedom. The exercise of power presupposes that those on whom it is exercised are subjects capable of action and that they are in fact free to act in a number of ways. The exercise of power can take a variety of forms, including inducement or incitement to act in particular ways, but also constraint or prohibition on acting in other ways: "Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are 'free'" (EW3, 342). The scare quotes around "free" here indicate that this is not a natural freedom but rather specific kinds of freedom such as those produced and maintained for the efficient operation of markets. A second difference relates to the kind of subject that is presupposed. For liberal governmentality, this is a subject of interests and rationality, endowed with a capacity to calculate courses of action that serve its interests. For neoliberal governmentality, *homo oeconomicus* is not simply a subject seeking to maximize its satisfaction in a market but also an enterprise. It is a subject endowed with interests and rationality but also with capital of various kinds that can be increased in competition with others.

The definition of power as action upon the actions of others confirms Foucault's rupture with economism in the theory of power, with the juridical conception of power and with the war model. Power is not something possessed that can be exchanged or transferred. It does not essentially involve either contracts or violence, which does not mean that the exercise of power cannot in particular cases involve the obtaining of consent or the threat of violence. Nor does it essentially involve struggle between contending forces. Rather, power acts on the "field of possibilities" that circumscribes the actions of others. It is a way of directing or governing the actions of others:

Basically, power is less a confrontation between two adversaries or their mutual engagement than a question of "government" . . . The relationship proper to power would therefore be sought not on the side of violence or of struggle, nor on that of voluntary contracts (all of which can, at best, only be the instruments of power) but, rather, in the area of that singular mode of action, neither warlike nor juridical, which is government. (EW3, 341)

Power, Strategy, and Neoliberal Governmentality

"The Subject and Power" answers many of the conceptual questions about power first raised in Foucault's 1976 lectures. At the same time, this intriguing text raises further questions about his approach to the analysis of power, especially in relation to the neoliberal governmentality discussed in 1979. The final section returns to the question of strategy and its role in relations of power. Building on the centrality of freedom to this concept of power as action on the actions of others, Foucault asserts that there is an intransigence of freedom and a corresponding "agonism" at the heart of power relations (EW3, 342). He argues that, as a result of the ineliminable freedom presupposed by this kind of power, there is no power relationship without the possibility of escape, flight, or resistance on the part of those over whom power is being exercised. This implies that a particular exercise of power will always fall somewhere on a continuum between "the free play of antagonistic reactions" and the achievement of stable

mechanisms that imply the ongoing possibility of governing or directing the conduct of others. The attainment of such mechanisms is both an aim of the exercise of power and the temporary overcoming or suspension of the agonism between power and freedom. It is an internal limit of power relations. Conversely, the free play of antagonistic reactions is another limit of power. Once this point is reached there is no longer government of others but only action and reaction: “instead of manipulating and inducing actions in a calculated manner, one must be content with reacting to them after the event” (EW3, 347). The result is that antagonistic relations are in constant danger of giving rise to the establishment of more or less stable relations of power, while conversely such relatively stable relations of power are in constant danger of falling back into adversarial or antagonistic relations. Foucault concludes from this perpetual instability that it is always possible to interpret the mechanisms employed in particular relations of power in strategic terms: the same events and the same transformations may be interpreted “either from inside the history of struggle or from the standpoint of power relationships” (EW3, 347). Moreover, he argues that the disparity between these two ways of reading history makes visible the fundamental phenomenon of domination.¹⁴

This points to an important feature of the analysis of power as this is carried out in Foucault’s lectures on neoliberal governmentality, namely the perspective from which this form of governmental power is analyzed. This is not the perspective from below that is advocated in Foucault’s retrospective account of his approach to power at the beginning of his 1975–76 course. Nor is it simply the perspective of the state which exercises governmental power in the form of public policy, legislation, and institutional design that shapes the field in which individuals act as subjects of interest and enterprise. He notes that the state is by far the most important institution in modern societies, since it sets the parameters of operation for the entire range of basic social institutions. However, as he argued in taking up the study of governmentality in 1978, it is important to study institutions from the perspective of the technologies of power that they embody (C-STP, 116–120). These technologies of power imply, among other things, a system of differentiations that enable action on the actions of others, particular objectives pursued by those exercising power, modes of exercising power, forms of institutionalization, and degrees of rationalization (EW3, 344). Foucault’s lectures on neoliberal governmentality focus on the objectives, modes of exercise, and forms of rationalization of this kind of power, rather than the strategies by which they were introduced or the struggles they have provoked. They help to understand the objectives and rationality of this kind of power, but they do not pursue the strategy outlined in the first part of “The Subject and Power” that consists in taking forms of resistance against particular modalities of power as the “starting point” or the “catalyst” for their analysis (EW3, 329). They do not address the different political dynamics that allowed what David Harvey calls the construction of consent in favor of neoliberal government policies, much less the kinds and degree of economic restructuring and social differentiation that followed (Harvey 2005). They do not address the fundamental shifts of economic power away from states themselves that resulted from the deregulation of currencies and international financial markets and that have brought about the current situation in which, at a global level, power involves action upon the actions of those (governmental) agents that act upon the actions of individuals and populations.

None of this should be surprising when we consider that these lectures were delivered shortly before the election of Margaret Thatcher's government in Britain in May 1979 and over a year before the election of Ronald Reagan as US president in 1980. However, the strategic and conceptual resources for the analysis of power set out in "The Subject and Power" point to some of the ways in which these lectures fall short of a critical analysis of neoliberal governmentality.

Notes

I am grateful to the editors and to Colin Gordon, Jess Whyte, and Ben Golder for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.

- 1 See also Deleuze 1995: 115: "Foucault may well go right back to the Greeks, but what interests him in *The Use of Pleasure*, as in his other books, is what's happening, what we are and what we're doing, today: whether recent or distant, a historical formation is analyzed only as it differs from us, and in order to trace out that difference."
- 2 In "The Subject and Power" Foucault recommended taking the forms of resistance to power relations as a starting point for studying them (EW3, 326–331). On his conception of his genealogical and archaeological studies as criticism of the limits of the present, see "What is Enlightenment?" (EW1, 315–318).
- 3 Ewald comments further that "The alchemy always worked, except once, which made him very unhappy: the first 'Greek' year. The very erudite course did not manage to find its dramatisation" (Ewald 2011: 51).
- 4 See also the 1972 interview "On Popular Justice. A Discussion with Maoists" in PK, especially pp. 14ff.
- 5 Behrent claims, that "Foucault's interest in neoliberalism appears to owe much to his attraction to the Second Left" (Behrent 2009a: 553). See also Behrent 2009b: 19–20; Senellart 2007: 371.
- 6 For further comment on this interview and the background of Foucault's collaboration with the CFDT, see Buisson-Fenet 2004.
- 7 At the end of the fourth lecture (February 1, 1978), in which he reorients the focus of this course towards a history of governmentality, he suggests that we still live in the era of a governmentality discovered in the eighteenth century: this is a form of government that acts on the population, that relies upon a form of economic knowledge or political economy and that "would correspond to a society controlled by apparatuses of security" (C-STP, 110).
- 8 His 1979 Tanner lectures refer to the "welfare state problem" as one of many ways in which the delicate adjustment between political power wielded over legal subjects and pastoral power wielded over living beings is played out in the contemporary world (EW3, 307).
- 9 Foucault could equally have called this Deleuze's hypothesis in the light of the latter's reconstruction of Nietzsche's theory of the will to power on the basis of his conception of active and reactive force (Deleuze 1983: 49–68). In their 1972 interview, "Intellectuals and Power," and again in a 1983 interview, Foucault acknowledged the influence of Deleuze's *Nietzsche and Philosophy* on his own thinking about power: "underneath the old theme of meaning, signified and signifier etc., at last the question of power, of the inequality of powers and their struggles" (LCP, 205–217; EW2, 445).
- 10 In his 1973 lecture course *The Punitive Society*, Foucault commented that "Power, the legality that it serves and the illegalisms that it manages or struggles against must all be understood as a particular way of pursuing civil war" (cited in Nigro 2011: 144). Earlier in the

- 1976 course, in answer to the question what was at stake in the genealogical exercise of identifying and resuscitating buried and disqualified knowledges, he relies on the struggle schema in suggesting that “Both the specialized domain of scholarship and the disqualified knowledge people have contained the memory of combats. . . . And so we have the outline of what might be called a genealogy, or of multiple genealogical investigations. We have both a meticulous rediscovery of struggles and the raw memory of fights” (C-SMD, 8).
- 11 Foucault’s discussion of power in *The History of Sexuality*, volume 1, draws a distinction that is obscured in the English translation between power in general, as it is exercised in local relations throughout society, and “the power” understood as the overall system of domination and control: “power insofar as it is permanent, repetitive, inert and self-reproducing” (HS1, 93). Foucault’s nominalist understanding of the latter relies on the military metaphor: “‘the’ power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength with which some are endowed; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society” (HS1, 93, translation modified). The original reads: “le pouvoir, ce n’est pas une institution, et ce n’est pas une structure, ce n’est pas une certaine puissance dont certains seraient dotés: c’est le nom qu’on prête à une situation stratégique complexe dans une société donnée” (FHS1, 123).
 - 12 Arnold Davidson’s introduction to *Society Must Be Defended* notes Foucault’s questioning of the war model of power in interviews, but then curiously disregards this critical dimension of the 1976 lectures by suggesting that “Foucault’s preoccupation with the schema of war was central to this formulation of the strategic model of power, of force-relations, a strategic model that would allow us to reorient our conception of power” (C-SMD, xviii). Foucault’s preoccupation with the schema of war was rather the beginnings of a shift in his thinking about power away from the strategic model.
 - 13 See Fontana and Bertani 2003: 283; Le Blanc and Terrel 2003: 16.
 - 14 He defines these in a manner reminiscent of his definition of “the power” in a given society at a given time in *The History of Sexuality*, volume 1: systems of class, caste or group domination are the result, at the level of an entire society, of ‘the locking-together of power relations with relations of strategy and the results proceeding from their interaction’” (EW3, 348).

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Foucault's Untimely Struggle

PAUL RABINOW

"If we define spirituality as being the form of practices which postulate that, such as he is, the subject is not capable of the truth, but that, such as it is, the truth can transfigure and save the subject, then we can say that the modern age of the relations between the subject and truth begin when it is postulated that, such as he is, the subject is capable of truth, but that, such as it is, the truth cannot save the subject."

Michel Foucault, *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*, 19

In his series of essays on Kant written during the 1980s, Michel Foucault attempted to discern the difference today made with respect to yesterday. As his essays as well as his lectures (especially at the Collège de France and Berkeley) during the early 1980s demonstrate, he was drawn to experiments in new forms of friendship, sociability, and transformations of the self and others that he imagined were taking shape around him. He devoted the bulk of his scholarly efforts to a renewed form of genealogical work on themes, venues, practices, and modes of governing the self and others. This work, which has come to be known unfortunately as the "late Foucault," arose out of deep dissatisfaction with his own life conditions, the larger political climate of the time, and a profound and unexpected rethinking not only of the specific projects he had intended to carry out but of what it meant to think.

This essay explores some of the elements at play during this deeply (re)formative several years, which, as they unfolded, were in no way intended to constitute a "late Foucault", indeed quite the opposite, even if fate would have it otherwise. The essay is organized around a "prelude" that introduces the problem of what *mode* is appropriate for giving form to thinking. It argues that Foucault engaged in a struggle to redefine the *object* of thinking. In order to do so he was not only led to pursue a *venue* in which such thinking could be practiced, but also to an increasingly articulate and acute quest for a *form* that would constitute a difference between what Foucault diagnosed as an impoverished modern problem space (alluded to in the above quote) and a future in which things might be different and better.

Prelude

Friedrich Nietzsche's *Untimely Observations* (*Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*; French, *Considérations inactuelles*), like almost everything he wrote, was a work in progress, a work on the way. In his notebooks of the period (1872–74), the young Nietzsche outlined plans for an ambitious “philosopher’s book” that would transform the discipline as well as the practice of thinking itself. Although he never wrote precisely that book, it could be said that he never stopped working on it. In 1874, Nietzsche published a series of polemical essays: these essays are aggressive; they fit the tone and timbre of his no longer youthful *On the Genealogy of Morals* (1887) whose subtitle is *Eine Streitschrift*, translated as “polemic.” A better translation would be “conflictual” or “contestatory” writing. The term refers to a German eighteenth-century genre of criticism: at its most artful it is a term of agonistic engagement carried out antagonistically.

If Nietzsche’s preferred affect was contestatory, the title, *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*, grouping these disparate interventions together, indicates the mode in which he was operating. That mode is a distinctive and significant composite; it can be pursued in a variety of affective registers. Nietzsche’s term is *Betrachtungen*, whose English translation as “observations,” or French as *considérations*, misses the refractory intent of the engaged and active state in which Nietzsche worked. Hence, *Betrachtungen* is better conveyed as something more like the purposively oxymoronic “vigorous contemplations.”¹ *Unzeitgemässe* literally does mean “untimely,” but the French *inactuelles* is more precise not only in its inclusion of a general temporal dimension but in its identification of that temporal dimension as the “actual.”

Combined, the two terms and their affective stylization yield a mode best captured by the French term *l'intempestif*. The semantic range of the term covers not only “untimely,” but also “ill-timed,” “unreasonable,” or “inopportune” – a striving to bring something forth, something that could be actual but does not yet exist. Of course, this claim does not mean that there is something waiting around to come to fruition, but only that, taken up in a distinctive way, the things of the actual and existing world can be made into something appropriate and inopportune. Such an event would be appropriate at least retrospectively in that it reconfigures existing things and inopportunistically disrupts those existing things and relations and changes their tone, register, and directionality.

The striving for such alteration – close to the present, contesting the present, seeking something that might be becoming in the present – is found everywhere in the *Untimely Observations*. Of the four essays Nietzsche grouped together under that title, the one that is still frequently taken to be pertinent today is the essay on the “On the Utility and Liability of History for Life.” He opens that essay by asserting:

In any case, I hate everything that merely instructs me without augmenting or directly invigorating my activity. These words are from Goethe, and they may stand as a sincere [*ceterum censeo* at the] beginning of our meditation on the value of history. For its intention is to show why instruction without invigoration, why knowledge not attended by action, why history as a costly superfluity and luxury, to use Goethe’s word, should be seriously hated by us – hated because we still lack even the things we need and the superfluous is the enemy of the necessary. (Nietzsche 1983 [1874]: 59)

Gilles Deleuze, in an interview late in his life, “Contrôle et devenir,” returned to Nietzsche’s use of history. He insisted to his (Marxist) interlocutor Tony Negri that historical contextualization can never be more than a partial determination of things; hence an appeal to a method of historical contextualization, while frequently a necessary preliminary for understanding, was not sufficient. Rather, for Deleuze, an adequate account of an event – its signification, its explanation, its effects, its affects – had to take the critical limitations of the uses and abuses of history into account. Like Nietzsche, although in a different form, Deleuze affirmed the challenge of philosophy as finding a way to produce concepts and affects, ones necessary for our survival and our flourishing. Method alone was not the route to such invention.

Significant events, Deleuze declaims, were always accompanied by “a history-less penumbra [*nuée*]” (Deleuze 1997: 231). This state of affairs arose from the fact that emergent things can be understood, as a form of experimentation, or what Deleuze calls a “counter-movement” (*contra-effectuation*). Thus, although historical conditions are necessary for there to be experimentation or counter-motion because without these conditions there would be only indeterminacy, the historical conditions themselves are not sufficient to explain either events or their eventual effects and counter-effects.

Deleuze identified two modes in which one can take up an event. The standard one consisted in methodically delimiting the event in its temporality and scope, its preconditions, its consequences, and its eventual historicity. He contested that method, arguing instead for a second mode in which one is:

Swimming upstream as it were, in placing oneself within the flow of the event in its becoming, to rejuvenate and to age simultaneously, to pass through each of its elements and each singularity. Becoming [*le devenir*] is not history; history designates only the collection of conditions, as recent as they may be, that need to be overcome in order “to become,” to create something new. That state of becoming is precisely what Nietzsche called the “inopportune” [*l’Intempestif*] (Deleuze 1977: 231)²

Exactly what Deleuze intended by his idiosyncratic tropes is not easy to grasp but, at the very least, it directs us to the critical task of the *thinker*, to seize an event in its becoming, while the work of the *historian* is to insist on the importance of historical elements as conditioning whatever takes place. The latter method, of course, produces valid knowledge of a specific sort; the former, the “inopportune” – *l’intempestif* – operates adjacently, in a space of becoming where the old and new are available if one approaches them in a mode of vigorous contemplation of the about to be actual.

Thought Must Be Defended against Society

Michel Foucault took up and experimented with the challenge of critical thought in many different ways over the course of his intellectual life. Almost all of Foucault’s writings could be called inopportune and vigorous contemplation, critical contestation perpetually in search of new forms of criticism and invention. Whatever else criticism or critique was for Foucault, it was not the denunciation associated with the speaker’s benefit, e.g. Bourdieu’s Pascalian overview (*surplomb*) of others’ irremediable *illusio*.³

Whatever else critical thought was, it always concerned one form or another of examining, up close and in detail, an existing (often historical) state of affairs in an affectively engaged yet contemplative way. Like Nietzsche, Foucault, almost always in an uneasy and restless fashion – *Pour une morale de l'inconfort* – strove to invent and practice a form of asceticism, by which he meant an active attention to work on the self, on those he worked with, and the material he was considering as well as the price to be paid for forging a different mode of relationship among and between these elements.

Foucault experimented with a number of different forms of criticism and inquiry, almost always attempting to find ways to connect them. As is well known, he frequently recast his previous efforts as if they had ineluctably led him to the work he had just finished. As is equally well known, he changed course multiple times, wary of the complacency inherent in repetition, yet not embracing an avant-gardist stance for its own sake although writers like Raymond Roussel or Maurice Blanchot did hold an attraction for him during a certain period. For example, Foucault told an Italian interviewer:

Each one of my books is a way of dismantling an object, and of constructing a method of analysis toward this end. Once a work is finished, I can of course, more or less through hindsight, deduce a methodology from the completed experience. (RM, 29)

This claim alerts us to the privileged status of objects and of analysis for Foucault as well as the secondary standing of method as either a guide or a guarantee, a theme he would take up explicitly and to which he would give great significance in his lectures of 1981–82.

One mode of analysis was the History of the Present, characteristic of Foucault's work during the middle 1970s, culminating in *Discipline and Punish*. The task of the History of the Present was essentially a diagnostic one: to trace out – *analysis* – the sedimented concepts, practices, and organizations of knowledge and power – *objects* – that made it seem coherent and plausible to build prisons and to claim that the prisons were reforming those imprisoned while, at the same time, contributing to defending another new object, *society*. This analytic dismantling, this production of estrangement, entailed detailed work in archives as well as a re-reading of conceptual texts of people like Jeremy Bentham not as academic philosophers but as producers of programs for social reform, at the time a distinctive *practice*, with a long future ahead of it. These programs were the proper objects for Foucault's analysis to the extent that they had established a specific type of rationality as reasonable. Whether a type of rationality had been taken to be reasonable was a question not for the historian to answer but, rather, for the *Historian of the Present* to pose. The reason for making this distinction and emphasizing it is that the work to be done was diagnostic, the work of freeing up the recent past to a concerned objectivity, an untimely attention to objects and practices.

Discipline and Punish occasioned intense, often negative reactions from psychiatrists as well as from some leading historians in France and the United States. Fortunately for us, Foucault's white-hot counters to these attacks, or as he says later, these "reproaches," are of an uncommon directness and lucidity. For example, in 1980 Foucault accepted an invitation to participate in a roundtable encounter with a group

of prestigious historians assembled by his friend Michelle Perrot, a historian of women. The encounter was not peaceable. From our perspective, the assembly was an extravagant success; Foucault was angry (*thumic*) enough to generate marvelously scathing demonstrations of his mode of analysis, his chosen objects, his diagnostic practice, and his goals.

In a written response to the historians, "La Poussière et le nuage," Foucault forged the famous analogy according to which what he was doing was deploying "fragments philosophiques dans des chantiers historiques" [philosophical fragments in historical sites] (FDE4, 10–19). His elaboration of what precisely he intended by that entrancing analogy is lucid. Primarily and fundamentally, it was a demand that the principles upon which his work and that of the historian-interlocutors proceeded required more careful attention. Technically, therefore this intervention was a critical contestation, styled in a *thumic* affect, vigorously analytic. To me, the most striking counter-movement is found in the following challenge:

Perhaps we should also investigate the principle, unexamined and taken for granted, that the only reality to which history must attend is society itself. (FDE4, 15)⁴

This challenge to focus on the tacit baseline, the unquestioned and assumed to be self-evident, ontological reality – society – opens up a vast terrain for exploration. From the way Foucault laid down the challenge, it was clear that it would be met with a counter-challenge, which, of course, he had anticipated. If the order of things was not social then what was it? Obviously, Foucault was not going to substitute "power" or "ethics" or "governmentality," as some of his followers would later assert with their habitual lack of acuity. The demand for naming the "really real" required first a refusal: a steadfast rebuff to the mode in which the question was being posed. It then required inquiry.

As Hans Blumenberg has argued in *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, a cornerstone of this anti-substantialist mode of thinking requires the reflective recasting of certain older questions and concepts (as well as objects and practices) that had been honed in a different problem space (Blumenberg 1983 [1966]). Philosophic fragments forged in the workshops of history and historians could not be taken over unexamined. Further, at times it was vital that certain older questions should not be left unanswered. That stance of course is not a general negation of past concepts and practices but only a reflective and critical questioning, a marking of the problems previously posed to which concepts and practices had constituted answers or solutions.

Thus, Foucault's task consisted not only of making what was self-evident contingent, but also of analyzing how it had been linked in complex ways with "multiple historical processes, many of them recent" (FDE4, 22).⁵ The task was to make visible the appropriate objects of analysis. Among those recent and multiple processes that needed to be taken into account were the histories of the processes in question, then and now.

To make or do a history of "objectivation," of those elements that historians consider as objective givens (the objectivation of objectivations, so to say); it is that circle that I wish to follow out. (FDE4, 22)⁶

It follows that in many cases, the parameters of the question needed to be rethought, so as to make them pertinent for addressing a different problem: one susceptible of being investigated, reflected on, experimented with, learned from, and recast. High on the list of objectified givens was – Society.

My problem is not to propose a global analysis of society [. . .] my general theme is not society but rather is true/false discourse; the correlative formation of domains, objects, and the discourses that are verifiable and falsifiable in relation to them; and furthermore it is not only that formation that interests me but the effects on reality connected to them. (FDE4, 23)⁷

For example, in an interview entitled “Est-il donc important de penser?,” conducted in May 1981 with his friend the journalist Didier Eribon – an interview given at the time of the presidential election of the socialist François Mitterrand, a time when the Socialist Party was calling for intellectuals to back their programs or be considered, if not class enemies, at least betrayers of social justice – Foucault presented a theme he would return to repeatedly with increasing urgency in his remaining three years, formulating variants over and over again. The theme was: the defense of thought when the pressing demand was for political action.

To begin from the outset by accepting the question of what reforms I will introduce, is not, I believe, the objective that an intellectual should entertain. His role, since he works in the register of thought, is to see just how far thought can be freed so as to make certain transformations seem urgent enough so that others will attempt to bring them into effect, and difficult enough so that if they are brought about they will be deeply inscribed in the real. (FDE4, 33; RM, 33)⁸

For Foucault this challenge followed from what he had gradually come to define as his vocation and his problem: to think. The work to be done entailed leaving totalities behind, specifically the taken-for-granted totalities to which certain French politicians were dispositionally attached. A critical analytic task, therefore, consisted in changing not society or culture or power but thought. This task, Foucault held, was analytic, certainly, but the goal of such critical work was pragmatic in the broadest sense of the term: to make changes in the near future subject to thought.

We must free ourselves [*s'affranchir*] from the sacralization of the social as the unique instance of the real and stop diminishing that essential aspect of human life and human relations, thinking. Thought exists well beyond the systems and edifices of discourse. It is something that is often hidden but always animates ordinary human action. There is always some pinch of thought in the stupidest of institutions. There is always some thought in the most silent of habits. (FDE4,180; EW3, 456)⁹

Critical work is diagnostic and analytic. This work might open up with more clarity that which was both a necessity and an obstructive luxury.

But where and how?

In Search of a Venue

I do not believe we are locked in by history; to the contrary, all my work consists in showing that history is crossed by strategic relations which consequently are mobile and can be changed; upon the condition, of course, that the agents involved in these processes have the political courage to change things. (Foucault 1985: 102)¹⁰

The Collège de France is not exactly a teaching institution as it grants no degrees and has no general curriculum, only the lectures of the professors who are free to explore any topic on which they are doing research. Consequently it is a distinctive kind of institution. Professors are paid to do research and to present their work in public to whoever decides to attend their presentations. An appointment at the Collège de France is the ultimate, and much coveted, pinnacle of academic prestige in France.

In this light, and in stark contrast to his inaugural lecture in 1970, the tone of Foucault's opening lecture of 1976 at the Collège took the form of an odd, pathos-toned, colloquy. "I would like to be a bit clearer," he wrote, "about what is going on here, in these lectures" (C-SMD, 1). Somewhat petulantly, yet with a tone of resigned resolve, Foucault was quite uncharacteristically blunt, informing the hundreds of auditors facing him, as well as those listening in an adjoining room:

So, I do not regard our Wednesday meetings as a teaching activity, but rather as public reports on the work I am, in other respects, left to get on with more or less as I see fit. To that extent, I actually consider myself to be under an absolute obligation to tell you roughly what I am doing. (C-SMD, 1)

He then asserted that those who attended the public reporting were free to do whatever they would like with the material he presented. His frustration and resignation were clear: "[T]hese are suggestions for research, ideas, schemata, outlines, instruments; do what you like with them" (C-SMD, 2). But Foucault was obviously not entirely comfortable with that arrangement. Having just told his audience to do as they liked with his public lectures, he admitted that, "it does concern me to the extent that, one way or another, what you do with it is connected, related, to what I am doing" (C-SMD, 2). But how it was connected, in what way, was not clear to him; given the structure of the situation, he had no way of knowing what was being done with his material, how it was being received, used, distributed, distorted, etc. Given these uncertainties and contradictions, Foucault adopted a tone of resigned consternation.

He observed to his audience that they, the throngs that attended his lectures punctually and regularly, for whatever reasons, were obliged to arrive early, and half or more of those attending had to sit in a different room and listen to the lectures over a sound system. He proposed shifting the time of his lectures from the late afternoon to 9:30 in the morning, because, as he remarked, he was told that students had trouble getting up that early. Clearly, the situation was a source of neither pleasure nor gratification for Foucault. Again, uncharacteristically, he spoke frankly about his unhappiness with the arrangement.

The problem for me – I will be quite blunt about it – the fact that I had to go through this sort of circus every Wednesday was really – how can I put it? – torture [*supplice*] is putting it too strongly, boredom [*ennui*] is putting it too mildly, so I suppose it was somewhere in between the two. (C-SMD, 2)

The “circus” atmosphere stood in stark opposition to the spirit of the lectures he spent so much time and care constructing: research in progress, forays in thinking and clarification, unsettling of certitudes, unexpected ramifications. What was supposed to be a venue characterized by the utmost freedom to conduct and report on current research in progress, the Chair in the History of Systems of Thought, had increasingly become the obligation to perform, at least in part, so as to please or amuse or simply distract an anonymous overflow audience over which he had no control and with whom he had no contact. Although there were no registered students at the Collège, there was also no procedure to exclude anyone. Whoever showed up, the public, had a right to attend.

So I said to myself: It wouldn’t be such a bad idea if thirty or forty of us could get together in a room. I could tell you roughly what I’ve been doing, and at the same time have some contact with you, talk to you, answer your questions and so on, and try to rediscover the possibility of exchange and contact that are part of the normal practice of research and teaching. (C-SMD, 3)

Although Foucault had sought an appointment at the Collège, increasingly he felt trapped by its form. In Paris, there was no other obvious outlet with which he felt comfortable. Apparently obtaining a position at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales was not something he seriously entertained even though Pierre Bourdieu and Roland Barthes (among others) had “accumulated” positions, as the French say, at both institutions. Foucault did have a small research seminar at the Collège for a number of years, which yielded a certain amount of collective work such as *I, Pierre Rivière* or work on the birth of the hospital. But for reasons that are not entirely clear, petty personality disputes among them, the seminar seems to have exhausted itself (Macé 2006). During this period Foucault attempted to start a publishing series of scholarly “works” and although after a series of rebuffs he ultimately succeeded on a smaller scale than he had hoped, the experience of trying to establish it had been discouraging, and the results limited (Eribon 1989: 310, 311). The discouragement was not only a product of the limited results but of the lack of response, of enthusiasm, of adventure among those in a position to support new things.

Of course, in order to contextualize Foucault’s mood, his growing sense of feeling trapped and ground down, it would be necessary to describe the broader political situation of France in the late 1970s (and the biographies provide the elements to do so) as well as some of the disruption he was undergoing in his personal life. Foucault’s political activity during the late 1970s and early 1980s basically took the form of direct protest. He spoke out, joined demonstrations, appeared on panels with other Parisian figures, and even signed petitions. He championed a variety of causes: he took a stand against what he took to be the French government’s arrogant refusal to back the Polish Solidarity movement; he expressed his dismay and anger at what he took to be the Socialists Party’s political program and its media attacks on independent intellectuals

– Jack Lang, a socialist who later served as a Minister of Culture, referred to Foucault as “a clown” (personal communication); and he expressed an unexpected affirmation of the political importance of human rights campaigns as well as of the nascent humanitarian movements in France. That being said, Foucault experienced political activity during this period as deeply frustrating and judged the harvests of his and others’ efforts to be at best frugal.

By the late 1970s, Foucault was thoroughly fed up with France, discouraged by the French political scene as well as all by the petty obstacles to his scholarly work that he encountered regularly. He had stopped using the one great public library in France, the Bibliothèque Nationale, because of the difficulty of accessing materials (Eribon 1989: 309). At the BN, one submitted request slips for the books one wanted to use and then had to wait until they were delivered. There were limits to the number of slips one could submit at one time, and the unions were not infrequently involved in protests that extended the delivery of materials beyond the usual delays. In frustration, Foucault shifted his research to a Dominican library where all the primary texts in Greek and Latin that he was beginning to work on were readily available for his use.

Although these and other such blockages and impediments appear petty in and of themselves, they are not insignificant. Micro-practices, as Foucault had demonstrated in *Discipline and Punish*, can be used as dividing practices, as insidious annoyances, as techniques of subordination, etc. Lest these details appear anecdotal and trivial, it is worth underscoring that this period was one in which Foucault was discussing suicide as an option worthy of praise, as an ultimate act of freedom (Szakolczai 1998: ch. 9). Remembering Deleuze’s admonitions about the uses and abuses of history, these conditions of existence were, of course, not determinative of Foucault’s personal and political actions or of the extraordinary twists and turns of this thinking. The fact that these conditions were not causal, however, does not mean that they had no importance. Without constraints, both local and general, after all, actions would be unintelligible. Without conditions, no becoming. Without context, nothing to be inopportune about. The effort to derive something singular requires counter-motion and there is no method to decide how to accomplish that.

Berkeley: Care of the Self

Foucault’s visits to the United States increased in regularity during this period. Gradually, and no doubt at first in an unstructured way, he demonstrated a growing eagerness to find a different way of practicing his thinking and a nascent program in which the care of the self, his own as well as that of those close to him, began to emerge. Foucault being Foucault, he explored this theme both existentially and conceptually. The question of a venue – a scene or setting in which something takes place – a place to come to work with others, to undertake research, to teach, learn, question, contest findings and methods with some earnestness and excitement, unquestionably formed an issue of concern. It was in the United States, and especially in Berkeley and San Francisco, that Foucault committed himself to the program of the care of the self and its inextricable reformulation of relations with others.

As Didier Eribon pithily puts it: “The United States for Michel Foucault was the pleasure of work” (Eribon 1989: 336).¹¹ To his great pleasure, the classical texts were readily available at the Berkeley library or through inter-library loan. Furthermore, in Berkeley he could actually take them out of the library. Additionally, many people were eager to help him. Berkeley provided him with eager students at all levels – the man insisted on having “office hours” – imagine! He had extended discussions with myself and with Hubert Dreyfus that provided him with a venue in which he could examine his work from a different perspective and with a different ethos. There were as yet basically no Foucauldians, or for that matter anti-Foucauldians, in the United States, although that would change rather rapidly.

During this period, 1979–83, the great sexual revolution was taking place in San Francisco, just before the dawn of AIDS. As Foucault wrote in a number of essays at the time, his previous battles to argue to himself and to others that sexuality was not the deepest meaning or the key to the self was being demonstrated, before his very eyes. Sex was practiced openly, defiantly at first but soon casually, as was the identity politics constructed around it, both unimaginable in Paris at the time. Foucault was fascinated by these events; yet his dry humor – “There are so many gays, and I am a homosexual!” (personal communication, in English) – suggested that he was seeking the locus of significance elsewhere than in the clubs and sex discussions. “Every gay is writing a book” – again, his humor was deployed not so much to distance himself from what he was seeing *per se* but rather to think about the distance he felt. Eribon, only slightly ironically, concludes:

Foucault’s American happiness: a reconciliation with himself finally realized. He is happy in his work. He is happy in the pleasures of his body. From the beginning of the 1980s Foucault was seriously considering leaving France and Paris, which he tolerated less and less well, to move to the United States. (Eribon 1989: 338)¹²

Of course, the Golden Age of American Happiness in the California Paradise was not to last very long. It was fated, tragically, in San Francisco, or, more banally, in Berkeley, for more somber times as the AIDS epidemic emerged.

In Search of a Mode, Practice, and Form of Spirituality

Unexpectedly, the concept that Foucault settled on to characterize the dimension missing from modern philosophy, the component whose elimination (or marginalization) had produced centuries of misplaced assurance arising from and instantiating (quite literally) a quest for method, was the theme of “spirituality,” which he defined as “the search, practice, and experience through which the subject carries out the necessary transformations on himself in order to have access to the truth” (C-HS, 15).

Foucault’s introduction of the term “spirituality” in the 1981–82 lectures at the Collège de France was unanticipated, even startling. Although he had used the term “political spirituality” briefly in his journalistic writings about Iran, and although it is true that he had intended to return to it as a central theme (along with governmentality) of a proposed longer-term research project on the sixteenth century and the 1920s with colleagues at Berkeley, he had not found an occasion to return to it during the late

1970s. Rather, during those few years, he had devoted himself to analyzing other topics and concepts (liberalism, governmentality, security, population, etc.) (FDE3, 302).¹³ By the early 1980s (and to a degree in the late 1970s), however, the growing consideration Foucault was giving to ethics, to practices of the self, to questioning the function, mode, and purpose of thinking, to the worth of his work, drew him into an exploration of different conceptual terrain (half-existent and half-imagined). Initially at least, Foucault did not realize as he entered into these explorations that they would occupy and preoccupy him during his few remaining years of life.

This essay is not the place to survey the vast and varied riches of the last three sets of lectures Foucault gave at the Collège de France. It is worth underlining, however, the importance Foucault gave to two of the major organizing themes (eventually concepts) that he identified as significant during this historical period: “frank speech” (*parrhesia*) and “care of the self” (*epimeleia heautou*). Foucault hypothesized, and argued to his own at least partial satisfaction, that both terms had been important themes around which many of the practices guiding philosophic activity in the period roughly following Plato and up until Gregory of Nyssa and the rise of Christian asceticism turned. Foucault’s own attention to these themes, and to the long since marginalized practices associated with them, at the very least shows his absorption with them. It also indicates, it is safe to say, that these themes constituted for him a possible way forward – an *Ausgang*, an exit toward maturity, to use Kant’s term – in his own life and work. To be more precise, these themes (in relation to the turmoil and transformations he was undergoing in his own life), as well as his analytic and genealogical work devoted to explicating and delineating them, allowed Foucault – in many ways for the first time – to pose to himself, and for himself, the question: what form would a philosophic practice take that would be salvific? (Szakolczai, 1998: 246–262)

The cornerstone of his lengthy explorations of the rise and fall of the care of the self as an integral part of Western philosophic practice proved to turn on the concept of spirituality. The identification of the significance of the term led Foucault to delineate how and why it had been understood conceptually, but more importantly, how it had been transformed into a series of practices. This exploration constituted his primary research terrain during the 1980s.

In his lectures of 1981–82 Foucault formulated a series of broad, general hypotheses (accompanied by detailed explications of philosophic texts) concerning the relations of philosophy and spirituality.¹⁴ Pivotal among the claims Foucault posited was his contention that in the pre-Christian philosophic tradition of the West, a defining principle of philosophic activity had been that “spirituality postulates that the truth is never given to the subject by right” (C-HS, 15). Although the Christian tradition did something quite different theologically and practically beginning with approximately the same starting point, both the pre-Christian and Christian corpus can be seen to concur with the assertion that gaining access to the truth always requires transformative work on the self. Such work, grouped under the rubric of ascetic practices, consisted in means and modes of changing, transforming, shifting, and modifying the individual so as to make him into a subject capable of receiving the truth. Foucault chronicles and analyzes (in the literal sense of breaking something down into its elements), a large array of techniques and practices developed historically to perform this preparatory transformational work on the subject.

These ascetic techniques were not exercises in virtuosity (as Max Weber described in other traditions), nor were they ends in themselves (as they have frequently become today). Rather, they functioned to make the subject susceptible to return “effects.” Foucault names these “effects,” “rebound [*de retour*] effects of the truth on the subject . . . The truth enlightens the subject; the truth gives beatitude to the subject; the truth gives the subject tranquility of the soul” (C-HS, 16).

Foucault’s introduction of this terminology is surprising, even disconcerting. Today, we contemporaries might readily imagine that we could understand what “enlightens” means; we might tender respect to others’ search for “beatitude”; and we might even imagine ourselves, with appropriate updating of the concepts, desiring to attain a “tranquility of the soul.” Such a range of topics, however, was hardly familiar terrain for Foucault. Even in his series of essays on Kant, Foucault never posited a state of enlightenment or maturity, only the affect driving certain citizens of the world to imagine a way forward – hope, enthusiasm – or preventing them from doing so – laziness or cowardice.

Foucault did not return to beatitude or tranquility of the soul but he did insist on the importance of “salvation” as the goal of spirituality. Again, this claim startles at first hearing or reading. During his lecture, it is as if Foucault realized how bizarre these terms must sound to the sleepy students (at 9:30 in the morning) populating the overflow auditoria in which his amplified voice reverberated. Foucault hastened to reassure them; he was not talking about Christian salvation. “Salvation,” he said, was simply “no more than the realization of the relationship to the self” (C-HS, 192).

He then concisely distinguished the Christian thematic of salvation and the one at issue among philosophers such as Seneca or Marcus Aurelius. The “meaning of “saving oneself,” Foucault wrote, “is not at all reducible to something like the drama of an event that allows one’s existence to be commuted from life to death, mortality to immortality, evil to good, etc.” (C-HS, 183). That semantic field and those meanings were, of course, the Christian ones.

Having cleared that ground, Foucault proceeded to present a philological exercise, a technique that was gaining increasing importance as a technique of exposition and demonstration in his later lectures. It was through his calm examination of terms that Foucault apparently sought to loosen them from the accretions of meaning and affect they had accumulated over the centuries, thereby allowing a different understanding and apprehension of past historical forms. No doubt such an exercise had as its horizon the intention of making future historical forms possible as well. As opposed to the strategy of the History of the Present, the goal was not to show the contingency of naturalized or taken-for-granted terms, concepts, or practices but rather to trace their previous branching or ramifications as a partial guide to their historically variable potency as well as their contemporary potential (virtuality).

Thus, the Greek terms *sozein* (to save) or the substantive *soteria* (salvation) cover a range of different meanings, all of them this-worldly. For example, *sozein* had a wide range of meanings, some of them quite ordinary: one could be saved from a shipwreck or an illness. The verb could also mean “to guard, protect, or keep a protective shield around something” (C-HS, 182).

Shifting from that rather literal or material sense of protection, the verb could also mean “to preserve or protect something like decency or honor.” Further, the verb had

a juridical meaning: to acquit or exonerate. Finally, and this was the most pertinent of the verb's meanings for the problem Foucault was addressing, "*sozein* means to do good. It meant to ensure the well-being, the good condition of someone, or something, or of a collectivity" (C-HS, 183). In sum, the verb denoted a type or form of activity: a proactive taking care of, guarding, perhaps nourishing, and the goods of one's life, material and spiritual. Understood in that manner, there was nothing exotic about the semantics or the practices directed at facilitating these quite worldly goals.

Foucault provided a synthetic overview of the functions of the techniques more or less coherently assembled into the ascetic and/or spiritual practices. He devoted many of his lectures, parts of the last two volumes of *The History of Sexuality*, as well as a number of lectures and interviews on various occasions during the 1980s, to the technologies and practices of spirituality, salvation, asceticism, that had been developed in the ancient world.

In the 1981–82 lectures, for example, he identified several functions of the care of the self. First, was the "curative and therapeutic function." Perhaps one could say that Foucault's experience in California had set him on a curative trajectory, or, at the very least, had helped him to recognize that such a trajectory was conceivable. Second, Foucault identified a "critical" function. By critical here he did not mean anything like the Kantian sense of inherent limitations or the more current sense of denunciation of evils or abuses. Rather, the critical function at issue turned on the demand to "unlearn," *de-discere*, what one had been taught or the way one had been trained. Likely, one had had bad teachers, perhaps bad parents, and many other practices and understandings no doubt needed to be examined with an eye to "unlearning" them if one was to proceed toward an adequate transformation of the self.

Telos: Which Struggle?

In addition to the curative and critical functions, Foucault identified the prominence within this tradition of "a function of struggle." This function did not consist in either the Christian preparation for the one last struggle to save one's soul or the struggle to free oneself from illusion or pollution. Rather, this Hellenistic struggle had entailed a mode of lifelong practice and exercise, a form of perpetual vigilance and training. The object of the struggle consisted in part in focusing attention on and unlearning the myriad bad habits and dispositions that one had accumulated and continued to accumulate. It consisted in part in the therapeutic or curative dimension mentioned above.

More appositely, such struggle aimed at providing the subject with a mode of vigilant preparedness for encountering any and all events throughout life. Its goal was to bring those events into the present and to live with them as actualities, not eventualities. To the degree that the philosopher accomplished or approached this goal, he would be able to know, as Foucault quotes Seneca, "I await the day when I will pass judgment on myself and know whether virtue was only in my words or really in my heart." Significantly, this sentence closes his course summary of 1981–82, a summary to which we know Foucault had devoted careful attention (Gros 2005: 507–550).

Seneca's world obviously was not Foucault's. We are given a strong sense of the distance between them in Foucault's presentation of the goals of these Hellenistic

philosophers. The purpose or telos of these practices, these exercises, these principles, these modes, these techniques turned on:

The two great themes of *ataraxy* (the absence of inner turmoil, the self-control that ensures that nothing disturbs you), and *autarchy* (the self-sufficiency which ensures that one needs nothing but the self) . . . the two forms in which salvation, the acts of salvation, the activity of salvation carried on throughout one's life, find their reward. (C-HS, 184)

Although scholastically the identification of *ataraxy* and *autarchy* as central goals of Hellenistic thought is uncontroversial, their status in Foucault's own life and works is far from obvious and deserves more attention. It seems patent to me that these goals, at least in their Hellenistic form, were not shared by Foucault. After all, if the challenge had been to achieve *ataraxy* and *autarchy*, there would have been no need to leave France. Quite the opposite, France would seem to have offered Foucault an exemplary field of aggravation and disturbance in which to put himself to the test. One thinks of Seneca faced with the plotted Roman alternatives of retreat to his villa (Foucault had sought to purchase an abandoned abbey in Poitou) or returning to face the fate Nero's crazed sovereignty held in store for him. For Seneca there were no other choices (although he fantasized about returning to the Athens of his youth where he had been schooled in rhetoric, he knew full well that returning to the Athens of old was an unrealizable fantasy in the present). Nero ordered Seneca's suicide (Foucault returned insistently to suicide as a topic and ultimate act of freedom during this period) as well as that of his wife. Seneca complied; his wife, having failed in her initial attempts, was spared.

The Hellenistic options in a literal sense made no sense as their meaning would have been totally different then and now. The challenge of "struggle," however, perhaps could be given a contemporary form. For Foucault, salvation could be thought of not only as a deliverance from sin but also an activity of self-transformation. It consisted in:

the subject's constant action on himself. . . . the vigilant, continuous, and completed form of the relationship to self . . . The self is the agent, object, instrument, and end of salvation. . . . Salvation ensures an access to the self that is inseparable from the work one carries out on oneself within the time of one's life and in life itself. (C-HS, 185)

Although to contemporary ears such claims can sound individualistic, nothing could be further from the original subject matter itself or from Foucault's reasons for bringing it back to light. Perhaps the simplest proof of this claim can be found in the fact that Foucault's 1982–83 lectures were devoted to explorations of "the government of self and others." His final lectures, the following year, dealt with a genealogy of the critical intellectual, specifically a series of lectures on the cynics, who spoke truth to power, in public, at the risk of their own well-being and even their lives. All of the genealogical and archaeological work on Hellenistic philosophy provided a means of reintroducing a set of concepts and terms (salvation, care of the self, equipment, etc.) that held the promise of being useful today. It provided a vast thematic panorama with parenthetical digressions that could clearly have become courses or books in and of themselves (on

Hegel, on Faust, on the nineteenth century, on the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, on science and theology, etc.)

We should be clear, however, that what Foucault did not provide was a solution. During the time when Foucault was working in the mode of the History of the Present, the refusal to outline solutions or propose directions for others was an ethical and political principle. By the 1980s, Foucault was uneasy with that mode of subjectivation. He was in quest of a different way forward when time ran out. What we do know is that, at least in his lectures and discussions, during the 1980s Foucault was once again problematizing philosophy as a practice and a way of life. The questions that Foucault posed and re-posed during the 1980s remain challenging: What difference does today make with respect to yesterday? How to find an exit toward maturity? How to give form to our impatience for liberty? It is certain that had Foucault lived longer these and other unexpected questions would indeed have drawn his attention and concern. What that work would have looked like, we will never know.

Notes

- 1 Thanks to James Redfield for his precision on the German meanings of this term as well as his overall reading of the text. The term “remediation” follows the general sense of the term, e.g. as discussed in Jean Starobinski’s *Le Remède dans le mal*. The term, however, has a more specific use: see Rabinow and Bennett 2008. Gratitude for their insights and patience go above all to James Faubion, Gaymon Bennett, Stephen Collier, James Redfield, and Marilyn Rabinow.
- 2 In the original: “à passer le long de l’événement, à en recueillir l’effectuation dans l’histoire, le conditionnement et le pourrissement dans l’histoire [...] à remonter l’événement, à s’installer en lui comme dans un devenir, à rajeunir et à vieillir en lui tout à la fois, à passer par toutes ses composantes ou singularités. Le devenir n’est pas de l’histoire; l’histoire désigne seulement l’ensemble des conditions si récentes soient-elles, dont on se détourne pour ‘devenir,’ c’est-à-dire pour créer quelque chose de nouveau. C’est exactement ce que Nietzsche appelle l’Intempestif” (Deleuze 1997: 231).
- 3 Foucault provides a partial genealogy of this *surplomb* as the act of looking down on one’s one life in order to judge it rather than in order to demonstrate the inadequacy of others’ self-understanding. See C-HS, 281–283.
- 4 In the original: “Il faudrait peut-être aussi interroger le principe, implicitement admis, que la seule réalité à laquelle devrait prétendre l’histoire, c’est la société elle-même” (FDE4, 15).
- 5 In the original, “des processus historiques multiples et, pour beaucoup entre eux, récents” (FDE4, 22).
- 6 In the original: “Faire l’histoire de ‘l’objectivation’ de ces éléments que les historiens considèrent comme les données objectivement (l’objectivation des objectivations, si j’ose dire), c’est cette cercle que je voudrais parcourir” (FDE4, 22).
- 7 In the original: “Mon problème, ce n’est pas de proposer d’analyse globale de la société. [...] mon thème générale, ce n’est pas la société, c’est le discours vrai/faux; c’est la formation corrélatrice de domaines, d’objets, et de discours vérifiable et falsifiables qui leurs sont afférents; et ce n’est pas simplement cette formation qui m’intéresse, mais les effets de réalité qui leur sont liées.” (FDE4, 23)
- 8 In the original: “Se dire d’entrée de jeu: quelle est donc la réforme que je vais pouvoir faire? Ce n’est pas pour l’intellectuel, je crois, un objectif à poursuivre. Son rôle, puisque

- précisément il travaille dans l'ordre de la pensée, c'est de voir jusqu'où la libération de la pensée peut arriver à rendre ces transformations assez urgentes pour qu'on ait envie de les faire, et assez difficiles pour qu'elles s'inscrivent profondément dans le réel" (FDE4, 33).
- 9 In the original: "Il faut s'affranchir de la sacralisation du social comme seule instance du réel et cesser de considérer comme du vent cette chose essentielle dans la vie humaine et dans les rapports humains, je veux dire la pensée. La pensée, ça existe, bien au-delà, bien en deçà, des systèmes et des édifices de discours. C'est quelque chose qui se cache souvent, mais anime toujours les comportements quotidiens. Il y a toujours un peu de pensée même dans les institutions les plus sottes, il y a toujours de la pensée même dans les habitudes muettes" (FDE4, 180).
 - 10 In the original: "Je ne crois pas qu'on soit enfermé dans une histoire; au contraire, tout mon travail consiste à montrer que l'histoire est traversée de rapports stratégiques qui sont par conséquent mobiles, et que l'on peut changer. A condition, bien entendu, que les agents de ces processus aient le courage politique de changer les choses" (1985: 102).
 - 11 "Les États-Unis, pour Michel Foucault, c'est le plaisir du travail" (Eribon 1989: 336).
 - 12 In the original: "Bonheur American de Foucault: la réconciliation avec soi-même enfin réalisée. Il est heureux dans son travail. Il est heureux dans les plaisirs du corps. Depuis le début des années quatre-vingts, in envisage très sérieusement de quitter la France et Paris qu'il supporte de plus en plus difficilement, pour s'installer aux États-Unis" (Eribon 1989: 338).
 - 13 The term comes up first as a problem to reflect on, as a possible concept whose genealogy would be worth exploring, in relation to Foucault's journalistic foray in Iran. "Dans cette volonté d'un 'gouvernement islamique,' faut-il voir une réconciliation, une contradiction, ou le seuil d'une nouveauté? [...] Ce petit coin de terre dont le sol et le sous-sol sont l'enjeu de stratégies mondiales, quel sens, pour les hommes qui habitent, à rechercher au prix même de leur vie cette chose dont nous avons, nous autres, oublié la possibilité depuis la Renaissance et les grandes crises du christianisme: une spiritualité politique. J'entends déjà les Français qui rient. Mais je sais qu'ils ont tort" (FDE3, 302).
 - 14 Hypothesis: in logic, the antecedent of a conditional statement.

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Part II

Knowledge and Critique

Foucault's Normative Epistemology

LINDA MARTÍN ALCOFF

"I know that, as far as the general public is concerned, I am the guy who said that knowledge merged with power, that it was no more than a thin mask thrown over the structures of domination . . . [This] is so absurd as to be laughable. If I had said, or meant, that knowledge was power, I would have said so, and, having said so, I would have had nothing more to say . . ."

Michel Foucault, *Politics, Philosophy, Culture*, 264

As this essay will argue, and as this epigraph should suggest, epistemology was a central concern of Michel Foucault's. By denying the conflation of knowledge with power, and consistently maintaining a dyadic relationship ("power/knowledge") rather than a relationship in which power eclipses knowledge, Foucault maintains that knowledge requires its own analysis irreducible to the strategic maneuvers of power. But clearly, given Foucault's *political* critique of numerous *truth* claims, to say that Foucault has an epistemology raises the question of what the term epistemology could mean in relation to Foucault's work. The term is often conflated with positivism by continental philosophers, Foucault included, or otherwise used as an oversimplified foil against which a historical approach to the various ways in which knowledge has been defined can be brought up for discussion. "Epistemology," by this caricature, has to approach the question of knowledge as a transcendent entity, akin to Plato's Ideal Forms. But this is not the way many influential analytic philosophers approach it today, from Brandom to Van Fraassen.

A better and more appropriate formulation of the project of epistemology, and one that avoids boxing it into a particular sub-trend, is that it is a normative inquiry into the categories of knowledge, truth, justification, and belief. Epistemology distinguishes itself from the sociology of knowledge in that it is not merely concerned with describing the ways in which human beings have claimed to know, but with considering how this has been done poorly, and how it might be done better. Importantly, the evaluative

criteria that are used to judge past cognitive practices and imaginatively formulate future ones are understood as epistemic criteria rather than being solely or reductively political, ethical, or aesthetic. The concept of “epistemic criteria” again requires clarification, but the general idea is that epistemology aims to improve our knowing practices in regard to truth.

Foucault’s work on knowledge is primarily critical rather than normatively reconstructive. He challenged some of the foundational claims in the study of sexuality, for example, such as claims about the ahistorical nature of desire, the objective and unchanging status of sexual identities, and the apolitical nature of empirical inquiry into sexuality. And he did so on the basis of his critique of the ways in which such claims came about within regulatory institutions. He developed similarly effective critiques in regard to criminology and the psychology of madness, focusing again on such reified categories as “the criminal mind” or “the insane.” Yet in developing these critiques, Foucault also began to develop a different approach to the study of knowledge, an approach that could explain how it was that the “self-correcting” mechanisms of empiricism sometimes came up short, and how one might become attuned to the mechanisms by which important aspects of received knowledge escape critical scrutiny. More generally, he began to develop ideas about how to rethink the categories of knowledge and truth.

The most important and influential of these ideas was Foucault’s claim that power and knowledge are co-constituting: “that power and knowledge directly imply one another” (DP, 27). We’ll explore what this means further on, but one implication of this idea is that epistemology needs to focus not only on knowledge, as if knowledge exists only where power is suspended, but on power/knowledge, a dyadic concept Foucault invented in order to get across his idea that the two terms must always be analyzed in relationship. Maintaining a focus on power/knowledge, and not simply knowledge, alters our ideas about the optimal procedures for justification. To be truly justified in a belief, one must build in some reflection about the ways in which the belief may be related to power. This central claim indicates both why Foucault should be counted among those with a normative epistemology, and also why the reception of his work has commonly led to misunderstandings.

Gary Gutting has pointed out that Foucault’s reception in the Anglo-American philosophical world has been negatively affected by the degree to which his work builds on a particular French tradition in the philosophy of science, which is relatively unknown by English-speaking philosophers. Gutting (1989) makes an invaluable contribution in explaining this context with helpful expositions of Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem, two of Foucault’s most important influences, showing how their historicist approaches to science can help to make sense of Foucault’s own approach. Failing to read Foucault in this context can make some of his claims appear groundless; placing his work back in this context shows that these claims are actually based on prior arguments. Thus, he is no more baldly asserting the existence of (Bachelardian) epistemological ruptures, for example, than we might baldly assert that (Kuhnian) paradigms govern “normal science.” This does not absolve Foucault from assessing the merits of the tradition he draws from, but we cannot reasonably ask him to defend every such borrowed claim with the same rigor and attention to detail as its initial proponents.

However, Gutting's thesis tells only a part of the story about Foucault's reception by Anglo-American analytic philosophers, and perhaps the less important part. For in the analytic tradition, historicist accounts of scientific theory-choice, similar to the accounts Foucault gives of the social sciences, are hardly unfamiliar. Lakatos, Kuhn, and Quine might be grouped together as offering philosophies of science more amenable to Foucault than to Popper or Hempel. For Lakatos, Kuhn, and Quine, scientific progression is contingent in the sense that it might have occurred otherwise, its criteria of theory-choice are never wholly determinate by autonomously existing empirical data, and the ultimate criteria of progress are in some significant measure *internal* to a research program, paradigm, or web of belief. Nancy Cartwright, Bas Van Fraassen, McDowell, and others have carried forward these post-positivist approaches in a manner that could also be related broadly to Foucault (Cartwright 1983, 1999; McDowell 1996; Van Fraassen 2002).

Neither the issue of Foucault's unspoken forebears nor his historicist approach to justification, however, constitutes the main obstacle in understanding Foucault as making a contribution to normative epistemology. Rather, his claims about the dyadic relation between power and knowledge, and his consequent refusal of the distinction between science and ideology, pose far greater problems. Foucault is often read as threatening the principal norm that guides analytic philosophy itself as well as science: the norm of truth. This concern deserves discussion.

It is important to note that Foucault himself did not understand his project as amounting to a reduction of knowledge to power, as the epigraph above indicates. But of course, a philosopher may be wrong about the implications of his ideas, not to mention the cogency of his arguments. Given that Foucault argues that there is a mutually constitutive relationship between power formations and accepted knowledges, that "truth isn't outside power" (P/K, 131), then what precisely is the "knowledge" in power/knowledge? And, if this is the only kind of knowledge there is, what are the prospects for improving epistemic practices? If the normative innovations that Foucault develops are all on the "power" side of the ledger, are these truly of epistemological concern? Working through these questions in regard to Foucault's account of power/knowledge is a necessary task for establishing the precise meaning as well as the utility of his ideas.

To grasp why Foucault's work does not result in a self-defeating incoherence or a complete repudiation of philosophy, one must also understand him in the context of the larger tradition of continental thought. In particular, his work builds on the twentieth-century critique of the Enlightenment paradigm of scientific knowledge as inherently liberatory, of the sufficiency of individual epistemic agency, and of the true/false distinction as a norm free from politics or historical shifts. This means reading Foucault in relation to the tradition of Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, the Frankfurt School, Habermas, Lyotard, and others, as well as French philosophy of science. This continental tradition of epistemology has changed the questions philosophers ask about knowledge, and not simply given new answers to old questions, which may make it appear that they are playing a different language game. But the questions that animate continental epistemology as well as Foucault's work are themselves motivated, I shall argue, by the most basic of philosophical concerns: what is the truest account of truth?

I

Let me begin with the starting point Gutting provides in his account of Foucault's relation to French philosophies of science. This tradition operates within a post-Hegelian view that human knowledge is constituted in part by contingent concepts and categories rather than the universal, transcendental, and transcultural categories that Kant imagined to exist. Foucault's historical studies are analyses of the historical conditions and unconscious framing assumptions out of which emerge the knowledges that currently exist.

From Gaston Bachelard, Foucault takes the project of studying rationality through studying science and studying science through studying its history. Bachelard was influential for his development of the concepts of epistemological "breaks" and epistemological "obstacles." Breaks occur when science breaks off from the common-sense or conventional ways of conceptualizing data results, and obstacles are all those elements that operate to prevent epistemological breaks. For example, Bachelard argued that some of what we classify as self-evident "necessary truths" may actually be epistemological obstacles. The starting assumptions we take to be obvious may simply indicate our inability to think beyond current scientific concepts. In this way, Bachelard instilled a greater sense of contingency into existing scientific approaches.

Foucault applied this idea when he characterized his approach to discourses of knowledge as an "archaeology," which he defined as a method for uncovering the positive (or substantive) unconscious of knowledge (OT, xi). This idea resonated with Bachelard's characterization of the project of uncovering epistemological obstacles as a kind of psychoanalysis of knowledge. But Bachelard assumed an overarching progressivist tenor to the overcoming of epistemological obstacles, as if science manifests a steady epistemic progress of accruing truth. Here Foucault disagreed. To claim progress across the expanse of epistemic periods, whether these are called paradigms or normal science or discursive regimes, would require the ability to judge the comparative reference or utility of scientific concepts and theories as if from an exterior perspective. Such a perspective is impossible to achieve and dangerous to claim, and thus Foucault aimed to develop an approach that would refer to nothing *outside* of a given discourse or system of knowledge under analysis, no experience, motive, intention, unmediated evidence, or overarching process. "Archaeology tries to define not the thoughts, representations, images, themes, preoccupations that are concealed or revealed in discourses; but those discourses themselves, those discourses as practices obeying certain rules" (AK, 138). The claim of progress would have to be surrendered, and yet one could still chart breaks in which the rules underwent alteration. Through identifying breaks one could also identify the obstacles that had obstructed them.

The Order of Things is Foucault's attempt to chart two major epistemological breaks, one occurring between the Renaissance and the Classical periods and one occurring between the Classical and modern periods. Both concern changes in the way knowledge was pursued and established. In the Renaissance period, knowledge of a thing was constituted by knowledge of what is similar to that thing, but this method was slowly overtaken by the method of establishing comparative tables of classification in the Classical period. If an object could be placed within a grid or table of classification, then

it was said to be known, even if little else were known about its etiology, function, or effects. The classificatory tables of the Classical episteme were later challenged when modern thinkers came to acknowledge that it is “man,” not nature or God, who constitutes the tables. An example of this idea was Kant’s claim that human knowledge *adds* constitutive categories to experience. The appearance of “man” in this way spelled the demise of the Classical episteme and the rise of the modern episteme. Foucault further suggested that we are now in the midst of a new epistemological break. The paradigm of “man” assumed by the modern period is beginning to lose its intelligibility: how can knowledge be traced ultimately back to human intention if human intention is itself the product or outcome of social structures, not to mention the fact that it is highly variant across cultures? “Man” explains nothing, and, when pressed, its conceptual unity begins to dissolve, and thus Foucault argued that “man” was becoming an epistemological obstacle.

Georges Canguilhem was Foucault’s teacher and Bachelard’s student, but he differed from Bachelard in holding that epistemological obstacles can play both a positive as well as a negative role in the constitution of knowledge. Here Bachelard was making an argument similar to Kuhn, though he made it earlier than Kuhn. For Kuhn, the most productive periods of science must necessarily leave a large body of assumptions unchallenged so that the elaboration of a paradigm and its implications can ensue without having to engage constantly in defense. Also like Kuhn, Canguilhem developed an account of the scientific concept that portrays it not as derived from but as constitutive of the data. The concept of normality, for example, trains our perception, guides the formation of our measuring instruments, and also guides our experimental formulations. Yet for all their substantive impact, concepts are contingent on Canguilhem’s account: the concept of normality is contingent on the kind of functioning that is optimal in a given society. The way we define normality then operates to define all gradations of deviance that can in turn be empirically studied and measured. Building on this, Foucault used the term *problematization* to refer to the ways in which projects of inquiry and empirical questions are rooted within very specific social contexts. Both the questions we ask about deviance, for example, as well as the answers we give will be internal to a *problematization*.

To say, then, that knowledge is only established internally within a given problematization or discursive formation is not to say that such knowledge has no empirical grounds, but that these grounds can neither be identified nor judged outside of the contingent conventions of social and scientific practice. This has led predictably to charges of anti-realism, but whether this charge makes sense of Foucault’s (or, for that matter, Canguilhem’s) approach is debatable. For one thing, Foucault allows that there are conceptual elements preserved in successive frameworks, thus conserving the intuition behind scientific realism that some of what we know will remain stable. For another, he rejects idealism outright. Consider the following passage:

Problematization doesn’t mean the representation of a pre-existent object, *nor the creation through discourse of an object that doesn’t exist*. It’s the set of discursive or nondiscursive practices that makes something enter into the play of the true and the false, and constitutes it as an object for thought (whether under the form of moral reflection, scientific knowledge, political analysis, etc.). (PPC, 257; emphasis added)

We'll return to the issue of realism in a moment, but perhaps the most important idea that Canguilhem imparted to Foucault, an idea that goes well beyond the mainstream of Anglo-American philosophy of science and that also raises the specter of anti-realism, was to reject the traditional distinction between science and non-science in regard to both scientific methodologies as well as ontological commitments. This distinction, on Canguilhem's view (1978), only furthers the misperception that science operates without contingent, constituting concepts, or concepts that constitute the data *as data*. Following Canguilhem, Foucault described the episteme as affecting both formal and informal sciences as well as knowledge outside the sciences, and he defined archaeology as a method to "find a common structure that underlies both the scientific knowledge and the institutional practices of an age" (Gutting 1989: 79).

On this approach, science is not a sequestered domain defined as free of historically contingent and politically interested assumptions all of whose claims are testable by empirical methods. In a sense, this is simply to reject positivism, but not necessarily to depart from scientific realism. As Gutting points out, Bachelard actually provided a new and "valuable approach to the defense of scientific realism" which does not require the postulation of mind-independent theoretical entities: "for Bachelard, theoretical conceptions are not abstractions from the full reality of objects but the way of reaching this reality beyond the vagueness and incompleteness of our sense experience" (Gutting 1989: 30). In other words, concepts go beyond experience not because ideas constitute the world but because experience, as Hume knew, is inadequate to sustain fully formed objects as objects of knowledge. Concepts are the bridges we need between our vague and incomplete human experience and knowledge. As such, concepts should not be taken as the product of empirical deduction but as contingent guideposts whose functional capacity refers back to our projects or problematizations.

Foucault's account of knowledge thus comes in a tradition of French post-positivism that prefigured some of the more radical elements of contemporary social epistemology. Foucault characterized his project as exploring "the history of the relations between thought and truth," that is, between particular discursive formations and what he began to call regimes of truth (EW3, 118–120, 131–133). The idea of a "regime" signifies the political stasis of given systems of knowledge which, full of epistemological obstacles, provide limiting rules for the construction of new knowledge claims. More neutrally, the concept of a discursive formation can be thought of as a system of possibility for a web of belief (AK, 67, 182).

Ian Hacking has suggested that Foucault's concept of discursive formation bears on the class of propositions considered as having a truth-value (Hacking 2002). It is not that, as Hacking mimes Hamlet, "*nothing's* either true or false but thinking makes it so," which would imply an "inane subjectivism" (2002: 160–161). Rather, while discursive formations cannot fully determine truth, they do determine meaningfulness and intelligibility and the very capacity to be epistemically assessed. Foucault's case studies in the human sciences are meant to show that the domain of the meaningful is ultimately *historically contingent*. What becomes knowledge is determined by a historically specific confluence of a host of interrelated elements, *some* of which are socially constructed, such as concepts like "normality."

The distinction Hacking draws between the realm of the true and the realm of truth-value is helpful in thwarting some common misreadings of Foucault as a simple-minded

idealist. But the distinction can generate some misreadings of its own if it is taken to imply that Foucault's work should have no effect on the way in which we understand the ontology of truth itself. I will explore this idea in regard to some of Foucault's case studies below.

II

The traditions of epistemology in the modern West might be loosely divided into two categories. What one might call a "proceduralist" category, paradigmatically represented early on by Francis Bacon and in the twentieth century by Carl Hempel and Moritz Schlick, and more recently by reliabilists, sought procedures of justification that would transcend all historical and cultural contingencies. Such procedures might include testing a theory's empirical adequacy in light of all the relevant evidence, maintaining consistency, and yielding testable predictions. Some proceduralists believe that theory-choice is amenable to logical explications (these are "logical empiricists"). But the main idea uniting this trend is the focus on procedures that can transcend the contingencies of historical and cultural variation and a resultant minimalist take on rationality. In contrast, what one might call the "historicist" trend holds that even if procedures are universal, their actual enactment is not. In other words, the judgment of adequacy, consistency, relevance, and the appropriate forms of testability is dependent on the qualitative determinations specific to historical context. For historicists, such as Quine, Lakatos, Wittgenstein, Kuhn, Putnam, Charles Taylor, Helen Longino, Elizabeth Potter, and others, epistemic justification is necessarily dependent on a historically contingent set of assumptions and practices. These include what Longino calls "contextual values" (Longino 1990) and what Wittgenstein called a "form of life" (Wittgenstein 1953). Epistemic judgments involve qualitative and comparative determinations of relevance, scope, and adequacy, and require decisions when the various criteria conflict in their support of contrasting theories. The ways in which such judgments and decisions are made comprise the variable, historically situated form of rationality in a given place and time.

Today the historicist camp is probably larger than the proceduralist camp. The currently influential Bayesian accounts of confirmation would, perhaps surprisingly, fit best in the historicist camp, since they hold that historically contingent "prior probabilities" are operative in rational judgment. In general, these philosophers are not interested in analyzing the justification of such claims as "It is raining" but of explanatory concepts such as "cancer," "empathy," theories about sex difference, and other complex claims.

For some continentalists, it may be a pleasant surprise to discover that positivism is largely rejected in analytic epistemology. However, the full implications of positivism's demise have not yet been worked thoroughly through, and many analytic philosophers prefer to focus on the logic of judgment *after* the contingent assumptions have been put into play; Quine's work provides a clear example of this (Nelson 1990). In contrast, continental philosophers who write about knowledge, such as Lyotard and Foucault, prefer to focus on the contingent side of the process, even while acknowledging that a rational reconstruction of certain aspects of judgment is possible. This focus on the

contingent, historically variant aspects of epistemic judgment can yield a misleading picture of total relativism and even subjectivism, not at all applicable in reality to Foucault.

III

Foucault's account of the role of historically contingent elements in the development of the human sciences places him in the historicist category. However, what makes Foucault stand out even in this historicist camp is his sustained consideration of the role that power structures and power relations play in both our forms of knowledge and our processes of knowing. The issue of power has been striking in its absence from Anglo-American epistemology, apart from feminist epistemologists, even though the argument for bringing in considerations of power is based on an exceedingly plausible, even obvious, claim: that social relations are imbued with power dynamics and that these affect which ideas and concepts become dominant and whose perspective formulates and frames dominant projects of inquiry. Configurations of power relations affect the set of assumptions and practices which make up any given "form of life" – whether for modern Westerners or for the pre-Colombian Maya. Epistemic judgment operates within a sphere of power, and yet most epistemologists seem unconcerned to explore how precisely this affects knowledge, leaving this to the sociologists. Yet sociological analyses of knowledge offer only description and critique, not normative reconstruction.

In Foucault's work, neither truth nor knowledge is assumed to operate free from power relations, and he includes here not just the applications of knowledge but also its content. The stream of psychiatric knowledge, for example, as collected in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual*, famously operates both as a developing set of theories about human beings and as an arena for institutionalizing various power relations involving therapeutic judgments through the courts, employment, educational institutions, and health-care delivery. Theories of psychiatry also contribute to the determinations of credible and authoritative experts among potential speakers, whether responsibility can be credibly attributed to given individuals, and a host of other issues. It is obvious to most people that the field of psychiatry is totally imbued with power, but what is less obvious are the details of how power affects the *knowledge* that psychiatry claims and not just its applications to specific individuals and institutions. It seems obvious that this should be a consideration for normative theories of justification, and just as obvious that norms of neutrality will be insufficient.

Foucault wanted not only to have power included in analyses of knowledge, but also to get us to rethink how we understand power, to think of it not as a quantity that can accrue to institutions as if stored in a vault, but as a more fluid operation that structures possibilities for action in a given domain. Foucault argued that power only exists in so far as it is exercised; it is "a mode of action upon the actions of others" (EW3, 341). Thus his focus was on the "how" rather than the "what" of power: how does power flow, how does it structure action, how does it affect the constitution of the problematics of inquiry? Importantly, like Canguilhem's approach to epistemological obstacles, Foucault also wanted to get us to stop thinking of power mainly as a form of constraint and to

see also the productive capacity of power. Power “incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; it releases or contrives, makes more probable or less” (EW3, 341). The social sciences, for example, operate within fields of possibilities for action, such as the possibilities in regard to children’s education, the organization of and imagined purposes of prisons, and the debates and deliberations that occur in courtrooms (see e.g. Wong 2004). Power plays a productive role in the manner in which norms of childhood development, theories of the “criminal personality” or the “culture of poverty,” and categories of sexual identity become arenas of knowledge. For Foucault, these examples are not simply applications of the knowledge that is developed elsewhere, where that elsewhere is imagined to be the “politically free” space of the academy or the laboratory. Rather, these examples serve as general illustrations of power/knowledge.

Peter Dews formulates Foucault’s view as holding that power is an institutional precondition for the elaboration of a form of knowledge (Dews 1987: 173–175), but Foucault also held that there is “no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge” (DP, 27). In other words, not only does power provide the site for the elaboration and flows of knowledge, knowledge itself has a constituting effect on power relations, for example, in establishing the criteria by which we can identify reliable epistemic authorities and experts. He further argued that power and knowledge can also be connected with, and strengthened by, the flows of pleasure, understood in a broad sense. Pleasure helps to spread and augment the flows of power, while power anchors and institutionalizes pleasure, and all of these relations operate through knowledge (HS1, 45 and 48). The effect of pleasure on the stream of power/knowledge is not only to enhance and strengthen its flow but also to affect its direction.

What are the implications of such claims for our understanding of knowledge itself? Habermas interprets Foucault’s account of power/knowledge as replacing validity conditions with power effects and thus essentially dissolving the idea of knowledge, a criticism that echoes the concerns coming from analytic philosophers. This is how he describes Foucault’s account:

Not only are truth claims confined to the discourses within which they arise; they exhaust their entire significance in the functional contribution they make to the self-maintenance of a given totality of discourse. That is to say, the meaning of validity consists in the power effects they have. (Habermas 1987: 279)

If validity is determined by power, then we have no reason to take the result of such a process as “knowledge.” Thus, Habermas believes that Foucault’s views entail skepticism or epistemic nihilism, obviating the very possibility of a normative epistemology.

One reason to think Habermas may be right is that Foucault repudiates the distinction between ideology and science (see P/K, 102, 118; AK, 184–186). The concept of ideology presumes the existence of a contrasting other, a discourse governed by truth free of power, while Foucault argues that all knowledges have formative relationships to power. Yet Foucault vigorously protested against such charges of epistemic nihilism. When he said that “If I had said, or meant, that knowledge was power . . . I would have had nothing more to say,” it suggests that he would agree with those who hold that the collapse of knowledge to power yields only epistemic nihilism, and that such nihilism

is actually incoherent, disabling one from being able to say anything else (PPC, 264). There must, then, be another way to understand Foucault's account of knowledge and its relation to power. In the same interview, he goes on to explain:

[If I had] made [power and knowledge] identical, I don't see why I would have taken the trouble to show the different relations between them. . . . What I set out to show was how certain forms of power that were of the same type could give rise to bodies of knowledge that were extremely different both in their object and in their structure. . . . We have, then, power structures, fairly closely related institutional forms – psychiatric confinement, medical hospitalization – that are bound up with different forms of knowledge, between which it is possible to draw up a system of relations based not on cause and effect, still less on identity, but on conditions. (PPC, 264–265)

Here Foucault makes a conceptual distinction between power and knowledge, despite his arguments about their intrinsic relation. Foucault also denies here that the relations that operate between power and knowledge are “cause and effect,” as Habermas charged and as the concept of ideology implies. For Foucault, power is not operating causally “behind” knowledge, but since power is ubiquitous across the social field of human action and interaction, the particular developments in knowledge cannot be understood as if occurring outside of power. Knowledge is produced in a field of structured possible actions, and has an effect on the reproduction of the field.

But we need more than a conceptual distinction between power and knowledge and a vaguely articulated idea about the relationship between the two if we are to answer Habermas's charge that Foucault conflates knowledge with power effects.

IV

It is helpful here to contrast Foucault's view with Habermas's elaboration of an epistemology for critical theory. Habermas and Foucault actually *share* the project of critiquing the limitations of Enlightenment or modernist epistemologies precisely on the point of their decontextualized account of human rationality. Both *share* the view that the question of power cannot be set aside in an account of human knowledge. For Habermas, this follows from the fact that political relations affect the public, communicative process by which truth is established, and because truth claims made about human beings can have a transformative effect.

Habermas has argued that we should acknowledge the important connection between knowledge and human interests, and he develops this claim in opposition to both positivism and Husserlian phenomenology that promised to free the theorist from the obfuscating irritations of everyday life and allow a pure perception of the cosmos. Such projects of transcendence are unrealistic, but if we return to a classical, pre-Enlightenment approach to epistemology, Habermas argued, we will discover that “the release of knowledge from interest was not supposed to purify theory from the obfuscations of subjectivity but inversely to provide the subject with an ecstatic purification [only] from the passions” (1971: 306). The classical view did not demand that knowledge be pure, nor did it judge knowledge on the basis of *whether* it is interested, but it

did judge knowledge on the basis of *which* interests it pursued. It is not neutrality that will ensure the integrity of knowledge but an interested engagement with universal human interest.

Habermas takes up this classical view to create a tripartite division of contemporary inquiry, in which each division is associated with a distinct human interest. The empirical sciences are based on a technical interest in the prediction and control of our environment, while the historical-hermeneutic sciences incorporate a practical interest in social intercourse and the communication of meaning, and the critical sciences incorporate our interest in emancipation. Echoing Foucault, Habermas points out, using the paradigmatic case of psychoanalysis, that the knowledge of *social* subjects, such as human beings, can transform or re-constitute such subjects. This is true even in regard to law-like behavior. "Thus the level of unreflected consciousness, which is one of the initial conditions of such laws, *can be transformed* . . . [T]o this end a critically mediated knowledge of laws cannot through reflection alone render a law itself *inoperative*, but it can render it *inapplicable*" (1971: 310 my emphasis).¹ Inquiry can thus be not only reflective but also transformative of objective reality. It must, then, consider and evaluate these transformative effects as a regular part of the justificatory process. The only legitimate grounds for such evaluation, in Habermas's view, will be a dialogic process that includes all affected parties.

In light of this, and in light of the dialogic basis upon which human knowers ultimately justify all of their claims, Habermas argues for a reflexive relationship between epistemology and politics. An adequate understanding of justification will require a pursuit of emancipatory interests in order to create the conditions for the possibility of knowledge in an unencumbered communicative process. "The ontological illusion of pure theory behind which knowledge-constitutive interests become invisible promotes the fiction that Socratic dialogue is possible everywhere and at any time " (1971: 314). Habermas concludes that we need an epistemology that recognizes that its own foundation – its own legitimacy – lies in the pursuit of the emancipatory interests that will open up communicative practice.

Thus, Habermas and Foucault both argue for a close connection between political relations and knowledge. The difference between them is that while Habermas asserts the ubiquity of objective human interests, Foucault asserts the ubiquity of detached, anonymous interests operating alongside or within strategies of power wherever knowledge appears. "Interest" may be the wrong word to use in regard to Foucault's account, since interests are usually understood as attached to a person or persons in a way Foucault rejects. Yet there is an intelligibility to the patterns of power relations that causes Foucault to call them "strategies and tactics" (EW3, 116).

For Habermas, reliable knowledge is dependent on democratic dialogical possibilities; knowledge claims about human subjects have dynamic, constitutive effects that science must acknowledge and consider; and knowledges are motivated by interests that themselves admit of rational judgment and debate. For Foucault, knowledge operates to produce relations of power between epistemic actors designated by their specific roles as expert or informant; such relations of power also make possible the elaboration, development, and testing of knowledges; and these knowledges in turn can constitute our experiences and identities in a material sense, causing experiences and identities to come into being rather than simply causing us to change the way our identities and

experiences are named or categorized. Foucault does not imagine a universal set of coherent interests directing these developments, nor does he seem to believe that democratizing the dialogic process is realistic or even sufficient to bring about the political reflexivity and expanded conceptual imagination he is aiming for. His norms are directed more toward a decentering and localization of knowledge forms that will dislodge power/knowledge convergences, making it possible for us to think differently, rather than a democratic organization of the whole. But this does not make him an epistemic nihilist or total skeptic. One of his central arguments in favor of decentering concerned truth-conduciveness, since large, hegemony-seeking theories inevitably promote the distortion or elimination of anomalous or non-conforming particularities. The human sciences inevitably treat complex phenomena with multiple variables; thick descriptions cannot often survive the attempt to conform to generalizations. Thus, hegemony-seeking theories routinely sacrifice epistemic adequacy.

Habermas's normative reconstruction of knowing practices assumes a rationality, objectivity, and potential universality of human interests that Foucault gives no evidence of supporting. And Habermas's happy resolution of the role of politics in knowledge – through pursuing our universal human interests with democratic deliberation – eludes Foucault. Thus he was tagged the philosopher of pessimism. But for Foucault, as for Canguilhem, even though power's role cannot be defused through a rational, democratic pursuit of interest, power does not simply play a negative epistemic (or political) role. To ask for power's removal from the sphere of knowledge is like asking for the removal of human bodies.

Yet the question of Foucault's pessimism pertains more legitimately to his notion of truth, which returns us to the concern behind Habermas's charge that Foucault collapses knowledge to power. After all, it is easier to understand a relationship between power and (received) knowledge, or justified belief, than between power and truth. How can power influence the very determination of truth without dissolving the meaning of the term?

V

Foucault followed in the Nietzschean and Frankfurt School traditions of questioning Enlightenment assumptions that the will to truth is a project of selfless inquiry and that the truth shall make us free. "[T]ruth isn't the reward of free spirits, the child of protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world; it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint" (EW3, 131). The operations of power affect what it is possible to see, to imagine, to conceptualize, and therefore to discover. Thus, Foucault famously argued that "It's not a matter of a battle 'on behalf' of the truth, but of a battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays" (EW3, 132). Some truths come to be taken as absolutes, unassailable and unchangeable, and in this way are used to obstruct future variable possibilities. Only when we abstract truth out of the power/knowledge context within which it arises can we imagine truth itself to be inherently liberatory.

The point here is not that the difference between what is true and what is false is unimportant. But Foucault's account does seem to be that truth can be socially

constructed, though what this precisely means requires some careful elucidation. "Discourses," he said, are "practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak" (AK, 49). Objects such as sexual identities and criminal personalities come into existence not just in the sense that pre-existing behavior is reinterpreted, but in calling forth the behavior and sense of self that would make such claims true. An authoritative figure pronouncing a person a depraved criminal can have a powerful effect. This is not a process of making falsehoods appear to be truthful, but of fashioning reality so as to make some claims refer. The claim "I am a bisexual" can be both true and the product of a social construction in which human experience, behavior, and perception develop in certain ways within given discursive conditions, and might well have developed in different ways under other circumstances. The "identity" of "bisexuality" is not necessarily merely a new categorization for a longstanding type of sexual behavior but the reflection of a culturally and historically specific promulgation and organization of behavior and the discursive characterization of its concomitant experience. In these kinds of cases, conferring an absolute status on truth claims, or characterizing truth as exempt from politics, works to obscure the role that truth claims play in the reproduction or transformation of power relations; roles such as, for example, effecting a naturalization of contemporary sexual practices, and thus contributing to the reified conception of "human nature." If anything, Foucault thought the belief that truth is unrelated to power endangers us more than it liberates us.

Power is the site or locus of the development of knowledge for Foucault, yet the inadequacy of Habermas's charge should be clear. It is not power that makes us take falsehoods for truths, or power that is a sufficient cause of truth, but "power-knowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse it and of which it is made up, that determines the forms and possible domains of knowledge" (DP, 28). This is a circular relation of partial mutual constitution, a relationship in which each part is necessary but never sufficient. Though the *formulation* of truth is partially dependent on power, this argument in no way entails that truth is mere illusion, or arbitrary, or that it does not refer to a shared, extra-discursive reality.

It is not just that there are today kinds of persons (e.g. bisexuals) about whom it is possible to gather knowledge, and that their very existence is interwoven with contemporary cultural, political, and economic formations, but that the kind of knowledge we seek about them also operates within institutions and discursive formations. Contemporary scientists seek to know whether bisexuality is "natural," whether it can be detected in one's DNA or brain, or whether it is related to some psychological pathology or malformation. Such questions would be unintelligible to fifth-century Athenian citizens or among many indigenous American groups in the more recent past, groups among whom such practices that we would today call bisexuality occurred. One might protest here that the cultural variance of intelligible questions does not disprove the answers, but for Foucault, it is not simply the questions and concepts that change but our practices and subsequent experiences.

For Foucault, the webs of belief that operate as the coherence test of new knowledge claims have been themselves produced within a domain of power/knowledge. There may be understandable anxiety that such an account might unleash a tide of non-scientific, anti-empiricist approaches, with disastrous effects. But the kind of view that Foucault, as well as other historicist philosophers, have about knowledge does not in

any way suggest that, for example, double-blind experiments are unnecessary, that we need not take sufficient samples from diverse representations of the relevant populations, or that experimental results should be accepted before they are replicated.

In other words, social constructionist approaches do not dislodge the usual sorts of methods used either in the natural or the social sciences. But they do claim that the truth of the matter about how truth is achieved is not exhausted by a recitation of the empirical method. Truth is in fact a good deal more complex than this, and its complexity resists easy formulations that ignore the fact, for example, that correspondences can be, in a sense, manufactured. One might imagine two sorts of responses to this kind of claim. The first response is to insist that these issues really have nothing to do with epistemology proper. The political machinations by which some bits of reality get constructed do not provide cause for altering our basic account of truth or even of justification. In other words, they have no normative epistemic implications. A second response would be to partition off the realm of the social sciences as a kind of special case given their feedback effects and their informal structures. On this view, the social sciences are incapable of having their epistemologies rationally reconstructed. In other words, in response to the critiques of the social sciences one finds in Horkheimer, Winch, Taylor, and many others besides Foucault, one might be disposed to respond “We’re out of here.”

In the final two sections these responses will be addressed in reverse order. The second response – the refusal to engage with social science – can be construed as a question about the scope of Foucault’s claims about power/knowledge. From here we can address the first response, that questions the normative epistemic implications of his account.

VI

One way to justify a refusal to engage with Foucault’s concerns about power/knowledge in the human sciences would be to make an argument, such as the following, about the proper (and legitimately narrow) scope of epistemology:

- 1 Power, as Foucault discusses it, intrudes only in the social sciences, and indeed, only in some fairly specific arenas of the social sciences such as where he develops his case studies.
- 2 Given how indeterminate theory-choice is in these domains, we should simply say that these are not domains of knowledge, or justified true belief. These “sciences” are too immature, have undeveloped methodologies and no agreed-upon paradigms for establishing exemplary processes of knowledge acquisition.
- 3 The fact that the social sciences are distinct in having a feedback loop with their objects of study (human beings) has no bearing on epistemology proper. Processes of justification remain the same and truth can still be characterized as a correspondence relation.
- 4 Epistemology should address only those epistemic issues that have universal relevance because in this way it can focus on the questions that arise in regard to knowledge proper, not knowledge only under certain conditions or of a certain form.

These provide independent reasons to justify considering Foucault’s work, even if it is sound scholarship, to be outside the proper scope of epistemology.

Yet one cannot dismiss the fact that what is being referred to here are publicly accepted claims and theories that have been given the label knowledge, and that their status as knowledge is precisely what justifies their intrusion into medical and psychiatric treatment as well as the courts, schools, prisons, and so on. If such claims and theories are to be sequestered from the realm of "real" knowledge, then the realm of "real" knowledge will have quite narrow relevance, and, moreover, will not be able to provide guidance in improving knowledge in these wider domains, domains that are arguably where epistemologists are most needed.

On the one hand, some might rightly complain that the social construction of reality does not require a new theory of truth, because existing theories of truth can operate with socially constructed objects. But this claim assumes precisely what Foucault's approach does not, that we can maintain an intelligible separation between the definition, criterion, and ontology of truth, or between the epistemology and the metaphysics of truth. In other words, it assumes we can separate the definition of truth (or what it constitutes, such as a correspondence relation with the world), from the criterion of truth (or how we discover it, such as coherence with existing knowledge), from a theory of the ontology of truth which would bring in the question about the ontological status of the objects to which true claims refer.

Foucault suggests that this is not such an easy separation to maintain. Let's concede his point that in at least some restricted arenas of knowledge, the ontology of truth can be characterized as social construction: truth is what we make it, not just in the sense of how we cut reality up but in the sense of how we construct aspects of reality itself, and it is made in relation to the very operations of inquiry into truth. If so, this fact bears on the definition of truth, because defining truth as "correspondence" could be misleading, diminishing the normative role that truth can play in guiding inquiry. If one insists that correspondence, as the definition of truth, simply doesn't apply in the realm of social construction, this would indicate that the ontological question is actually figuring into this conception of the definition of truth, because here truth is assumed to be correspondence to a human-independent world.

The criterion of truth is likewise affected by our ontology of truth. If we take the real to be only what is independent of human practice, then we will not accept as criteria of truth that which leads to truths of the sort Foucault discusses or any of the truth claims that are more typical in the social sciences. This claim is implicit in the argument that social science is not a domain of truth – it is not a domain of truth only if truth is understood as ontologically independent of human practice or social construction. Thus, the attempt to shear truth down to its minimal, universal elements without any metaphysical commitments turns out to be based on a metaphysical commitment.

As Neurath knew, there are no "clean hands" in epistemology (see <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neurath/>). Foucault's work should actually encourage philosophers to return to the logical positivists' project of being the helpmeet of the sciences, this time including the social ones. This might galvanize a new movement in epistemology that would ask how it can better serve the more difficult arenas of knowledge. How might a theory of truth address its effects on power relations? How might we refashion accounts of justification that would provide guidance for more complex claims with feedback effects?

Foucault himself restricts his focus to the social sciences, but it may well be that this makes little sense given the under-determination of theory-choice in the natural sciences. There may be no feedback loop between scientific theories and planets, but the determination of whether something is a planet, a dwarf planet, or an asteroid is made within complex processes of concept formation embedded in technical processes humanly devised and funded by states and corporations. In the new area of “science studies,” pioneered by such figures as Steven Shapin, Ulrich Beck, Bruno Latour, and the team of Michael Gibbons, Helga Nowotny, and Peter Scott, the demarcation between science and technology has largely broken down in favor of the view that the production of scientific knowledge is dependent on the evolving transformations of the social order. The increasingly important biological sciences are an interesting case, since they can produce a similar sort of feedback loop between conceptualization and human practice. “Cancer” can be defined in such a way that its cure will require pharmacology or extreme regulation of private enterprise (Levins and Lewontin 2007). Debates over the effects of the genetic modification of our food supply require not only a deductive calculation, but also a judgment based on both prior probabilities and prior values, such as the value of a sustainable seed supply (Shiva 1999). The etiology of mental difficulties such as depression, attention deficit disorder, or panic disorders may well include social factors such as poverty, sexism, and racism. If the nature of our political economy is ruled inadmissible in debates over such matters as cancer, the genetic modification of food, and mental illness, is this a process we can describe as rational?

Foucault’s work offers a critical reassessment of the assumptions that limit the approach to these topics, suggesting that we consider the relation of truth to power/knowledge and the process by which some knowledges become subjugated or classified as “naive.” The point is not to reject all dominant or received knowledges, but to raise the question of power as a matter of course in regard to existing knowledge.

Foucault’s account does not deny the necessity of the ordinary processes of empirical confirmation used in the justification of theory-choice, but he does raise new kinds of questions about the epistemic adequacy of these kinds of determinations as the means to establish truth. He also raises new questions about what kinds of truth these established methods produce. The new questions Foucault raises are of obvious epistemic concern; they are not “merely” political.

The question of the intended scope of Foucault’s analysis was very much left open at the end of his life. He made general claims about the nature of truth and knowledge, but the case studies he used to elaborate, demonstrate, and provide support for these claims and for his account of power/knowledge involve specific domains of knowledge in the social sciences, particularly psychiatry and medicine. Interestingly, Foucault’s case studies have three important elements in common. First, they focus on theoretical claims that are clearly in the realm of educated conjecture about dynamic and complex human phenomena, where what counts as evidence is obviously open to interpretation. Second, they each involve knowledges that have potentially transformative effects on the human subjects being described. And third, they involve major social institutions that span numerous arenas of society with enormous impact on people’s lives. Thus, the idea of the interplay between power and knowledge arises naturally from these case studies. But that is not to say that the knowledge claims can simply be dismissed as illusory ideologies lacking an evidentiary basis. In other words, their status in regard

to truth is not dissimilar from much else that passes for truth in our society based on surveys, government-collected statistics, interpretive ethnographies, and the like.

The question of scope and general applicability may actually be operating here as something like an "epistemological obstacle," producing an unnecessary stumbling block to an effective dialogue between analytic and continental traditions in epistemology. The dominant view in the Anglo-American tradition remains that the diversity of knowledge forms can be distilled into a set of essential features, and thus epistemology can justifiably pursue a single, unified account. The unexamined possibility here is that there are multiple forms of knowledge needing multiple analyses, in which case Foucault's analysis might have a restricted domain and yet still contribute to an overall theory of knowledge. I would argue that the commitment to a universal treatment of knowledge is not a necessary requirement for an epistemology; however, what is required is some attention to normative questions.

VII

Foucault does make normative assessments. As I argued in *Real Knowing* (1996), Foucault offered an epistemic defense of his celebrated subjugated knowledges alongside a political defense. Foucault argues that "global theories," or hegemony-seeking theories, are useful only at the price of curtailing, dividing, overthrowing, and caricaturing non-global discourses. This has proven to be, as he says, a "hindrance to research" (PK, 81). The problem with global theories lies not only with their political effects, but with their dismissive approach toward concrete, particular events that cannot be reduced or adequately included in their terms. Hegemonic knowledges always work through distortions and omissions at the local level in order to enable the reductionist move of containment. Thus, Foucault characterizes his own genealogical strategy toward knowledge as an:

attempt to emancipate historical knowledges from that subjection, to render them, that is, capable of opposition and of struggle against the coercion of a theoretical, unitary, formal, and scientific discourse. It is based on a reactivation of local knowledges . . . in opposition to the scientific hierarchisation of knowledges (PK, 85)

This is clearly a normative project. Dews argues nonetheless that it is not a normative epistemological project because it would make power-location, or the way in which a given knowledge is located in the grid of power, the single most important normative criterion by which to judge knowledge. Yet Foucault's concept of locality is itself not extra-epistemic, since there are epistemic considerations in the comparative judgments of diverse localities and in the consideration of the local versus the unitary. Foucault does not propose a normative strategy of the political against the epistemic, but of one set of power/knowledges against another. Local knowledges are to be preferred epistemically because they require less distortion and omission, and they are to be preferred politically because they can allow for a diversity of experience and perspective. These two arguments, however, are so interconnected as to be inseparable: the political advantages follow from the epistemic considerations and the epistemic advantages are made

possible by the political advantages. Increasingly, Foucault's approach weans us away from thinking of these as entirely independent features of knowledge.

Joseph Rouse (1994) has argued that when looking for normative epistemic implications in Foucault's work the mistake is to assume that the normative can only come from a position outside of all localities, from a universal standpoint that normatively compares local power/knowledges. Rouse would have us give up on the view from nowhere, but he refuses to conclude from this that normative epistemology is in fact dead. In response to the critics of Foucault, Rouse argues the following:

I suggest instead that Foucault has offered a different sense of what it is to make a truth claim, criticize power, or offer hope. Foucault's critics presuppose a conception of epistemic and political sovereignty: to claim truth or to criticize power is to try to stand outside an epistemic or political conflict in order to *settle* it. . . . Foucault suggests a different image in which conflict and struggle are always present and inescapable. To make truth claims is to try and strengthen some epistemic alignments, and to challenge, undermine, or evade others. . . . Foucault was perfectly prepared to offer reasons for his choices of struggles and sides. He was equally prepared to offer reasons and evidence for the statements he made. What Foucault was not prepared to do was to see these choices, statements, and reasons as more than a situated response to a particular political and epistemic configuration. (1994: 111–112)

Rouse's point suggests that the real obstacle to achieving a dialogue between analytic epistemology and Foucault's work is not the question of the normative per se, but the question of a particular conception of the normative. Foucault's normative thrust is to insist that those of us who are interested in knowledge cannot escape an engagement with the political realms in which we work, right outside the door to the philosophy seminar room.

Note

- 1 The point here would be that knowledge of a law can change human behavior or constitution, thus rendering it no longer applicable at least in a given case or for a certain population. The sort of example Habermas probably has in mind is something like transference, which, once one knows about the process of transference in psychoanalytic settings, no longer carries the same force in the same way for the patient.

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Foucault and the Freudians

WENDY GRACE

"We discovered that it was necessary to try to liberate all that hides behind the apparently simple use of the pronoun "I". The subject: something complex, fragile, about which it is so difficult to speak, and without which we are not able to speak."

Michel Foucault, *Dits et écrits* IV, 205)

"As for Foucault, he follows what I do, and I love his work, but I don't see him being too concerned about Freud's position."

Jacques Lacan, "Sartre contre Lacan," 4

One of the most complex areas of Foucault's work is his relationship to Freudian psychoanalysis. In *The Order of Things* of 1966, he reported that psychoanalysis, in conjunction with ethnology, had created a daring counter-current to the "anthropological sleep" plaguing the human sciences. This alternative came to be known as structuralism. What united the disparate analyses under the collective umbrella of structuralism, including those of Foucault, was the shared attraction to the methodological potentials of the Freudian unconscious. By recuperating the unconscious, and redeploying it as trans-individual and cultural, structuralism was able to dislodge, irrevocably, the naive conception of language and subjectivity associated primarily with existentialism. "Let us say that structuralism explores above all an unconscious," Foucault declared in 1968 (FDE1, 653) – perhaps the only aspect of structuralism he was readily prepared to own.

Yet Foucault refused to grant universal status to any material object, concept, or institutional formation invented by European civilization – no matter how central it might seem. From *History of Madness* to the three volumes of *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault consistently argued for the historical specificities of the two principal human objects of psychoanalysis – madness and sexuality. Foucault now stands starkly removed from Freudian thought, which cannot countenance ethnographic or cultural versions of madness or sexuality. Even psychoanalysis as propagated by Jacques Lacan assumes

that (sexual) desire transcends local and particular *milieux* and holds the key to all forms of identity, reason, and unreason. This is unacceptable to Foucault.

Put simply Foucault embraced the methodological elaboration of the unconscious, especially in the French intellectual context of the 1950s and 1960s associated with the work of Lacan and Claude Lévi-Strauss; but he adamantly rejected the Freudian mind and body that had originally conceived, housed, and nursed that unconscious. It is Foucault's simultaneous acceptance and refusal of psychoanalytic knowledge, wanting to keep the unconscious baby but not the sexual bathwater, which makes the issue difficult to elucidate.

While interest in this problem has been evident for many years, beginning with Jacques Lagrange's unsurpassed study (1987a, 1987b); followed by the accounts of John Forrester (1990), Jacques-Alain Miller (1992), and Arnold Davidson (2001), the task of appreciating Foucault's position faces many obstacles. With few exceptions – notably Davidson – commentators have assumed a Freudian or Lacanian position in the debate, and have even attempted to dismiss Foucault's "struggles" on the basis of biographical episodes (Whitebook 2003). Many feminists sympathetic to Foucault reject his assessment on the grounds that psychoanalysis has been necessary and helpful for understanding women's sexuality (McNay 1992: 46). Similar arguments suggest the "untapped potentials" of Lacanian psychoanalysis for reinventing same-sex relations in an age of AIDS (Dean 2000), while for other queer theorists Foucault has rightly become a hero, if not a saint (Halperin 1995; Sawicki 2003, 2010). There have also been dubious attempts to amalgamate Foucault and Lacan on the basis of shared philosophical concern with the relationship between *Eros* and truth (Allouch 1998, 2007; Rajchman 1991). Finally, after extensive critical treatment throughout his career, Jacques Derrida amongst others retreats back to psychoanalysis in the face of Foucault, contending that there is nothing original about the philosopher's notion of positive power: "what Foucault announces and denounces about the relation between pleasure and power" would be found already in Freud, "to say nothing of those who followed, discussed, transformed and displaced him" (Derrida 1998: 93).

Let us concur for the moment that "much remains to be said" about this issue (Davidson 1998: 22) and propose at least a correction to the caricature of Foucault that has tended to dominate the discussion so far. Not only is his position more complex than critics have realized, but many well-meaning commentators or critics have muddied the waters further by explaining his contradictory attitude either in terms of differences between his early and late work, or by closer affinity to Lacanian analysis over that of Freud. Both these interpretations have their place, but a more accurate framework is what we indicated previously: throughout his career, Foucault welcomed the extra-psychoanalytic potentials of the Freudian unconscious for undermining existentialist and phenomenological accounts of the subject and knowledge, but he utterly repudiated all universal theories of sexuality and madness.

The Art of Returning to Freud

A common misconception to be dismissed at the outset is that Foucault ignored the theoretical side of psychoanalysis, and offered only a political protest directed at its

normalizing procedures and heterosexist discourses. This interpretation often appeals explicitly to differences between his early “apolitical” work and the middle period when Foucault turned to power (Dews 1987: 147–148). Supposedly, for example, it was his “radical agenda of political activism” during the 1970s that led Foucault to view psychoanalysis “as just one more instrument of power at work in our panoptic society” (Leonard 2005: 88). Hence the belief that Foucault did not investigate psychoanalysis as “a body of ideas,” he merely protested its role as “a social institution” (Barrett 1991: 115).

But it would be more accurate to claim the reverse – if indeed such a division between the political and the philosophical is at all appropriate for Foucault’s work. While exposing the conceptual proximities to psychiatry and sexology that Freudians hastily chalk up as epistemological ruptures, Foucault in fact celebrated the *political* divergences of psychoanalysis as one of its strengths. He argued in *History of Madness*, for example, that Freud had restored to medical thought “the possibility of a dialogue with unreason,” systematically banished before him by nineteenth-century positivism (HM, 339). That the partnership ended up being a “monologue of the surveyed” rather than dialogue (HM, 488) does not detract from Freud’s pivotal role in opening a new understanding of the relationship between the normal and the (psycho)-pathological. For this reason, all nineteenth-century psychiatry “converges” on Freud (HM, 510).

Related to this point, Foucault also grants Freud his due as a critic of the nineteenth-century psychiatric asylum, “demystifying” those features that had hitherto unified the institution: violent interrogations, hypnosis, and a shameless abuse of drugs such as opium (C-PP, 234–235). The shift from the asylum to the consulting room was not as innocent as historians of psychoanalysis would have us believe, of course: Freud merely exploited alternative power relations instead, enlisting the prestige enveloping the “medical personage” so that the psychiatric power of the asylum could be transposed into an updated version of the ancient “divine” power exercised by the doctor over patient (HM, 510–511). After all, knowledge production is not possible without power relations. We must also dismiss those fairytale accounts that place Freud as the happy ending to the psychiatric story, for the asylum culture continues today. Speaking for a Brazilian publication in 1974, Foucault made the point that internment was still the overwhelming solution for the vast majority of mental patients worldwide; psychoanalysts were content to “co-exist” with this oppressive system, when they knew very well that only a tiny section of society, the most “intellectual and cultivated” at that, had access to psychoanalysis (FDE2, 662).

Nevertheless, it was precisely in the 1970s at the height of what commentators have called his “radical agenda” (Leonard 2005: 88) of opposition to psychoanalysis that Foucault came to pinpoint Freud’s role in the history of science more clearly and positively. It is not the usual story, however. For Foucault, it was not a case of Freud finally discovering the sexual aetiology of neurosis; there was little credit to be had uncovering the very thing – “sexuality” – that our institutions, discourses, customs, and knowledge were “busy producing in the light of day and broadcasting to noisy accompaniment” (HS1, 156). In fact, the problem of sexuality “was massively and manifestly inscribed in the medicine and psychiatry of the nineteenth century” (PK, 212).

Of far greater significance, for Foucault, was Freud’s role in abolishing the theory of degeneracy (PK, 212; HS1, 118–119). Briefly, this notion – degeneracy – was first

formulated in psychiatry in the mid-1850s; it quickly became a “scientific ideology” in widespread circulation. The crux of the theory asserted that neuroses and perversions were inherited from parents who had succumbed to vices such as prostitution, gambling, or drug addiction (Pick 1989). In Foucault’s terms, degeneracy enabled a type of “internal racism” against the abnormal, those who “more or less randomly transmit to their heirs the unpredictable consequence of the evil.” (C-AN, 316). Let it not be imagined, Foucault warns, that degeneracy was only a medical theory that was “scientifically lacking and improperly moralistic.” On the contrary: “Its application was widespread and its implantation went deep” (HS1, 119).

But Freud steadfastly opposed degeneracy. It was the reason he broke with his teacher Jean-Martin Charcot, whose concept *famille névropathique* was the one of the pillars of degeneracy (Gelfand 1989). For Freud, all forms of neurosis were “acquired” by life experience and were *not* inherited. He argued in 1895 that there was “no excuse for regarding as a consequence of degeneracy” features one meets “every day” in hysterics (Freud, *Studies*: 161). Similarly, Freud consistently denied that homosexuality was linked to degeneracy: “The perversions are neither bestial nor degenerate in the emotional sense of the word” (Freud, “Fragment”: 50). Given the widespread existence of “inversion” in earlier historical periods as well as in non-Western societies, Freud celebrated the “anthropological” takeover of the study of homosexuality (cited in Davidson 2001: 80). In Freud’s view, all types of adult sexuality originated from a common pool of childhood polymorphous activity. “The sexual life of each one of us extends to a slight degree – now in this direction, now in that – beyond the narrow lines imposed as the standard of normality” (“Fragment”: 50). This is a far more democratic psychological theory than anything his predecessors or contemporaries could come up with. In other words, Freud’s originality lies in effecting a political shift in the history of science. As Foucault put it:

It is all very well to look back from our vantage point and remark upon the normalizing impulse in Freud; one could go on to denounce the role played for many years by the psychoanalytic institution; but the fact remains that in the great family of technologies of sex . . . psychoanalysis was the one that, up to the decade of the forties, rigorously opposed the political and institutional effects of the perversion-heredity-degenerescence system. (HS1, 119)

Moreover, in that “great family,” it is not the case that Foucault singled out psychoanalysis for special critical attention as a “technology of sex” par excellence, forcing the subject to speak about him- or herself (Allouch 1998: 169; Forrester 1990: 301). On the contrary, Foucault’s more profound criticism is that psychoanalysis does *not* have a monopoly on the “talking cure” after all. Instead, a tripod figure has emerged – “psychiatrist, psychoanalyst, sexologist” – whose combined function in this area amounts to little more than exploiting, shrewdly, a pre-existing cultural compulsion to confess. There are “all kinds of mechanisms everywhere – in advertising, books, novels, films, and widespread pornography” that “invite the individual to pass from this daily expression of sexuality to the institutional and expensive confession of his [or her] sexuality to the psychiatrist, psychoanalyst, or sexologist” (C-AN, 170).

This cultural dimension had never been explained. Proposing his own account would constitute the dominant prong of Foucault’s critical ethnography of Western

sexuality, while also acting as an “archaeology of psychoanalysis” (HS1, 130). To summarize drastically, dating from reforms associated with the Tridentine councils of the sixteenth century, which gave Catholic priests increasing power at local level (C-AN, 175), the imperative to confess soon extended beyond “acts contravening the law” to “thoughts, desires, voluptuous imaginings, delectations, combined movements of the body and soul” (HS1, 19). Indeed, one can “plot a line going straight from the seventeenth-century pastoral” as it existed in both Catholic and Protestant contexts, to autobiographical literature of the nineteenth century epitomized by texts such as the anonymous *My Secret Life* (HS1, 21). We have become a singularly confessing society, where confession “plays a part in justice, medicine, education, family relationships, and love relations, in the most ordinary affairs of everyday life, and in the most solemn rites” (HS1, 59).

Viewed over a shorter span of time (since the end of the nineteenth century), psychoanalysis also reflects another “strange phenomenon of the West”: the development of a “sexual science” and its concomitant medicalization of erotic practices. More fundamentally than making pleasure or babies with our sexes, we make truth. The result is an “over-production” of knowledge about sexuality, a “veritable encyclopaedia” comprising hundreds of scientific concepts – “libido” being a prime example (FDE3, 556; Carrette 1999: 119). Yet for all this, we are no closer to savoring, multiplying, or intensifying erotic pleasure as an overt cultural experience; it remains underground – one only has to think of the extraordinary cultural importance attached to fine food, its preparation and delectation, to see the difference.

Psychoanalysis is thus situated at a point where two historical processes – confessional procedures and the medicalization of sexuality – “intersect.” It spearheads the scientific and medical takeover of Christian pastoral practices directed at sexuality; twentieth-century psychiatry and sexology would imitate, or try to better, psychoanalysis in turn. Interestingly, the link between the confessional and the “talking cure” was recognized long before Foucault by Freud’s collaborator Josef Breuer: “Telling things is a relief; it discharges tension even when the person to whom they are told is not a priest” (Freud, *Studies*: 211). Not that this makes Foucault’s critique any less irritating to psychoanalysts. Freud had strongly resisted the idea of assimilating psychoanalysis to the Catholic confessional (Freud, “Lay Analysis”: 189), as did Jacques-Alain Miller and others in response to Foucault during a debate in 1977 (PK, 215). Indeed, the very fact that the term “confession” was obviously a “little annoying” to these Lacanians (PK, 215) speaks volumes in itself.

Unconscious Potentials Beyond Freud

To describe Foucault’s relationship to psychoanalysis as radical opposition overlooks his willingness to acknowledge its progressive aspects: rejecting the theory of degeneracy is the main highlight of this history. Foucault never denied that his own genealogies stemmed from this heritage: it was not possible to place oneself outside it, and Freud was “an indispensable point of departure” for everyone writing on this subject (PK, 219). Nor was Foucault offering an “anti-psychoanalysis” (FDE3, 555). What he demanded was that we go beyond the sterile limitations imposed by the Freudian tradi-

tion. In fact, Foucault's ethical opposition is founded on a contradiction in psychoanalytic theory. Essentially, one can only "repress" something – a knowledge, an essence, or a quality – that is already present in the subject. Yet Freud's whole purpose is to argue that sexuality intrudes from the outside; that sexuality and the neuroses are "acquired"; otherwise, Freud's position would be no different to that of the degeneracy proponents. Many theorists including Lacan and Foucault support Freud's anti-degeneracy agenda. There must then exist other types of powers besides those that repress; *productive* powers associated with knowledge must also play a part. This will form the crux of Foucault's power critique of desire.

But let us first establish the intellectual context through which Foucault encountered the unconscious, and why he considered it a powerful methodological device, chiefly for surpassing existentialism. The great "stumbling block" of existentialism was its refusal to recognize the Freudian unconscious (FDE1, 654). This made it incapable of considering properly the complexities of language and discourse in its account of "lived experience" (*le vécu*). Although it is common to believe that Foucault's perspective on the subject "changed over the years" (Barrett 1991: 146), his rejection of phenomenological and existentialist forms of subjectivity was firm and consistent. In an interview from 1984, Foucault gave the following summary of his views:

I do indeed believe that there is no sovereign, founding subject, a universal form of subject to be found everywhere. I am very skeptical of this view of the subject and very hostile to it. I believe that the subject is constituted through practices of subjection, or, in a more autonomous way, through practices of liberation, of liberty, as in Antiquity, on the basis, of course, of a number of rules, styles, inventions to be found in the cultural environment. (PPC, 50)

Deploying the notion of the unconscious was the *sine qua non* of possible alternatives to the "sovereign, founding, universal" subject in that phase of Foucault's career when Sartre's existentialism was at its zenith. During this period, as is well known, Sartre's contemporary Jacques Lacan was busy taking the unconscious into philosophical areas not even dreamed of by Freud – let alone interpreted. In a speech delivered to an audience of psychoanalysts in Rome in 1953, Lacan declared that the unconscious was to be restored to its proper place: the field of speech and the symbol. What else can the terrain of psychoanalysis be besides the speech of the analysand – made possible by the particular and positive relationship of "transference" existing between the speaker and the analyst? This perspective required a "return" to Freud's texts, because the technique cannot be properly applied "if the concepts on which it is based are ignored" (Lacan 2006: 221). He implored his audience to "take up the work of Freud again at the *Traumdeutung* to remind yourself that the dream has the structure of a sentence . . . a rebus; that is to say, it has the structure of a form of writing" (2006: 221).

Thus, analytic communications, symptoms, lapses, neuroses, and dreams are all, to use the phrase that became famous, "structured like a language" (1993: 167). These phenomena always reveal "the essential duality of signifier and signified" – providing we understand, by "signifier," the conceptual development given it by Ferdinand de Saussure in the early years of the twentieth century: that no object is being referred to,

not even the trace of one. Signifiers only refer to other signifiers, and language begins at opposition: “day” and “night,” like “male” and “female,” cannot be defined by experience, but only in reference to each other (Lacan 1993: 198).

This approach meant a different psychoanalysis and a different subject of that analysis. The philosophical subject as proposed by Descartes – “I think, therefore I am” – implies an already-constituted mind and self who secondarily negotiates the outside world. Essence precedes existence. Against Descartes and his eighteenth-century philosophical heirs, Sartre argued that existence precedes essence: “I am, therefore I think.” One acts first and defines it afterwards – and only if there is time, for actions speak louder than words anyway. But in both cases, Descartes and Sartre, there is an uninterrupted unity between thought and the person owning those thoughts. Freud’s notion of the unconscious makes such a unity impossible, declares Lacan. The formula should read: “I think where I am not, I am where I do not think” (2006: 430, translation modified). In the history of Western philosophy, there is a fundamental “dissymmetry” between Descartes and Freud due to the introduction of the unconscious, yet this fact has never been properly appreciated by philosophers ignorant of psychoanalysis, nor by Freudians poorly informed philosophically – those people busy remodeling psychoanalysis into a right-thinking movement “whose crowning achievement is the sociological poem of the *autonomous ego*” (2006: 435).

It was this deployment of the unconscious that Foucault gravitated towards (Davidson 1998: 6–7; Eribon 1994: 233–263). In an interview in 1981, he spoke about his “conversion” in the 1950s to the Freudian unconscious and its implications for the philosophical conception of the subject, at that time conceived, in France at least, as “ego” (*le moi*):

If I look back to the fifties, the time when, as a student, I read Lévi-Strauss or the first texts of Lacan, it seemed to me that the novelty consisted of the following: we discovered that philosophy and the human sciences had existed according to a very traditional conception of the human subject, and that it was not enough to say either, from one angle, that the subject was radically free, or from another angle, that he [or she] was determined by social conditions. We discovered that it was necessary to try to liberate all that hides behind the apparent simple use of the pronoun “I”. (FDE4, 205, my translation)

Ego (*moi*) became subject (*sujet*) – and neither Kant, nor Hegel, nor any other philosopher would be capable of recognizing it. As the above passage indicates, it was not solely Lacan who created this possibility, however. Claude Lévi-Strauss, too, had pointed to Sartre’s imprisonment within the traditional Cartesian cogito; and, for Foucault, the twin poles occupied by psychoanalysis and ethnology represented a joint capacity at the heart of structuralism to undermine the concept of “man” – that scientific proxy standing in for philosophy’s ego when objectivity was called for. Towards the conclusion of *The Order of Things*, Foucault almost describes his own methodology when he speculates on the prestige ethnology could possess if it were to turn to the “unconscious processes” that characterize a “given culture” (OT, 379). This was not a “collective unconscious” in the manner of Jung, who proposed shared “hallucinations” on a social scale that would reflect what “analysis can discover at the level of the individual” (OT,

379). Rather, Foucault meant “the totality of formal structures which render mythical discourse significant, give their coherence and necessity to the rules that regulate needs, and provide the norms of life with a foundation other than that to be found in nature, or in pure biological functions” (OT, 380).

Structural analysis had in effect transformed the Freudian unconscious. At the hands of Lévi-Strauss, Roland Barthes, Foucault, and others, it was now a different concept to the one used in traditional psychoanalysis: “through linguistics, logic and ethnology one arrives at the discovery of a sector which stands outside consciousness in the usually accepted meaning of that word” (FL, 99). This “structural” unconscious, as Foucault called it in an interview from 1972, involves relationships that “are operative in language, in formal thought, and even in certain social structures” (FL, 100). As he made clear in the same interview, it could not be equated either to Freud’s individual unconscious or to Jung’s “collective unconscious” – the latter conceived as “a kind of collection or reservoir of archetypes at the disposal of everyone”; the “structural unconscious” was “neither of these” (FL, 100).

Interestingly, Freudian commentators, too, have expressed the view (or fear) that the unconscious deployed by structuralism during those years was not really Freudian. Jean Laplanche, a former student turned critic of Lacan, noted in 1967 that persistent objections to Freud’s system of knowledge were all the more insidious as they now came from philosophical “friends” no longer challenging the fundamental “psychoanalytic vision of man” (Laplanche 1992: 7; see also Laplanche 1972). Foucault was one of these friendly enemies. More recently, François Roustang, another psychoanalyst raised in Lacan’s flock who subsequently deviated from him, even goes so far as to say that the exchange of ideas did not happen in the way usually thought. It was Lévi-Strauss who seduced Lacan, not vice versa, with the idea of grafting structural anthropology and linguistics onto the unconscious – hence traditional Freudian psychoanalysis was irrevocably altered (Roustang 1990: 41).

For Roustang and Laplanche, the liaison between linguistics and psychoanalysis was a retrograde step; a misappropriation of Freud. But their indignation may inadvertently have shed light on the *extra*-Freudian character of the unconscious in structuralism. It was now a tool of *cultural* analysis beyond the individual: “It is the unconscious structures of language, of a literary work, and of knowledge that one tries at the moment to bring to light” (FDE1, 653). When seen from this angle, Lacan’s sociability and openness to intellectual exchanges was a blessing, for here was a unique opportunity to rescue the unconscious from the incestuous control of feuding Freudians and merge it into a different family of ideas. After all, Freud had calmly poached the unconscious from the “poets.” Now it was structuralism’s turn to free it from psychoanalysis and medicine, and recast it as a tool of cultural analysis. Foucault was a child of this meeting ground. In relation specifically to his own work, he described his exploitation of the unconscious in the following way:

What I have tried to show in the first place is that there exist, within the history of knowledge, certain regularities and certain necessities at the interior of this knowledge that remain obscure to the knowledge itself and which are not present to the consciousness of individuals [*hommes*]. There is something like an unconscious in science . . . (FDE1, 656)

Moreover, in an interview from 1981, he stated:

[I]t is too simple, indeed inadequate, to explain human discourse by referring simply to the intentions of the subject. The idea of the unconscious, and that of language as structure, enables one to respond to this problem, so to speak, from outside of the ego. I have tried to apply the same practice to history. (FDE4, 667)

As is well known, Foucault had difficulty distancing his work from the structuralist tag (Eribon 1993: 156–168; 1994: 163–183). You will have to ask Sartre what “structuralism” is, declared Foucault in 1968, because he’s the one who “thinks that Lévi-Strauss, Althusser, Derrida, Lacan and I constitute a coherent group” (FDE1, 665). By the 1980s, the issue had become something of a joke for him. When addressing an American audience, Foucault declared “once and for all” that he had never been “an analytic philosopher” and neither had he been a “structuralist.” “Nobody is perfect” (RC, 160).

One way to see Foucault’s distance from structuralism is to note that he went the farthest in stretching – nay, *distorting* – the Freudian unconscious beyond what “structuralists” themselves would recognize. He stressed that the “systematicity” he was speaking about, which linked together “forms of discourse, concepts, institutions, and practices” is *not* a “Freudian unconscious” but it is an unconscious all the same (HM, 578). What is more, Foucault had always rejected the central premise of psychoanalytically informed literary and semiotic analysis that would posit surface manifestations belying the “real” latent meaning. For Foucault, discourses were “events” in their own right that could not be reduced to another level of reality (FDE1, 595). When he analyzed discourse, therefore, he was not concerned with what was “secret, hidden, more silent and more profound” than consciousness; rather, he sought to “make visible” relations “at the very surface of discourse.” These relations are invisible precisely because they are “*too much at the surface of things*” (FDE1, 772, my italics). This is quite different from the psychoanalyst who would ignore the surface relations (for example, husband and wife) in favor of “hidden” ones (that the husband is *really* relating to his wife as if she were his mother – but without knowing it).

In the 1970s with his introduction of the concept of power, Foucault preferred to speak of “strategies” and “tactics” that are both conscious and unconscious; but again, he recommended that we resist the “Freudian” temptation to seek out the “non-said” and “repressed” of discourse, when, of far greater importance, there existed a mass of documents revealing “conscious, organized, reflective” intentions that were blatantly clear in their political cynicism (FDE2, 720). As a final example to illustrate this point, contrary to Lévi-Strauss and Lacan, who both aspired to a scientific method and supported Freud’s penchant for *universal* structures of the mind, Foucault asserted manifold regimes of truth production, and he entertained the possibility that the unconscious functions not only on the cultural plane, but also in a *plural* sense as well: “cultural unconsciousnesses” (OT, 380, my italics). Such a preposterous travesty of Freud’s “discovery” would alarm any psychoanalyst, certainly, and confirm all too clearly that Foucault was never really on their side. Indeed, there is evidence that Lacan himself recognized the inappropriateness of amalgamating their respective works. In 1966, at the height of *médiatique* frenzy concerning the “death of man,” he noted: “I don’t

see [Foucault] being too concerned about the position of Freud. So what's the connection [with me]?" (1966: 4).

Ethnographic Dissidence in French Freud

Commentators nevertheless insist that the conceptual affinities between Foucault and Lacan outweigh the differences. Lacan was the founder of a "second and more prestigious version of psychoanalysis" that broke with "the Freudian orthodoxy," and Foucault had always recognized Lacan's difference (Eribon 1994: 249). In some quarters, there is resistance to taking sides between the two; a wish "to draw simultaneously on both Foucault and Lacan" (Jackson 1996: 27). After all, Lacan's affirmations as to the dominance or pre-eminence of the symbolic order are those points that, superficially at least, most resemble Foucault's politico-methodological approach. Speech envelops the subject, says Lacan, and everything that has constituted him or her. Moreover, when Foucault was deploying his critique against the confessional nature of psychoanalysis in the 1970s, Lacan, at least, had "moved on," argues Jean Allouch (1998: 169) to a critical "erotology," or "*spychanalyse*" ("speak-analysis") rather than "psychoanalysis" (Allouch 2007). Somewhat contradictorily, from the opposite wing of Lacanian thought, it has also been suggested that Foucault's "late" work serves as an admission that psychoanalysis was right all along, given the stubbornly "trans-historical thoroughfare" that led Foucault "irresistibly" back to the Greeks (Miller 1992: 61).

In addition, not just Lacan, but post-war France as a whole is generally celebrated for its philosophical readings of Freud, described on one occasion as the attempt to "de-biologize" the unconscious (Mehlman 1972: 19). Put in summary fashion, returning the unconscious to speech and language meant banishing biomedical ideas such as "instinct" and "need" from psychoanalysis. While Freud's early work had argued that drives are directed towards pleasure only – everyone pursues pleasure and shuns displeasure – his writings after the 1920s complicated this idea, for he realized that the displeasure of yearning can also be pleasurable; it may even be the whole pleasure. Lacan takes up Freud's mature posture, using the term "desire" to designate the totality of human drives both affirmative and aggressive, all ruled by language and not biological instinct. Unlike needs that can be satisfied, desire is that element productive of ceaseless endeavors aiming to satisfy what in reality can never be satisfied. According to Derrida, this is the crux of the French reading in psychoanalysis: a general acknowledgment by followers *and* dissidents alike that the "death drive" introduced by Freud in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* of 1920 had opened up the "horizon" against which "the whole economy of pleasure needs to be rethought" (Derrida 1998: 95). One should not speak of Freud "in general" as Foucault does, says Derrida, but of a "filial connection" between a certain "French heritage of Freud" and Foucault's project itself – even if the latter did not fully realize his indebtedness to it (1998: 95). On this view, Foucault's critique of psychoanalysis should be regarded as valid only for the early Freud, as well as those non-"French" readings that followed him.

But, as hinted in the previous discussion, Foucault endorsed the structural unconscious and its conception of the subject only insofar as it was *not* submissive theoretically to a Freudian body and mind. Foucault would deny that the unconscious had

in fact been “de-biologized” in the French context – a view tantamount to treason in French-speaking departments of psychoanalysis. Even when paying tribute to Lacan, Foucault doubted that psychoanalysis was capable of posing the question of “the relations of the subject to truth” in the manner he himself was trying to do (C-HS, 30). His continued resistance is reflected not least in the terminology he used in the 1980s: not ego (*le moi*), nor subject (*le sujet*), but the *self* (*le soi*). If the history of sexuality involved “techniques of the self” perhaps underestimated in his reformulation of the notion of power, this only made it all the more imperative to find an alternative, so as to rid ourselves “of the more or less Freudian schema” that would attribute all forms of sexuality to “the interiorisation of the law by the self” (RC, 139). Otherwise, the “subject of desire” would continue to be, as it is in Freudian psychoanalysis, “withdrawn from the historical field” (HS2, 4).

Indeed, the insistence by Lacan and others on the trans-historical nature of desire, reflected in many statements pertaining to the history sexuality in Western culture, could not be more contrary to Foucault. Not only does Lacan endorse Freud’s myth that a “primordial” crime (murder of the father) calls forth the need for law (represented by the “phallus”), but this eternal law can explain manifestations as diverse as medieval courtly love (Lacan 1992: 139–154), or the torments of Shakespeare’s Hamlet (Lacan 1977). Equally, it lives on unconsciously today, superimposing the “kingdom of culture” on a nature otherwise “abandoned to the law of mating.” (2006: 229). Importantly, the real father’s presence or absence (let alone his “personality”) matters little because the phallus he represents will be put into signifying action regardless. It will be the primary signifier in any chain of communication, instituting and reinstating desire in each locus by prohibiting access to the mother. In other words, although symbolic rather than biological, the phallus is not conditioned by a cultural or historical context, as Lacan expressed clearly in the following statement:

The position of the father as symbolic does not depend on the fact that people have more or less worked out that there must be a connection between events as different as a coitus and the birth of a child. The position of the Name-of-the-Father as such, the qualification of father as procreator, is an affair situated at the level of the symbolic. It can be realized according to diverse cultural forms, but it does not depend as such on the particular cultural form, it is a necessity of the signifying chain. (Lacan 1998: 181, my translation)

For Foucault, on the other hand, phenomena like “madness” or “sexuality” do indeed depend on the “particular cultural form.” No material object, concept, or institutional formation developed over the course of Western history has universal status (C-BB, 5). Not even the body with its hungers or emotions is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding others. On the contrary: “The body is molded by a great many distinct regimes; it is broken down by the rhythms of work, rest and holidays; it is poisoned by food or values, through eating habits or moral laws; it constructs resistances” (LCP, 137).

The idea of a “French” reading of Freud has therefore become something of an intellectual iron curtain, containing Foucault artificially within a perspective that implicitly includes the Lacanian idea of desire. Meanwhile, his alternative ethnographic

account of sexuality is obscured. If we go back to Foucault's first major text, *History of Madness*, it is no surprise to find that the initial preface of 1961 does not refer to Lacan or any other psychoanalyst, but describes a historical method based on Nietzsche instead. Later in the text, he claims his "archaeology of alienation" was opposed to any form of analysis that "supposes an immutable continuity in madness . . . equipped with its timeless, intricate psychological complexities" (HM, 79). Implicitly, Lacan too, like his psychoanalytic and psychiatric colleagues, assumed "that madness was content to sit locked up in its immutable identity, waiting for psychiatry to perfect its art, before it emerged blinking from the shadows into the blinding light of truth" (HM, 79). What Foucault argues instead is that "madness" in Western civilization cannot be separated from the historical practice of confining social undesirables – an "invention" both economic and moral that arose quite suddenly in the seventeenth century and was "truly European in its dimensions" (HM, 52–55).

The 1961 preface to *History of Madness* also eerily forecasts a Nietzschean history of sexuality "one day." In a manner identical to the case of madness, he writes, we should compose a history of "sexual prohibitions" (note the plural) to expose the "continually shifting yet obstinate forms of repression" within "our culture itself" (HM, xxx). He provides examples of this in the body of the text when he claims that increasing intolerance towards male homosexuality during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries seemed to coincide with the emerging rationality surrounding confinement. While there was a "new indulgence towards sodomy," unknown in Christian teachings, this was accompanied by severe "moral condemnation" of homosexuality as a social and literary expression: "the moment when sodomites were being burnt for the last time was also the moment when 'erudite libertinage,' and a whole culture of lyrical homosexuality that the Renaissance had tolerated unquestioningly, began to disappear" (HM, 88). He goes on to describe the Classical era of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as "the great confiscation of sexual ethics by family morality" (HM, 89). This attitude would be echoed later in the *History of Sexuality* with equal militancy but more complexity by replacing "family morality" with the four positive "strategic unities" of the *dispositif* (apparatus) of sexuality: a hysterization of women's bodies, a pedagogization of children's sex, a socialization of procreative behavior, and a psychiatrization of perverse pleasures. These unities represented the production of what we understand today as sexuality (HS1, 104–105).

It could even be argued that, by extending his history of sexuality to Greek civilization as he did in his last writings, Foucault makes this ethnographic picture more coherent. It is common, for example, to cite ancient Greek homoeroticism as proof that there is a universal sexual body. That was certainly how Freud saw it, who often referred to the Greeks as evidence of the ubiquity of "perversion" (Freud, *Three Essays*: 139). But despite greater sensitivity to history and culture compared to his medical colleagues, Freud does not make it clear that the word "perversion" is highly inappropriate for the Greek context, given that love between men and boys was celebrated, not condemned, and this love went beyond the act of penetration. Even terms like "homosexual" and "toleration" cannot apply because, unlike today and amongst other differences, "the Greeks did not see love for one's own sex and love for the other sex as opposites, as two exclusive choices" (HS2, 187).

Powerless Desire

Foucault's manifest critical position towards psychoanalysis was thus always present; there was no sudden hostile change in the manner sometimes portrayed by commentators (Eribon 1994: 255; Lagrange 1987b: 259). But nor was his position an "anti-psychoanalysis" through and through. On the contrary, Foucault valued the conceptual potentials of the unconscious, as we have seen, and he spared it from association with his critique of the *scientia sexualis* in *History of Sexuality*. As Davidson argues, there was an endeavor on Foucault's part to "detach" the significance of the unconscious from Freud's "much more suspect" account of sexuality (2001: 211).

But what is scandalously unacceptable to Allouch, Rajchman, and many others writing on this topic is that Foucault denies any advance occasioned by the Lacanian concept of desire over Freud's original theories of sexuality. The demand from Foucault is to go beyond psychoanalysis *tout court* in the area of sexuality/desire. This comes not from a lack of respect or understanding, but from recognition that neither the Freudian theory of sexuality nor the Lacanian theory of desire is tenable while founded on the shaky concept of repression. The crucial counter-concept is power. As a final stage in our argument, therefore, let us examine more closely why the introduction of power represents the culminating point of Foucault's relationship to psychoanalysis.

In a complex commentary that we cannot do "justice" to here, Derrida suggests that the "drive for power or mastery" that was proposed by the mature Freud in the "enigmatic text" entitled *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* of 1920, and which constitutes the basis of French readings of Freud, cannot be contained by Foucault's critique of "sexuality" (Derrida 1998: 95). As mentioned, there is a general acknowledgment in the French context that this text had opened up the "horizon" against which "the whole economy of pleasure needs to be rethought" (1998: 95). The great "radicality" of the death drive problematizes the "agency of power and mastery." But Foucault ignores this development, claims Derrida, by continuing to speak of "sexuality" as if it is only a pursuit of pleasure. What about the death drive and aggression? Moreover, evidenced by Foucault's ambivalence towards Freud throughout his career, says Derrida, the French readings that confirm and even enhance this "radicality" introduced by the "death drive" are never properly dealt with (1998: 95).

But Foucault's argument is that psychoanalysts, including those in the French context, have uncritically adopted a political conception of power ("juridico-discursive") to theorize all forms of authority. The lacuna goes back to Freud: by proposing a death drive in addition to a sexual drive, Freud still leaves the question of power itself untreated. What is power and how does it work? Is power an object I can hold or own, or is it a force like gravity? Is paternal power in families like that of a king, a general, a priest, or something else again, and how does it differ from maternal power? This kind of analytics of power never makes an appearance in Freudian psychoanalysis, which continues to focus exclusively on bodily drives and organs. Why, specifically, did no subsequent analyst – or even Freud himself – review and criticize the banal representation of power in the Rat Man case of 1909? Without going into unnecessary details, Freud had assumed that the bullying force flaunted by the army captain was identical to the power exercised by the victim's father in the past; but the fact is that the captain

did not lay a finger on the Rat Man, unlike his father who often struck him physically. Can we really say that this is the same “power”?

While psychoanalysis and sociology assume the family as the bedrock of all society and culture without question, Foucault insisted that the family “does not duplicate society, just as society does not imitate the family” (HS1, 100). Likewise, there was no continuity between the family and “the institutions [of] disciplinary apparatuses,” operating in “the asylum, school, barracks, workshop” (C-PP, 80). On one occasion, Foucault equated disciplinary power to sunlight: capable of touching and illuminating everything, yet “non-material” (C-PP, 77); all the more subtly physical in that it is less “corporeal” (DP, 177). This power is very different from the sometimes overt physicality of family relations, where bodies rub and bump against each other constantly, for better or worse. Moreover, parental power is unlike sunlight in another way, for it only impacts on that discreet huddle known as the family circle and has no effect on those outside it. One cannot judge a court case, sporting contest, or work performance on the strength of being a father or mother. Even reproaching another person’s child is barely tolerated.

For Foucault, power is not a *drive*; it is not something that springs from the individual or the body. Rather, it is a series of forces generated by differential social relations that exist prior to, and independently of, an individual body. These are like invisible elastic bands of inter-subjectivity, if you will, contracting and expanding according to other surrounding powers: a “multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate” (HS1, 92). Derrida is thus mistaken if he believes that Foucault’s “power” was already theorized through Freud’s idea of a *drive* for mastery.

Foucault was also well aware that one of the characteristics of Lacan and his school was a repudiation of the pleasure principle as the cornerstone of the theory of desire, which complicated the idea of repression as it had been used widely by advocates of sexual liberation and by historians. Lacanian theorists have challenged, Foucault conceded, and for “some time” before him, “the simple little machinery that comes to mind when one speaks of repression; the idea of a rebellious energy that must be throttled has appeared to them inadequate for deciphering the manner in which power and desire are joined to one another” (HS1, 81). What they failed to challenge, however, was the political notion of power behind the concept of “law” that is used in place of “repression.” Hence the ubiquitous references to repressive forces in Lacanian discourse, which he does not relate to a theory of power. In particular, the distinction crucial to French psychoanalysis between primary repression at a psychological level (*refoulement*) and secondary suppression in a political sense (*répression*), which imply two different types of *power* that are not distinguished. In other words the French psychoanalytic theorists postulate two levels of censorship: a timeless psychological dynamic of internal struggles (*refoulement*) existing prior to contingent social and political configurations (*répression*). In political terms, changing the latter will not fundamentally alter the psychosexual dynamic, based as it is on primary repression. (For a clear statement of this difference, see Green 1979: 232).

But Lacan is obliged to define the nature of the difference between the power of repression (*refoulement*) and the power of suppression (*répression*), at the very least, in order for the distinction to have any meaning; and, given that these constitute the cultural forces that will determine (ultimately) sexual subjectivity, these differences in

powers are vital for his theory. Yet Lacan identifies only *one* power: the phallus, or paternal metaphor. This leaves only pre-existing instincts to determine sexual subjectivity, orientation, and difference. Otherwise, we would all be phallic clones, and always the same versions, whether in ancient Greece, medieval France, modern Japan, or contemporary America.

Shifting the site of subject construction to an earlier scene “before the phallus” – the mirror phase, the pre-Oedipal, the semiotic, the pre-verbal, the feminine, the Lacanian “real,” the *chora* of the mother’s body, or what have you – in no way dissolves the problem. Power becomes ever more obscure. Even the self-styled “dissident” psychoanalyst Julia Kristeva, when pressed on the question, dutifully repeats the Lacanian line: all power can be reduced to “phallic” domination: “there is no other [power]” (1998: 208, my translation). But unless one identifies *productive* power mechanisms within those pre-Oedipal scenes whose purpose is to differentiate bodies and behaviors; unless one proposes forms of power beyond the negative and juridical; then we can only assume that differences exist from the beginning and that subjective identity is born, not made. Rat Man, Bat Man or Cat Woman – the answer must lie in the genes. This makes a joke of Freudian theory; and, by association, all sociological, existential, and anthropological theories that argue for the cultural construction of subjective identity.

So, far from ignoring the theoretical side of psychoanalysis, we could say that Foucault’s brilliance consisted in exposing the power vacuum haunting all social theory – Freudian, Lacanian, existentialist, Marxist, or otherwise. “In political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the head of the king” (HS1, 89). It was a subtle brushstroke – but the intellectual landscape was shattered for anyone who was paying attention. What people refer to as Foucault’s “crisis” in the late 1970s is more correctly a crisis on the part of his readers, who had relied in good faith on homespun recipes mixing a pinch of culture with handfuls of nature – only to have this framework exposed to be not just naive, but actually fraudulent in regard to power’s relationship to sexuality. Foucault was always reluctant to disparage his readers, or “lay down the law” about how to read his work (2011: 385). But there is little doubt that those who refuse his initiative remain locked in the theoretical *ancien régime*, arguing contradictorily that subjective identity is socially constructed through forces that, by their very nature, can only *repress*.

From this perspective, the critique of desire is really the climax of Foucault’s efforts to develop an alternative Nietzschean genealogy of the modern subject as a historical and cultural reality – a domain that had hitherto excluded sexual identity, while the Freudian and feminist traditions had perhaps seen only sexuality and not the wider political domains. By way of conclusion, we could say that Foucault’s relationship to psychoanalysis is therefore complex for good reason: psychoanalysis had acted for him as an important support *and* counter-tradition through which his alternative analysis could unfold. Rejecting the uniform representation of power as it exists in Freudian discourse finally enables us to shift analysis away from the individual and his or her psychosexual development and turn the spotlight on the social networks – and the plural is important – within which any person is entangled. After all, how futile would it be to know thyself if one were merely a fish caught in a net? Only knowledge of the mesh and its possible loopholes gives clues to escape. And this is work that has only just begun.

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Foucault on Critical Agency in Painting and the Aesthetics of Existence

MICHAEL KELLY

"Whatever the exercises [in the aesthetics of existence] may be, one thing is worth noting, which is that they are all practiced by reference to situations that the subject may also have to confront; it is therefore a matter of constituting the individual as rational subject of action, of rationally and morally acceptable action."

Michel Foucault, Dossier: "Government of the self and others"¹

A major unresolved issue from the Foucault/Habermas debate in the 1980s is critical agency, which unfortunately casts a shadow over the philosophical reception of Foucault's work.² The issue is a subject's capacity to act with some degree of autonomy (freedom) in public practices and institutions that are the material embodiment of heteronomy (constraint), where the measure of autonomy is whether the subject can rationally critique and transform the norms of such practices and institutions and, eventually, the practices and institutions themselves. While Foucault often engages in social, political, epistemological, moral, or other forms of critique, he doesn't have a viable conception of agency, Habermas worries, as the focus in most Foucauldian texts is not on the subject who could enact critical agency but rather on the problematics of subjection (e.g., in *Discipline and Punish*) or subjectification (e.g., in the *History of Sexuality*) that, on the face of it, only constrain critical agency. By contrast, Habermas claims to have found an alternative normative foundation for critical agency outside any specific human practice or institution, namely, in the various types of norms embedded in communicative action that generate what he calls discourse ethics.³ Although he may recognize that Foucault's conception of the aesthetics of existence (i.e., techniques of the "care of the self") implies a conception of critical agency and is intended to serve as a model for ethics, Habermas thinks that Foucault merely conceives agency and ethics on the model of the heroic aesthete.⁴ What Habermas fails to recognize is that,

for Foucault, the conditions of heteronomy enable as well as constrain the subject's autonomy.

My aim here is to make a case that Foucault does indeed have a viable conception of critical agency. In general, this conception can be characterized as a subject's capacities (a) to render sensible and to critique the norms underlying any social, political, moral, aesthetic, or other practices or institutions that subjugate rather than liberate people; (b) to imagine, if not initiate, new norms that would transform the practices or institutions so they *desubjugate* and liberate people; and, recognizing that liberation carries its own forms of subjection, (c) to sustain this rendering, critiquing, and imagining as a permanent ethos (PPC, 154–155; PT, 47). The issue of critical agency emerges implicitly and explicitly throughout Foucault's work, but appears consistently, if not initially, when he discusses art, painting in particular, because painters exhibit these capacities, sometimes consciously but more typically just while trying to enact autonomy under heteronomous conditions.⁵ Painters enact critical agency under relatively invisible normative conditions (moral, social, political as well as aesthetic) by rendering these conditions sensible (i.e., visible through paintings), if only indirectly (or even mostly for the benefit of later viewers, as in the case of Foucault's discussion of painters in the Classical Age). This sensible rendering enables painters or viewers to understand the norms better and imagine, if not initiate, actions to transform them, as well as the practices or institutions that the norms condition. In turn, since the critical agency in painting is similar to the critical agency operative in other spheres of society so long as the same basic capacities are involved, and since the aim here is to understand Foucault's conception of critical agency, we would do well to examine his discussions of critical agency in painting.

To be clear, I'm not suggesting that critical agency is always present as an explicit theme in Foucault's texts and I'm aware that painting (or art) is not often a central topic. Yet the key capacities of critical agency are present all along in Foucault's discussions of painting and, moreover, they culminate in the aesthetics of existence (introduced only after he largely stopped writing about painting or other art). The reason painting is relevant to, even a prototype for, the aesthetics of existence is not simply that painting involves the creation of works and the late Foucault believes that existence, or life, can be transformed as if it were a work (*oeuvre*). Rather, the reason is that painting exhibits the capacities essential for the more robust critical agency enacted through the aesthetics of existence. In addition, Foucault's discussions of painting (and of art more generally) help to explain why he appeals to the *aesthetics* rather than the *ethics* of existence, despite the fact that the aesthetics of existence is also very much about ethics. Finally, seen against the background of painting (either as a marginal or a central topic), Foucault's aesthetics of existence no longer appears to be a rupture in his work, an allegedly sudden turn to the problem of agency after years of announcing the disappearance of the autonomous subject (e.g., one who acts independently of social-historical conditions) and highlighting the heteronomous (i.e., social-historical) conditioning of all modes of subjectivity. Rather, the aesthetics of existence is the culmination of Foucault's thinking about critical agency as requiring a recognition and avowal of the agent's heteronomy as the site of its autonomy. In short, the aesthetics of existence is the form of critical agency in his late work (and not just with regard to sexuality).

Painting as a Marginal Topic

Foucault wrote indirectly throughout much of his life about the critical agency enacted in painting, even when he wrote about other topics. Many of his early, marginal discussions of painting resonate in later texts centrally devoted to painting and its critical agency (see section 2 below) and, moreover, they anticipate the critical agency in the aesthetics of existence (section 3). To trace this resonance and anticipation, I'll first examine Foucault's main texts from *History of Madness* (1961) through *The Order of Things* (1966).⁶

History of Madness (1961)

Painting is introduced in this text, albeit at the margins, largely because it is thought to provide possible insight into madness, at least elliptically, by rendering sensible the logic of exclusion when reason fears madness as its Other. Since Foucault's goal is to identify the moment at which madness is no longer "an undifferentiated experience" because of an act of exclusion that separates madness from reason, the mad man from the rational and true man, he needs a witness close enough to madness to render sensible the epistemological as well as ethical implications of this exclusion. Painting is one of his preferred witnesses (along with other art mediums) because it creates sensible, material artifacts indirectly embodying some of these implications. At the beginning of the text, for example, when Foucault is tracing the views about madness that characterize the Classical Age (roughly, 1650–1800), he contrasts them with earlier, Renaissance views of madness enacted in paintings (or drawings) by Hieronymus Bosch, Albrecht Dürer, Pieter Brueghel, and others. In sharp contrast to their literary and philosophical peers, who viewed madness in moralistic terms, these painters were empowered by the dissolution of the unity between word and image, leading to "a fundamental change" in the world of images (HM, 16, 18). That is, once visual imagery was no longer anchored to the word – "painting was beginning the long process of experimentation that would take it ever further from language" – its aim was no longer instruction but fascination (HM, 16). Thus liberated, painters became fascinated with madness because it was thought to embody the impossible, fantastical, and inhuman, which all held "a power of attraction" because they were associated with a "fearsome freedom" (HM, 18–19). In a word, forms of madness opened up the madness of forms: "the image began to gravitate around its own madness" (HM, 17). Unfortunately, all this freedom was shut down in the Classical Age, on Foucault's account, because the mad were no longer wandering on a ship, "the greatest reservoir of imagination," but confined in a hospital, which means that the mad could no longer represent freedom, neither in art nor in society (EW2, 185).

To clarify the "silence" to which madness was reduced when it was separated from reason in the Classical Age (HM, xxviii), Foucault also turns to painters (and other artists) on *this* side of that age, namely, in the Modern Age. Hölderlin, Sade, Van Gogh, Nerval, Artaud (along with Nietzsche) are singled out because their works bear witness to "the life of unreason," and not merely because many of them battled madness in their personal lives. What they witness, in effect, is not so much the voice of madness,

but the fact that it has no voice, that it has been silenced. They do not recover the experience of freedom that madness once represented during the Renaissance (the freedom of madness as “an undifferentiated experience”), for that type of experience cannot be recovered. Rather, they enact (by making material artifacts) the *loss* of freedom that the confinement of madness in the Classical Age signifies. So, Foucault’s account in *History of Madness* of the effect of the practice of painting helps to render sensible both the *epistemological* character of the discourses and practices of madness that distinguish the Classical Age, specifically its logic of exclusion, and the *ethical* character of this age because of such exclusivity’s negative impact on freedom (in the more explicit language of the late Foucault, ethics is the “practice of freedom” [EW1, 284]). By indirectly rendering sensible the exclusion of freedom, which in turn helps viewers (if only from the vantage point of a later historical period) to begin to apprehend the loss of freedom and imagine new forms of freedom, the practice of painting is enacting critical agency, on Foucault’s account; for such rendering, apprehension, and imagination engage the capacities essential to critical agency.⁷

Despite some of Foucault’s own language in *History of Madness* suggesting that the effect of the practice of painting is to capture the truth of madness, painting’s witnessing of the fate of madness in the Classical Age, as seen from the contrasting perspectives of the Renaissance and the Modern Age, does *not* mean that we understand madness by understanding painting (or art in general) or vice versa. That is, despite the long-standing and continuing relationship between painting and madness (e.g., the talk that modern art seems to “explode into madness” [HM, 536]), painting (or any art) remains on reason’s side of the border between reason and madness, even when it renders that very border visible: “Where there is an oeuvre, there is no madness” (HM, 537; see also LCP, 84–85). Nevertheless, Foucault argues that madness is “the harbinger of the time of [the oeuvre’s] truth”: “By the madness that interrupts it, an oeuvre opens a void, a moment of silence, a question without an answer, opening an unhealable wound that the world is forced to address,” thereby making the world aware of its guilt (in relation to the oeuvre) (HM, 537). That is, the truth of the work of art is not that of reason, nor of madness, but of the *world* that excludes one from the other. At the same time, the world is to be held responsible for this exclusion: “The instant in which, together, madness and an oeuvre come into being and reach fulfillment is the beginning of the time when the world first finds itself summoned by the oeuvre, and is responsible for all that is in the face of it” (HM, 537). Once morally summoned, the world is “arraigned by the oeuvre, constrained to speak its language, and obliged to take part in a process of recognition and reparation, to find an explanation for this unreason, and *explain itself* before it” (HM, 537). Painting is now no longer just a witness but a prosecutor, in effect, implying a shift to an even stronger enactment of critical agency in Foucault’s account of the loss of freedom resulting from the exclusion of madness.

The summoning and arraignment of the world make Foucault’s emerging conception of critical agency more explicit and, as the earlier language of freedom suggests and the current language of “recognition and reparation” confirms, they highlight the ethical effect of the practice of painting. This effect is further confirmed if we now ask: who in the world is being held responsible, through painting, for the exclusion of madness from reason? Beckoned by the void or silence that the oeuvre opens up, we viewers are the world, so we are responsible for the exclusion of madness. And whose

freedom is at stake here? When painting holds the world responsible, it is doing so in the interest of the viewers' possible freedom, not merely the freedom of the mad or the painters.

It is important to emphasize here, however, that Foucault does not presume any fixed identity for the "viewers." Are they the viewers of the paintings he analyzes and, if so, are they the viewers at the time they were first painted, or now? Are they the readers of Foucault's texts? He answers these questions, at least indirectly, by understanding the identity of the viewers as the effect or result of their engagement with paintings. What he's beginning to establish, indirectly, is a space within which viewers can exercise their own critical agency, with their identity to follow. In doing so, he implicitly recognizes from the start, and explicitly acknowledges in later texts, that it remains to be seen whether any actual "community of action" emerges from artistic engagement (EW1, 114–115; on the "we" and the French Revolution, see C-GSO, 13). It is clear from Foucault's earliest discussions of painting, however, that the critical agency of painters and viewers is a goal, for how else could we explain the summoning and arraignment at the end of *History of Madness*? If we acknowledge the critical agency of art in Foucault's account of madness, it is easier to see how he later connects aesthetics with ethics. But these connections will not be explicit for years – and texts – to come.

The Birth of the Clinic (1963)

Although painting remains at the margins in this text, there are several key passages that make painting relevant to the enactment of critical agency in the clinic. To begin with, Foucault says that writing the history of disease is like painting a portrait, for in both cases one has to be attentive to "the smallest signs" whose relevance may not be evident at first (BC, 6). More concretely, the individual patient becomes the subject of the portrait, for he is "the disease itself, with shadow and relief, modulations, nuances, depth," which are all pictorial attributes (BC, 15). This portrait is more than a metaphor, however, because the portrait of disease created by the medical gaze is the linchpin of the science of the individual (patient) that opens up once the corpse is integrated into clinical anatomy, once death becomes the concrete a priori of medical experience (BC, 196). That is, the visualization (rendering sensible, localization) of disease in the individual body – a portrait – is what makes the clinic possible, giving the gaze an important analytical function in the birth of clinical knowledge (BC, 113). While the painterly gaze is not the same as the medical gaze, painting does share the capacity of visualization – rendering sensible the normative conditions of a practice – which is central to critical agency.

Despite Foucault's positive account of the concept of visibility in his account of the medical gaze in *The Birth of the Clinic*, he also counterbalances it with recognition of the concept of *invisibility*. Anticipating the analysis of painting in *The Order of Things*, Foucault claims that the clinic emerges from a new "distribution of the visible and the invisible," a combination of the "sovereign power of the empirical gaze" (BC, xiii) and the limits of the gaze because of what lies invisibly beyond it and thus beyond medical knowledge (BC, 166). That is, while the clinic becomes possible once what was "fundamentally invisible [disease] is suddenly offered to the brightness of the gaze"

(BC, 195), something still remains invisible (unknown) about the body and life, because when death (the corpse) is the focus of the medical gaze, part of life remains outside it. When illness is excluded from life much the way madness was from reason, we end up with a limited view of life just as we ended up with a limited view of reason; and freedom is presumably at stake once again since such limits constrain freedom as much as knowledge. So Foucault isn't merely pointing here to the epistemological limits of the new science of medicine; he's also invoking a conception of life broader than the medical conception of it. Though he doesn't tell us in *The Birth of the Clinic* what that other conception is, he has opened up conceptual space for it, which he begins to clarify only in his late work on biopower and the aesthetics of existence.

The Order of Things (1966)

Although Foucault discusses Velázquez's *Las Meninas* (1656) at great length in the opening chapter, painting is virtually absent from the rest of this text, except for a brief reappearance of *Las Meninas* in a late chapter called "Man and his Doubles."⁸ Yet this does not mean that painting isn't important for Foucault's philosophical goal(s) in *The Order of Things*, especially with respect to critical agency. For although the normative (e.g., epistemological as well as aesthetic) conditions comprising the Classical Age were not explicitly recognized by anybody at the time, some of them were rendered visible in Velázquez's painting. Since the act of rendering visible normative conditions that would otherwise be invisible is a key capacity of critical agency, painting is crucial for Foucault's emerging conception of critical agency, just as it was in his earlier accounts of madness and the clinic.⁹

The importance of painting for critical agency is evident in *The Order of Things* in Foucault's discussion of the concept of invisibility, which he claims is embodied in an invisible painting embedded in a visible painting: "how could we fail to see that invisibility, there in front of our eyes, since it has its own perceptible equivalent, its sealed figure [the back of a painting], in the painting itself?" (OT, 4). That is, Foucault is interested in invisibility in *The Order of Things*, not as a metaphysical concept in its own right, but as a way to render sensible a "positive unconscious of knowledge: a level that eludes the consciousness of the scientist and yet is part of [what constitutes] scientific discourse" (OT, xi).¹⁰ To clarify the concept of invisibility, he identifies the other players that are invisible in Velázquez's *Las Meninas*, in addition to the painting seen only from the back: (1) the models for *Las Meninas*, despite their apparent image in a mirror at the back of the painting; (2) the painter himself, despite Velázquez's self-portrait; and (3) the spectators, except for the one spectator stepping into the painting (studio) from the back.

To take the models first, Foucault argues they are invisible because it is indeterminate who is modeling for Velázquez and thus who is the subject of the painting. We might reasonably assume, given the royal figures depicted in the painting (and all that we know historically about the context and conditions of its production), that the models are the king and queen, especially since they seem to be reflected in a mirror at the back of the painting. But Foucault highlights the fact that, despite the mirror image, we cannot confirm who the models are since we can never see the front side of the painting depicted in *Las Meninas*: the "opaque fixity" of the invisible painting in *Las Meninas* prevents the models "from ever being discoverable or definitely established" (OT, 5, 10),

which is why Foucault repeatedly conceptualizes the models as an essential absence (blindspot or void) (OT, 4, 16, 308). Moving to the painter, Foucault says that he is subject to a double invisibility because he cannot “at the same time be seen on the picture where he is represented and also see that upon which he is representing something” (OT, 4). In other words, because the painter has stepped back away from his painting and turned his gaze to the models, his own painting is as invisible to him as it is to the spectators; were he to step back behind the painting to see it, then *he* would become invisible. However, given the centrality of invisibility, this double invisibility only makes the painter all the more significant because his invisibility renders sensible a truth about how a painting is constituted. It is not constituted merely by the visible agent self-depicted in the painting, as if Velázquez were an autonomous subject (even a genius) creating the painting out of whole cloth; rather, like the Classical Age itself, the painting is constituted by something that remains invisible. That “something” leads us to the third player, the spectators, for the spectators’ gaze “transforms the painting into an object” and is that for which any painting exists: there is no painting without spectators (OT, 308). In turn, the painter is not actual unless his paintings are actualized by the spectators’ gaze. So Foucault’s talk of the invisibility of the back of the painting depicted in *Las Meninas*, which ultimately leads to the spectators, is (again) talk of how the *painting* is constituted. Likewise, his talk of what is invisible to the painter, leading again to the spectators, is talk of how the *painter* (qua subject and agent, the one representing) is constituted (the one represented) (OT, 4, 16).

Now, since Foucault has shifted our philosophical as well as aesthetic attention away from the painter, the most conspicuous agent in *Las Meninas*, how are we to understand the issue of critical agency here? As we saw, the painter (e.g., Velázquez) is constituted by external conditions invisible to him, so he cannot be considered an autonomous agent (i.e., one who acts independently of external conditions). However, this point does not diminish the importance of the painter as a subject or agent, even if we add to it all Foucault’s talk elsewhere of the “end of man,” the “disappearance of the author,” and similar tropes that seem to mark the philosophical demise of human subjectivity and agency. On the contrary, as Foucault emphasizes in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (a text which includes methodological reflections on OT): “I wanted *not* to exclude the problem of the subject, but to define the positions and functions that the subject could occupy in the diversity of discourse” (AK, 200, italics added; see also EW1, 290; EW2, 462; LCP, 137; and EW3, 118). In fact, the constitution of the painter (subject, agent) just described is a momentous event in history, for it marks the event of “man” as both a subject and object of knowledge and action alike, as was the case in *The Birth of the Clinic*. To return to *Las Meninas*, “man” was assigned a place in advance precisely where the spectator “appears in the place belonging to the king” (OT, 312), the putative subject (model) of the painting. Since the painter creates this space, he is an agent who contributes to the arrival of “man,” though he is an agent only in a collective and heteronomous rather than an individual and autonomous sense. Moreover, Foucault claims that the space of the spectators where “man” appears is at the same time “that space in which we are, and which we are” (OT, 4). This means that *we* are the spectators, for we occupy the spectator position. But it also means that when “man” arrives in our space, we become “man.” So what we witness in *Las Meninas* is the beginning of the birth of the modern human subject or agent, though it is delayed

for over a century, anticipated but not realized in *Las Meninas*. To be sure, given the predominance of the theme of invisibility, we're not aware of this birth as it's taking place. Like the painter, we spectators are conditioned and thus we don't know ourselves: "we do not know who we are, or what we are doing" (OT, 5).

To clarify these points about the attenuated agency of the painter, "man," and spectators, let me return to Foucault's claim that there is an essential absence at the center of *Las Meninas*. How are we to understand this absence in relation to the possibility of critical agency? Foucault mostly links the absence with the models, the king and queen, and specifically the king. But this interpretation has the ring of deficiency by emphasizing that somebody is missing or lacking, leaving the painting less than complete, its possibility never fully realized, always deferred. On this interpretation, the space of the spectators is likewise an absence, which presumably means it couldn't possibly be a space for critical agency. However, Foucault makes it clear in the second, brief discussion of *Las Meninas* in *The Order of Things* that there is another way to interpret the absence. The infinite exchange between the observer and observed, the painter and the models/spectators, points in the direction of the space occupied by the spectators, for they occupy that "ambiguous place in which the painter and sovereign alternate, in a never ending flicker" (OT, 308).¹¹ But while the models may remain essentially absent because we can never be certain of their identity, their absence is not a lacuna in the end because their space "never ceases to be inhabited, and really too" – by the spectators. Evidence of the fact that spectators fill this space so it is no longer a lacuna is provided "by the concentration of the painter . . . by the respect of the characters portrayed . . . by the presence of the great canvas with its back to us," and ultimately by us "by our gaze, for which the painting exists" (OT, 308). If the spectators are now the absence, they are also what fills it. So the space of the spectators, also potentially the space of critical agency, is secured on this interpretation of the absence in *Las Meninas*.

Foucault's apparent decentering of the painter's agency now looks more positive. When the painter is visible, in a pose suggesting that he is in control of the painting, he actually only renders visible his double invisibility, which is itself a type of absence and hence a lack of agency. But this absence is not a lacuna, for Foucault, because the painter's gaze, depicted in the self-portrait, reaches out of the canvas to the spectators (OT, 4), thereby setting up the exchange between observer and observed that renders visible the invisibility of the spectators and, in turn, actualizes the painter himself (OT, 308). Moreover, by introducing the spectators, the painter also makes it possible for "man" to appear since "man" is rendered visible in its invisibility in the space occupied by the spectators – the spectators are "man." By all these gestures, the painter enacts the appearance of "man," even calling "man" into being (OT, 16). These various acts of rendering are evidence of the painter's agency, though one that is still conditioned rather than autonomous. What this means, I think, is that the denial of agency (author, artist, subject, "man," the painter: LCP, 131) that often overshadows interpretations of Foucault's work is overstated. To be sure, the philosophical conception of an agent operating under invisible conditions is starkly different from the conception of an agent constituting itself autonomously. But a rejection of the autonomy model is not a rejection of agency *tout court*, as Habermas claimed. This last point is crucial if the painter's newly conceived agency can be interpreted as foreshadowing the kind of critical agency enacted in the aesthetics of existence under heteronomous conditions.

Of course, the appearance of “man” is short-lived. On Foucault’s account, it took place only at the *end* of the Classical Age, around 1800, despite “waiting for thousands of years in the darkness for that moment of illumination in which he would finally be known”; moreover, the nineteenth century immediately marked the end of “man” (OT, 308; EW2, 257, 264–265). That is, the event of “man” followed the death of God, but it was in turn followed by the death of the one who killed God, namely, “man,” since “God” and “man” are a conceptual pair with a common fate (OT, 385; LCP, 85, 121).¹² This might suggest that agency is in trouble again, once the killing is over, but that would be the case only if “man” were the only possible agent or if agency were always dependent on “man.” Neither is the case, for Foucault, because human agency has distinct forms in different historical ages. As soon as the subject recognizes the ethical and epistemological implications of its finitude, that’s the beginning of the end of “man,” but only as an (ideally) autonomous agent (LCP, 85). “The end of man” does not spell “the end of agency,” Foucault says in 1978; rather, it marks a recognition of the heteronomous conditions under which agency can be realized in the present as we never cease constructing ourselves “in an infinite and multiple series of different subjectivities” (RM, 123). He is pointing here, in effect, to the emerging conception of critical agency, I believe, though it takes time for it to be fully articulated.

Painting as a Central Topic

Foucault’s conception of the critical agency of the painter and the viewer is more explicit in his various writings centrally devoted to painting. If the painter and viewer in Velázquez’s time do not explicitly have critical agency, they anticipate the kind(s) of critical agency enacted in painting later by the likes of Manet, Klee, Kandinsky, and Magritte – and their viewers.

Manet and the Object of Painting (1971)

In this work, a transcript of a lecture Foucault delivered several times between 1967 and 1971 but never published in his lifetime, he analyzes thirteen Manet paintings in three sections, focusing on the space of the canvas, lighting, and the place of the viewer. In each section, Foucault analyzes how Manet reinserts painting’s materiality “in that which is represented” and thereby turns “upside-down [ruptures] . . . all that was fundamental in western painting since the quattrocento” (MP, 31). But rupturing to what end, and how does Foucault’s interpretation of Manet relate to critical agency? Manet’s ruptures, achieved by experimenting with painting’s materiality, inaugurate not only a new mode of painting – modernism – but also a new model of agency, not only for the painter but, even more so, for the viewers for whom Manet’s paintings establish space. That is, the key player in this new model is explicitly the viewer (as it was implicitly in *The Order of Things*): “it is the first time that painting has presented itself as something invisible that we watch” (MP, 55; italics added). So the key questions in each section of Foucault’s interpretation of Manet are: How do the viewers or the “we” emerge? How do they do so both *with* agency (their own) and as the *effect* of agency (the painter’s)?¹³

Foucault argues in section 1 that Manet exalts the material properties of painting (the paint, the horizontal and vertical weave of the canvas, the stretchers, etc.) that rupture its depth or anything else that would contribute to its having or being an illusory, perspectival space. Then, while directing our eye to the obvious and subtle details of the material surface of Manet's paintings to establish that the painting *is* a horizontal and vertical surface with no depth, Foucault argues that the surface turns out not to be "a place where a visibility manifests itself; it is the place which assures, on the contrary, the invisibility of what is seen by the figures that are in the foreground of the canvas" (MP, 53). In *The Waitress* (1879), for example, a woman is looking outside the painting to something that we cannot see; in fact, there are three figures looking in three directions, and thus three distinct cases of "something" we cannot see. Or in *Saint-Lazare Station* (1872–73), there are two figures whose gazes are directed at something invisible: a woman looking outside the painting at something unknown to the viewer and a child looking into the painting but at something obscured by the smoke of a passing train. In such cases, the paintings show nothing but the invisible. In doing so, they entice, even "force," the viewer "to have the desire to turn the canvas around, to change position [from recto to verso] in order finally to see what one senses must be seen, but all the same is not given in the picture" (MP, 54). The viewer thereby becomes actively engaged in the painting, specifically in a "game of invisibility" (MP, 54–55). However, since what is invisible is necessarily so, because it always remains in front of and outside the painting no matter which face we're looking from, what kind of game is this? On Foucault's account, the point of the game is that we viewers should be less interested in the "something" we cannot see than in the "we" who cannot see it, since it turns out that "we" *are* that something, as we were in the case of *Las Meninas*. So, in the end, Manet's rupturing of illusory pictorial space is evidence of both his nascent critical agency and of a new space for viewers to enact their own critical agency.

Foucault's discussion of lighting in Manet's paintings has a similar dynamic (visible/invisible) and result (the viewers). For there too, after analyzing how Manet's lighting exposes the materiality of painting because the light is no longer coming from the outside (or above or below) but now strikes the canvas at the perpendicular, disclosing the painting as a surface, Foucault analyzes what the surface does *not* show. For example, in *The Balcony* (1868–69), Manet exposes the materiality of the object-painting by highlighting how the green shutters and railing of the balcony expose the framing of the painting and how the lighting obscures the room inside the balcony. The invisible is already manifest in the picture because the "great empty space inside the room is rendered invisible to us" by this surface because its lighting eliminates any depth (MP, 68). At the same time, the three figures suspended on the surface between the room and the daylight are looking beyond the balcony, each in a separate direction "toward something which we do not see" (MP, 71). In fact, we see "nothing other than the brilliance of invisibility itself," which is strangely unified by a "circle of hands" formed by the gestures of the three figures (MP, 71). In turn, these gestures render visible the theme of agency: Manet's painterly gestures, his agency, render visible the gestures of the figures, their agency, that help to render visible invisibility itself, which is a condition of agency.¹⁴ Moreover, all these gestures point us (again) to the space of the viewers positioned in front of the painting – they *are* the invisible and, in the end, they are the new agents.

In discussing the third issue, the place of the viewer in Manet's paintings, Foucault arrives at the concept of invisibility even more quickly, and not only because he discusses just one painting, *A Bar at the Folies-Bergère* (1881–82). After pointing out the visible elements of the painting – in brief, a woman looking forward while standing behind a marble bar with a wall mirror covering almost the entire background – Foucault analyzes its strangeness because the mirror behind the woman does not seem to reflect what is in front of her (MP, 74). Instead, the mirror seems to reflect multiple perspectives or positions that the painter may have taken, none of which is consistent with any of the others; for the painter's position, given how he depicts the woman's gaze, "must be here" yet it also "must be there"; he depicts a man in the back right of the painting, yet it's not plausible for anybody to be depicted there without also being visible in front of the woman; and, depending on the focus, he seems to direct both an ascending gaze and a descending gaze at the woman (MP, 78). For Foucault, the incompatibility of these positions implies that the viewers can – even must – occupy multiple positions, making them as mobile as the painter: "The picture appears like a space in front of which and by rapport with which one can move around" (MP, 78). That is, the new mobility of the viewers is indirectly an effect of Manet's critical agency, namely, his rupturing of the *sovereignty* of the norms of representation, specifically the norm that the viewer needs to be in a fixed point for the sake of the illusory, perspectival space of painting. But for Foucault, the painter's critical agency generates the viewer's critical agency. To be clear, the two forms of agency are mutually conditioning: while the painter's gestures or enactments are forms of agency that engage the agency of the viewers, the viewers' gaze in turn illuminates the paintings, which actualize the painter, implying that he would not have any agency if the viewers were not present. So the mutual constitution of the painter's and viewer's forms of critical agency and freedom – agency as the enactment of freedom under heteronomous conditions – are still central issues for Foucault and even more explicitly so than in earlier texts.

This is Not a Pipe (1973)

Foucault focuses on Magritte's transformation of the relationship between word and image within modern painting. What's important here is not simply the transformation of aesthetic norms, but the enactment of critical agency by a painter who utilizes capacities relevant to other practices beyond art (and who does so in a more explicit manner than his predecessors, from Bosch to Manet, discussed above). To explain this transformation and its relevance to the issue of critical agency, let me start in chapter 3, "Klee, Kandinsky, Magritte," where Foucault identifies two aesthetic principles (norms) that, on his account, were sovereign in the history of painting from the fifteenth century to the twentieth. The first principle is the separation (difference) between *plastic representation*, the image, which implies resemblance, and *linguistic reference*, the word, which excludes resemblance; this separation is warranted because, when the two systems of representation came together in the past, say on a canvas or in a book, one tended to be subordinated to the other. The second principle is an equivalence between the *fact of resemblance* and the *affirmation of a representative bond*, mistakenly implying that any instance of a painting's resembling an object in the world is to be taken as evidence that there's a mimetic bond between the painting and the object

which, in turn, accounts for the painting's meaning (NP, 34). According to Foucault, Klee ruptured the sovereignty of the first principle by creating pictorial space in which a canvas is also a page, in which, in short, there's a merger of equals, image and text (NP, 33). For his part, Kandinsky ruptured the sovereignty of the second principle by demonstrating that lines and colors are "things" in an individual painting as much as, say, a church or person might be, yet this new kind of "thing" doesn't resemble anything but the "gesture that formed it" (NP, 34). Once the sovereignty of the reigning principles has been undermined by the painter's critical agency, he can explore and generate other principles (e.g., similitude – i.e., resemblance without an original element or model), while old ones may still have roles, though now without any sovereignty (NP, 43–52). Once new norms (and practices) emerge, critical agency continues the process of challenging their sovereignty too, for any norm (or practice or institution) will carry new forms of subjugation.

While Magritte may seem to restore the sovereignty of the principles that Klee and Kandinsky ruptured, Foucault argues that he reinforced the ruptures (NP, 35). The reason for the apparent ambivalence in Magritte's work is that, according to Foucault, painting has to continue to enact these (kinds of) ruptures in order, in turn, to enact the freedom they open up and to challenge the constraints they simultaneously embody, which makes painting anticipate the late Foucault's characterization of the Enlightenment (or modernity) as an ongoing ethos or attitude rather than a merely historical event or period (EW1, 312). In this light, the practice of modern painting involves multiple tasks simultaneously, which all involve critical agency: enact the reigning principles by bringing them into play; rupture the sovereignty of those same principles; explore and generate new principles in the practice of painting; and sustain this process of critical agency.¹⁵

So, while Magritte simultaneously enacts and ruptures the norms of painting of his time, he is a critical agent. This is what happens, for example, in the two paintings involving the sentence, "*Ceci n'est pas une pipe*," which Foucault analyzes in depth. The earlier painting, *Ceci n'est pas une pipe* (1926), establishes an intimate, if disturbing relationship between word and image. At first, the painting seems to defy principle 1 because the words assert a certain authority over the image by naming its object and affirming its referent. At the same time, however, the words deny the affirmation of a pipe and thus undermine their own authority. Also, while the words seem to bind the image's resemblance of a pipe to a real pipe in the external world and thereby uphold rather than rupture principle 2, the words break that bond, reinforcing the rupture. Yet this last result seems to create another problem. For now that the image is free from (any subordination to) the word, the two appear to be separated from one another, which would seem to restore principle 1. But once Magritte eliminates the subordination of image to word that was the rationale for separating word and image, they are now free to relate to one another as equals and in different ways, to be determined in practice. In fact, Foucault seems to argue that this new-found freedom is a theme of the later painting, *Les Deux mystères* (1966). By embedding the earlier painting (*Ceci n'est pas une pipe*) in a painting that also depicts a large, free-floating pipe, the new painting enacts freedom, not only of the image from any subordinate ties to the word but even of the image from the relationship between the word and image, since the floating pipe has no clearly defined relationship (spatially or otherwise) to the embedded

painting. Freed of any subordinating relationship to one another, word and image need not be separated any longer – rupturing principle 1; and neither is constrained any longer by the presumed tie between resemblance and reference – rupturing principle 2. So, although Magritte’s paintings initially seem to restore the principles that Klee and Kandinsky ruptured, they clearly reinforce the ruptures. As a result, Magritte is able to enact critical agency in his paintings, as Manet, Klee, and Kandinsky did before him. Moreover, even though the norms at issue for them are principally aesthetic, the capacities of critical agency involved in the transformation of aesthetic norms are the same, in principle, as those involved in the case of other kinds of norms (social, political, moral, etc.).

The Aesthetics of Existence

The kind of critical agency evident in Foucault’s discussions of various painters from the Renaissance to modern art can now be found in more explicit form in his conception of the aesthetics of existence, that is, in the various techniques or practices that individuals adopt to transform their lives ethically as if they were works of art. What makes such agency *critical* is that it, too, involves the same capacities essential to the conception of critical agency that, in effect, has been emerging in Foucault’s work all along.

Critical agency and ancient ethics

There are eight years separating the publication of volume 1 of *The History of Sexuality* (1976) from that of volumes 2 and 3 (1984), and there are significant methodological and substantive differences between the earlier and later volumes (HS2, 3–32; PPC, 47–53). In particular, Foucault needed a new concept of the subject or agent in volumes 2 and 3, where sexuality is newly understood in terms of the aesthetics of existence or “care of the self.” Yet what, if any, kind of agency is possible here? Foucault’s answer begins already in volume 1, where he makes it clear that power is never so complete that it eliminates agency: “It is *not* that life has been totally integrated into techniques that govern and administer it. It constantly escapes them” (HS1, 143, italics added; HS2, 5).¹⁶ How does life escape power, which Foucault at times prefers to speak of as “relations of power,” relationships “in which one person tries to control the conduct of another” (EW1, 291–92)? Through which practices or techniques is such an escape possible? And what kind of agent is carrying out and emerging from these practices or techniques?

When Foucault introduces the aesthetics or arts of existence in volume 2, agency is a clear focus. “What I mean by the phrase [“arts of existence”] are those intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves in their singular being, and to make their life into an *oeuvre* that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria” (HS2, 10–11). So agency is now explicitly the concern as individuals transform themselves into ethical subjects. To be clear, the ethical self is not the starting point of the aesthetics of existence (“the self is not given to us”), which means the self is not to be understood

on the model of an autonomous subject that acts independently of power relations; for this is the model of agency Foucault critiqued in many of his earlier texts, ranging from *The Birth of the Clinic* to *Discipline and Punish*. Another indication of the agent's heteronomy is that the practices or techniques of the self comprising the aesthetics of existence are "not something invented by the individual himself"; rather, they are "proposed, suggested, imposed upon him by his culture, his society, and his social group," much the way the artists Foucault discussed always started from the cultural norms shaping their mediums (EW1, 291). However, from these general claims about the agent's heteronomy, which might suggest that it lacks critical agency, Foucault argues that we should rather draw "only one practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art [*oeuvre*]" (EW1, 262). That is, the heteronomous agent has to create itself as if it were a work of art. It does so by rupturing the techniques or practices that condition its subjectivity and by creating new ones, much the way the modern painters discussed earlier ruptured the pictorial norms and practices they started out with and created new ones. In the end, the agent that Foucault envisions in the context of the aesthetics of existence is not unlike the medical subject, mad subject, laboring subject, or criminal subject in his earlier texts. In all earlier cases, the agent is heteronomously constituted but still capable of critical agency; now, the subject is constituted by the techniques of the self (e.g., dietetics, economics, erotics) that it practices and through which it enacts critical agency (EW1, 290).

According to Foucault, the aesthetics of existence is not only the enactment of critical agency; it is also tied to ethics or, in stronger terms, it *is* ethics. In making this stronger claim, Foucault appeals to a rather distinct conception of ethics, which he introduces in volume 2. Ethics is not merely about whether our behavior adheres to "rules [or codes] of conduct" (from the family, church, state, or other institutions). Rather, ethics is about the "manner in which one ought to form oneself as an ethical subject," that is, about the practices through which the subject constitutes itself ethically in the context of heteronomous constraints (HS2, 26, 251; EW1, 260). To clarify his conception of ethics, Foucault proposed a four-part schema: "a process in which the individual delimits that part of himself that will form the object of his moral practice [determination of ethical substance], defines his position relative to the precept he will follow [mode of subjection], and decides on a certain mode of being that will serve as his moral goal [telos]. And this requires him to act upon himself, to monitor, test, improve and transform himself [forms of elaboration]" (HS2, 28).

For example, the ethical substance for the Greeks was pleasure; their mode of subjection was politico-aesthetic choice; their form of elaboration was comprised of elaborate techniques involving diet, marriage, and sexuality; and their telos was the mastery of oneself – the culmination of critical as well as ethical agency (EW1, 267). Using this schema, Foucault analyzes how sexual pleasures were problematized from Classical antiquity through the first centuries of Christianity, where by "problematized" he means "how, why, and in what forms" sexuality was "constituted as a moral domain" (HS2, 10). In short, the basic issue in volumes 2 and 3 is how subjects attain moral agency by transforming their nonmoral, sexual practices into moral, sexual practices. This self-transformation through the aesthetics of existence is also a mode of critical agency since it involves the same capacities.

The art of critical agency

Now, while discussing only in limited detail Foucault's extensive two-volume analysis of sexuality, let me respond to some skeptical concerns about my proposal that a model of critical agency emerging in Foucault's writings involving painting, centrally or marginally, is now more fully enacted as the aesthetics of existence.

First of all, even before we ask about the aesthetics of existence, how can the critical agency enacted in painting (or in any art) possibly be relevant to, possibly be even a prototype for, other forms of critical agency? Even if the discussions of painting in Foucault's early work demonstrate that painting involves the capacities essential to critical agency, what relevance does the critical agency in painting (or art) have to his later works when he no longer writes much about painting (or other art mediums)? To answer this first skeptical concern, consider how Foucault understands the concepts of "art" and "aesthetics" in his late work. Art does not primarily concern objects, such as works in the fine arts, as was the case in various early writings involving painting, marginally or centrally; rather, the principal work of art is now one's life or existence (EW1, 261, 271, 278; C-CT, 162). When the concept of art is widened, so too is the corresponding conception of aesthetics, for its scope is a function of its object. According to Foucault, the narrow focus in modern aesthetics on the work of art has obscured the richer (Greek) sense of aesthetics tied to existence that he hopes to revitalize: "The transformation of one's self by one's own knowledge is, I think, something rather close to the aesthetic experience. Why should a painter work if he is not transformed by his own painting?" (EW1, 131). Consider also how he understands the concept of "governmentality," which is, along with the aesthetics of existence, a key focus in his late work. Governmentality covers "the whole range of practices that constitute, define, organize, and instrumentalize the strategies that individuals in their freedom can use in dealing with each other . . . the basis for all this is freedom, the relationship of the self to itself and the relationship to the other" (EW1, 300). Governmentality is tied to the aesthetics of existence, for Foucault, because the government of others is inseparable from the government (i.e., care) of the self. Consider next how he describes the "art of government": "the reasoned way of governing best and, at the same time, reflection on the best possible way of governing. That is to say, I have tried to grasp the level of reflection in the practice of government and on the practice of government" (C-BB, 2). What makes governmentality an art is its being a form of critical agency since it involves the same capacities, which explains how Foucault is able to connect governmentality to the aesthetics of existence. Finally, consider that when Foucault claims in his late work that freedom is the ontological condition of ethics, he emphasizes that "ethics is the considered form that freedom takes when it is informed by reflection" (EW1, 284). So ethics, understood in terms of the aesthetics of existence, is a practice that is structured by critical agency, namely, critical reflection on the *form(s)* of freedom as it is enacted through various techniques of the "care of the self" (and of others).

Now, if the art of government has freedom as its goal, and freedom makes ethics possible, where are we to find a prototype of the freedom needed to help guide politics (governmentality) and ethics (aesthetics of existence) on their respective courses? The Foucauldian answer I'm proposing here is that art, specifically painting, is a practice in

which spectators – not only painters – enact critical agency. What painting provides is a prototype of the kind of critical agency needed in ethics and politics, in the aesthetics of existence and governmentality – as Foucault confirms in his late writings, albeit while also speaking about other art mediums (e.g., C-CT, 187–189).

But, to address a second skeptical concern, what makes the aesthetics of existence *ethical* and not merely aesthetic? Foucault's response to this kind of concern is that sexual practices were understood in aesthetic terms before they were considered to be ethical. Yet the shift to ethics, though a development of critical agency, was not a rupture from aesthetics but a development within it. That is, the practices comprising the aesthetics of existence (dietics, economics, erotics) changed to the point that, in the case of sexuality, "the individual is summoned to recognize himself as an ethical subject of sexual conduct" (HS2, 32). How does a nonmoral aesthetic practice come to be moral, yet remain aesthetic? Foucault's answer, in effect, is that critical agency is driven by certain anxieties or concerns that emerge in the practices comprising the aesthetics of existence (HS2, 143). So, for example, anxiety about a sexual practice can force changes in the practice to the point that the practice itself becomes ethical along with the subjects engaged in it (e.g. HS2, 147, 151, 187, 197, 225, 253). Take the example of sexual practices in Classical Greece involving relations between an older free man and a younger free boy. Anxiety emerged about the disparity between the free man and the free boy because the boy would become a free man, and more specifically because the disparity was incompatible with the normative expectation that there be an isomorphism between sexual relations (aesthetics of existence) and social relations (governmentality) (HS2, 23, 215). While the boy does not yet have the rights and responsibilities of a man, he cannot act or be treated in ways that would make him unworthy of those rights and responsibilities in the future. So if, say, the boy were always in a subordinate and passive position in the sexual act with the older man, such a position would be inconsistent with his being trained to be in a position of authority (domestically and publicly) that requires agency, not passivity, which was deemed unacceptable for a free person, boy or man (HS2, 194–195; EW1, 257). This anxiety fueled critical agency which, in turn, transformed the sexual relations between the free man and free boy into an ethical concern, and, more concretely, the older free man began to transform his sexual relations with free boys (HS2, 213). However, such transformation was not merely altruistic because it was also in the older man's best ethical interest, since any treatment of a free boy in a manner involving his subordination and passivity was deemed inconsistent with the man's own public status of governing among free men. So, to care for himself well, the man had to care for the boy differently and ethically. This is a clear case where Foucault insists that the care of the self (aesthetics of existence) and the care of others (governmentality) are inseparable (e.g. C-GSO, 33, 37, 43).

A third skeptical concern, which Foucault acknowledges, is that the sexuality analyzed in volumes 2 and 3 involves "the smallest minority of the population," namely, free, adult males (HS2, 22, 253; also EW1, 254–258). What kind of prototype of critical agency could this possibly represent, whether ethically or politically, since it entails sexual and social inequality that marginalizes women and slaves, and thus the majority of people in ancient Greece? Once again, Foucault's answer involves the kinds of anxiety generating critical agency (HS2, 195, 197). For example, there is an *asymmetry* in the conjugal fidelity practiced in Greek marriage, for the wife was restricted to sexual activ-

ity with her husband but the husband was free to engage in sexual activity with other women or slaves, provided no other husband's rights over his own wife were violated. Foucault argues that it is precisely the recognition of the asymmetry in the sexual roles that made conjugal fidelity an ethical matter, because the sexual asymmetry was deemed inconsistent with the social symmetry in the husband's public relations. Over time, while pursuing the aesthetics of existence, the husband transformed his behavior into an ethical concern by confining his sexual relations to his wife, creating the *appearance* of symmetry in the handling of conjugal fidelity.¹⁷ A main reason the husband transformed his behavior, as he did in the case of sexual relations with free boys, was that he needed to prepare himself better for symmetrical relations in the public realm; he would not be deemed fit to govern in public if he could not govern his own desires in the private realm (HS2, 150–151). In the end, ethical and political anxieties fueled critical agency that, in turn, transformed the husband's aesthetics of existence.

What the above examples of critical agency at work in the aesthetics of existence have in common, according to Foucault, is that some aesthetic effect of a sexual practice occasioned anxiety among the Greeks, and later among early Christians, "because it disturbed and threatened the individual's relationship with himself and his integrity as an ethical subject in the making," whether man, boy, or husband (HS2, 136). Critical agency from *within* a sexual practice was able to identify the disparity, inequality, or asymmetry of relations or roles within the practice – all markings of *unethical* relations – and, eventually, to transform the practices to address the disparity, inequality, or asymmetry – making them ethical. In a word, critical agency was able to transform particular sexual practices into ethical practices. Of course, there are limits to such critical agency and thus to the ethics that may emerge from it. But to those (e.g. Habermas) who insist that norms of critical agency have to be grounded (i.e., derived from a source) outside the practice in which such agency is operative, Foucault would argue that we don't need to look outside that practice. Just as medicine has been able to develop critically – epistemologically and ethically – despite the fact that we are both the subject and object of medical practice, sexual practices can be developed critically even though we are again the subject and object of critical agency. In this light, awareness of the limitations of critical agency in the case of Greek sexuality was itself the result of such agency, for it was what identified, critiqued, and transformed the normative issues of disparity, inequality, and asymmetry in the first place.

But, looking to understand the limits of the prototype of critical agency at play here, the skeptic here may still want to ask: why not transform the *apparent* symmetry of conjugal fidelity between husband and wife into *real* symmetry? The recognition of the asymmetry in conjugal fidelity, which led to a transformation of the husband's sexual behavior, was what opened up this critical questioning and, moreover, it is also now what prevents it from being closed down. The burden is now on those who sustain the asymmetry to justify it and to do so with ethical as well as aesthetic reasons. Of course, there are many power relations that explain why this ethical justification may not materialize or why it may prove inadequate if it does. But the momentum of critical agency cannot easily be stopped, even within the context of power relations because power enables as well as constrains agency. To be clear, painting is not solely responsible for sustaining this momentum, nor is the aesthetics of existence in general. But painting and the aesthetics of existence enact the capacities essential to critical agency. The

more these capacities can be explicitly enacted, the more easily they can be apprehended, recognized, and, under the right conditions, more persistently enacted. In the meantime, so long as the aesthetics of existence involves “at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them,” it will serve as a prototype for what Foucault once described as our “patient labor giving form to our impatience for liberty” (EW1, 319).¹⁸ This labor is the critical agency consistently, if not initially, enacted in painting and more widely enacted in the aesthetics of existence.

Notes

- 1 Quoted F. Gros, “Course Context,” in C-HS, 537 n. 50.
- 2 See e.g. Kelly 1994. On Amy Allen’s analysis, “the problem of the subject and possibility of critique” – what I’m calling “critical agency” – is also “the central point of contention” in the later, feminist iteration of the Foucault/Habermas debate enacted by Judith Butler and Seyla Benhabib (Allen 2008: 4). Allen provides an excellent account of the original Foucault/Habermas debate before she offers her view of its present status. On a critical note, she argues that Foucault’s conception of the self overlooks “the role played by nonstrategic social relations, relations based on communication, reciprocity, and mutual recognition, in the development of autonomy and the self” (Allen 2008: 69). Although she acknowledges that art (the cultural and social imaginary) is a possible source of the transformation of the self along the lines she proposes, she pursues other avenues (Allen 2008: 183). I’m arguing that we look to art from the start, though not exclusively.
- 3 For Habermas’s critique of Foucault, see Habermas 1986: ch. 9, and for his “discourse ethics,” see Habermas 1990.
- 4 Such aestheticization is, in Habermas’s eyes, just another Nietzschean influence overshadowing the Kantian legacy of the Enlightenment that the late Foucault claims for his work (EW1, 303–319; PT, 41–95; C-GSO, 1–40).
- 5 I’m focusing on painting among the arts because the issue of critical agency is so prevalent in Foucault’s writings on painting, but also because I don’t have enough space here to cover his writings on other art mediums. What is true of painting is not always true of all art, but whatever is true of painting’s capacity for critical agency should hold for all art because painting’s having this capacity is a function of its being art. For discussions of Foucault on art, see O’Leary 2009; Shapiro 2003; Soussloff 2010; and Tanke 2009.
- 6 To be clear, I’ll be examining how Foucault understands the practice of painting as the enactment of critical agency under heteronomous conditions in the Classical and modern ages, without claiming that the particular painters he discusses were consciously enacting critical agency. That is, I’m examining the *effect* of Foucault’s account of the critical agency enacted in painting on the development of his later, admittedly more explicit, conception of critical agency.
- 7 Even if critical agency is being anachronistically imputed by Foucault to painters of the Classical or modern ages, such imputation is central to his philosophical argument about the emergence of critical agency, which means, I’m arguing, that it’s significant that this imputation implicates painting (and other art forms), not some other kind of practice.
- 8 Foucault claims that the gazes of the painter, the models, and the spectator all converge in a singular vantage point in front of the painting. Some critics challenge his account of their convergence; see Shapiro’s critical account of this challenge in Shapiro 2003: 227–228, 247–250.

Of course, the preface to OT begins with a passage about “a certain Chinese encyclopedia” from a Jorge Luis Borges’s short story that introduces the book’s theme: “there is nothing more tentative . . . than the process of establishing an order among things” because “fragments of a large number of possible orders glitter separately” among the things to which order is given (OT, xix, xvii). Foucault also discusses various writers (e.g., Artaud, Roussel, Kafka, Bataille) at the end of OT, much as he does in BC. While such discussion may imply that art is marginal, it also confirms the philosophical significance of art’s marginality. For these writers reflect on and reflect “the figure of finitude in language” (the tortured body, fabricate chance, death, repetition) that is tied to madness, a space in relation to which language can find its freedom (OT, 383–384).

- 9 While it makes a difference whether the critical agent here is the artist in the Classical Age or Foucault or any of his readers, painting has a crucial role in any of these scenarios.
- 10 Foucault understands the concept of “order” in terms of the “distribution of the invisible and visible”: a combination of the *hidden* network connecting disparate things and the spaces of a grid on which these connections are *manifested* (OT, xx; italics added).

The relationship between the scientist and the “positive unconscious of knowledge” is analogous to my claims about the painter and critical agency; for in the latter case too, the painter is typically unconscious of the critical agency s/he enacts. The sense of “positive” here, developed in the case of knowledge in Foucault’s *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, implies that what we may be unconscious of can still have an enabling or constraining effect on our practice.

- 11 Foucault says that the only sense in which the absence is a lacuna is for “the *discourse* laboriously composing the painting” (OT, 308; italics added). This is a crucial point because such talk of absence has contributed to a tendency within some contemporary art theory to predicate a deficiency in art, as if *art* rather than the discourse on art has an essential absence. See Kelly 2003 and 2012.
- 12 See e.g. Allen 2008: 32–39.
- 13 Foucault shifts from “you” to “we” in each section of his lecture when he begins speaking about Manet’s paintings in terms of the concept of invisibility: the shift marks a transition from what is visible in Manet’s painting to what is invisible, from what *you* the viewer (or reader) can see in each painting to what *we* the viewers necessarily cannot see.
- 14 Foucault analyzes the gestures of the hands in three of Manet’s paintings: *Greenhouse*, *Luncheon on the Green*, and *The Balcony* (MP, 48–49, 62–63, and 71). He claims that the gestures mark the various axes structuring the interiority of each painting; but he also says that they mark the heterogeneity of each painting, its pointing in many directions and compelling the viewer to assume a variety of perspectives. Heterogeneity, which may threaten to implode the integrity of the painting on a formal level, opens up the freedom of the viewer. Such freedom implies agency, so the gestures are evidence of agency.
- 15 Or, as Foucault later says in an essay on Pierre Boulez’s music, what is needed is “the strength for breaking the rules” of art while bringing them “into play” to create a new space for freedom (EW2, 244).
- 16 Foucault realized within volume 1 that he needed a concept of power that is not merely juridical (i.e., tied to the sovereign, law, and rules) and not merely disciplinary (i.e., tied to the forms of normalization, such as those analyzed in *Discipline and Punish*) because these forms of power seem to restrict the analysis of sexuality to talk about how the law or power are used principally to repress or normalize sexual practices (HS1, 90–91; C-SMD, 12–19). However, the major thesis of volume 1 was that the repressive hypothesis is a misguided way to understand sexuality. So Foucault’s analysis of sexuality was at odds with juridical power and, to a lesser extent, with disciplinary power. Yet, despite the brief introduction of “biopower” at the end of volume 1 – power focused on “the biological existence of a population” (health, hygiene,

- birth rate, life expectancy, race, etc.) (HS1, 137; C-BB, 317; C-SMD, 239–249) – Foucault does not unequivocally offer either a new, third concept of power or an interpretation of the existing two concepts to show how power can be conceived in a way that is compatible with the rejection of the repressive hypothesis. For a recent discussion of Foucauldian efforts to envision practices that *derepress* the repressive classifications of sexuality, see Davis 2010.
- 17 The emphasis here was on appearance, Foucault emphasizes, because the husband's transformed behavior was not meant to be a "prefiguration of a symmetry" between husband and wife; it was rather a "stylization of an actual *dissymmetry*" within the marriage, but a stylization that was ethical as well as aesthetic.
 - 18 Perhaps it's only fitting to add a less optimistic note, this being an essay on Foucault, whom some regard as a skeptic. To return to Manet, we could quote T. J. Clark's remark that optimism about art and freedom is certainly a possible response to Manet's paintings, but it is also naive because the limits of modernity have outweighed the achievements of the best modernists (Clark 1984: 267, 260, 15, 66). That is, the historical circumstances in which modernist paintings have been produced also have determined, in the end, that they have mainly served the interests of ideology. So despite the artists' best experimental efforts, which Foucault has analyzed, they "could find no basis for representation besides the spectacular ones." As a result, painting is merely a spectacle celebrating rather than critiquing the normative conditions (of society as well as of art) in which it was produced, which would suggest that the space of the viewers that I've claimed is opened up by Manet's work is merely a space of ideological spectacle. To respond briefly, though Foucault is often associated with critiques of the modern society of the spectacle, doesn't he also recognize that spectacle is not always a negative event? For example, the late Foucault argues that the French Revolution was significant precisely because it was a spectacle, "greeted everywhere by spectators [the "we"] who are not participants, but observers, witnesses, and who, for better or worse, let themselves be caught up in it" (C-GSO, 17). These spectators are, in effect, the heirs of Velázquez's spectators and the forerunners of Manet's viewers. In the end, since even Clark acknowledges that ideology is not a "seamless garment" and that Manet helps to render this ideology visible, and since on my reading such rendering visible is a condition for critical agency, can't we live vigilantly within these seams while welcoming art and the aesthetics of existence as allies in the struggle for critical agency?

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Foucault on Kant, Enlightenment, and Being Critical

MARC DJABALLAH

Until the end of the 1970s, Foucault's histories of experience had dealt either with discursive practices in terms of relations of knowledge, socio-political practices in terms of relations of power, or their points of intersection. Thereafter, his work incorporates an investigation of ethical experience, a history of subjectivity, of the practices in which the conditions of possibility of the way we experience ourselves are elaborated and transformed. Its guiding thread is what he calls "practices of the self," the procedures available for individuals to establish, maintain, and transform their knowledge and control of themselves. This later work is driven by a pair of interwoven concerns. The interrogation of these practices is in part motivated by historical interest in the status of philosophy as a practice. The ethical practices of the self that most directly interest Foucault are philosophical, and his historical analysis of them is embedded in the problem of the relation between philosophy, discourse, and life. In turn, this historical work is fueled by a methodological concern that generates resistance to the standard conception of contemporary academics. Philosophy, like every other academic discipline, is organized around discursive objectives and criteria modeled on the sciences of nature, namely, knowledge and truth in abstraction from the human practices both that deploy them and to which they are supposed to pertain. The pursuit of these strictly discursive, epistemological ideals does not require self-interrogation, and they can be attained without self-transformation (see FHS, 19–20). Foucault's analysis of Greek and Hellenistic philosophical practices brings this contemporary epistemological bias into relief by testing a historical alternative. For the ancients, philosophical practices were chosen and exercised as basic ontological orientations, ethical and spiritual lifestyles. While they involved a discourse, they were not meant to consolidate our relation to the world by establishing the conditions of knowledge and truth with the help of techniques to record and to interpret the elements of a theory, doctrine, or set of arguments. On Foucault's reading, the primary objectives of these practices were not merely

discursive, but ethical and personal: not to acquire or to conserve knowledge, but to dispossess oneself, to transform one's own thought by putting its limits to the test though the exercise of other ways of thinking (see FHS2, 14–15). His work aims to undermine the contemporary institutional imperative to reject such a conception of philosophy in favor of one based on exclusively discursive ideals. Foucault aims to show, on the contrary, that philosophy is first of all an ethical practice of self-transformation, one in which discursive and institutional practices can only have a subsidiary function. Foucault finds this understanding of philosophy in the ancient practice of spiritual exercises, renewed in a tradition of modern thought that begins with Kant, and includes Hegel, Nietzsche, and the Frankfurt School. As we will see, he situates his own histories in this tradition of critique, with Kant's essay on the Enlightenment as his most direct point of reference.

Foucault is less interested in the Enlightenment as a historical period than in the variety of critique that Kant used to account for it in his essay on the question. Indeed, the Enlightenment is primarily of methodological significance for Foucault, as the historical reality that provided the occasion for the invention of this form of critique, which is a primary source of his own approach, a *critical ontology of ourselves*.¹ Critique in this sense is not a theoretical position or a doctrine, but an ontological attitude, a philosophical mode of being and way of life. It is not primarily a type of discourse, but a largely inarticulate disposition, being critical, that permeates the entire array of practices that is our life. It requires that we engage with our actual existence and everything we do in life in a specifically philosophical way, such that its exercise not only prescribes historical interrogation of the limits of our experience in theoretical work, but also requires that we constantly test these limits by working on ourselves. Foucault's challenge is that this, being critical, is our freedom: the cultivation of an alert sensibility to the rules of the game – of what we do, make, say, and think – as that which should and can be modified, precisely through the formulation of the rules of another game. The idea of critical ontology is deeply challenging as an interpretive grid for an understanding of Kant, no less than as a live conception of philosophical practice to be taken seriously. Such are the stakes of Foucault's reading of Kant on the Enlightenment. Various obstacles occlude the matter.

Part of the difficulty stems from layers of critical interpenetration between the form and the content of this interrogation, between its method and its material. In his analysis of Kant, Foucault proceeds by doing what he describes, as though in reverse. He brings out the very attitude of being critical that Kant adopts, with meta-critical reverberations: his treatment of the Enlightenment exercises the method. This reversibility of method and material is a mark of the formidable meta-critical awareness built into the very structure of Foucault's work. It forestalls both distortion of the reality described by inapt theoretical commitments, and illusory attempts to describe a putative reality that it lacks the theoretical tools to accommodate. This critical circularity is a great strength of Foucault's reading of Kant, but it does impede attempts to formulate it simply and exhaustively.²

A different kind of challenge in Foucault's reading of Kant is posed by the complexity of the relations between the central concepts involved in this reading, namely, Enlightenment, critique, and modernity. These belong to a single semantic field – they can only be fully defined in relation to each other – and the analysis moves fluidly from the

characterization of the one to the other, and uses the terms in different ways. The three concepts are axes of a unified but complex philosophical practice, one that is born in the meta-philosophical (theologico-political) context of the transformation of the Christian pastorate at the time of the Reformation, but is formulated for the first time in Kant's essay on Enlightenment.

The fact that Foucault's reading of Kant is dispersed throughout his writings further compounds the difficulty of the position.³ The material, which is scattered in several different texts, appears in connection with vastly different problems and is published in very different contexts. In Foucault's recently published *Introduction à l'Anthropologie* (Kant and Foucault 2008), the first part of his *thèse complémentaire* (Sorbonne, 1961), transcendental critique and anthropology are distinguished as discursive standpoints in Kant's philosophy. Both, properly exercised, can be considered ways of being critical.⁴ Although in many respects distant, the problems at issue in Foucault's later work on Kant resonate with those treated in the thesis, despite the fact that Foucault does not call attention to the relation between the two.⁵

This essay addresses Foucault's later work on Kant, which is found primarily in three texts: (1) the transcript of an important lecture given to the Société de Philosophie Française in 1978 and published posthumously in 1990 as "Qu'est-ce que la critique?"; (2) the first lecture of *The Government of Self and Others*, Foucault's course at the Collège de France in 1983; and (3) "What is Enlightenment?", first published in 1984. Despite considerable thematic overlap, each of the three elaborates a facet of being critical not found in the others. The 1978 lecture includes a genealogy of the attitude of being critical in terms of relations of power. The 1983 lecture accounts for the methodological interest of Kant's essay as the first theoretical formulation of this form of critique. The 1984 piece presents the theme of modernity in Baudelaire as an example of the renewal of the attitude of critique after Kant. As a philosophical exercise, it conceives modernity as the permanent choice to transform one's relations to oneself, to the present, and to history.

Foucault distinguishes three senses of critique in these texts: (1) the variety of specific, local, as Foucault puts it, "polemico-professional" critical activities, the typically under-theorized, empirically oriented, primarily polemical discourse that assesses the value or urges the rejection of its object in the name of avoiding error, such as in political or artistic criticism; (2) Kant's transcendental critique as exemplified in the three *Critiques*; and, between the first two senses in terms of generality and theoretical density, (3) being critical as an attitude, a practice that embeds a discourse in a way of being that aims at self-transformation. While polemico-professional criticism is not specifically tied to Kant, we will see how Foucault shows that the attitude of being critical is essential for him. What it is to be critical is formulated and exercised in Kant's discussion of Enlightenment and other popular and historical writings of his such as "What is Revolution?". Critique for Foucault is the organizing factor of a practice that has unity, generality, and a regulating principle independent of its object. Thus Foucault describes being critical as "a way of thinking, of saying, of acting" that determines one's relation "to what exists, to what is known, to what is done," which is also a relation "to society, to culture, and to others" (FQC, 37). As we will see, in Foucault's view, the transcendental standpoint of Kant's three *Critiques* is the record of a partial, disfigured exercise of being critical, one in which discourse is given absolute priority over

lived experience. It exemplifies how the cost of elevating the level of abstraction of the formulation of conditions of possibility to the point of universality and necessity in the name of modern scientific and epistemological ideals is the sacrifice of contact with real existence.

The following discussion falls into four parts. It begins with an exposition of Foucault's genealogical account of critique as an untheorized attitude and mode of existence, that of *being critical*. Foucault finds the sources of philosophical critique in practices of resistance to politicized forms of pastoral power transposed from Hebraic and Christian traditions at the time of the Protestant Reformation. The second section explores Foucault's identification of the first theoretical formulation of this attitude of being critical in Kant's essay "What is Enlightenment?". The ensuing section sketches Foucault's reading of Kant's piece, with an eye to the distinction between the transcendental version of critique practiced in the three *Critiques*, and critique as Enlightenment, the attitude characterized by the will not to be poorly or excessively governed. Finally, in the fourth section, Foucault's analysis of modernity is presented as a model of practicing the self, a "limit attitude" emblematic of the exercise of freedom.

Genealogy of the Critical Attitude

Long before the attitude of being critical was adopted by Kant, it was operative in social practices without theoretical formulation. In order to account for this pre-philosophical historical emergence, Foucault's history of being critical is undertaken in terms of the power relations that externally condition it as religious and socio-political practice, rather than in terms of its internal rules as discourse. This genealogical investigation of being critical marks a decisive turning point in Foucault's thought, for it is here that he recognizes the need for a third register in his historical analysis, one that deals with ethical practices described in terms of one's relations to oneself, distinct from relations of knowledge and of power.

This genealogical approach is sketched at an appropriate level of generality in the first of a series of lectures given in Rio de Janeiro in 1973 (FDE2 538–646). There Foucault maintains the continued relevance of Nietzsche's critique of the kind of theory of the subject found in Descartes and Kant, who make the subject the absolute foundation and the disinterested source of knowledge on the basis of which truth and freedom are possible. He draws the methodological implications of the Nietzschean idea that the subject and truth are not eternal categories that must be taken as given, but have a history external to philosophical discourse; they were constituted under specific historical conditions and with meta-philosophical motivations. The conception of the subject of knowledge, the theoretical objects, concepts, and techniques of discursive practices of Descartes and Kant, were *invented*. They were formed in specific social practices, apparatuses of power relations on the basis of strategic interests, in view of practical (institutional, theological, political, economic, psychological), rather than theoretical considerations. They were driven by the need for mendacity, hatred, and violence, rather than their will to knowledge and truth (see FDE2, 542–550).

Foucault's reading of Kant helps us to understand this fact by analyzing the history of discursive practices in terms of the relations of power and the games in which the

subject can obtain knowledge and truth, not in terms of their internal structure, but in terms of the rules of the social practices in which they arise. As we will see, the attitude of being critical that Foucault finds in Kant is guided by this genealogical orientation, and thus Foucault circularly extends and delimits the conception of the subject at work in Kant's transcendental critique through a genealogical critique of the critical attitude, at a point of intersection of the content and the form of his reading.

This account is provided primarily in "Qu'est-ce que la critique?", where Foucault investigates the socio-historical conditions of critique. As an attitude, critique is not the invention of Kant's philosophy, or of philosophical discourse at all, for that matter. It emerges in response to the modern form of the Christian pastorate that Foucault calls *governmentalization*, in the context of the generalized socio-political anxiety about how to govern individuals that that can be seen at the time of the Protestant Reformation.⁶

The pastorate is decisive in Foucault's history of political practices, in which it is the site of an important transformation of power relations, one that Foucault considers to be decisive in the move toward centralization of political power in the state. He considers the pastorate to be "the strangest and most characteristic Western form of power" (FC-STP, 134). It is exercised through techniques that aim to guide the conduct of individuals assiduously and permanently. Pastoral power is most fundamentally a conception of the relation between God (or the king, or leader) and human beings based on the model of the relation between a shepherd and his sheep. Foucault finds this conception of power operative everywhere in the pre-Christian Mediterranean Orient, but with particular salience in the Hebrew tradition, in which it is an exclusively religious relation: God is the pastor of his people (see FC-STP, 128–129). Pastoral power is notably absent from the Greek context, in which the gods establish the city, guarantee its solidity, and provide oracular counsel; in which they even protect, intervene, and can be angered, but never relate to the citizens in the way a shepherd leads his flock, which is a "a multiplicity in movement" (FC-STP, 129). The shepherd's power is exercised on his moving flock of sheep, not on a land or territory, and must itself be mobile in order to do so. Thus, the biblical God guides the movements of his people, and is himself ambulant; he directs them on the move by taking the lead and showing them the path to follow.⁷ The goal of this form of power is to direct the flock toward a specific goal, between the flock and which it is the intermediary. This pastoral power is wholly beneficent, and its objective is to ensure the salvation of the flock, that is, its subsistence, by selflessly providing it with sustenance and taking care of it. It must do so with careful vigilance and hyperbolic consideration for the totality of the flock, keeping away what threatens even a single sheep. While the bad shepherd leads the sheep to fattening pastures in order to increase the profit he can make by selling them, the good shepherd is never self-interested, considering only the well-being of each and every one of them. The ideal is to be not only wholly and caringly beneficent, but individualizing. As Foucault puts it, "the pastor directs the whole flock, but he can only direct it well if not a single sheep can be lost" (FC-STP, 132). Thus the first form of the shepherd's paradox: he must take care of his whole flock as well as each sheep individually. More radically still, the shepherd must be prepared to sacrifice himself in order to save a single one of his sheep, thereby being forced to neglect the rest of the flock.

Foucault shows how this pastoral power was institutionalized, transposed, and modified in third-century Christian communities in the form of precise mechanisms of organization based on the principle that “every individual, regardless of age, status, from the beginning to the end of his life and in every detail of his actions, should be governed and should let himself be governed, that is, be directed to his salvation by someone to which he bears a relation of global, but meticulous, detailed, obedience” (FQC, 37). Such techniques were centrally tied to the process through which Christianity as a religious community was institutionalized as a church. In contrast to the Hebraic context, here pastoral power deploys a fully developed art of directing conduct, of leading, but, according to Foucault, also of pressuring, of manipulating individuals throughout their lives and on a daily basis (see FC-STP, 168).⁸

Another transformation of pastoral power coincides with the emergence of the modern state and “insurrections of conduct” such as the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Counter-Reformation. Foucault shows how this form of power was politicized, giving rise to calculated and reflexive practices that aimed not to save souls, but to govern men, with, on the surface, a strategic appeal to truth motivated by political interests involving the violent and excessive exercise of power, whose pursuit needed to be concealed. This appeal to truth involves dogma, individualizing knowledge of individuals, and reflexive, tightly regulated techniques of governing (see FQC, 37). This form of power is visible in what Foucault describes as a “veritable explosion” of the arts of governing operative in the Christian pastorate, a development that involves both a secularization and an intensification (FQC, 37). On the one hand, there is an expansion into civil society beyond the church and ecclesiastical authority. It is raised as a philosophical problem in Descartes, for example, where it is a matter of how to regulate one’s thought in order to arrive at the truth. This question of conduct is also raised in a directly political sphere, in which the sovereign has the task of conducting the people. Here the pastoral power is no longer specifically religious or theological, but also philosophical and political (see FC-STP, 235–236). On the other hand, the religious forms of governing are intensified and expanded as pastoral power is exercised pervasively in daily life, through a multiplication and diversification of techniques introduced into various domains of life, for governing in contexts such as childhood pedagogy, hygiene, poverty, and domestic living, as well as in political life (see FC-STP, 235). In general, Foucault’s historical insight is that by the end of the seventeenth century, this shift resulted in most of the functions of pastoral power being incorporated into governmentality (see FC-STP, 201). The individualizing effect of pastoral power becomes subjugation, through the emphasis on the imperative to obey and the transposition of the role of governing from God or his representative, driven by religious motives, to the sovereign, driven by political ones.

Foucault maintains that the attitude of being critical arises in the context of this process of politicization of pastoral power, as what he calls a “counter-conduct,” a disposition and course of action taken by some in reaction to poor or excessive governmentalization. It is the permanently renewed interrogation, not about how to not be governed at all, but about “how to not be governed *like this*” – that is, to recognize deplorable and excessive principles, objectives, and procedures in techniques of governing and to defuse their effectiveness (FQC, 38; my emphasis). It is a way of thinking

and conducting oneself that limits, rejects, investigates, balances, or transforms abusive governing of oneself by others. In Foucault's view, this reaction is not simply a contingent historical fact, to be explained by external factors. The attitude of being critical is not a rejection of being governed from the outside, but a counter-attack from within the internal dynamic of its techniques of subjugation.

Although Foucault does not make the point himself, the dynamic between the governing of conduct and of counter-conduct is a particular case of a more general mechanism that Foucault identifies as characteristic of relations of power in general. It is presented in the methodological section of *The Will to Knowledge* as the principle that "where there is power, there is resistance" (FHS1, 125). This resistance is not exercised from a position of exteriority, but from within a network of relations of power, the existence of which "depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance" that function as "the other term," the "adversary, target, support" of the exercise of power in a given practice (FHS1, 127, 126). These points of resistance are not a massive refusal of the dominant position of power, but local, heterogeneous, and irregularly distributed conducts of resistance that can be "necessary, possible, improbable, spontaneous, savage, solitary, concerted, rampant, violent, irreconcilable, prompt to transaction, interested, or sacrificial" (FHS1, 126). They tend to be "mobile and transitory," and contribute to the density of the relations in a network of power by intersecting with institutions and apparatuses, social stratification and individuals, while finding their unity only in a "strategic codification" (FHS1, 127).

Given that Foucault takes this interdependence of an exercise of power and conducts of resistance to be a general fact about power, it comes as no surprise that the structure of the relation between governmentality and critique echoes the dynamic that he identifies within the pastorate from the outset, in its Hebraic form. Already in the Hebraic context, he finds "an immediate and founding correlation between conduct and counter-conduct" (FC-STP, 199). It is formed in relations "of confrontation, of hostility, of war" in the context of the generalized "inebriation of religious behavior" in the Middle East during the second to fourth centuries, such as in certain Gnostic sects, in a network of power relations in which they function as points of resistance (FC-STP, 198). Certain sects identified matter as evil, leading the believer either to "indefinite asceticism" and suicide in order to free oneself from matter, or to destroy matter by committing as much sin as possible (FC-STP, 198–199). There was also the theme of the negation of a world of laws, of the need to destroy the law, which led to "systematic infraction" of all laws, in order to overturn the reign of Yahweh (FC-STP, 199).

Foucault's analysis finds such correlation between conduct and counter-conduct during the Middle Ages, where there are particularly intense revolts from within pastoral power. There one can observe the formation of an internal crisis in pastoral power, in which it is "questioned, worked through, elaborated, and eroded" (FC-STP, 205). These forms of resistance, counter-conducts such as the ascetic communities that resisted the authority of the pastor on the basis of theological justifications, mysticism, the appeal to the Scriptures, and eschatological belief, are complicit in the exercise of the pastoral power they oppose (see FC-STP, 205–218). Foucault's suggestion is that the transformation in the network of power relations that resulted in the politicization of the pastorate and the emergence of governmentality was made possible by the crisis generated by these increasingly intense points of resistance within pastoral power. The

revolts against the pastoral programmed the general redistributions of power relations described above. However, within the new dispensation of power and the politicized arts of governing that emerged at the time of the Reformation, these counter-conducts did not disappear. Indeed, the exercise of this power depended on their renewal in different forms. Being critical can be considered Foucault's specification of the practices of resistance to governmentality. Thus, in Foucault's genealogy, being critical becomes possible historically as counter-practice, the "partner and adversary" of governmentalization (FQC, 38).

He provides three general sites of interaction between the arts of governing and the attitude of being critical. First, in relation to arts of governing that were still primarily religious and grounded in the authority of the church, being critical was *biblical*. In Wycliffe or Bayle, for example, it was an orientation to the Bible that set out to limit or to reject the authority of the religious teachers by a return to a direct study of Scripture. Access to the text allowed individuals to establish biblical truth for their own part, rather than merely accepting it on authority (see FQC, 38). Second, being critical as the counter-practice of being governed is *juridical*. Confluent with the tradition of natural right, here being critical involved contesting unjust laws by unmasking the fundamental illegitimacy of sovereign power, and vindicating "universal and imprescriptible rights" to which even the monarch is subject (FQC, 39). In a third register, being critical has an *epistemic* orientation. It rejects dogmatic claims to knowledge, and the certainty of claims to truth based on authority, accepting them only if one has grounds to do so oneself.

More specifically, Foucault provides several historical examples of counter-conduct to governmentalization, which are forms of pre-theoretical attitudes of being critical. Consider the conducts of resistance to war in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the conduct of desertion-insubordination in contexts in which combat in war had become a generalized political conduct expected of all citizens (see FC-STP, 201). He also calls attention to the existence of secret societies in the eighteenth century, such as the Freemasons, which functioned as forms of religious dissidence, and in the nineteenth century, pursuing political objectives such as plots, revolutions that aimed to establish a new social order, a new way of living (see FC-STP, 202). Finally, he evokes the dissent from medical practices since the end of the eighteenth century, ranging from the refusal of medication and means of prevention such as vaccines, to attempts to establish medical heresies around practices of alternative medicine such as the use of magnetism, herbs, and traditional approaches (see FC-STP, 203).

Foucault points out that, as in the case of the early dynamic of pastoral conduct and counter-conducts, the exercise of power and its points of resistance are in a field of relations of exchange and mutual support. The objectives of these points of counter-conduct are aligned with those of the governmentality they resist: "to refuse State reason and its fundamental demands" (FC-STP, 363). On this analysis, for both conduct and counter-conducts, "society is opposed to the State, economic truth to error, incomprehension, blindness, the interest of everyone to particular interest"; both conduct and counter-conducts affirm "the absolute value of population as a natural and living reality, security in the face of insecurity and dangers," and "freedom from regulation," as an expression of a revolutionary eschatology in which civil society would defeat the state (FC-STP, 363). In order to grasp the stakes of critique in all its breadth, it is

necessary in a Foucauldian perspective to consider it in the context of this socio-political field of conduct and counter-conduct.

Foucault's genealogy shows that the critical attitude arises at the intersection of religious and political practices, in a dense bundle of relations between power, truth, and subjectivity. Governmentalization in Foucault's language is "the movement whereby individuals are subjected to mechanisms of power that make a claim to truth" (FQC, 39). Like the religious Hebrew and Christian pastoral, this mobile political power is exercised on the totality of a mobile multiplicity, but unlike it, it involves making the imperative to obey central, and replaces the aim of salvation with a will to truth. As a counter-conduct to these arts of governing, being critical is "the movement whereby the subject gives himself the right to interrogate the truth about its effects of power and power about its discourse on truth" (FQC, 39). It is, as Foucault put it, "the art of voluntary inservitude," of "reflective indocility," whose primary function is "desubjectivation in the game of the politics of truth" (FQC, 39). Desubjectivation here is the objective of an attitude of dissatisfaction in the face of the excess that is justified by the need to violently lay claim to the truth. Here, being critical operates by freeing itself from the effects of this excessive exercise of power, by unmasking deceit in the conditions of possibility of its techniques, and thereby, in a certain respect, overcoming its limits.

The implication of these genealogical conclusions is that critique is a practice that comes from the Judeo-Christian rather than Greek tradition. Foucault's analysis shows that, when considered as an ontological attitude, a pre-theoretical way of life and mode of existence, its birthplace is a field of power relations exercised by the practices of governmentality, to which it is an internal foothold of counter-attack, at the time of the Reformation. As discussed, these arts of governing owe their existence to the pastoral practices of the Christian church, and biblical communities. However, these counter-conducts were not reflexively philosophically formulated as critique at the different points of their spontaneous invention as practice. Foucault finds the first theorization of this critical attitude in Kant's well-known 1784 essay on the Enlightenment, in which it is also exercised. The attitude defined by Kant as that of enlightenment is a theoretical formulation of the attitude of being critical that Foucault identifies in the context of the political arts of governing.

The Importance of Kant's "What is Enlightenment?"

Foucault's genealogy thus accounts for the emergence of the attitude of being critical as a political appropriation of a religious practice that takes place as an untheorized reaction to the excessive governing practices in the context of the Christian pastorate. However, as a discursive practice, he finds it emerging several centuries later, in Kant's essay on enlightenment. Despite its secondary importance for Kant scholarship, the piece is a historical touchstone for Foucault (he describes it as his emblematic fetish text: FC-GSA, 8). The opening lecture of *The Government of Self and Others*, Foucault's 1982–83 course at the Collège de France, identifies four reasons for the emphasis on this essay in particular.

The interest is prompted, first, by the resonance between its form and its content. The conditions of publication that centrally determine its formal characteristics as a

literary genre are intrinsically connected to what Foucault considers to be its “essential axis of analysis,” namely, the concept of an audience (*Publikum*) (FC-GSA, 9). The “Enlightenment” essay belongs to a substantial body of work by Kant in the form of journal articles, critical reviews, and polemical interventions. It is written as a journal article, a genre tightly regulated by institutional norms that addressed a wider audience than the technical discourse of his more narrowly philosophical writings. This is especially notable for Foucault, insofar as Kant’s definition of Enlightenment makes explicit his concept of an audience, of the codified relation between the author as scholar and the individual reader (see FC-GSA, 9). An audience in this sense is not an academic or an editorial relation, but a capacity, a form of expression of the intellectual communities, institutions, and academies and the journals they publish, and that determine “the relation between competence and reading in the free and universal form of circulation of written discourse” (FC-GSA, 10). An audience is neither an academic readership nor something like a contemporary television audience, but rather, Foucault explains, “a reality that is instituted and designed by the very existence of these institutions as scholarly societies, as academies, as journals, and whatever revolves in these circles” (FC-GSA, 10). Kant’s essay belongs to the genre of publication that is attached to an audience in this sense, to the concept it puts into play. Note that this circularity between content and form is echoed by the conditions of publication of the three principal *loci* of Foucault’s own discussions of Kant’s text: the 1978 lecture to the Société Française de Philosophie, the *Magazine littéraire* article, and the lectures at the Collège de France. In all three cases, Foucault is addressing an audience in the sense discussed.

A second source of interest in Kant’s essay for Foucault is also contextual. It concerns its relation to Mendelssohn’s essay in response to the same question, published three months earlier in the same journal, which Kant did not read prior to completing his article (see FC-GSA, 10). Foucault considers that these simultaneous responses to the question of Enlightenment mark a crucially important moment in the history of Western culture: “both Kant and Mendelssohn very clearly pose not only the possibility, not only the right, but the necessity of absolute freedom, not only of conscience, but of expression, in relation to anything that could be an exercise of religion considered as a necessarily private exercise” (FC-GSA, 11). Foucault refers to correspondence between the two thinkers some months earlier in which Kant praises Mendelssohn’s conviction that his religion can only be a matter of private concern, without proselytism or social authority, which is precisely the attitude that Kant holds that Christians ought to have with respect to their own religion (see FC-GSA, 11).

Foucault’s third point of interest in Kant’s essay is that he considers that it introduces “a new type of question into the field of philosophical reflection,” a new form of historical interrogation (FC-GSA, 11). Unlike the other modalities of reflection on history in Kant’s work – around the question of origin (such as the hypotheses on the beginnings of human history); around the question of achievement (such as his text on universal history from a cosmopolitan point of view); or around the question of finality (such as his text on the use of teleological principles) – his text on Enlightenment poses the historical question of “the present, of actuality, the question: what is happening today? What is happening now? What is this ‘now’ each one of us is inside, and which is the place, the point from which I write?” (FC-GSA, 13). Foucault maintains that the Enlightenment essay is not only the first time Kant himself has posed this

type of problem, but it also marks its emergence in the history of thought in general. Whereas, he points out, one finds references to the present in relation to specific historical situations, for example, in Descartes and Leibniz, they are inevitably introduced as motivations and pretexts for philosophical decisions, without reflection on the distinctive marks of the present itself (see FC-GSA, 13). Unlike prior historical interrogation of the present, for the first time, Kant's essay poses the question of "the present as a philosophical event to which the philosopher who speaks belongs" by introducing a threefold novel problematic, asking: (1) "what it is that in the present, actually makes sense for philosophical reflection"; (2) "what in this shows itself to be the carrier or the expression of a process . . . that concerns thought, knowledge, philosophy"; and (3) "what and how the one who speaks, as scholar, as philosopher, is himself a part of that process," and how "he has a role to play in the process in which he is himself both a part and an actor" (FC-GSA, 13–14). Here, Foucault suggests, "philosophy becomes the surface of emergence of its own discursive actuality for the first time" (FC-GSA, 14). It interrogates this actuality as an event of which it must make sense, specify the value and the philosophical singularity, "both its reason for being and the basis for what it says" (FC-GSA, 14). In the context of this type of interrogation, "the philosopher, in holding his philosophical discourse, cannot avoid posing the question of his belonging to the present," not only to "a doctrine or a tradition," not only "a human community," but a present, "a certain 'we' that is related . . . to a cultural group characteristic of his own actuality," and is the object of his own reflection, thereby making it impossible to avoid making a problem of his belonging to this "we" (FC-GSA, 14).

This threefold function of the conception of philosophical reflection that emerges from Kant's text – as surface of emergence of an actuality, as interrogation of the philosophical significance of the actuality to which it belongs, as interrogation by the philosopher of the "we" to which he belongs – is of enormous importance for Foucault: it characterizes philosophy as "a discourse of modernity" (FC-GSA, 15). While the question of modernity had been posed at least since the sixteenth century along a "longitudinal axis," as a pole of authority to be accepted or rejected in "a polarity between Antiquity and Modernity," Kant's text poses it along a "vertical axis" in which philosophical discourse accounts for its own actuality in order to find itself a space, determine its meaning, and specify its mode of action (FC-GSA, 15). Foucault sees Kant's definition of Enlightenment as the first time that a historical period named itself by reference to a specific event, rather than as a period of decadence or prosperity: "it is a period that designates itself . . . that formulates its own slogan, its own precept" (FC-GSA, 16). Thus Kant's essay is for Foucault the point of emergence of modernity as a question, a problem.

Foucault's fourth point of interest in Kant's essay is methodological. The attitude of being critical that it deploys theoretically was not confined to the eighteenth century. He considers it to be the point of departure of "a whole dynasty of philosophical questions," giving birth to "a way of philosophizing that has had a very long history over the past two centuries" (FC-GSA, 16, 21). Thus Kant's thought provides the first theoretical formulation and grounds of what Foucault considers to be "the two great traditions of critique that divided Modern philosophy" (FC-GSA, 21). These are, the analytics of truth, which raises the problem of the conditions of possibility of knowledge and truth such as one finds in analytic philosophy and cognitive science, and the attitude

of being critical, the ontological critique of ourselves, to which Foucault attributes a lineage that includes Hegel, Nietzsche, and the Frankfurt School, and in which he situates himself.

Foucault's Reading of Kant's "What is Enlightenment?"

Kant defines enlightenment as the process through which humanity leaves its state of minority, through which it comes of age, and reaches maturity (see Kant 1999). Foucault outlines three distinctive marks of this state: (1) it is a state to which humanity is constrained by the force of authority; (2) it is characterized by the incapacity to use one's own understanding without the guidance and direction of another; and (3) this incapacity is defined by a correlation between "an excess of authority" that maintains humanity in its state of minority, and "a lack of decisiveness and courage" (FQC, 40). Foucault points out that Kant's reflection, written as a newspaper article, is not merely historical and theoretical; it is of the order of an invocation, "a call to courage" (FQC, 40). Note that the three axes around which Foucault identifies the origin of the practice of critique as an attitude – the religious, the juridical, and the epistemological (scientific) – echo Kant's examples.

On Kant's account, Enlightenment is precisely the emergence from this state of "self-incurred minority" (Kant 1999: 8: 35). Foucault outlines a series of problems raised by this definition. He remarks that (1) as a form of historical discourse, this conception of Enlightenment has a very particular status. It is neither the identification of the age of the world to which the present belongs, nor a reference to an immanent event of which one can identify the presaging signs, or a moment of transition through which the present enters a state of permanent stability. It is, rather, the issue, the process through which the present is freed from a certain state with no indication of the state in which it thereby enters (see FC-GSA, 26–27). Foucault notes moreover that (2) Kant leaves the nature of the process indeterminate, specifying neither whether it is active or passive, whether it involves humanity as a whole or only certain societies or individuals. It is also significant for Foucault that (3) Kant's tone in the essay is both descriptive and prescriptive, invoking the courage to use one's own reason as both a distinctive mark and an order (see FC-GSA, 28).

Reflecting on what Kant means by a state of minority, Foucault reasons that it cannot be a matter of a natural incapacity belonging to something of the order of "the childhood of humanity," but must rather be "a default, a lack of willpower" (FC-GSA, 28). Nor can it be a politico-juridical state in which humans would be forcefully deprived of their rights against their will. It is rather the state of a culture in which individuals "do not want to conduct themselves, and in which others obligingly presented themselves to take them under their guidance" (FC-GSA, 29). It is a matter of voluntary dependence on an external authority. Foucault further explains Kant's conception of the state of minority in terms of the relation between the use of one's own reason and obeying others. It is a state characterized by the "vitiating relation" between the "government of oneself and the government of others" (FC-GSA, 32). Enlightenment rearranges this relation, allowing humanity to enter majority by rectifying the distribution between obedience and the use of one's own reason, on the one hand, and the public

and the private, on the other. Whereas, in the state of minority, one does not use one's own reason at all, but obeys in both the public and private sphere, in the enlightened state of majority one obeys in the private use of reason (as citizen, or in one's other social and civil functions) but uses one's own reason in its public aspect (as a subject in the element of the universal that addresses an audience) (see FC-GSA, 34–36). Kant illustrates the obedience characteristic of minority by specifying three ways of relinquishing authority to guide one's own behavior: by replacing understanding with a book, conscience with a director of conscience, and diet with a doctor (Kant 1999: 8: 37–9).

These examples of the state of minority allow Foucault to stipulate the relation in Kant's thought between Enlightenment and transcendental critique, suggesting that the authority of the book, the director of conscience, and the doctor correspond respectively to each of the three *Critiques*, of pure reason, practical reason, and judgment. There is a relation of mutual implication between Enlightenment and critique such that the two complete and require each other. The one is the reversal of the other in a "system of echoes" (FC-GSA, 32). For example, Foucault notes the resonance between Kant's idea that the state of minority in question is due to ourselves, and the critical objective to show the necessity of a certain form of illusion that we give ourselves, as opposed to the objective to dispel these illusions. Moreover, from the fact that Kant defines Enlightenment as "the moment at which humanity makes use of its own reason, without submitting to any authority," and that transcendental critique attempts to describe the conditions under which "the use of reason is legitimate to determine what we can know, what we can do, and what we can hope for," Foucault concludes that it is "the moment at which transcendental critique becomes necessary" (FDE4, 567). In this respect, the *Critique* is "the logbook" of reason that has reached majority in Enlightenment, and inversely, Enlightenment is "the age of the *Critique*" (FDE4, 567).

And yet, despite their interpenetration, in "Qu'est-ce que la critique?" Foucault shows that there is a gap between Enlightenment, which emphasizes the need for courage in the emergence from minority, as the transformation in a moral register of a state of laziness and pusillanimity, and transcendental critical philosophy, in which freedom is not a matter of doing something more or less courageously, but of taking stock of the fact that our own thought forms and limits our knowledge of the world. Therefore, in a context in which we are governed, rather than accepting when we are told to obey, by properly conceiving our own knowledge, "it is possible to discover the principle of autonomy and to no longer hear the *obey* ; or rather that the *obey* will be founded on autonomy itself" (FQC, 41). Foucault considers that Kant's invocation to courage and audacity in the context of Enlightenment would apply in an attenuated sense to the transcendental requirement to recognize the limits of knowledge, where it recedes into the background. The ontological dimension of the attitude remains latent, overshadowed by the epistemological objectives at the forefront of transcendental critique. Properly understood, it is a dysfunctional way of being critical, a mode of existence in denial of its practical structure and its personal, ethical motivations.

The distinction between transcendental critique and the attitude of being critical is decisive for Foucault's reading of the inheritance of critique in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in which the transcendental critical enterprise has had a much stronger presence than the attitude of being critical. This priority of the epistemological

over the invocation to courage in the history of critique, and in the relation between the two poles of critique involved in Kant's thought, manifests itself in three registers: (1) positivist science; (2) the state system that takes itself to be the rationality of history and takes the rationalizations of the economy and society as its tools; and (3) a science of the state modeled on positivist science (FQC, 42). This attitude of being critical that Kant described as Enlightenment, the individual and cultural attitude driven by the "decisive will" to not be improperly governed, is repressed and marginalized in transcendental critique, the fundamentally epistemological project of the three *Critiques*, which aimed to ensure that knowledge would have an accurate image of itself. Foucault himself urges that the most pressing task of being critical is to reverse this theoretical denial of the ontological motivations that condition it as a practice, and to interrogate knowledge in its relation to domination, abuses of power, and subjection to the politics of truth (FQC, 53).

Modernity as an Attitude

For Foucault, the innovation of Kant's essay is its interrogation of the present as a differential historical factor. He describes it as the *attitude of modernity*, a way to exercise the critical attitude's task of reversing transcendental critique's self-denial. Rather than a period of history considered linearly, standing between a pre- and a post-modernity, modernity thus conceived would be an *ethos*, a constant task always in tension with various attitudes of counter-modernity, defined by three distinctive marks: (1) "a mode of relation to the actual," (2) "a voluntary choice that some make," and (3) "a way of thinking and feeling, a way of acting and of conducting oneself" (FDE4, 568). Baudelaire best exemplifies this attitude for Foucault.

With respect to the relation to the present, the theme of heroism is central in the Baudelairean context. On Foucault's formulation, it involves the adoption of "a voluntary, difficult attitude" with respect to the fleeting dimension of temporality and history, which aims to "seize something eternal that is neither beyond, nor behind the present moment, but in it" (FDE4, 569). This aspect of the attitude of modernity that Foucault finds in Baudelaire involves a disposition to heroize the present that distinguishes it from fashion, which is integrated into the movement of time. As Foucault points out, however, this heroization is ironic: it refuses to "sacralize the passing moment" by immobilizing it and gathering it as "a fugitive and interesting curiosity" (FDE4, 569). Unlike the attitude of *flânerie*, in modernity one is not content to merely "pay attention and collect in memory" (FDE4, 569). The attitude of modernity attributes atemporal value in the present through "an exercise in which extreme attention to the real is confronted with the practice of a freedom that both respects and violates it" (FDE4, 569). It violates the present not by destroying it but by transforming it, negating it determinately, respectfully "capturing it in that which is" by "imagining it differently than it is" (FDE4, 570). For Foucault, in Baudelaire's conception of modernity as an attitude, the disposition toward the present is tied to a disposition toward oneself; it is an "indispensable asceticism" (FDE4, 570). To be modern is to take oneself to be a "difficult and complex object of elaboration." One must not discover oneself, but "invent oneself," and thus modernity does not liberate man, but "constrains him to the task of elaborating himself" in

artistic endeavor rather than in social or civic practices. This attitude is “not faith in a doctrine,” but “the permanent reactivation of an attitude . . . a philosophical *ethos* . . . a permanent critique of our historical era” (FDE4, 561). Foucault’s analysis of this attitude begins by specifying what it is not, alerting us to a pair of conceptual traps that threaten balanced consideration of the issue. He considers Baudelaire’s modernity to be an echo of Enlightenment in Kant’s sense. This correspondence makes it possible for Foucault to avoid a number of traps in the critical understanding of Enlightenment.

According to one widespread misconception, the question of Enlightenment is necessarily polarizing, involving an incitement to position oneself either for or against it. Foucault sees this as a kind of blackmail, which invites the mistake of considering the opposition between rationalism and irrationalism to be a disjunctive option. From his perspective, Enlightenment is not a doctrinal position to adopt or to reject, but a way to specify a multiplex historical reality constituted by a privileged *domain of analysis* (a set of decisive economic, social, and institutional events), an open *problem* (the relation between the progress of truth and the history of freedom), and a form of *philosophical reflection* (an interrogation of the present in its historical specificity and function in the invention of oneself). There is consequently a methodological imperative to take stock of the aspects of our actuality that are historically determined by Enlightenment through specific, local historical analyses that describe the “actual limits of the necessary,” our possibilities and impossibilities as autonomous subjects (FDE4, 562).

Another common mistake Foucault dispels is to confuse Enlightenment and humanism. The latter, he suggests is too “supple, diverse, and inconsistent” a theme for precise historical analysis, and tends to “color and justify” the conceptions of man to which it recurs, unlike Enlightenment, which is rather “the principle of a critique and a permanent creation of ourselves in our autonomy” (FDE4, 563). Consequently, on his view the two should be seen as in tension, rather than as identical.

By avoiding these misconceptions, a more satisfactory approach is suggested. Rather than something with respect to which we could be for or against, or of which we could be inside or outside, Foucault characterizes Enlightenment as a “limit attitude.” This allows him to specify the discursive dimension of being critical: “Critique is indeed the analysis of limits and reflection on them. But if the Kantian question was to know what limits knowledge must renounce transgressing, it seems to me that the critical question, today, must be reversed into a positive question: what part of that which is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, is singular, contingent, and due to arbitrary constraints?” (FDE4, 574). In the attitude of being critical, the experience of the necessity of the limit is transformed into a test of the possibility of crossing over to the other side. Thus, as a limit attitude, the aim of being critical is not to make metaphysics possible as a science by deducing universal forms – it is not transcendental in this sense – but to analyze the historical events that determine our capacities to do, make, think, and say with as much precision as possible. It is, in Foucault’s terminology, “genealogical in its finality and archaeological in its method” (FDE4, 574). That is, instead of deducing what we cannot do or say from the indispensable characteristics of our experience, it aims to project the possibility of being, thinking, and doing otherwise from the historical contingency that determines us (FDE4, 574). The goal of establishing metaphysics as a science is thereby replaced by the will to exercise the “indefinite work of freedom” (FDE4, 574).⁹ Foucault, typically for him, does not elaborate on this critical

conception of freedom. It is clear, however, that he is referring to the exercise of the capacity to do, say, and think otherwise; that is, to a conception of freedom based on spontaneity and autonomy such as one finds in Kant, a difficult exercise to be permanently reactivated, rather than a basic feature of reason, and with a view to effecting transformation, rather than generating regularity.

This capacity is exercised through the experimental dimension of the attitude of being critical. Foucault's view is that the work at and on our limits is circular. At a second order of consideration, it operates by opening new fields of historical reflection, whereas at a first order, it is alertly receptive to the specificity of actual reality, to the need for change and to the way to bring it about. This critical circularity between the theoretical and the reality that serves as its material requires that the fields of analysis remain local and fragmentary, provisional and to be perpetually renewed, but for Foucault it is indispensable that they remain so in order to protect the critical attitude from the socio-political dangers associated historically with globalizing aims. He submits that that "the pretension to escape the system of actuality in order to give whole programs of another society, another mode of thought, another culture, another vision of the world, has in fact only led to the most dangerous traditions" (FDE4, 575).

Foucault examines this critical work in terms of practice: not the way humans represent themselves, or the conditions that unconsciously determine them, but their forms of action, "what they do and how they do it" (FDE4, 576). These practices have both technological and strategic dimensions: "the forms of rationality that organize their ways of doing things," and "the freedom with which they act in these practical systems, reacting to what others do, modifying the rules of the game to a certain extent" (FDE4, 576). Finally, they are constituted around three interpenetrating axes that correspond to the three primary domains of analysis of his own historical work: relations of knowledge (the mastery over things), relations of power (toward others), and ethical relations (toward oneself).

Conclusion

By considering Foucault's elaboration of the sources of being critical as an ontological attitude, this essay has attempted to characterize his conception of philosophy as a critical and ontological attitude that orients a practice that is not only discursive – the historical analysis of practices in the three registers of experience – but one that takes stock of its own modes of existence: discourse, power, and being oneself. It is not possible to interrogate the most radical dimension of this way of understanding critique, that it is at base a mode of being and a way of life, without denaturing it, without addressing it in terms of what it is not, namely, as discourse. Here we have attempted to draw out the implications of the critical circularity of his work, and to attend to the specificity of his objects of analysis, in this case discursive and genealogical analysis of Kant's discourse. Consideration of Foucault's work in terms of power relations has also not been of primary concern here, although such investigation could well be undertaken, externally to his discourse, in terms of the networks of power relations that determine it as a political and institutional reality. Instead, we have given discursive attention to his discourse, with the challenge of taking seriously the echoes between

the reality it describes and the method it exercises. Fundamentally, its practice is not oriented discursively or politically, but ontologically, as a sort of permanent personal exercise, a mode of existence and a way of life. In Kant's text on Enlightenment, one does not find a direct formulation of his own method, but a historical analysis of an attitude of being critical that itself functions as the discursive logbook of the attitude. Is the implication of Foucault's reading of Kant on Enlightenment that Kant himself lived his critique as a mode of being and a way of life, or was he subject to transcendental denial of critique's ontological roots? Are we to take at face value Foucault's claim that his own discourse is fundamentally only a means to self-transformation and of being critical in general? Or is this a point on which we would do well to suspect a healthy dose of Foucauldian irony?

Notes

I would like to thank Andy Djaballah, Amar Djaballah, and the editors of this volume for their helpful comments on this essay.

- 1 Foucault gives various interchangeable names to this practice: the critical ontology of ourselves, the ontology of the present, the ontology of actuality, the history of the present, the historical ontology of ourselves, etc.
- 2 There is a formulation of this critical circularity in the context of the analysis of the apparatus of sexuality in FHS1, 119–120. The point is explored at length in Djaballah (forthcoming).
- 3 Gros 2006 provides a careful account of the main differences among the texts.
- 4 Kant figures decisively in the history of thought developed in *Madness and Civilization* (1966); see Djaballah (2008) on this issue. Questions related to the Enlightenment are addressed in the review of the French edition of Cassirer's *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment* in 1966 (see "Une pensée restée muette," FDE1, 545–550).
- 5 The difficult question of the relation between the two is beyond the scope of this study.
- 6 Foucault gives in-depth analysis of the pastorate and governmentality in the 1979 Tanner Lectures on Human Value ("'Omnes et singulatum': Vers une critique de la raison politique," FDE4, 134–161) and in the 1977–78 lecture cycle at le Collège de France (see FC-STP, 91–370).
- 7 See Psalms 23 and 80 for example.
- 8 Foucault uses the concept of conduct, in both active and passive senses, activities of conduction and the ways of being conducted and how we behave as being conducted (see FC-STP 196–197).
- 9 Foucault adds that critique as an attitude is not transcendental insofar as it does not aim to describe "the universal structures of all knowledge or of all possible moral action," but to analyze "the discourses that articulate what we think, say, and do like so many historical events" (FDE4, 574). It is worth noting, however, that this sense of transcendental is only one of the uses of the term in Kant; more generally it designates the level of description on which conditions of possibility of experience are described, and the form of reasoning that leads from experience to the description of its conditions of possibility. In this more general sense, it does not imply either universality and necessity, or impossibility rather than possibility, and thus it could perfectly well be used to characterize the critical attitude that Foucault endorses. Indeed, in Kant's *Critiques*, the positive side of the transcendental is emphasized as well as the negative, albeit without the transformative interest and historical awareness of

Foucault's genealogy. Foucault's concern, already detectable in MC, seems to be that as a methodological aim, transcendental reflection in Kant can be tied to the constitution of a metaphysics that would, perplexingly, be both post- and pre-critical. As it is often the case, the problem is based on a confusion between spatial and temporal conceptualization.

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Making History

CHRISTOPHER FALZON

It is risky to read Foucault in terms of familiar categories, because he tends to call such categories into question. So it is with the notion of history, which looms so large in his work. Most of his books are presented as histories, from *The History of Madness* (1961) to the last volume of the *History of Sexuality* (1984). They are certainly histories in the sense of being reflections on the temporal development of human affairs, on history. But caution is required here because Foucault also significantly remakes the idea of historical reflection, which includes challenging ways that philosophers have traditionally understood history. Moreover, in the course of his thinking, his own understanding of historical reflection undergoes significant transformation, out of which a new understanding of the relationship between history and philosophy emerges. This essay looks at some of the ways Foucault remade history and rethought the relationship between history and philosophy. It will look at Foucault's rejection, not only of traditional philosophical history, but also of traditional empiricist approaches to history. Then it will turn to his alternative view of history as the mapping of transformations of forms of thought. Finally, it will consider the transformations his view itself undergoes, from the "archaeology" of the 1960s, and the "genealogy" of the 1970s, to the "historical ontology of ourselves and our present" in the early 1980s, out of which emerges an understanding of philosophy in which historical reflection plays an integral part.

Let's begin, however, with a sketch of this final understanding itself. Towards the end of his work Foucault makes explicit what has really been a feature of his work throughout, that historical reflection for him is not external to the philosophical enterprise. His concern with history does not, as some have suggested (see O'Farrell 2005: 55), represent an unfortunate distraction from his philosophical concerns, or even an abandonment of philosophy altogether. Foucault's histories always serve a distinctly philosophical purpose. This is, however, an understanding of history that presupposes a rethinking of what constitutes philosophical reflection, and philosophy's relation to

history. Foucault's starting point, conceptually, and to a large extent chronologically, is a rejection of the kind of philosophy that seeks to identify unchanging essences that might ground or organize our thought and practices – as for example in Kant's transcendental critique. Philosophy so understood stands opposed to history, its target being ahistorical, universal, and necessary forms. Foucault's way out of this foundationalist or "metaphysical" (EW2, 379) form of philosophical reflection is to turn to history. His historical turn, therefore, is invoked in opposition to metaphysical thinking and is central to his own brand of philosophical reflection.

Abandoning absolute foundations in this way does not mean that we are left with no ground on which to stand, as if only forms of life grounded in the universal and necessary could be legitimate. Foucault insists that we cannot think or act without a framework, an order, of some sort. But what he also insists on is that no such order is necessary, universal, or fixed, that every human arrangement is historical and finite; it has emerged at a particular time and is also destined to pass away, to be transformed. Nor does this simply amount to a loss, a melancholy realization that everything we value and which defines us is doomed to disappear. Rather, it opens up a whole range of possibilities. First of all, no longer constrained to view history itself from the perspective of principles and forms that have to be considered universal, necessary, and timeless, it becomes possible to comprehend these forms in their historical development. The second implication of this historical finitude is that forms we live by can be changed, that it is possible for us to transform them, rather than being constrained to endlessly repeat ourselves. As Foucault put it in one of his last writings, historical reflection "will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think . . . it is seeking to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom" (EW1, 315–316). Indeed, he suggests, it is only through resistance, revolt, and transformation that there is anything like a history: "It is only through revolt that subjectivity (not that of great men but that of anyone) is brought into history, breathing life into it . . . it is because there are such voices that the time of human beings does not have the form of evolution, but of 'history,' precisely" (EW1, 452). To take the broader view, it is only through ongoing acts of resistance, transgression, and invention that the arrangements we happen to rely on at any particular time can emerge in the first place. History itself is this process of the emergence and transformation of forms; and if we are immersed in history, we also have a crucial role to play in making it.

In this context, to apprehend our current forms of thinking and practice as historically emergent and finite is to facilitate the transformation and invention of new forms that is constitutive of history. It is also to pursue what is in fact a quite traditional philosophical task, though in a new way – that of interrogating the presupposed or taken-for-granted in our thinking. Philosophical reflection on central categories like knowledge, action, and the self is pursued not by trying to grasp their general essence, or through an analysis of the concepts involved, but by looking at how particular forms of knowledge, action, and subjectivity have emerged in particular historical contexts. This both dispels claims these forms might have to universality and necessity, and opens up possibilities for changing them. The late emergence in Foucault's work of an explicit conceptualization of philosophy in which historical reflection plays an integral role also means that Foucault is able to clearly situate himself in relation to the position he began

by rejecting. His philosophical reflection is not simply a rejection but an inversion of Kant's transcendental critique, of the "anthropological turn" that seeks to raise human beings above history and turn them into the timeless foundation of their own thought and action (see e.g. EW1, 315). Foucault's critical reflection historicizes human existence, and aims to facilitate transformation, the work of "concrete freedom," and the continuation of the historical process. If history is at the heart of Foucault's brand of philosophical reflection, his philosophical reflection is also an instrument for historical change and transformation.

Beyond Philosophical and Empiricist History

Let us retrace the steps leading to this final understanding of philosophy and history. In rejecting a form of philosophical reflection that seeks timeless essences above history, Foucault also wants to escape from philosophical conceptions of history understood in terms of such essences. He calls his own approach an archaeology, in works like *The Order of Things* (1966) and the *Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969), and later a genealogy, in *Discipline and Punish* (1975) and *History of Sexuality*, volume 1 (1976). We will come to what differentiates archaeology and genealogy presently, but they are united in both being presented in opposition to what Foucault calls "continuous" or "traditional" history, the philosophical history that seeks to discern immobile forms beneath the historical world of accident and succession, to impose unity and purpose on historical practices, and to retrace the past as a process of continuous development. In particular he opposes a Hegelian-style conception of history centered on a suprahistorical subject. In the introduction to the *Archaeology of Knowledge*, continuous history is said to be the "indispensable correlative of the founding function of the subject," of Man as the originary maker of events (AK, 12). History so understood carries with it the promise of a finality in which everything that has eluded the subject will be restored, and humanity will attain the sovereign form of historical self-consciousness (AK, 12). In "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" (1971) he reaffirms his rejection of a form of history that assumes a "suprahistorical perspective," a history "whose function is to compose the finally reduced diversity of time into a totality fully closed upon itself . . . that always encourages subjective recognitions and attributes a form of reconciliation to all the displacements of the past . . . whose perspective on all that precedes it implies the end of time, a completed development" (EW2, 379).

But Foucault does not simply stand in opposition to Hegel. Hegel is himself a profoundly historically minded thinker, and like Foucault directs this historical self-awareness against Kant's transcendentalism. For Hegel the knowing subject cannot be construed as a self-contained unity outside the movement of history. The subject and the forms of reason or categories of understanding it employs have to be comprehended in their historical development (see McCarthy 1978: 53–54). Forms of understanding, categorical frameworks claiming to be complete and self-sufficient, are called into question by the apprehension of a "something else" that goes beyond them, an encounter that leads to the transformation of the framework. Hegel's emphasis on the historicity of forms of understanding finds its echo in Foucault. Indeed, the later Foucault locates his own work in a modernist tradition of historico-philosophical reflection, the histori-

cal ontology of ourselves and our present, that can count Hegel as a key figure (see e.g. PPC, 95). But Hegel also remains wedded to the notion of philosophy as a search for the timeless and essential, for the conditions in which true knowledge is possible, the second modernist tradition that Foucault identifies. This stands in some tension with Hegel's historical awareness. In his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* he himself points to an apparent contradiction in the very idea of a history of philosophy. Philosophy aims at understanding what is unchangeable and eternal, the Truth that "does not fall within the sphere of the transient, and has no history," whereas history tells of "that which has at one time existed, at another time has vanished" (Hegel 1995: 8). Hegel aims to resolve this contradiction by affirming the "Reason of history". History is no mere "collection of chance events, of expeditions of wandering knights, each going about their fighting, struggling purposelessly" (Hegel 1995: 19). Underlying historical events is a deeper continuity, as Reason and the Absolute Subject unfold and come to self-realization (see Lloyd 1984: 5).

The internal tensions in Hegel's attempt to incorporate history within a philosophy that privileges the ahistorical are instructive in relation to Foucault's own position. First of all, Hegel's philosophical history is unable to take history seriously. The historical is only acknowledged to the extent that historical movement is reduced to the continuous, unitary process of the Absolute Subject's coming to be, the unfolding of an underlying essence. That which appears to elude this subject is understood only in negative terms, as self-alienation to be overcome in due course. As Foucault puts it: "In actuality, dialectics does not liberate differences; it guarantees, on the contrary, that they can always be recaptured. The dialectical sovereignty of similarity consists of permitting differences to exist, but only under the rule of the negative, as an instance of non-being. They may appear as the successful subversion of the Other, but contradiction secretly assists in the salvation of identities" (EW2, 358). Since history is reduced to a function of the Absolute Subject, Reason, in comprehending history, only comprehends itself, and "transcendental-historical thinking" ends up as "tautological" (FL, 34). For Foucault, once the "historical sense" is mastered by a suprahistorical perspective, metaphysics can bend it to its own purpose, absorbing the "diversity and movement of history" into a "totality fully closed upon itself" (EW2, 379). Foucault rejects Hegelian-style philosophical history precisely in order to take history seriously, to acknowledge the historical as that which exceeds attempts at containment in an overarching system. To critics who argued that he is "killing" history, he emphasizes that what he is rejecting is a certain philosophical myth of history as a grand and extensive continuity, not history in general but a "history for philosophy" (FL, 54–55; see AK, 14).

A second internal problem for the Hegelian-style account is that, despite seeking to escape from the Kantian notion of the subject as a self-contained unity outside history, and comprehend it in its historical development, interpreting that history in terms of the Absolute Subject commits him to a standpoint that once again cannot be comprehended historically. Because there is nothing genuinely other, "outside" this standpoint, there is nothing that can figure in an explanation of how it might have come to be, or challenge its claims to all-encompassing supremacy. Taking history seriously, no longer reducing it to a function of a metaphysical standpoint, means that it becomes possible to envisage a history of things formerly thought to be outside history, things that are typically presupposed and made the basis for interpreting history – not least, the

supposedly foundational or constituent subject. One characterization Foucault gives of his genealogical approach is in these very terms:

One has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, that's to say, to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework, and this is what I call genealogy, that is, a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history. (EW3, 118)

Hence also: "I have tried to get away from the philosophy of the subject, through a genealogy of the modern subject as a historical and cultural reality" (EW1, 177). It is worth emphasizing that Foucault does not simply reject ordinarily presupposed notions like the subject or reason, dismissing them as fictitious epiphenomena. Rather, he questions their hypostatization in universal-transcendental terms, and seeks to apprehend them as historical and cultural realities, things of this world that can also change.

Foucault's turn to history to escape from a philosophy of ahistorical essences is thus also a rejection of a Hegelian-style philosophical history, in which history itself is subordinated to metaphysical absolutes. History is to be freed from metaphysics. For Foucault, the historical sense "can evade metaphysics and become a privileged instrument of genealogy if it refuses the certainty of absolutes" (EW2, 379). At the same time he is careful to distinguish what he is doing from Marx's efforts to "turn Hegel right side up" (Marx 1961: 20). For Foucault, Marx certainly reaffirms the historical in the face of idealist abstraction. In Marx, Hegel's Absolute Subject gives way to human beings participating in specific, historically developed social organizations; forms of subjectivity vary according to the historical conditions under which people live; and rationality is socially and historically embodied, grounded in the material conditions and historical forms of social life. But despite Marx's turn to a materialist history, like Hegel he falls into a renewed anthropologism. The Absolute Subject is replaced by species-being; and the history of the world as a rational process is replaced by Marx's view of history as moving in a certain direction through necessary and predetermined stages (see e.g. AK, 12–13). Once again a total history is envisaged, in which every event is to be explained in global, evolutionary terms.

In general, Foucault wants to escape from historicist interpretations of history, historicism understood not only as the expression of a philosophy that seeks to discern the essential and universal beneath the multiplicity of events, but as a particular way of doing history. In Maurice Mandelbaum's characterization, historicism requires that historical events can only be adequately understood as part of a process of development. "The thesis of historicism," he writes, "demands that we reject the view that historical events have an individual character which can be grasped apart from viewing them as embedded within a pattern of development . . . essential to historicism is the contention that a meaningful interpretation or adequate evaluation of any historical event involves seeing it as part of a stream of history" (Mandelbaum 1971: 43). It represents a distinctively nineteenth-century approach to history, exemplified not only in Hegel and Marx, but in figures like Herder, Comte, and Spencer. Hegelian idealism in particular was transferred into historiography via Wilhelm von Humboldt and Leopold von Ranke who, while rejecting an overall historical teleology, appealed to the

“historical idea” expressing the essential spirit of a historical period, to give coherence to historical events. For Humboldt historical events have an inner truth, and the historian’s role is to comprehend the inner structure of the historical individuality under study, the struggle of the idea to realize itself in actuality. Similarly for Ranke, human affairs embody a definite logic whose meaning derives from an invisible world of “leading ideas” (see Humboldt 1967; Ranke 1973).

Foucault rejects all forms of historicism. In the introduction to the *Archaeology of Knowledge*, he aligns himself with the French historians of science Bachelard and Canguilhem, who challenge the idea that science continually progresses, and develop the idea of scientific change through ruptures between distinct conceptual frameworks (AK, 4–5). He also points favorably towards the new history of Braudel, Ariès, and the Annales school, which even though it favored the analysis of centuries-long continuities (the *longue durée*), came to these continuities through an analysis of the fine grain of events, which were never subordinated to the “formless unity of some great evolutionary process” (AK, 230; see Dean 1997: 39; Rajchman 1985: 52–54). Despite their differences, they share with Foucault the desire to break from the nineteenth-century historicism of Hegel and Ranke. In this spirit, Foucault insists that we should set aside a priori, explanatory notions like evolution, mentality, or spirit of the age: “Nothing . . . is more foreign to me than the quest for a sovereign, unique and constraining form. I do not seek to detect, starting from diverse signs, the unifying spirit of an epoch, the general form of its consciousness, a kind of *Weltanschauung*” (FE, 55; see EW2, 302–303). He wants to avoid the “total history” that would “draw all phenomena around a single center – a principle, a meaning, a spirit, a world-view, an overall shape” (AK, 10). Such notions serve to deny the historicity of events, requiring them to conform to a preconceived metahistorical framework.

But if Foucault wants to avoid interpreting history through the prism of a metahistorical framework, he does not turn from this to an uncritical empiricism. He rejects the naive empiricist account of history as a matter of seeking to give the best possible account of the past as it really was, the conventional idea of historiography as a “reconstruction of the past,” using historical documents that are the traces of the reality which have been left behind (see Dean 1997: 14). The classic formulations of the historian’s task as a matter of “telling it like it was” also derive from nineteenth-century Germany. For Humboldt, the historian’s task is to “present what actually happened” (Humboldt 1967: 57); for Ranke, it is to re-create the past as it really was (Ranke 1973: 57). These pronouncements are, however, bound up with the philosophical idealism also present in their thinking. Much of Humboldt’s discussion concerns the idea that an “event . . . is only partially visible in the world of the senses; the rest has to be added by intuition, inference and guesswork” (Humboldt 1967: 57). Ranke similarly distinguishes between the careful focus on primary sources and rigorous principles of source-criticism needed to accurately represent past events, and the intuitive method needed to establish their “interconnectedness” and penetrate to the “essence” of an epoch (see Evans 1997: 25). In fact, then, their concern is not with the past as it actually was but as it essentially was, its inner essence or meaning. Nonetheless Ranke in particular, through his emphasis on empiricist methods, stands as the founder of empirical or “scientific” history. Interpretation may still play a role in this empirical history, to discern what Ranke calls the interconnectedness of facts; but it is an interpretation

“solidly grounded in the facts of history,” one that aspires to portray the past as it actually was (see Megill 1979: 457).

For Foucault, such history is epistemologically naive. Instead of an uncritically empiricist history, devoted to uncovering the facts even if the role of interpretation is acknowledged, Foucault insists that there is no fact that is not already an interpretation (EW2, 275). Everything is already a secondary source, in the sense that the available historical records have already been selected and organized through practices of conservation and organization undertaken in a particular present. In the *Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault affirms that history does not turn to documents as “inert material,” the by-product of a past that serves as its memory, in order to recapture that past. Rather, it is the active marshaling, ordering and organizing of historical resources, of the traces the past leaves behind, by the present society (AK, 7; see Dean 1997: 15; Rajchman 1985: 81). History may still be a form of knowledge, a discourse, but knowledge for Foucault is itself not simply a passive uncovering or description of facts but an active invention, an attempt to impose order on a chaotic world (EW3, 7, 9; see Kelly 2009: 19). There are echoes here of Kant’s critique of empiricism in favor of a conception of knowledge as an active construction. In a more Nietzschean mood, Foucault speaks of this interpretive activity as a “violation”: “knowledge can only be a violation of the things to be known” (EW3, 9). We must conceive of discourse as “a violence that we do to things . . . or, at all events, as a practice we impose upon them” (AK, 229). Here, the ordering is not merely discursive. Knowledge is now complicit with power, and what counts as knowledge, i.e. what sort of empirical data is selected and organized, and what is marginalized or excluded, is both governed by and supports institutionalized disciplinary systems (see O’Farrell 2005: 87).

History as a form of knowledge or discourse is complicit in contemporary systems of power to the extent that it provides interpretations of the historical record that filter and organize it through the framework and categories of the present. In doing so it finds the echoes and anticipations of the present in the past, and thereby provides legitimations for present social orderings. As Mark Poster puts it, such history “gives support to the present by collecting all the meanings of the past and tracing the line of inevitability through which they are resolved in the present” (Poster 1984: 74). The past becomes a continuous story of progress towards the present, the present order comes to be justified as the culmination of the past, and its ruling categories are affirmed. Not only empiricist but also idealist history is at risk of this complicity. A naively empiricist history that claims to be simply disclosing the truth of the past fails to acknowledge the role of interpretation and organization in the constitution of the historical record, while an idealist or historicist history turns existing categories into universal, transcendental principles underlying historical existence, around which all historical phenomena are supposed to coalesce. Both empiricist and idealist history, to the extent that they are blind to their entanglements in the present, serve to legitimate it.

An Alternative View of History

It might be thought that Foucault’s rejection of a naive empiricism, and the quasi-Kantian emphasis on the role of organization and interpretation in the determination

of the facts, is going to lead him back to a new kind of idealism, and a new kind of idealist or historicist history. Such a reading also provides another basis for the charge that Foucault is “murdering history,” this time from the empiricist side: the charge that Foucault abandons objectivity and reduces all history to a function of the historian’s present. For example, Richard Evans, in *In Defence of History*, sees Foucault as part of the postmodern assault on objective truth, as someone for whom history is merely “a fiction of narrative order imposed on the irreducible chaos of events in the interests of the exercise of power” (Evans 1997: 196; see also Megill 1979).

It seems clear, however, that Foucault wants to distance himself from all forms of idealism. First of all, the organization and selection constitutive of knowledge are not undertaken by a foundational subject standing above history. Rather, they come about through an ensemble of discursive and non-discursive practices. In Thomas Flynn’s characterization, this framework is a preconceptual, anonymous, socially sanctioned body of rules that govern one’s manner of perceiving, imagining, judging, and acting (Flynn 2005: 34; see EW3, 225). In the archaeological phase of his thinking, where the focus is on the history of discursive practices in particular, Foucault refers to this ordering framework as the “episteme” (OT, 157), “archive,” or “historical a priori” (AK, 127). It is the set of rules or patterns of discursive practice regulating what can be known during a certain period. As he moves into his genealogical phase in the 1970s, non-discursive practices of organization, division, and exclusion, practices of power, are seen as contributing to the production of bodies of knowledge or “regimes of truth,” which in turn provide legitimation for those non-discursive practices. Foucault’s concern here is no longer primarily epistemological but shifts to social ontology; moreover, knowledge acquires a political dimension. Like Kant, then, Foucault is interested in the a priori conditions of thought and action, but as the reference to “historical a priori” suggests, in Foucault’s eccentric neo-Kantianism (see Deleuze 1986: 60) these are not the timeless categories of the transcendental subject but historical conditions constituted through the discursive and non-discursive practices of a culture. They emerge historically and are susceptible to transformation, and their emergence and decline are the subject matter of Foucault’s histories.

Secondly, that which is ordered is not simply reducible to a function of that ordering. Society is not wholly captured by its organizing frameworks, or subject to an inescapable tyranny. In the most general terms, there is a reality external to the ordering framework, even if that reality cannot be wholly separated from the framework through which we have access to it. As Mark Kelly notes, the very notion of discourse as violence towards things presupposes those things; one can only order what is there, and even then only to a certain extent (Kelly 2009: 22). If we could order the world any way we wanted, if it were entirely passive and malleable, it would have no independence and the effort of organization would be unnecessary. Thus when it comes to the analysis of madness, criminality, or sexuality, Foucault never claims that these things are reducible to the discourses about them, that they don’t exist “outside the text” or are simply the creation of an oppressive society, a construction of power. Though not wholly independent of social conditioning, they have a real material basis in the bodies, capacities, and behaviors that come to be “objectivized” through various discursive and non-discursive practices (see HS1, 150–157; EW3, 238). Moreover, this material reality is not simply a passive substrate, yielding unresistingly to power. Despite suggestions that

Foucault envisaged a bleak world wholly subordinated to all-embracing systems of power, such a vision would render the multiple strategies and techniques of social ordering unnecessary. The independence of social reality is manifested in its inherently resistant character. While bodies are shaped by discourses and ordering practices, there is intractability in them such that they do not simply yield but elude and resist particular forms of interpretation.

This resistance in turn does not amount to an absolute escape from interpretation, a complete repudiation of all forms of order. Rather, it is manifested in ongoing demands for change within the social body, which lead to modifications in its organizing practices. The social space itself is constituted not as a harmonious whole under some all-embracing organizational principle, but by multiple conflicts, “agonistic” power relations. If there were no resistance to ordering practices, it would be difficult to explain social change, or indeed the very emergence of social order. Concrete forms of social ordering emerge and are transformed through the interplay between forms of ordering and forms of resistance. This brings us back to the theme of history. Generally speaking, it is only because the human objects of discursive and non-discursive forms of ordering are not reducible to mere functions of those ordering frameworks that history itself is possible, history as a realm of change and transformation. As Colin Gordon puts it, if this human material were not inherently resistant, “history itself would be unthinkable” (Gordon 1980: 255). This is the idea behind Foucault’s point noted at the outset, that it is only because of revolt that the time of human beings does not have the form of an evolution but precisely that of a history.

In this context we can situate Foucault’s historical reflection, which maps the emergence and decline of these ordering frameworks. Here Foucault combines recognition that one’s starting point imposes an interpretation with the insistence that what is interpreted is not wholly reducible to that interpretation. He wants to avoid “presentism,” the projection of a structure of interpretation from the historian’s own context into the past being studied (see Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 118). That would be a return to the traditional history that reads the past as a continuous narrative culminating in the present. Against presentism Foucault insists he is not seeking a “history of the past in terms of the present,” but a “history of the present” (DP, 31). This involves turning to the past precisely in so far as it is not reducible to the present. For Foucault the very idea of history presupposes difference, as “the past can only be an object of study if it is different from the present” (O’Farrell, 1989: 36; see AK, 8; EW2, 300). In his histories Foucault looks to that which resists containment in a continuous narrative, that which is discontinuous, different, strange, threatening (see Poster 1984: 74–76, 78). Where continuous history explains away or suppresses difference, Foucauldian history is a “countermemory” (EW2, 385), recalling difference in order to formulate a genuine history of the present. In the interests of bringing out this difference, Foucault suspends all categories and principles that might be employed to give unity to the past. He refuses to take them for granted, to assume they reflect some timeless essence, transcendental form, or enduring human nature. Thus, rather than subjecting the matter of history to an interpretive framework that goes unquestioned, this approach aims to develop a historical account of the interpretive frameworks informing our thinking. Foucault attempts to “conceive of the *Other*,” the otherness of the past, “in the time of our own thought” (AK, 12).

This concern with identifying difference is evident in both the archaeological and genealogical versions of Foucault's thinking. In the archaeological version, Foucault suspends the subject as foundational, and the correlative notion of a "total" history of continuous development, in order to find difference in a "population of dispersed events" (EW2, 302–303), the field of discursive acts, spoken and written statements in all their diversity. This also reveals relations between statements, and the set of rules that determine what statements can be made at any time, which is to say, the discursive formation or archive that governs the truth and falsity of statements that can be uttered in a particular discourse. Foucault also identifies difference, i.e., ruptures or discontinuities, between discursive formations. Archaeological history thus uncovers the conditions for knowledge in specific frameworks that have undergone radical transformations in the course of time. The apprehension of past systems also brings into relief the present system of statements in its historical specificity, as different from "what we can no longer say" (AK, 130). At this point Foucault characterizes his historico-philosophical reflection as a "diagnostic" enterprise, in the sense of a form of knowledge that identifies difference, and holds that philosophy should "diagnose the present, describe how our present is different, and absolutely different, from that which is not it, in other words from our past" (FL, 53, see 95; AK, 206).

Foucault's genealogical reformulation of his historical approach radicalizes the identification of difference. While archaeology historicizes frameworks of understanding, it imposes its own kind of unity on history. It sees the discursive formation as capable of constituting a historical epoch in its totality, and that which is organized as subservient to that framework. Consequently changes between frameworks, and the emergence of our own, cannot be explained. They arise though mysterious global mutations, as wholly new forms of thinking absolutely different from the past. The genealogical perspective not only contextualizes discourse in non-discursive power practices but also offers a more thoroughgoing appreciation of difference. In the face of continuous history, genealogy finds difference in multiple practices of power, organizing practices that are themselves engaged in a conflict of interpretations in so far as efforts by one side to order the other are met by resistance and counter-strategies. Out of these conflicts, overarching, relatively stable forms of social organization emerge; and these forms also come to be transformed through ongoing resistance and conflict. Once again Foucault aims to give a historical account of forms of organization, only now they do not arise discontinuously, through sudden global ruptures, but emerge and are transformed in a piecemeal way, through the play of power relations. Above all, there is a history of the emergence of the present, out of multiple encounters and struggles that "gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us" (EW2, 374).

This genealogical history of the present is inevitably also a critical one. It already stands in an oppositional relationship to the present to the extent that Foucault looks for difference, for that which resists containment in a continuous, unified narrative culminating in the present. The history that results in turn shows the present framework currently presupposed in our thinking and action to be historically singular, finite, an "event," calling into question its claims to necessity, universality or inevitability. In "Questions of Method" (1980) Foucault makes this critical import clear. His historical analysis, he says, is designed to rediscover "the connections, encounters, supports, blockages, plays of force, strategies and so on which at a given moment establish what

subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal and necessary" (EW3, 226–227). What Foucault calls genealogical "eventalization" means "making visible a singularity at places where there is a temptation to invoke a historical constant, an immediate anthropological trait, or an obviousness which imposes itself uniformly on all" (EW3, 226). Something that is historically emergent and specific in this way is also shown to be susceptible to transformation. By undermining the necessity or universality of existing forms of thinking and practice, genealogical reflection has a role to play in current resistance and struggle that seek to bring about change, freeing those involved to imagine different practices and forms of life.

Foucault thus offers a view of history that is neither a philosophical, idealist history nor an empiricist, scientific one, but a history in which the principles that underpin continuous interpretations of history are themselves apprehended as historically emergent and singular. Neither a history of the past in terms of the present nor a straightforward uncovering of the past, Foucauldian history incorporates a concern for the past, for identifying that which is different in relation to the present, with a concern for the present, using the past to provoke a defamiliarization of the present.

First of all, there is a concern with the past, in that Foucault's historical researches are always motivated by the concern for truth. They make use of "true documents" and demand "relentless erudition" (RM, 137; EW2, 370; see O'Leary 2002: 87–88). This is not to forget the present, in that Foucault questions the idea that we can ever have wholly unvarnished access to the past, in the manner of naive empiricism. The "facts" we encounter have already been interpreted from the standpoint of our present. The historical record is already a "fiction," in the sense that the historical materials have already been selected and organized in various ways (O'Farrell 2005: 84). However, as has been noted, despite the emphasis on interpretation, Foucault does not see the past as simply reducible to, a mere construction of, the present. In the face of accounts that start from what are taken to be universal categories and turn history into a continuous narrative, Foucault suspends the notions behind the "postulate of continuity" in order to seek out and highlight precisely that which does not fit the story – that which is different, discontinuous, divergent, dispersed events, multiple conflicts and struggles. This implies a "meticulous and patiently documentary" approach, a close examination of the historical record, apprehending historical events in their specificity, rather than imposing a ready-made ordering on those events (EW2, 369; see Flynn 2005: 10–11). Hence, as Foucault puts it in "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," the historical sense becomes a "privileged instrument of genealogy if it refuses the certainty of absolutes"; and in so far as it does so, "it corresponds to the acuity of a glance that distinguishes, separates and disperses; that is capable of liberating divergence and marginal elements" (EW2, 379).

In keeping with his distrust of universals, the ready-made and *a priori*, and his concern to examine historical events in their specificity, Foucault also characterizes his approach as "nominalistic". His nominalism is explicitly conceived as a position that stands in opposition to claims about universals, and to the "historicist reduction" that subordinates history to universals, turning instead to individual, concrete practices (C-BB, 3). This in part embraces the ordinary sense of nominalism, as the doctrine that only particular individuals exist. There are no universal structures underlying the multiplicity of historical practices. However, as Flynn points out, Foucault's nominal-

ism is distinctive in that he is also concerned with understanding general forms of order and classification (Flynn 2005: 32). Indeed, he is not only concerned with apprehending the past as a dispersed field of particular events, but also with the present, with formulating a history of the orderings and unities that characterize it. Some have seen a conflict between Foucault's programmatic emphasis on finding difference and dispersion and his practice of telling large historical stories of the emergence of present forms (see e.g. Curthoys and Docker 2011: 187). But the latter are not a recourse on his own part to the total, continuous histories he so stridently rejects so much as retrospective reconstructions of the emergence of existing frameworks that highlight their specificity, contingency, and fragility. Foucault's account is nominalist not to the extent that he denies general forms or categories, but in so far as he aims to understand them in terms of concrete practices, starting from the "details of what was said and what was done" (Veyne 2010: 10), as emerging historically out of concrete encounters and struggles, and to that extent, as themselves historically specific.

Thus Foucault's historical approach is nominalist in that he refuses to take as "given" anthropological universals like madness, sexuality, Reason, "Man," along with universals traditionally employed in historical and political analysis like sovereignty, the people, the state. Rather: "my starting point is the decision, at once theoretical and methodological, that consists in saying: suppose that universals simply do not exist"; and "instead of deducing concrete phenomena from universals, or instead of starting with universals as an obligatory grid of intelligibility for certain concrete practices, I would like to start with these concrete practices and, as it were, pass these universals through the grid of these practices" (C-BB, 3). So something like madness might be supposed not to exist as a universal category: "In these circumstances, what kind of history can be devised for these disparate events and these diverse practices that are apparently classified as some supposed thing called madness?" (C-BB, 17). The key genealogical notion of power is itself treated in this nominalistic fashion: "power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of relations of force immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization"; and in order to arrive at a "grid of intelligibility" for the social order "[o]ne needs to be nominalistic no doubt: power is not an institution and not a structure . . . it is the name one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society" (HS1, 92–93).

Foucault's histories of the present thus amount to a nominalist reversal, seeking to historicize the universals presupposed by historicist history. This concern with the present is also a concern to interrogate the present, to undermine the self-evidence, necessity, and universality of its ruling forms, to eventalize and defamiliarize them, and open up the possibility of changing them: "It is a question, basically, of presenting a critique of our own time, based upon retrospective analysis" (Foucault 1971: 192). However, this is not a critique that forgets the past. Certainly, he is not interested in giving a full account of the past; he is interested in the past in so far as it can serve to challenge the present. This is not, however, to reduce the past to a function of the critical enterprise, to say that Foucault is not interested in what happened, that the only criterion is that the history is useful for contemporary political debates and struggles. That is Jürgen Habermas's criticism, that although Foucault's genealogy rejects the presentism of traditional history that reads the past in terms of the present, because genealogy is the relativistic unmasking of the truth claims of all knowledge, it is forced

to instrumentalize the past in terms of the needs of the present; and so becomes a species of the very presentism it seeks to avoid (Habermas 1987: 278, 249–251, 276–278; see Dean 1997: 28). However, for Foucault it is the traditional reading of history that instrumentalizes it to support the present. He is interested in that which resists this instrumentalization, which does not fit into the continuist story, and which informs a different history that can historicize and have critical effects in relation to the present. So it is not the requirements of the critique of the present that determines what constitutes history, but the history informed by what is different from the present that engenders critique. History is not “whatever promotes transformation”; rather, it is the transformations of forms of thought and action that constitute history.

Transformations in Historical Understanding

At the same time, as is evident from the shift from archaeology to genealogy, Foucault’s conception of historical understanding also undergoes transformation in the course of his work. What this implies is that while his histories consistently look to that which resists containment in continuist historical narratives, he himself is imposing a certain theoretical interpretation on the historical story, a framework for making sense of it, a certain “way of looking at things” (HS2, 11), and one that changes. Foucault refers in this connection to the “grid of intelligibility” being employed, not only in the historicist account he wants to reject, but also in his own account.

If the historicism Foucault opposes starts with “universals as an obligatory grid of intelligibility for certain concrete practices,” his historicizing approach changes the focus to concrete practices in order to account for the form or coherence that social existence exhibits (C-BB, 3; see also EW2, 462–463). This shift in focus means that the anti-historicist historian is employing a different grid of intelligibility or interpretive framework, which singles out the kinds of practices through which forms of order are established. Here, rather than interpreting the coherence of social practices in terms of some underlying, transhistorical principle, the practices are understood as bringing about their own organization. To that extent the grid is both a theoretical framework that the historian imposes on the practices being studied, and the practices themselves acting to bring about particular orderings of social reality. It is Foucault’s conception of this framework that changes. In other words, the view, crucial to his understanding of the historical emergence and transformation of social order, that what is ordered or interpreted is not simply reducible to a function of that ordering, is also maintained in relation to his own interpretive framework. Although there are points where the framework he is using does become totalizing and limiting, in terms of the kinds of practices that can be picked out, he refuses to be confined to any one framework. He remains open to different kinds of phenomena that call for a transformation of that framework, a “theoretical shift” (HS2, 6), in order to acknowledge them. A number of these shifts can be identified in his work. Which is to say, his way of looking at things, of making sense of history, also has a history.

On this reading, the archaeological version of Foucault’s historical analysis is characterized by recourse to the episteme, the discursive formation, as the framework of analysis. In these terms he looks to statements, discursive practices, in order to deter-

mine the rules that must be in place for them to operate, the particular epistemes or sets of discursive rules that govern them, and the transformations of these epistemes. However there is a totalizing aspect to this approach in that it only singles out discursive practices. Also, as noted before, a particular discursive formation is understood here as capable of organizing a historical epoch in its totality, and the statements it organizes are entirely subordinated to it, so it becomes difficult to see how historical change, the transformation of the episteme, is possible. This way of interpreting history ultimately works against Foucault's historicizing strategy. With the subsequent shift to genealogy, however, discourse is decentered; non-discursive practices of power come into view and provide a context for discourse. This shift in focus reflects a theoretical shift, a change in the framework of analysis being employed. The episteme is now reformulated as the "specifically discursive" form of a more general apparatus (or *dispositif*), which encompasses non-discursive as well as discursive practices; that is, a "coupling of a set of practices and a regime of truth" forming "an apparatus . . . of knowledge-power" (C-BB, 19; see PK, 194–195, 197). It is now, above all, mechanisms of power that provide the grid of intelligibility for the social order (HS1, 93). From this point of view, what historical analysis picks out is the interplay of power practices, bound up with forms of discourse, through which the overall order is established, and also comes to be transformed.

But genealogy is not the end of the story. There is a further theoretical shift, which inaugurates the last phase of Foucault's work, as the limitations of the genealogical focus on power become apparent. There, while what is organized is not wholly subordinate to forms of organization, and there is room for resistance as one side of the power relation, and hence the possibility of historical change, the notion of resistance remains undeveloped. Forms of liberation, in so far as they involve affirming an "essential self" against power, only seem to entangle us more completely in systems of power. We identify with a self that has in fact been constructed by those systems. This is the position of *Discipline and Punish*, and the first volume of the *History of Sexuality* (see especially HS1, 155–157). The subject only appears in terms of its role in subjection; there is no room for talk of a resisting or free subject. In his late work, however, it is the subject that becomes the focus, the self conceived in terms of "ethical" self-relations, practices, or techniques of the self (see HS2, 26–28; TS, 18). Discourse and power practices are now both decentered and conceived in terms of their role in relation to the self, so understood: thus, "it is not power, but the subject, that is the general theme of my research" (EW3, 327; see also EW1, 177). This further shift in focus reflects another theoretical shift, which Foucault details in "The Subject and Power" (1982), and the introduction to the *History of Sexuality*, volume 2 (1984). Foucault now views history in terms of three axes or dimensions through which human beings are turned into subjects: through forms of discursive practice, power practices, and their own practices of the self (EW3, 326–327; HS2, 6; see also FR, 336–338; EW1, 262–263, 318). The aim of historical analysis is now to pick out the discourses, power practices, and practices of the self that go into making us who we are, and to "create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects" (EW3, 326). Foucault still sometimes characterizes this history as a genealogy (HS2, 5, 6; EW1, 262), but he now also refers to it as a historical ontology of ourselves (EW1, 315).

This final shift in focus to the self allows Foucault to continue the historicizing reversal characterizing his approach, and to bring it into direct opposition to the traditional,

foundational conception of subjectivity. Rather than a transcendental, timeless essence or human nature that imparts unity and continuity to history, the subject emerges historically, as human beings become the objects of discursive practices, power practices, and practices of the self. However, with the acknowledgment of the further dimension of self-practices, there is now room to talk of the subject as something more than a product of power, to talk of a free subject. Our self-practices may be such as to entangle us in a system of power and knowledge, internalizing, and subordinating our behavior to, its norms; but as the effort to break from and reinvent oneself, they can play a part in resistance to that system, and the transformation of its forms of thought and action (see EW3, 336). The second and third volumes of the *History of Sexuality*, which focus on picking out the forms and transformations of self-relation in antiquity, remain relevant to the historical and critical understanding of the present, and to current forms of resistance and struggle. They show the historical singularity of present forms of self-relation, their emergence out of a history in which they have taken different forms, and played different roles in relation to power and discourse; and thus bring into question the necessity of relating to ourselves in a way that ties us into the present network of power and knowledge. In so doing they open the possibility of relating to ourselves in a different way, a crucial element of contemporary forms of resistance.

Foucault's final theoretical perspective also allows him to bring his own theoretical activity fully into view, to situate his own historico-critical reflection in relation to the historical practices he is reflecting on. At the archaeological stage of his thinking it is not clear where he stands. He describes epistemes, including his own, seemingly from a position of complete detachment. With the genealogical shift, Foucault no longer sees himself as detached from the social practices he analyses. Genealogy recognizes that its own present has been produced by the historical developments being studied. The archaeological move is not abandoned, but is now situated as a "moment" in genealogical analysis; Foucault now effects a partial detachment from his situation, stepping back from specific practices in order to genealogically trace their emergence, and putting this knowledge to work to subvert those practices (see PK, 85; Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 124–125). Genealogy is called for when something in one's situation has become politically problematic, a focus of power struggles, and works to unsettle ways of thinking about the situation, calling attention to its contingency and potential changeability. Historical reflection thus becomes a political weapon, useful in the context of power, resistance, and conflict that it seeks to comprehend.

The final turn to practices of the self makes it possible for Foucault to understand his historico-critical reflection itself as a kind of practice of the self, a "mode of relating to contemporary reality" (EW1, 309), a historical ontology of ourselves and our present. It gives impetus to what he can now speak of as the "work of freedom" (EW1, 316), understood not as a form of reflection that seeks to establish the unchanging grounds of one's thinking and actions, the limits of what one can legitimately know or do, the transcendentalist project, but one in which one strives to "get free of oneself," to reveal the limits of one's thinking to have been constructed, and explore what can be changed in oneself and one's present. In "What is Enlightenment?" (1984) Foucault presents this work of freedom as the overall goal of his historical ontology of ourselves, a critical self-reflection incorporating both the archaeological and the genealogical. It is archaeological in the sense of treating the "discourses that articulate what we think,

say and do" as historically emergent and specific events; and genealogical in the sense of promoting, through the apprehension of the contingent character of "what we are" the possibility of transforming ourselves in practice, the possibility of "no longer being, doing or thinking what we are, do or think" (EW1, 315).

In his late work, Foucault is also in a position to explicitly acknowledge his historico-critical reflection, this practice of the self that promotes the work of freedom, as a "philosophical exercise". This is philosophy itself understood as "an exercise of oneself in the activity of thought" (HS2, 9). It is a way of relating to oneself, "the critical work that thought brings to bear on itself . . . the endeavor to know how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently, instead of legitimating what is already known." In more familiar terms it is the traditional philosophical task of questioning the taken-for-granted in our thought and action, and freeing oneself from the grip of dogma. In Foucault's terms, this traditional philosophical task is to be undertaken in a new way, through the use of history, through historico-critical reflection. Foucault thus arrives at a conception of philosophy in which historical reflection has an integral role to play. This form of self-reflection is clearly distinguishable from philosophy as a transcendental reflection on the conditions of possible knowledge and action. It is also distinguishable from historical reflection understood as an empiricist discovery of the past. As Foucault puts it in the introduction to the *History of Sexuality*, volume 2,

[T]he studies that follow like the others I have done previously are studies of 'history' by reason of the domain they deal with and the references they appeal to; but they are not the work of a historian . . . It was a philosophical exercise . . . The object was to learn to what extent the effort to think one's own history can free thought from what it silently thinks, and enable it to think differently. (HS2, 9)

The recourse to history as part of a philosophical exercise is not unique to Foucault. Indeed, he now identifies himself not only as a philosopher but as part of a modernist philosophical tradition that flows from the Enlightenment, and from Kant in particular. This is not the Kant who introduces the "analytics of truth," the foundationalist project concerned with determining the conditions of possibility of knowledge and truth. Foucault remains firmly opposed to this form of critique. However, Foucault also discerns something else in Kant, especially in Kant's short article "What is Enlightenment?" (Kant 1983): here, thought begins to question itself as to its history and place, to raise the question of the present. In this Foucault sees Kant as introducing the second great critical tradition in modern philosophy, that of the ontology of ourselves, the historical ontology of the present (see PPC, 95; EW1, 309; EW3, 335). This tradition informs the turn to history that is a feature of the thinking of Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche. Even if it is all too readily subordinated to the other tradition, to a reinstituted foundationalism, this tradition remains as a continually reappearing challenge to that foundationalism, turning it on its head and inverting it. And, Foucault suggests, it is the "form of philosophy that, from Hegel, through Nietzsche and Max Weber, to the Frankfurt School, has founded the form of reflection in which I have tried to work" (PPC, 95; see also EW3, 335–336).

Thus Foucault finally comes to see his turn to history not only as a philosophical exercise but also as part of a historical tradition in modern philosophical thought. In

that sense it is itself a historically specific form of thought. But perhaps we can also, in the end, see it as an insight into our essential condition. This is not to see it as a gesture towards a renewed transcendentalism so much as recognition of the abiding historicity of our existence, the inescapable finitude of every human idea and practice. If so, this is the most fundamental sense in which Foucault can be said to turn to history. His historical analyses represent a mode of philosophical self-reflection appropriate to a thoroughly historical being, one who is both made by and makes history.

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Part III

Power and Governmentality

Power, Resistance, and Freedom

JON SIMONS

Introduction: Between Opposition and Affirmation

Foucault's work contributes innovatively, controversially, and sometimes enigmatically to conceptions of how power operates throughout society. Most of Foucault's thought is posed in terms critical of modernity, portraying its forms of power as unduly constraining. He urges us to "refuse what we are," associating his project with all those who struggle against their subjection, against "a form of power that makes individuals subjects" (EW3, 331). Much of Foucault's work until 1976, his studies of madness and psychiatry, medicine, punishment and delinquency, and sexuality, focuses on forms of power that subject us, those being forms of power that he later came to characterize as entailing "states of domination" in distinction from other forms of power that he termed "strategic relations" and "techniques of government" (EW1, 299). Critics for whom "power" and "domination" are synonymous regard Foucault as a prophet of entrapment who decries "power" yet sees it as ubiquitous and ineluctable. On this interpretation, Foucault cannot explain how it is possible to struggle against or resist such power; he neither can nor does judge forms of power and resistance normatively; and he cannot conceive of freedom.

Foucault's political project, however, is not merely oppositional. At the very point when he formulates his aim as the refusal to be what we are, he also proposes an affirmative project, to promote "new forms of subjectivity" (EW3, 336). To be a subject does not entail subjection to domination, there being other forms of power in which subjects are constituted freely. Certainly, Foucault is unconventional in that he does not conceive of freedom – or resistance – as the opposite of power. He is indeed critical of modern forms of power, but towards the end of his life Foucault portrayed his critical work in terms of a modern, enlightened "philosophical ethos [that] may be characterized as a *limit-attitude*." This philosophical critique seeks "to give new impetus . . . to

the undefined work of freedom” by means of a “historical analysis of the limits imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them . . . a patient labor giving form to our impatience for liberty” (EW1, 315–319). The limits which concern Foucault are the limits of discourses that have the status of truth, the limits of our modes of subjectivity, the limits of our actions and thoughts. Limits can be limitations that constrain and subjugate to the point of domination, yet limits are also conditions of possibility for discourse as well as subjectivities. Rather than striving to transcend all limits, the critical question for Foucault is which limits to knowledge and life should be resisted, and which are enabling. Attending to these aspects of Foucault’s work and in contrast to the reading of Foucault as a gloomy analyst of modernity as inescapable domination, other commentators interpret him as an advocate of resistance to power and a philosopher of freedom (Rajchman 1985).

This essay follows the second line of interpretation without disregarding the first, arguing that Foucault developed sophisticated analyses of power relations of which domination is but one aspect. Foucault did devote much attention in his most widely read books, such as *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality*, volume 1, to modern forms of power relations that tend to congeal into states of domination, but the first interpretation is partial, being supported only in reference to a certain period of Foucault’s work in the 1970s. Moreover, the first interpretation overlooks that Foucault’s conceptualization and analysis of power relations develops through tension with itself, such that he not only critiques modern forms of dominating power, but also advocates resistance as a practical possibility within them, and conceives of freedom as an aspect of power relations rather than their opposite. Across Foucault’s work a productive struggle operates (in a way that is similar to the strategic relations of power), between “power” and “freedom,” between constraining and enabling limits, though the latter, along with “resistance,” are not conceptualized as fully and convincingly as the former. The purpose of the essay is to explain, through the tension between them, the coherence of these conceptualizations of power and resistance, which remained works in progress until Foucault’s death.

A useful way to grasp some key developments in Foucault’s thinking about power is to follow one of his retrospective assessments of his work as genealogical critique. According to Foucault, “three domains of genealogy are possible . . . truth . . . power . . . ethics” (EW1, 262), genealogy being, in brief, the way he characterizes his historical critiques of limits or conditions of possibility. The interaction of these three axes determines the conditions of possibility and limits of subjectivity. The axis of truth refers mostly to the human sciences which offer objective knowledge in fields of inquiry such as mental illness and which define and categorize human subjects. Power is the most amorphous field, as it includes political structures, systems of rules and norms, techniques and apparatuses of government, dividing practices, and strategic relations between subjects who act upon each other. The axis of ethics involves not only a relationship to oneself, or self-constitution as a moral agent, but also recognition of oneself as a subject of, for example, sexuality or madness. Though the emphasis in any genealogical account may be on one axis, only by taking into account how all three interact can one can provide a full genealogy of any subjectivity (EW1, 116). Foucault’s conceptualization and analysis of power, therefore, are closely connected to the phenomena of truth and subjectivity, the latter entailing a consideration of ethics as well as power. There is continuous

development and revision of Foucault's conceptualization of power, resistance, and freedom, between the axes of truth, power, and ethics, rather than discontinuous breaks between periods of his work.

Foucault claimed in 1982, after shifting to the third axis of genealogy, ethics, that his goal had not been to analyze power but the modes by which humans are made into subjects. Yet, even at the point at which he appears to downplay his studies of power relations, he explains that when power is exercised and political technologies are deployed, individuals are made into subjects, that being the form of power that many contemporary struggles resisted (EW3, 331). Power, then, along with the other axes, constitutes the conditions of possibility for our subjectivities, while genealogy conducted according to these axes is "an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework" (EW3, 118). Such power produces a subject who is both "subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge," these being the "two meanings of the word *subject*" (EW3, 331). The first meaning implies power as coercion and domination by an other, while the second refers to the constraint of being limited by one's identity. The second meaning implies some degree of self-subjection, indicating that the power axis is also related to the axis of ethical relation to oneself. Genealogical analysis and critique of power relations thus examines how subjects are constituted by others and how we participate in constituting ourselves as subjects, whether under the states of domination and subjection, or through ethical relations that can include practices and strategic games of liberty.

The essay first outlines some of Foucault's conceptualizations of forms of power, focusing on discipline and biopower. In doing this, I also attend to Foucault's key concerns with the relation between power and truth, as well as the crucial role of power relations in constituting human subjects. This first section thus explores the extent to which Foucault understood modern power relations to be constraining limits, inhospitable to freedom. The second section focuses on some of Foucault's general conceptualizations rather than specific historical analyses of power and resistance. Here I explain that he understands power as the strategic relation of forces, a struggle between "power" and "resistance." The third section follows Foucault's conceptualization of power relations as more expansive and complex than domination, by focusing on his notion of power as governmentality and his understanding of ethics as a power relation with oneself. In the final, fourth, section Foucault's affirmative conceptualization of power relations in the forms of liberty and freedom, not only resistance, comes to light. The section argues that Foucault's theorization and practice of resistance and liberty illustrate that, under contemporary conditions, resistance is the most viable way to practice freedom.

Power Relations as Domination: Power/Knowledge, Discipline, and Biopower

This section will focus on Foucault's analysis of the second axis of power during the mid-1970s, but it is important to understand the relation of this axis to the truth axis. Prior to his focus on the axis of power, Foucault analyzed the limits imposed

by discourse, especially the discourses of the human sciences, by conducting historical critiques of the discourses of psychiatry, medicine, and punishment in his books *History of Madness* and *The Birth of the Clinic*, and in his lecture courses at the Collège de France from 1973 to 1975 (C-PP; C-AN). The connection between the axes of truth and power became apparent only when the limits of discourse were considered along with non-discursive conditions of possibility, such as “institutions, economic processes, and social relations” (AK, 164). This connection is developed through Foucault’s power/knowledge thesis, explained below.

According to the power/knowledge thesis, “‘Truth’ is linked in a circular relation with systems of power that produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it” (EW3, 132). Specific genealogical analyses show the contingent manner in which certain rational discourses became true by presenting historical versions of the systems of exclusion that determine what is true or false. There is a will to truth because a vast range of social practices, such as economics or punishment, seek to justify themselves by reference to a true discourse (PPC, 107). It is because “we are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth” (PK, 93) that “the political question . . . is truth itself” (EW3, 133). One of the aims of *Discipline and Punish* was to understand “in what way a specific mode of subjection was able to give birth to man as an object of knowledge for a discourse with a ‘scientific’ status” (DP, 24).

Exploring the power/knowledge thesis, Foucault, in *Discipline and Punish* and *History of Sexuality*, volume 1, analyzes the simultaneous emergence in the early nineteenth century of the modern human sciences and of certain new “technologies” for the government of people. There is a correlation between power and knowledge which “directly imply one another . . . there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations” (DP, 27). The relation between power and knowledge is also constitutive (EW1, 203) in that power relations and scientific discourses mutually constitute one another by rendering the social world into a form that is both knowable and governable. According to Foucault’s “rule of immanence,” if something was “constituted as an area of investigation, this was only because relations of power had established it as a possible object” and power can only be exercised over something that “techniques of knowledge and procedures of discourse were capable of investing in. Between techniques of knowledge and strategies of power, there is no exteriority” (HS1, 98). Methods of government render phenomena (such as an expanding number of people) into objects that are amenable to scientific study (such as population). Simultaneously, scientific methodologies provide knowledge of these objects that renders them amenable to government. Thus Foucault analyzes the entanglement of the truth (human sciences) and power axes as he focused on disciplinary and biopolitical forms of power relations, thereby tending to situate modern knowledge on the side of domination and subjection.

In *Discipline and Punish* Foucault conceptualizes a mode of power, discipline, that subjects people according to scientific definitions, making them fit in to the types of person defined by criminology, for example (DP, 24). “Discipline makes individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise” (DP, 170). It produces “both a productive body and a subjected

body" (DP, 26), the workforce for industrial capitalism, coordinating the accumulation of people with the accumulation of capital (DP, 221). Discipline involves a range of detailed, meticulous techniques for the subjection of the individual that constitute the "micro-physics of power" (DP, 26). Individuals are formed through training, which is conducted by means of three simple instruments, "hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement and . . . the examination" (DP, 170).

Discipline is not merely of local interest as its "penitentiary" techniques of government were applicable in other institutions that assumed a carceral character, especially schools and factories. In other words, a whole series of institutions became prison-like in that they used the power to punish infractions of their rules as their main mode of management, a power which then spread throughout society. "The carceral archipelago transported this technique to the entire social body" (DP, 298), punishing deviance from bourgeois legality through the power of normalization (DP, 308), which is a form of power requiring adherence to norms. The norm is both a statistically determined standard of behavior administratively required by disciplinary institutions, such as schools, hospitals, armies, and prisons, and what is considered as moral law. Moral-legal norms do not disappear but are colonized by the administrative and statistical norms determined by power/knowledge regimes, such that it becomes morally "right" to follow a norm determined scientifically. As its purpose is not only to punish illegal acts, this "normalizing judgement" is appropriate to the fields of education, health, and production too (DP, 183–184). Everyone is judged according to whether or not they meet the norms of particular institutional settings, such as academic progress, recovery from illness, or productivity at work. Each of these apparatuses is "intended to alleviate pain, to cure, to comfort – but . . . all . . . exercise a power of normalization" (DP, 308). Punishment becomes an extension of the "right" to supervise, train, correct, and improve. Deviations from the norm are punished as if they are violations of the law. Not only the excluded and abnormal pay the cost of normalization, but everyone who is constituted as normal. Modern Western society is not disciplined, but it is disciplinary, meaning that even though the goals of disciplinary programs are not achieved, power is exercised according to them.

Although Foucault conceives disciplinary power (and biopower) in terms of domination and subjection, he does not regard them as merely negative and oppressive forms of power. Rather, "power produces: it produces reality, it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth" (DP, 194); it constitutes subjects. In the case of discipline, the particular individual subjected to and produced by the techniques of the penal system is the delinquent, who fits into a typology of deviancy, as a character that does not conform to the norm. The delinquent is not simply the author of a crime, but a member of a sub-species whose crime can be explained as part of his being, his character, and his upbringing (DP, 251–255). The broader apparatus of disciplinary normalization constitutes a vast range of subjectivities according to "dividing practices" that distinguish "the mad and the sane, the sick and the healthy, the criminals and the 'good boys'" (EW3, 326) – in brief the normal and the abnormal.

In the same period that Foucault refined his notion of disciplinary power, he also developed the concept of biopower in the context of his study of modern Western sexuality. Foucault posits disciplinary power and biopower as complementary or overlapping conceptualizations of power suitable for analyses with different foci. The power

associated with sexuality is productive because it enhances life forces. Whereas the paradigm of pre-modern sovereign power was its right to take the life of whoever challenged it, thus being a merely extractive and subtractive power, modern power is exemplified by “the right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life” (HS1, 136). Biopower deals with social hygiene, rates of fertility and mortality, and birth control (HS1, 25), being concerned with the generation of life, which calls for regulation of the biological processes of the population as a whole, or a biopolitics, whereas discipline normalizes individual bodies. “The discipline of the bodies and the regulation of the population constituted the two poles around which the organization of power over life was deployed” (HS1, 139). Discipline is a generative power in that it produces docile and productive bodies. Regulation is generative in that it produces a healthy and vigorous social body (HS1, 147) through its administration and optimization of life (HS1, 137).

Rejecting the “repressive hypothesis,” according to which all but reproductive sexuality was repressed for the sake of capitalist production and bourgeois order in the nineteenth century, Foucault argues that there was an “incitement to talk about sex” (HS1, 23) which developed into objective, scientific truth about sexuality (HS1, 58). Moreover, rather than restricting sexuality to the legitimate couple, the Victorian government of sexuality caused a proliferation of what it considered to be perversions (HS1, 37). From the mid-eighteenth century the bourgeoisie affirmed itself as a class in its efforts to overcome these implanted perversions, thereby “creating its own sexuality and forming a specific . . . ‘class’ body with its health, hygiene, descent and race” (HS1, 124). The bourgeoisie produced itself as a class-race by subjecting itself in relation to a recently invented sexuality, and only later was normalized sexual hygiene and conduct imposed on the working class as form of “class racism” (HS1, 125–127). Sexual perversions were thought to undermine the hereditary stock of the class-race, while eugenic programs could enhance “an entire capital for a species” (HS1, 118). The life of the species became a political issue. State-directed racism was born in the later nineteenth century as biopower was deployed throughout the population (HS1, 119). Nazism is the “most cunning and most naive” case of biopower, combining not only disciplinary and biopower in its enhancement of the Aryan race, but also the old sovereign right to kill and a pre-modern, aristocratic “symbolics of blood” whose purity was endangered by enemies of the race (HS1, 149). Yet Foucault argues that the play between the affirmation of life and the right to kill functions to some degree in all modern states, both capitalist and socialist (C-SMD, 259–261). Biopower became a dominating form of power, responsible for the worst and most murderous oppression of the twentieth century.

In his work on sexuality and biopower, Foucault brings out both meanings of “subject.” In the first sense of being subject to control, the particular subjects formed through the apparatus of sexuality were the hysterical woman, the masturbating child, the perverse adult, and the Malthusian couple (HS1, 104). The sexual attributes of these persons were extrapolated to create a whole identity, including constituting homosexuality as a species. The woman was medicalized, the child pedagogized, the pervert psychiatrized, and the couple socialized, within sexual technologies of discipline, surveillance, and regulation combined with new medical, pedagogic, and economic knowledges of sex (HS1, 104–105, 116). But at the same time, the second sense

of “subject” – being tied to an identity – entails self-subjection in this case because of the power/knowledge apparatus of sexuality, especially the “scientia sexualis” according to which “the individual constitutes and recognizes himself *qua* subject” (HS2, 6). Normalization operates in relation to biopower too, as the norms of sexuality by which we define ourselves, are quasi-scientific, being derived from biology and physiology, sciences about the body (HS1, 154–155). The modern mode of subjection superimposes scientific norms on moral standards, so that our sexual ethics are defined by scientific truth.

Discipline, biopower and normalization developed as dominating forms of power in that they infiltrate so deeply and persistently into the lives of populations and individuals. The extent of modern government and modes of subjectivity is obscured, however, by narratives of emancipation that incite us to seek our liberation through strategies that actually intensify our subjection, attaching us ever more deeply to constraining modes of subjectivity. Foucault mistrusts the theme of liberation in so far as it refers back to the idea of a repressed human essence (EW1, 282). But “the individual is not a pre-given entity which is seized on by the exercise of power. The individual, with his identity and characteristics, is the product of a relation of power exercised over bodies, multiplicities, movements, desires, forces” (PK, 73–74). Foucault’s apparent claim that there is no possibility of achieving freedom through sexual liberation (HS1, 159) is easily read as a denial of any liberation or freedom whatsoever, yet it is actually an analysis of how certain ostensibly oppositional moves are “nothing more, but nothing less . . . than a tactical shift and reversal” of biopower (HS1, 131). So if not in reference to liberation, how could modern power, as epitomized by the combination of discipline and biopower, be resisted?

Power and Resistance

To address the question of how resistance is possible requires attention to Foucault’s general conceptualizations of power and resistance rather than their specific manifestations. To begin with, Foucault does not consider power to be evil and hence does not anticipate a society without power (EW1, 298). This non-normative approach, and his loose use of the term “power,” has confused commentators and critics of Foucault such as Taylor (1984) who, as Connolly (1985: 369) points out, makes his case against Foucault’s allegedly incoherent conceptualization of power by translating it into his own vocabulary, according to which “‘power’ . . . is linked with the notion of the imposition on our significant desires/purposes.” By his own admission Foucault was not careful, in his work of the mid-1970s to which Taylor refers, to distinguish between “power relations” and “domination” (EW1, 299). Yet even as he analyzed the constraints of modern forms of power, Foucault was not dreaming of a world without power.

Generally, power relations are not evil because they are conditions of possibility for society and subjectivity, which would not have any form without relations of force that govern them, in Foucault’s distinctly relational conceptualization of power (EW3, 340–342). Power relations are both enabling and constraining limits, as Foucault had earlier realized when writing in the 1960s his historical critiques and analyses of discourse,

notably *The Order of Things* and *Archaeology of Knowledge*. The guiding question of those studies is: what constitutes the unity of discourses such as medicine, grammar, or political economy? There are sets of presuppositions, which Foucault calls epistemes, that elevate perception to the level of objective knowledge. To ask what is “the law of existence of the terms [of discourse], that which has rendered them possible” is to ask not about codes but “events” (FL, 39). Particular discursive events occur because of “the system that governs the appearance of statements as unique events” (AK, 129). Such a system consists of “rules of formation for all its [the discourse’s] objects . . . operations . . . concepts . . . theoretical options” (FL, 34–35). Rules of formation are conditions of existence for a particular discourse (AK, 31–39), which constitute a system that enables statements to become intelligible or significant. “‘Truth’ is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of statements” (EW3, 132). Yet the rules of regulation of discourse are not only limits that enable the truth to be told, but also constraints. They govern what may be said, in what mode (scientifically or not), what is considered valid, what is considered appropriate to be circulated in the educational system or another public setting, and who may say what (AK, 118–120, 14–15).

Discursive formations are also enabling limits in that they constitute the authorial subject as a position within themselves. The subject or author cannot be considered as the foundation, origin, or condition of possibility of discourse, but can be defined as an element within a discursive field, a particular space from which it is possible to speak or write and which must be filled if the discourse is to exist (AK, 95–96). For example, the subject of a discourse such as medicine is a function of legal rights, criteria of competence, institutional relations, and professional hierarchy. The limits of discourse thus simultaneously enable and constrain authorial subjectivity, just as other power relations are conditions of possibility for subjectivity.

Another reason that power relations are not evil, which emerges in Foucault’s work on the axis of power, is that they are “interwoven with other kinds of relations (production, kinship, family, sexuality) for which they play at once a conditioning and conditioned role,” and hence “power is co-extensive with the social body” (PK, 142). Power does not emanate from any particular evil agent, whether the state or a dominant class or other social group, but from the whole network of power relations (PK, 98–101). Political subjects who exercise power, whether individual or collective, are positions or “vehicles” (PK, 98) within “a multiple and mobile field of force relations” (HS1, 102). The relationship of power is not primarily a “relationship between ‘partners’” or “a confrontation between two adversaries” (EW3, 340–341), but operates over fields of force relations that govern actions according to power strategies that are “the totality of the means put into operation to implement power effectively or to maintain it” (EW3, 346). Such power strategies deploy political technologies (discipline, biopower), by coalescing various components of power relations: “mechanisms, effects, their relations, the various power-apparatuses” (C-SMD, 13). Both the specific techniques and the general technologies attempt to govern the actions of “multiple bodies, forces, energies, matters, desires, thoughts, and so on” (C-SMD, 28). Foucault conceptualizes a whole “physics” of power relations, a swirling or even chaotic field of energies and forces that are governed, constituted into form, by strategic power relations.

Within this conceptualization of power relations and strategies, struggle plays a key role. "Every power relationship implies, at least in potentia, a strategy of struggle" (EW3, 346). Strategy concerns the objectives of winning or victory in games or wars, with each strategy aiming to overcome other strategies, to command the field of forces, to govern the actions within it. So, strategy implies struggle between forces confronting each other. When Foucault asserts that "where there is power, there is resistance" (HS1, 95) he refers to the relational character of power, to the confrontation of strategies, to actions on other actions, to the apparatuses, techniques, and technologies that come up against each other and additional forces as they attempt to govern. Each power relation seeks to extend itself to the point where it "can direct, in a fairly constant manner and with reasonable certainty, the conduct of others" (EW3, 347). As it does so, it confronts other forces, whose resistances are not only "a reaction or rebound . . . doomed to perpetual defeat," but the key term in the strategic dynamic of struggles (EW1, 167), or the "odd term in relations of power . . . an irreducible opposite" (HS1, 96), that strive themselves to become the winning strategy (EW3, 347).

As a corollary to the above, power relations do not exist when the struggle ceases, when there is no resistance to the strategy of government from the actions of others. Power cannot be a physical determination, and thus "slavery is not a power relationship when a man is in chains." Foucault would have made this point more clearly had he stated that slavery is a power relationship,¹ whereas the chains are a "physical relationship of constraint" (EW3, 342), which like violence, is an instrument or result of the exercise of power (EW3, 340). Similarly, power relations reach their limit "in a type of action which reduces the other to total impotence" (EW3, 347). In this sense, too, power is not an evil opposed to freedom.

Foucault does not claim that resistance always does become the winning strategy, merely that resistance always confronts power relations and is never exterior to them (HS1, 95). It is not possible to escape power *per se*, but resistance to any particular strategy is a necessary condition of power relations. This conceptual insight is not, however, entirely apparent from *Discipline and Punish* and *History of Sexuality*, volume 1, in spite of his retrospective guideline to analyze power relations starting from "the forms of resistance" to them (EW3, 329). For some readers, his genealogy teaches us that the whole of history is "a single drama" of "the endlessly repeated play of dominations" (FR, 85). Baudrillard (1980) and Dews (1987: 188) suggest that in his substantive historical works of the 1970s Foucault tends to depict the operations of power from the perspective of the programs of the power/knowledge regimes, such as Bentham's panoptical scheme. Foucault is on this view induced to overestimate their success in normalizing the whole social body (McNay 1992: 39). Given that modern forms of power tend towards domination, in the form of disciplinary society, biopower, and the individualizing/totalizing doublet of modern political governmental rationality, Foucault's research often does imply entrapment.

Yet Foucault struggles against this implication at the same time as he conceptualizes modern subjection. He claims that resistance occurs because power relations do not solidify into states of domination so complete that they become physical determinations and subject people to the point of impotence. Since power comes from below in its micro-physical forms (HS1, 94), composed of different tactics and heterogeneous

techniques, “power is in reality an open, more-or-less coordinated (in the event, no doubt, ill coordinated) cluster of relations” (PK, 199). Power relations are always fragmented, competing with each other and operating in different sites along different lines (HS1, 94–95). Foucault, however, does not conduct a sustained analysis of the fragmentation and inconsistencies of contemporary modes of government and subjection.

A second reason why resistance occurs, according to Foucault, is that although power relations are ubiquitous (HS1, 94), the same system of power relations does not fill the whole field of forces. As a consequence, as individuals we are not constituted as only one subject in a form that is “always identical to itself” (EW1, 290), and we may act as different types of subjects, which is one of the reasons we can act ethically and freely, by exercising power on ourselves. Foucault does not hold that our subjectivities are constituted by one dominating set of power relations, or that resistance is a capacity created by power relations (Kelly 2009: 119–121). In Foucault’s conceptualization, while strategies of power aim to govern the whole field of matter and energies, there is always more of the latter than the former can govern. One of the ways in which Foucault characterizes this intractability of the social world is in terms of a “plebs” which “is not a real sociological entity” but “something in the social body, in classes, groups and individuals themselves which in some sense escapes relations of power, something which is by no means . . . primal matter, but rather an inverse energy” (PK, 138). An example of this would be the “bodies and pleasures” that Foucault suggests could serve as “a base of operations” for a “counterattack against the deployment of sexuality” (HS1, 157, translation modified).

A third reason why resistance is always possible has to do with the limit of power relations themselves. All regimes and structures of power reach their limit when people “prefer the risk of death to the certainty of having to obey,” which is “that moment when life can no longer be bought, when the authorities can no longer do anything, and when, facing the gallows and the machine guns, people revolt” (EW3, 449–450). No power can continue to rule over people who refuse to be intimidated by death. When a regime becomes merely destructive, it ceases to govern (EW3, 340). This does not mean that the willingness to die is always the basis for a winning strategy against domination, but to some extent, all political power is conditional upon the cooperation and obedience of its subjects, who always have the potential to withdraw their consent and thus defeat tyrannies (Sharp 1985: 151). Foucault argues that such revolt stands in the way of “utterly absolute” power and anchors all forms of liberty (EW3, 449).

Foucault’s conceptualization of resistance is truncated compared to his work on power because he did not study resistance historically in as much detail as power. He did, however, pay attention to a synonym for resistance, “counter-conduct,” in his lectures on the development of the Christian pastorate, as part of his genealogy of modern pastoral power. Foucault argues in this case that power does not precede resistance, but “the pastorate developed in reaction to” these different modes of conduct, there being “an immediate and founding correlation between conduct and counter-conduct” (C-STP, 195–196). Resistance is not merely reactive. Moreover, as effective resistance, counter-conduct was incorporated into the pastorate, remaining “an element of struggle throughout the history of Christianity” and a “border-element” that it later “re-utilized” (C-STP, 207, 215). Foucault identifies a “component of

counter-conduct . . . in delinquents, mad people, and patients" (C-STP, 202), those who resist modern subjection through a series of struggles against the very forms of modern, subjecting governmentality that have developed since 1968, struggles including the feminist movement, campaigns against parents' power over children, the medicalization of social problems, anti-psychiatry, and general opposition to the administration of daily life (EW3, 330–332). The actions of those subjected to discipline, normalization, and governmentality in general, resist forms and strategies of power that are modified in the process. "Resistance comes first . . . power relations are obliged to change with the resistance" (EW1, 167). Modern subjects are thus not trapped, as resistance is a constitutive feature even of modern power relations that congeal into states of domination.

Power beyond Domination: Governmentality and Ethics

Rather than analyzing resistance more extensively, Foucault conceptualizes power relations as having forms in addition to domination by conducting further genealogical critique, along the third axis of ethics as well as power. After writing *The History of Sexuality*, volume 1, Foucault continued to conceptualize power relations using different notions, most notably "governmentality," meaning a "general technology of power" that operates at the level of the state, just as biopolitics is the general technology pertinent to the medical apparatus and discipline is to the penal system (C-STP, 120). Foucault's later clarification that "technologies of government" lie between and are compatible with either "states of domination" or "strategic games between liberties" (EW1, 299) indicates that governmentality is also a way to conceive of power other than as domination. Given its broader framing of political technology, many of the power relations reviewed above under the rubric of discipline, normalization, and biopower can also be analyzed in terms of "governmentality."

Conduct is the most appropriate term for conceptualizing the "specificity of power relations" (in contrast to other relations such as communication or exchange) because government concerns the conduct of individuals and groups as well as the state. One governs one's own conduct, while government guides the conduct of others. Government is the conduct of conduct, as "to govern" means "to structure the possible field of actions of others." Government is "the relationship proper to power," in that "a relationship of power" is "action upon an action," not an action directly on others (EW3, 341). Significantly, the conceptualization of power relations as governmentality enables Foucault to extend his study of power relations to ethics, self-government, and the exercise of power over oneself, as governmentality refers to the "contact between the technologies of domination of others and those of the self" (TS, 19), the link between power as the regulation of others, and a relationship with oneself.

Foucault's analysis of governmentality begins at the time of the Counter-Reformation and the formation of states in the sixteenth century, when the very form of government of the polity, the household, and one's soul was questioned. The assumption at the time was that there should be continuity of form from one domain to the other, such as governing the polity like a household. He goes on to examine the European models of government known as "police" such as mercantilism, all of which refer to widespread

techniques and practices of supervision and intervention in a wide range of social and economic matters (C-STP). He also studies early and contemporary liberalism, which he defines as a political practice as much as a philosophy (C-BB). Foucault claims that the modern art of government is the consequence of a combination of the two following elements. The model of "police" included pastoral thinking derived from Jewish and Christian models of devoted, kindly power, according to which the government should take care of the flock (or population) as a whole and also each individual, or member of the flock. Reason of state concerned a modern logic whereby the leaders of the state should act in accordance with the aim of enhancing the state's strength in relation to the other states with which it is in competition. Combining pastoralism and reason of state, modern government is interested in population and welfare in so far as they contribute to state power. The care of the individual becomes a duty for the state, because each individual can contribute to the strength of the state (TS, 152–153, 147).

Reason of state relies on the regularized and rationalized practices and techniques of "police," or the technology of police, to make individuals useful to the purposes of the state. The aim of "police" in general as a model of government was salvation in this world, in the form of "health, well-being . . . security, protection against accidents" (EW3, 334). "Police" proposes and attempts to practice a supervision of and intervention in everything, from trade and industry to provision for the poor, from transport and communications to health, from religion and public morals to education. It was concerned with how all these things were connected, and contributed to the wealth and strength of the state. "Police" aims to increase the happiness of individuals, to improve their lives as working, trading, living beings, because the state can make use of social resources. Individual happiness can be guaranteed only in relation to aggregate developments and general relations, which are subject to "police" (EW3, 317–323; TS, 153–160).

It is through disciplines, normalization, and biopower, all of which can be conceived as aspects of "police" and modern governmentality, that welfare can be improved and populations governed. At the same time, these forms of government enhance the power of the state. Governmental power augments individual capacities as it augments its own power. "The modern Western state has integrated . . . pastoral power" by reorganizing it as "individualizing power" (EW3, 332–334). The integration, by pastoral power, of concerns of state or collective strength with those of individual life makes the modern state a formidable machine of individualization and totalization, which is both an antimony that defines modern political rationality and a dominating double bind (EW3, 336). The struggle for freedom of individuals in the modern West has taken the form of the "acquisition of capabilities." Initially conceived as a fight for greater autonomy, this struggle has been accompanied by the development of political technologies, disciplines, and normalization processes (FR, 47–48). These practices and techniques of government subject the supposedly free or to-be-freed subject. The state has built its strength not only by paying attention to the totality of its resources but by enhancing the potential of every individual under its auspices (EW3, 334–335). Modern pastoral government invests in the capacities of the individual, developing qualities of rationality, autonomy, and decision-making. Foucault ascribes the "failure" of our political theories to "the fact that this integration of individuals in a community or in a totality

results from a constant correlation between an increasing individualization and the reinforcement of this totality” (TS, 161–162). To get rid of this “political ‘double bind’” means precisely to “refuse what we are,” meaning the kinds of individuality that are bound up with totalization (but not subjectivity *per se*) and instead “to promote new forms of subjectivity” (EW3, 336).

While Foucault concentrated on the second axis of genealogy, power, he was mostly concerned with how power relations constitute subjects in constraining forms that dominate and subject. Yet his affirmation of resistance and new subjectivities could not be elaborated without the third axis of genealogy, ethics, meaning the relationship with oneself. It is “the kind of relationship you ought to have with yourself, *rapport à soi* . . . which determines how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of his own actions” (EW1, 263). The ethical turn in Foucault’s work can be understood as “a critique of and an alternative to modern self-subjugation” (Bernauer 1990: 9). According to Deleuze (1988: 96), after the impasse of *History of Sexuality*, volume 1 (whereby attempts at liberation reinforce repression), Foucault sought a third axis in addition to power and knowledge as a way for us to get free of ourselves. Forming oneself as an ethical subject requires practices of the self (HS2, 26–28). These practices constitute “technologies of the self” by means of which individuals

effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality. (TS, 18)

Foucault distinguishes these from “technologies of power,” but as they involve exercise of power over oneself, Foucault’s turn to ethics is not a break from but continuous with his work on power, adding the exercise of power in relation to oneself through the axis of ethics. Most of Foucault’s work on ethical concern for the self focuses on the Classical Greek and Hellenistic eras, as Greek ethics turns power relations on the self. It is also a continuation of the theme of government in that ethics entails self-government. As Kelly (2009: 100) puts it, “the self relation is a power relation.”

In his turn to Classical Greek ethics, Foucault also signals that the subject constituted through ethical self-government may not be “subjected” but free, by introducing the term “subjectivation” (the same word in English and French, though sometimes translated into English as “subjectivization”) (PPC, 253; FDE2a, 1525). By contrast, Foucault had relied previously mostly on the term *assujettissement*, or subjection (as in DP, 30; FSP, 38; HS1, 60; FHS1, 81) (Kelly 2009: 87–89). In his preference for subjectivation, Foucault endorses the formal or conceptual conditions of the Greek and Hellenistic relation of self to self, namely, the loosening of the connections between the three axes of subjection: power, truth, and ethics (Deleuze 1988: 100). The possibility of freedom lies in loosening the tight stranglehold of the triadic relation within which we are subjected. Foucault insists that we must detach our ethical relations with ourselves from the government of others, while also coming to understand that “it’s not at all necessary to relate ethical problems to scientific knowledge” (EW1, 261). The ethical relation to the self also corresponds to an “absence of morality,” morality in the sense of obedience to a universal code of rules (PPC, 49). The Greeks and Hellenistic

models indicate alternative forms of individuation focused on the ethical-aesthetic construction rather than the scientific and moral discovery of the self; that is, that are attempts “to make . . . life into an oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values” in contrast to our psycho-technologies of the self (HS2, 10–11).

In Classical Greek ethics, the focus was on pleasures that were liable to excess, to be untimely, or inappropriate to one’s social status (HS2, 54–60). Self-formation, or subjection, among the Classical Greek elite took the form of self-mastery in the face of pleasures to be moderated, following a “principle of stylization of conduct” (HS2, 250–251). While Greek ascetics, or practices of self-discipline, are detached from scientific definitions of the self, unlike modern subjections, they are not uninvolved in political relations, as the regulation of others was associated with mastery of the self. Greek techniques of the self, associated with dietetics (the health of the body), economics (the husband’s running of a household), and erotics (men’s love of boys), took the form of combat with pleasures to be mastered. They were of the same nature as techniques for the government of households and of cities (HS2, 65–72). Moderation understood as control of pleasures entailed freedom from oneself and thereby a domination of oneself, as a condition for domination over others. However, it should be emphasized that Foucault objects to the connection in Classical ethics between attention to the self and domination of others (TS, 19), finding nothing either exemplary or admirable about the Greek stylization of conduct, which never made itself available to all but remained an elite practice (PPC, 244). Foucault does not conceive of ethical self-government as freedom in itself without considering the socio-political context in which it is conducted. We moderns will not liberate ourselves by returning to the Greeks, yet the difference between modern subjection and ancient subjectivation does turn on detaching the tight bonds between truth, power, and ethics that exist in modernity.

Affirming Power: Resistance and Liberty

As Foucault’s conceptualization of power includes self-government and an ethical relation, it cannot be limited to an oppositional mode but also becomes affirmative, as indicated by his use of terms such as liberty and freedom in his later work in the 1980s. Foucault states that “power relations are possible only insofar as the subjects are free . . . even when the power relation is completely out of balance” (EW1, 292). All power relations that are attempts to direct the conduct of others can be conceived as “strategic games between liberties” (EW1, 299). Freedom or liberty, and power, are thus not external or opposed to each other. When Foucault writes: “to say that one can never be ‘outside’ power does not mean that one is trapped” (PK, 141–142), he indicates that to be in power relations does not necessarily mean to be dominated. Not only are the recalcitrant actions of subjects in counter-conduct a necessary condition for the exercise of power, but these subjects must be free. “At the heart of power relations and as a permanent condition of their existence there is an insubordination and a certain essential obstinacy on the part of the principles of freedom” (EW3, 346). Freedom can be practiced in resistance, insubordination, counter-conduct, as well as ethical subjectivation. The term that best characterizes Foucault’s concept of adversarial, strategic,

potentially reversible power relations is “agonism” (EW3, 342). The word suggests a contest involving strategy, reaction, and even taunting, as in a wrestling match. Agonism may be as serious as political struggle or as light as child’s play. It permeates all the different types of relationships (economic, familial, communicative, and sexual) within which power relations are immanent (HS1, 94).

In his affirmative mode, Foucault distinguishes his concept of power from states of domination, which are a particular case of power relations that have consolidated or locked together in “a massive and global form” (EW3, 348). Power relations tend to domination in modernity because of the close connection between truth, power, and ethics, and because of the double bind of individualization and totalization. Rather than conceiving of domination as a binary relation between oppressors and oppressed that structures power relations, Foucault conceives of the “major dominations” as the “hegemonic effects” of power relations” (HS1, 94). In “states of domination . . . the relations of power, instead of being mobile, allowing the various participants to adopt strategies modifying them, remain blocked, frozen” (EW1, 283). Resistance still occurs under domination, and, in response to a high degree of “institutional integration of power relations” such as by the state (or a dominant class or social group), can take the form of revolution, which is “the strategic codification of . . . points of resistance” (HS1, 96). However, under states of domination “the practices of freedom do not exist or exist only unilaterally” (EW1, 283). The practice of freedom, then, is not the same as the occurrence of resistance, as the latter occurs even under domination while the former remains limited. However, the practice of resistance is also the practice of liberty, a practice directed towards expanding freedom.

Foucault evaluates power relations according to the extent that they are open to resistance, or to shifts and reversals in power relations. His conceptualization of power relations as agonistic implicitly provides an evaluative stance for the assessment of modes of governmentality, that being the condition of possibility for further resistance and the constitution of agonal subjectivity (Thiele 1990: 918). A form of power is judged unfavorably as dominative if it minimizes the possibilities for strategic reversal and thereby confines practices of freedom (EW1, 283). The question to be asked is “whether the system of constraints in which a society functions leaves individuals the liberty to transform the system” (EW1, 148).

Foucault has often been found wanting on normative grounds by political theorists who argue that he fails to provide motivation or reason to resist, which is a necessary condition for revolt. Fraser (1981: 283) asks why domination ought to be resisted. Given that Foucault is not neutral about forms of power, Fraser argues that “What Foucault needs and needs desperately are normative criteria for distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable forms of power” (1981: 286). Fraser claims that the logic of Foucault’s argument presupposes the liberal norms he criticizes (1981: 284), while Habermas (1987: 282–284) concurs that Foucault is a “cryptonormativist” who makes familiar complaints about asymmetries of power. However, the counter-argument to Fraser and Habermas is that, while Foucault is neutral toward power itself, he is not neutral about domination and he does evaluate modes of power relations according to their openness to agonism and practices of liberty. In this way, Foucault should satisfy Fraser’s (1985: 180) demand for an “alternative, posthumanist, ethical paradigm.” Foucault’s evaluative, ethical approach combines ethical concerns for liberty

with practical, empirical analytical questions about the main dangers to liberty and the key possibilities for extending its practice through resistance. The form of resistance that Foucault endorses challenges power on the level of conduct, on the level of the objectives and procedures of government (C-STP, 194–195).

The practice of resistance as liberty is also an ethical practice. The problem is not to abolish power, “but to acquire the rules of law, the management techniques, and also the morality, the *ethos*, the practice of the self, that will allow us to play these games of power with as little domination as possible” (EW1, 298). There is a continuum between power as “strategic games between liberties” and “the states of domination” (EW1, 299), so it is always a matter of more or less liberty and domination. “Liberty is a *practice* . . . [I]t is never assured by the institutions and laws that are intended to guarantee them” (FR, 245). Liberty should not be considered as a secure state of liberation immune to excesses of power, but as the practices that effectively limit power.

The practice of freedom is also an ethical practice, the two being wrapped in and around each other. “Freedom is the ontological condition of ethics. But ethics is the considered form that freedom takes when it is informed by reflection” (EW1, 284). Foucault’s positions on liberty as practice and agonistic openness suggest that his politics entail an ethic of permanent critique of and resistance to domination, which is part and parcel of his philosophical *ethos* of critique (Simons 1995: 86–87). He comes closest to defining this ethic when he says:

The ethico-political choice we have to make every day is to determine which is the main danger . . . My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous . . . If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism. (EW1, 256)

Incessant activism demands the ethical conduct of agonal subjects who seek not the end of struggle, but the liberty of participating in it. For Foucault, ethics is “the practice of liberty” entailing perpetual critique of and resistance to domination.

Foucault’s research is motivated and informed by practices of resistance and liberty, by both others and himself. There is an ethics, a relation with the self, that informs Foucault’s conceptualization of ethics as a power relation and his affirmation of such power. He reflects on the relationship between resistance and freedom through the connection between his work and critical practice.

Whenever I have tried to carry out a piece of theoretical work, it has been . . . because I thought I could recognize in the things I saw, in the institutions with which I dealt, in my relations with others, cracks, silent shocks, malfunctionings . . . that I undertook a particular piece of work, a few fragments of an autobiography. (PPC, 156)

Rather than tracing each of the ways in which Foucault’s critical analysis of power and resistance is autobiographical, I will refer to two key episodes. In 1971 in the wake of prison revolts, Foucault was instrumental in establishing the *Groupe d’Information sur les Prisons*. While the aim was to give voice to the prisoners’ protests, the impetus of the agitation came from imprisoned Maoist militants who refused to dissociate

themselves from the common criminals (Eribon 1989: 237–248). From the GIP and a visit to Attica prison in 1972 emerged the thesis of Foucault's next book, *Discipline and Punish*, that disciplinary power is exercised over everyone in modern society. Foucault later became unhappy with the way the struggle around the prisons developed as an isolated campaign of ex-prisoners and social workers that identified with one group of oppressed without taking account of their place in wider political networks (EW3, 130). While analysis of power should begin with the resistance of the subjected, it does not simply identify with the oppressed, nor does it necessarily have to illustrate successful resistance to a form of power, in order to critique power relations.

In the second example we can see how Foucault's involvement in gay issues animates his conceptualization of resistance, the ethical practice of liberty, the play of power relations, and the invention of new subjectivities. Foucault refused his subjection as a homosexual, to being bound to an identity that was defined in the nineteenth century according to a sexual nature (HS1, 42–44). He does not denigrate the value and effectiveness of turning scientific discourses of sexuality against those who use it to exclude marginal groups. Both gays and women have been able to use the sexual natures constructed for them as the basis for the demand that they be recognized as different but natural (FDE2a, 261). However, Foucault was not interested in reversals that simply affirmed what had been repressed, be it sex, madness, or delinquency, but in practices of resistance that begin with such affirmations in order to dissolve the categorizations or subjections that construct sexual or other natures (EW1, 159). So he recognized the importance of struggling for rights to sexual freedom, but only as a condition of possibility for the affirmation not of identity but creativity. "What the gay movement needs now is much more the art of life than a science" (EW1, 163). The task is "to advance into a homosexual *askesis* that would make us work on ourselves and invent . . . a manner of being that is still improbable . . . To be 'gay,' I think, is to try to define and develop a way of life . . . [that] can yield a culture and an ethics" (FL, 206–207).

The promise of the gay community and culture lies in its invention of ways of relating (EW1, 158). Love, affection, tenderness, and intimacy between men have not been tolerated. "The development towards which the problem of homosexuality tends is the one of friendship" (FL, 204). Foucault does not deny that same-sex relations and sexual pleasure would be at the core of envisaged lifestyles of friendship. However, the wider significance of gay friendship, beyond experimenting with sexual pleasure, is the proliferation of new forms of relations between people, beyond those currently sanctioned, namely marriage and the family. One of the present's unbearably constraining features for Foucault is the poverty of institutionally permitted relations. He looks forward to the possibility of "homosexual culture, that is to say the instruments for polymorphic, varied and individually modulated relationships" (FL, 311–312). By inventing new relations, it promotes new forms of subjectivity. Foucault's interest is in "relationships of differentiation . . . of innovation . . . not ones of identity" (EW1, 166). The multiplication of relations and pleasures is an ethic of permanent critique of and resistance to normalization and domination that is also an ethical practice of freedom.

Conclusion

Foucault struggles to balance his sustained critique of modern power relations that dominate and subject – discipline, biopower, and normalization – with substantive notions of resistance to those power relations, or of ethical subjectivation in which liberty could be practiced by all. The theoretical, academic struggle in which Foucault was engaged is a mirror of what he regarded as the paradigmatic political task, namely, to practice liberty and struggle for freedom in the face of dominating power relations, without dreaming of a world beyond power. “A society without power relations can only be an abstraction . . . the analysis, elaboration and bringing into question of power relations and the ‘agonism’ between power relations and the intransitivity of freedom is . . . the political task that is inherent in all social existence” (EW3, 343). Perhaps if Foucault had lived longer we would have a clearer picture of how Classical and Christian practices of the self help us elaborate practices of freedom in modernity. Perhaps Foucault could have left us clearer conceptual distinctions between power and domination, resistance and liberty, subjection and subjectivation. Perhaps if he had been of a different sexuality, nationality, ethnicity, and class he would have conceptualized different forms of power, such as apprenticeship in a craft, patrons and clients, gender relations, geographies of migration, and so on. But no doubt Foucault would prefer us to write our own autobiographies, to critique our own limits, to engage in our own resistance, to practice our own liberties, to fashion our own subjectivity.

Note

- 1 My thanks to Megan Fitzgerald for her insightful reading of this sentence.

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From Biopower to Governmentality

JOHANNA OKSALA

As a theorist of power, Foucault is best known for his influential account of disciplinary power introduced in *Discipline and Punish*, and for his novel understanding of productive power analyzed in connection with sexuality in *The History of Sexuality*, volume 1. In this essay I want to discuss his less well known, but equally important, conceptualizations of power – biopower, pastoral power, and governmentality – developed mainly in his lecture courses at the Collège de France in the late 1970s. I will also explicate his analysis of liberal and neoliberal governmentality central in these lectures – the forms of governmentality that he saw as specific to modern Western societies.¹ Foucault did not intend these lectures to be published – they have only been published posthumously – and he regarded the arguments and ideas central in them as working hypotheses. With this caveat in mind, it is nevertheless crucial to consider these later texts in order to fully appreciate the originality of his views on power, as well as the contribution he has made to political philosophy and theory. Foucault's thought has had an enormous influence on cultural studies, gender studies, and social theory, but it is important to keep in mind that it has been equally influential in political thought. His idea of governmentality has inspired a whole new approach to the study of politics – governmentality studies – that focuses on the actual historical practices and technical means through which Western liberal democracies are governed. Biopower and biopolitics have also become essential theoretical concepts in contemporary political analysis. Foucault's lectures take a sideways look at politics, and challenge many of the ideas that have traditionally organized political philosophy.

Biopower

Foucault's short but influential discussion of biopower first appears at the end of *The History of Sexuality*, volume 1. The discussion is prefaced with a summary definition of

A Companion to Foucault, First Edition. Edited by Christopher Falzon, Timothy O'Leary, and Jana Sawicki.
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sovereign power: sovereign power is a form of power that was historically founded on violence – the right to kill. Its characteristic privilege, since Roman law, was the right to decide life and death. In its limited modern form, as in its ancient and absolute form, it was asymmetrical: the sovereign exercised his right of life only by exercising his right to kill or by refraining from killing. In other words, he demonstrated his power over life through the death he was capable of enforcing. Sovereign power was exercised mainly by means of deduction: it consisted of the right to appropriate a portion of the nation's wealth, a tax on products, goods and services, time, bodies, and ultimately life itself. It culminated in the privilege to seize hold of life in order to suppress it (HS1, 136). The obligation to wage war on behalf of the sovereign and the imposition of the death penalty for going against his will were the clearest forms of such power.

Foucault's key claim is that mechanisms of power in the West have been profoundly transformed since the seventeenth century. Deductive and violent sovereign power has been gradually complemented and partly replaced by biopower, a form of power that exerts a positive influence on life, "that endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations" (HS1, 137). Deduction or violence is no longer the predominant form of power, but is merely one element among others, working towards a new objective under a new rationality. Biopower is bent on generating and ordering forces: the aim is to increase them rather than to impede or destroy them. In short, its logic or rationality is not violent deduction, but positive production.

The era of biopolitics is marked by the explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and control of populations: techniques that coordinate medical care, normalize behavior, rationalize mechanisms of insurance, and rethink urban planning, for example. The aim is the effective administration of bodies and the calculated management of life through means that are scientific and continuous. It is a form of power whose highest function is no longer to kill but to "invest life through and through" (HS1, 139). Mechanisms of power and knowledge have assumed responsibility for the life process in order to optimize, control, and modify it. In other words, the exercise of power over living beings no longer carries the threat of death, but implies the taking charge of their life. Life and its mechanisms are brought into the realm of explicit calculation in the regimes of knowledge-power.

The rationality of biopower is markedly different from that of sovereign power in terms not just of its objectives, but also of its instruments. A major consequence of its development is the growing importance of the norm at the expense of the juridical system of the law. The law is always armed and is based on violence, whereas biopower takes charge of life with the help of continuous regulatory and corrective mechanisms based on knowledge. Foucault argues that the rise of biopower means that we have entered a phase of juridical regression. He remarks:

I do not mean to say that the law fades into the background or that the institutions of justice tend to disappear, but rather that the law operates more and more as a norm, and that the judicial institution is increasingly incorporated into the a continuum of apparatuses (medical and administrative, and so on) whose functions are for the most part regulatory. A normalizing society is the historical outcome of a technology of power centered on life. (HS1, 144)²

According to Foucault, biopower uses administrative policies, strategies, and tactics instead of laws as its instrument; when it does use the law, it does so merely as a tactic. Biopolitical rationality treats the law as one administrative technique among others that can be utilized to regulate and improve the life of the population. Biopolitical techniques do not typically result from sovereign parliamentary decisions, but are part of the administrative and managerial procedures legitimized by expert knowledge. Urban planning, and campaigns to improve the health of the population and the regulation of hospitals, schools, and prisons, are biopolitical techniques that function as effective forms of political control for example.

Thus, Foucault claims that the dominance of biopower as the paradigmatic form of power in modernity means that we live in societies in which the power of the law has subsided and political sovereignty has been undermined. Biopower is not political power in the traditional sense, because it is not reducible to the power of a democratically elected sovereign body, whether individual or collective. It penetrates such political power, but it is essentially the power of life's experts, interpreters, and administrators.

Whereas the essential feature of sovereign power is its license to kill, for biopower killing presents a problem: it does not celebrate death and violence, but seeks to exclude or at least to hide them. Foucault notes that death has ceased to be a collective and spectacular ceremony in modern biopolitical society, and has become something to be hidden away: it is "not so much sex as death that is the object of a taboo" (C-SMD, 247). This obviously does not mean that modern biopolitical societies are non-violent. On the contrary, the violence is harder to detect because it has to be hidden. Foucault readily acknowledges the unprecedented violence of modernity: the biological conception of politics has made killing possible on an unprecedented scale (HS1, 136–137). Biopower is thus clearly capable of utilizing violence, but only under very specific conditions and restricted by defined limits. The violence it uses has to be hidden away or called something else because it presents a problem in the rationality of biopolitics, the explicit aim of which is the optimization and enhancement of life. The connection with violence has to be mediated: biopolitical violence must pass through the regime of knowledge/power and it must be given a scientific legitimacy compatible with the aims of biopolitics.

In his last lecture in the series *Society Must Be Defended* (1975–76), Foucault discusses the phenomenon of state racism in Nazi Germany as an example of the paradoxes in the exercise of modern biopower. He notes that Nazi Germany could be seen in many ways as the extreme development of biopower: there was no other state in which "the biological was so tightly, so insistently, regulated" (C-SMD, 259). However, he poses the question of how a political system so completely centered upon biopower could unleash such murderous power and in fact utilize the old sovereign right to kill. "How can power such as this kill, if it is true that its basic function is to improve life, to prolong its duration, to improve its chances, to avoid accidents, and to compensate for failings?" (C-SMD, 254).

His answer was biological racism, which provided a way of separating the different groups that exist within a population and then establishing a biological relationship between them. This was not an adversarial relationship between enemies – the inferior group was not the enemy threatening the nation's existence. It was rather a biological relationship of abnormality: the inferior group had to be eliminated as a biological

threat to the population and its improvement. The death of the inferior race would make life in general healthier. The objective to improve life for its own sake could thus legitimize killing within the rationality of biopower. The logic of biological racism was the condition that made killing acceptable in biopolitical societies. As Foucault describes:

In the biopolitical system . . . killing, or the imperative to kill, is acceptable only if it results not in a victory over political adversaries, but in the elimination of the biological threat to and the improvement of the species or race . . . Once the State functions in the biopower mode, racism alone can justify the murderous function of the State. (C-SMD, 256)³

It is thus highly significant that the racism of Nazi Germany was essentially different from “ordinary” racism, which takes the form of mutual contempt or hatred between races. The specificity of modern biopolitical racism was bound up with the rationality of biopower. When racism became the racism of a biopolitical state, it was “obliged to use race, the elimination of races and the purification of the race, to exercise sovereign power” (C-SMD, 258). In biopolitical societies sovereign power cannot simply assume unmediated power over life if it wants to kill its own citizens; it must pass through the regime of power/knowledge and gain bio-scientific legitimacy. Biological racism provided a pseudo-scientific discourse that was compatible with biopower, and through which biopower could be transformed into sovereign power. The Third Reich thus became a monstrous combination of biopower and sovereign power, exercising sovereign means for biopolitical ends. Genocide was carried out in the name of care and the improvement of life (C-SMD, 260).

Biopower and biopolitics have become important theoretical tools in contemporary political analysis and debate. They have been appropriated recently by influential political thinkers such as Giorgio Agamben and Roberto Esposito. Agamben’s provocative claim in his book *Homo Sacer* (1998: 148) is that Nazism and fascism will remain with us until contemporary political thought is able to situate the totalitarian phenomenon in the horizon of biopolitics and thereby make sense of it. Foucault’s distinction between biopower and sovereign power, and his analysis of their intertwinement in Nazi Germany is an important attempt to do that. His analysis of biopower as a particularly modern form of power has also foreshadowed the growing criticism of medical intervention in today’s society: larger and larger areas of life are medicalized and brought under bio-scientific control. Although he does not make explicit judgments about medicalization, he exposes the theoretical underpinnings and historical processes that have made its growth possible.

Governmentality

Commentators sometimes read Foucault’s lectures on the history of governmentality *Security, Territory and Population* (1977–78) and *The Birth of Biopolitics* (1978–79) as a major turning point in his thought. After his study of disciplinary power in the context of the prison, and of productive power in connection with the emergence of modern sexuality, these lectures effect a shift to more traditional political theory in being concerned with the development of the modern administrative state. However, while they undoubtedly represent Foucault’s most explicit engagement with the questions of

political theory, they also continue his critical ontology of the present in crucial respects and build upon the philosophical premises elaborated in his earlier work.

In the first lecture of the series *The Birth of Biopolitics* in 1979, Foucault confirms that “the question here is the same as the question I addressed with regard to madness, disease, delinquency, and sexuality” (C-BB, 19). In all these cases, it was neither a question of showing how these objects were natural and could be simply discovered by proper scientific methods, nor of showing how they were nothing but illusions or ideological products. It was, rather, a question of showing how they were established as scientific objects in a set of historical practices and thus became part of our experience of reality. The thread that goes through all these investigations is thus his historical nominalism. Foucault’s focus in his lectures is still on the critical analysis of relations of power as well as on their role in the political and historical constitution of contemporary reality, but he is now interested in the constitution of those entities that are commonly understood to belong to the political realm such as the state, the economy, and the population.

While continuing his philosophical investigation of the present, the lectures nevertheless introduce new terminology and shift to a new domain of inquiry. In these lectures government becomes Foucault’s preferred term for power, while governmentality functions as his main theoretical tool for analyzing its rationality, techniques, and procedures in modernity. Foucault discusses a range of individual political thinkers and theories in his lectures, but his main interest lies, once again, in understanding the larger institutional and epistemic context in which these theories became possible. These conditions are examined through historiographical study, but they cannot be reduced to empirical, institutional facts about politics.

Foucault’s notion of governmentality emerged in the fourth lecture of the series *Security, Territory, Population* in 1978. The word “governmentality” is not only ugly – as Foucault himself noted – it is also ambiguous (C-STP, 115). As Michel Senellart (2007: 387–388) explains, its meaning progressively shifts from a precise, historically determinate sense connected to the governance of the modern state, to a more general and abstract meaning. Whereas in the 1978 lectures it denotes the techniques of government that underpin the formation of the modern state, from 1979 onwards it receives a more general meaning: “I have proposed to call governmentality . . . the way in which one conducts the conduct of men . . . a proposed analytical grid for . . . relations of power” (C-BB, 186).

The initial definition that Foucault provides in the fourth lecture of *Security, Territory, Population* is already ambiguous, however. He claims (C-STP, 108–109) that governmentality refers, on the one hand, to a distinct regime of power that emerged in the eighteenth century and that can be distinguished from both sovereign power and disciplinary power in terms of its rationality, its aims, and its means. It is an ensemble of power that has the population as its target; its major form of knowledge is political economy, and its essential technical instruments are apparatuses of security. On the other hand, governmentality also refers to the tendency that has led to the development of a series of specific governmental apparatuses and forms of knowledge. Finally, it also refers to the actual historical process through which Western societies became *governmentalized*: that is, the process through which the state of justice of the Middle Ages became the administrative state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.⁴

It is this historical development, “the history of governmentality” or “the genealogy of the modern state,” that Foucault attempts to expose in his lectures in 1978. He wants to reveal, through a historical analysis, the development of a specific type of power technology that was fundamental to the modern administrative state. He identifies its historical conditions – such as Christian pastoral power and the birth of political economy – and analyzes its distinct rationality. As a result, his nominalism is now applied to the state in two important ways.

First, Foucault criticizes the attempts to theorize the essence of the state: “The state is not a universal nor in itself an autonomous source of power . . . the state is nothing else but the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities” (C-BB, 77). The idea of governmentality radically historicizes the state and dissolves its fixed identity into a multiplicity of institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics. “The state is a practice . . . inseparable from the set of practices by which the state actually became a way of governing, a way of doing things” (C-STP, 277).

Second, he criticizes the tendency to demonize the state in political thought, to see it as the simple enemy and the root of all political problems. The state not only exercises repressive, negative power over the social body, but also should be understood as one historical modality of “government.” It is a new political form of power that has been continuously developing since the sixteenth century, and this development reflects changes in the rationality of governmental practices. His method thus entails “going behind the institution and trying to discover in a wider and more overall perspective what we can broadly call a technology of power” (C-STP, 117). He continues:

So, in short, the challenge of the lectures I would like to give this year will be this . . . just as for the prison we tried to go behind penitentiary institutions in the strict sense so as to seek out the general economy of power, can we carry out the same reversal for the state? . . . Is it possible to place the modern state in a general technology of power that ensured its mutations, development, and functioning? (C-STP, 120)⁵

While Foucault’s analyses of disciplinary power provided interesting avenues for enlarging and reconfiguring the domain of the political, in his attention to specific practices and techniques he failed to address some of the more general, strategic issues of power involved in politics.⁶ His lectures on governmentality could be read as an attempt to fill these lacunae. His analyses of disciplinary power were restricted to specialized institutional contexts, whereas the idea of power as government widened the scope of his rethinking of power to the domain of the state. In other words, in studying modern state power he was able to transport his understanding of power to the domain of politics, as it is traditionally understood.

However, Foucault makes it clear that this genealogy is not simply an account of how mechanisms of governmentality replaced disciplinary mechanisms, which had replaced the earlier juridico-legal mechanisms. Rather, what we see is a change in the system of correlation between the three. Governmental technologies, focusing on the population, had to utilize the existing armatures of law and discipline, while also introducing their own distinct organization and rationality. Discipline was never more important or more valorized than at the moment when it became important to manage a population, and this also rendered all the more acute the problem of the foundation

of sovereignty (C-STP, 107–108). Foucault's move from discipline to government was thus not a conceptual substitution, but an extension. It mirrors the earlier shift from sovereign to disciplinary power in important ways. In his analysis of disciplinary power he had moved the emphasis from repressive institutions to productive practices. In his analysis of governmentality he was, in a similar fashion, attempting a move from portraying the state as a repressive institution to analyzing governmental practices.

As in his study of disciplines, Foucault also distinguishes governmental technologies by opposing them to sovereign power. He discusses Machiavelli's *The Prince* as a paradigmatic example of the rationality of sovereign power. For Machiavelli, the prince stood in a relation of singularity and externality to his principality. In other words, the sovereign presided over a territory and its inhabitants as the self-grounding and external basis for the rule of law, and there was no fundamental or natural connection between the ruler and the ruled. Because their relationship was external, it was also fragile and continually under threat. The sole objective of the exercise of political power was therefore to maintain the power of the sovereign: the end of sovereignty was the exercise of sovereignty (C-STP, 204–210).

In contrast to the external and transcendent power of the sovereign, governmentality implied that practices of power had to be founded on principles of governing inherent in the state itself: the state, like nature, had its own proper form of rationality and it had to be governed accordingly. This meant, firstly, that practices of government had to be multifarious because they were founded on different forms of knowledge, and concerned many different people – the head of the family, the superior of an institute, the teacher of a school. Different practices of government, furthermore, had a plurality of aims: the increase of wealth, the efficiency of production, the growth of the population and its welfare. Achieving these aims required various strategies and tactics. Foucault singled out the introduction of political economy into political practice in the seventeenth century as an essential development: government came to denote the correct way of managing *things* – individuals, goods, and wealth (C-STP, 95):

I think this marks an important break. Whereas the end of sovereignty is internal to itself and gets its instruments from itself in the form of law, the end of government is internal to the things it manages; it is to be sought in the perfection, maximization, or intensification of the processes it directs, and the instruments of government will become diverse tactics rather than laws. Consequently, law recedes; or rather, law is certainly not the major instrument in the perspective of what government should be . . . the ends of government cannot be effectively achieved by means of the law. (C-STP, 99)⁷

Practices of government prefer to employ tactics rather than laws, or to use laws as tactics, to arrange things in such a way that certain ends may be achieved. The procedures of governmentality are thus irreducible to the rule of law. They utilize administrative apparatuses and managerial techniques that are, for the most part, extra-legal. They also rely heavily on forms of knowledge. As Thomas Lemke (2002) points out, however, governmental knowledge is never pure, neutral knowledge, which simply “represents” the governed reality. It is rather an element of government itself that helps to create a discursive field in which exercising power is understood as “rational” (see also Lemke 1997). Governmentality implies the emergence of a particular, circular relationship between power and knowledge, or government and science. Governments

are not assessed any longer on the basis of whether they conform to moral or divine laws, but on the basis of whether they conform to scientific truths. To understand what politics is today we have to grasp how our modern conception of economy emerged “though a series of complex processes that are absolutely crucial for our history” and how it came to designate “a level of reality and a field of intervention for government” (C-STP, 95). Exercising political power has come to mean governing a population on the basis of forms of scientific knowledge, one of the most important being economics.

Pastoral Power

In addition to identifying a major rupture in practices of government contemporaneous with the emergency of the modern administrative state, Foucault emphasizes an important continuity with earlier technologies of power that were oriented towards individuals.

A genealogy of the state requires understanding the dual tendency towards centralization as well as individuation. Fully grasping the rationality of contemporary, productive forms of power such as biopower requires tracing their origin to a form of power that Foucault calls pastoral power: “If the state is the political form of a centralized and centralizing power, let us call pastorship the individualizing power” (EW3, 300).

Pastoral power is a form of power that is oriented towards individuals with the intention of ruling them in a continuous and permanent way. It is essentially a beneficent power: “Pastoral power is a power of care” (C-STP, 127). It accompanied sovereign power in various, marginal forms throughout Western political history, and became pivotal for the type of political rationality implemented in the exercise of modern state power. It cannot be assimilated to the methods used to subject men to a law or to a sovereign because its rationality, its ends and means, are radically different. It is a deterritorialized and individualizing power: modern political power has shifted from being exclusively sovereignty over a territory to the regulation of a population.

According to Foucault, the Christian pastorate forms the background for understanding the technology of power specific to the modern state. In his lectures at the Collège de France in 1978 and at Stanford University in 1979 he attempted to outline the historical origins of this pastoral modality of power, as well as to show how it combined with the modern state. He contended that the idea of the ruler as a shepherd of a flock was completely foreign to Greek and Roman political thought, but it was central for the ancient Oriental societies such as Egypt, Assyria, and Judea. The ruler had to gather together, lead, protect, and guide his people like a good shepherd guides his or her flock. This idea became pronounced and vital in Christian thought and institutions and later for the government of the modern administrative state.

Foucault emphasizes that this model of power is distinctive in that it is individualizing: the shepherd’s power implies individual attention paid to each individual member of the flock. While Western political history is often characterized by its inventiveness in terms of legal structures and forms of stupefying violence, Foucault wants to remind us that we alone have also invented this strange technology of power that is grounded on the rationality of pastoral care: the vast majority of people are treated as the flock

of a few shepherds. It is a technology of governing – a form of governmentality in the general sense of the term – that does not focus on the question of the unity of the polis and its citizens in a legal framework, but concerns the lives of individuals in their specificity. Pastoral power must “constantly ensure, sustain, and improve the lives of each and every one” (EW1, 307). It requires obedience, but also detailed knowledge about the individuals. It focuses on the individual’s conduct and produces obedient subjects through “the conduct of conduct” – the normalization of people’s conduct. Its essential mechanisms are continuous care and the compulsory extraction of knowledge rather than violent coercion and the delimitation of rights.

When we thus attempt to critically analyze the political rationality of the modern state, we have to pay attention to its individualizing and not only to its centralizing and totalizing effects. The modern state is a complicated structure, in which individuals can be integrated, but only under very specific conditions: their subjectivity must be shaped in a specific form through forms of individualizing knowledge and continuous techniques of normalizing power. The state must subject its population to continuous care, control, and guidance in the name of its wellbeing.

To sum up Foucault’s understanding of governmentality, he introduced the notion in an attempt to identify and chart the forms of political power that corresponded to the historical shift from feudal society to the modern state. He describes a new practice of governance in which political power is exercised in the form, and according to the model, of economics. Its object is not territory nor are its inhabitants understood as juridical subjects: it is a complex composed of men and things. In the eighteenth century this complex came to be understood as *population*: an object of statistical analysis and scientific knowledge with its own intrinsic regularities. Its governance required tactics, strategies, and forms of knowledge that were specific to it – rates of death, birth, and disease; life expectancy; labor capacity and wealth. The population and its welfare came to form both the field of intervention of modern governmental techniques as well as its ultimate end. It was not a question of political power primarily adopting the form of sovereign power – an individual or communal sovereign ruling juridical subjects with the instrument of laws: we live in society in which a complex managerial and administrative apparatus governs a population by means of policies, tactics, and strategies in the name of wellbeing and care.

Liberal and Neoliberal Governmentality

As we have seen, Foucault’s short discussion of biopower at the end of *The History of Sexuality*, volume 1, was followed two years later by the lecture series *The Birth of Biopolitics* (1978–79). The very title suggests that the lectures were intended as an elaboration of the topic. However, their actual content appears to have nothing to do with biopolitics, and concerns economic liberalism and neoliberalism. A quick look at the index reveals that the word biopolitics occurs in only four instances, and in two of these the context is an apology for the fact that Foucault has spent too long on other topics and has not been able to talk about it (see e.g. C-BB, 185).

In the first lecture Foucault nevertheless gives a general characterization of the relationship between liberalism and biopolitics: the governmental regime of liberalism

must form the framework for understanding biopolitics. [i]t seems to me that it is only when we understand what is at stake in . . . this governmental regime called liberalism . . . [that we] will be able to grasp what biopolitics is" (C-BB, 22). In the course summary he again apologizes for the fact that the course has ended up being devoted entirely to what should have been the introduction. He insists again, however, that biopolitical issues cannot be understood as separate from the framework of political rationality within which they appeared and took on their intensity. This framework was liberalism:

This means "liberalism", since . . . it was in relation to liberalism that they assumed the form of a challenge. How can the phenomena of "population," with its specific effects and problems, be taken into account in a system concerned about respect for legal subjects and individual free enterprise? In the name of what and according to what rules can it be managed? (C-BB, 317)⁸

The demands of biopolitics thus posed a theoretical challenge to liberal governmentality, and biopolitics and liberalism formed a historical intersection: they were linked *de facto*, not *de jure*. Nevertheless, Foucault argues that liberalism fundamentally determined the specific form that biopolitics assumed in Western societies. Rather than being imposed by totalitarian systems of coercion, it has, for the most part, developed as a complex regime of power/knowledge in Western societies. In order to understand the political rationality of modern biopolitical states it is thus imperative to understand liberal, and particularly neoliberal, governmentality.

Before explicitly focusing on contemporary neoliberal governmentality, Foucault begins his investigation by going back to the eighteenth century. He shows how a new liberal form of governmental reason began to be formulated, reflected upon, and outlined around the middle of the century, and how it found its theoretical expression and formulation in political economy.⁹ Physiocrats such as François Quesnay in France had already given the economic domain a high degree of internal consistency, but it was Adam Smith who established economics as a neutral, economic science. Through him, the modern conception of the economy emerged as a separate sphere of society and as an autonomous object of scientific knowledge in political history, and this was highly significant for our conception of good government and, more generally, for our understanding of the political.

Foucault argues that with the development of political economy a new principle for limiting governmental action was established. Whereas up until then the law had functioned as an external limitation on excessive government, the new principle – political economy – was internal to the very governmental rationality. This meant that government had to limit itself not because it violated the liberty or the basic rights of men, but in order to ensure its own success. Up until the middle of the eighteenth century there had been a multitude of imposed economic practices such as tax levies, customs charges, and manufacturing regulations. All these were conceived of as the exercise of sovereign or feudal rights, the maintenance of customs, or techniques for preventing urban revolt. However, with the birth of the new governmentality based on political economy the meaning of all these economic practices changed profoundly. From the middle of the eighteenth century it became possible to establish a reasoned, reflected coherence between these practices by means of intelligible mechanisms. This, in turn,

made it possible to judge them as good or bad, not in terms of law or some moral principle, but in terms of truth: propositions about governmental practice became subject to the division between true and false. If the sovereign now wanted to impose market regulations, for example, their political legitimacy was no longer assessed in terms of social justice or political right, but in terms of whether they were beneficial according to the scientific laws of economics. Foucault contends that governmental activity thus entered into a new regime of truth (C-BB, 18).

The market had been a site of jurisdiction in the Middle Ages, and this still pertained in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in the sense that it was invested with strict regulations ensuring that prices were fair, and that there was no fraud, theft or crime. It was also a site of distributive justice: the rules of the market ensured that the poorest could also buy things. Entry into a new regime of truth in the middle of the eighteenth century meant that the market no longer appeared or had to be a site of jurisdiction. It now appeared as something that obeyed and had to obey “natural,” spontaneous mechanisms. The spontaneity was such that attempts to modify the mechanisms would only impair and distort them. The market thus became a site of truth – it allowed natural mechanisms to appear, and these permitted the formation of the right conditions for its proper functioning (C-BB, 30–31).

The market also constituted the essential site of the veridiction of governmental practice: a good government now functioned according to truth rather than justice. This meant that limiting its reach also became increasingly a question not of rights, but of utility. Limiting the exercise of power by public authorities was no longer formulated in terms of the traditional problems of law or revolutionary questions concerning original rights and how the individual could assert them against any sovereign. From the beginning of the nineteenth century the key questions addressed to government were: Is it useful? For what is it useful? Foucault claims that what fundamentally characterizes liberal governmentality is the idea that “governmental power is limited by evidence, not by the freedom of the individual” (C-BB, 62).¹⁰

The possibility of limitation and the question of truth are thus both introduced into governmental reason through political economy. This is an extremely important moment in the history of governmentality “since it establishes, in its most important features . . . a particular regime of truth which . . . is in fact still the same today” (C-BB, 18). Foucault’s claim is not that at that moment in history politics and the practice of government finally became rational or scientific. He is, rather, arguing that governmental activity entered into a new regime of truth that conditioned what kind of claims could be reasonably made about it and when its interference was legitimate. This transformation was decisive for our current understanding of politics. It meant that all the questions formerly posed by the art of governing had to be reconfigured in order for us to be able to answer them in terms of truth or falsehood. Foucault elaborates:

At one time these amounted to the question: Am I governing in proper conformity to moral, natural, or divine laws? Then, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, with *raison d’État*, it was: Am I governing with sufficient intensity, depth, and attention to detail so as to bring the state . . . to its maximum strength? And now the question will be: Am I governing at the border between . . . the maximum and minimum fixed for me by the nature of things . . . ? (C-BB, 18–19)¹¹

Foucault's key claim is that our modern understanding and practice of politics was constituted and limited by a particular liberal regime of truth; one which established a new relationship between political power and economic knowledge. To sum up its essential features, it became possible, for the first time in history, to make scientific truth claims about economics and consequently about good governance. This regime also implied that good government could not interfere with economic mechanisms. Because economic truths dictated that market mechanisms – Adam Smith's invisible hand – best ensured that the pursuit of private interests spontaneously led to the common good, it was irrational to place such pursuits under political control. All possible market distortions had to be avoided to ensure the correct formation of prices, because only correct pricing effectively guided resource allocation towards efficiency, equity, and stability. This meant that once something was defined as an economic question – such as the magnitude of the income gap between the rich and the poor – it was moved out of the political realm, which was understood as a realm that could be interfered with politically in accordance with political commitments and moral principles. Economic truths, on the other hand, could not be argued against politically without falling into irrationality.

Thus, what characterizes liberal governmentality is the idea that there can be no sovereign in economics. Economic rationality is not only surrounded by, but also founded on, the fundamental unknowability of the *totality* of the economic process: the invisible hand is invisible precisely because there can be no totalizing sovereign view. Central planning of the economy is disastrous because the sovereign has to respect the natural and inevitable mechanisms of the economy in order to ensure the maximal wellbeing of all. The erosion of sovereign power that is now often attributed to globalization thus had already begun with liberal governmentality in the eighteenth century. Crucially, the eighteenth century saw the emergence of new economic experts whose task it was to tell the government the truth about the natural mechanisms that it could not control and had to respect. While the economic experts could not direct or control the totality of the economic process, they were able to formulate some of the natural laws governing it. The economists of the time were able to explain, for example, that the movement of the population to where wages were highest was a law of nature (C-BB, 16). The discovery of “natural laws” in the social sphere meant that the form that biopolitics assumed in modern societies was essentially tied to the power of experts – economic experts and others with privileged access to scientific truths about life.

This idea has reorganized our political ontology in carving out an autonomous realm of economy that cannot be interfered with politically. From a Foucauldian perspective, the emergence of neoliberal governmentality in the 1930s and its spectacular rise in the last three decades must be understood as the culmination of a historical development that redrew the ontological boundary between economy and politics. However, under neoliberal governmentality the economic sphere places even stricter limits on the realm of politics because economy is no longer understood as one domain among others with its own particular rationality. Economic rationality becomes the rationality of the entirety of human action.

The lectures provide an explicit analysis of the neoliberal program in its two forms. The initial German form was represented by proponents of the Freiburg school of economists such as Walter Eucken and Wilhelm Röpke. They were also called “Ordoliberals”

after the journal *Ordo*. This form was strongly linked to the critique of Nazism and, after the war, to post-war reconstruction. The other, American, form was the neoliberalism of the Chicago school, which was derived from the former but was in some respects more radical. There are a number of connections between the two: they share the same enemy – a state-controlled economy – and a series of persons, theories, and books passed between them. Yet they also have their own distinctive features. Foucault argues that the Chicago school was more radical because it did not accept any distinction between the economic and social spheres. Chicago school economists, such as Gary Becker, argued that it was possible to generalize the economic form of the market throughout the social body, including relationships that were not conducted and therefore not usually analyzed through monetary exchanges. Economic analyses of marriage or parenting, for example, were attempts to decipher what is traditionally considered non-economic behavior in economic terms (C-BB, 323).¹²

Many commentators now see the year 1979, when Foucault delivered his lecture series at the Collège de France on neoliberal governmentality, as the inauguration of the formal period of the dominance of neoliberal economic policy in Europe and the United States (see e.g. Palley 2005). Thirty years after its expanding application, Foucault's topic and his insights appear far-sighted, almost prophetic. In contrast to the commentators who argue that Foucault's genealogical analysis of neoliberalism in these lectures is a gesture of endorsing it, it is my contention that his point in spending so long on it was to engage in a critical study of his political reality (C-BB, 192). The historical account of neoliberalism is suddenly interrupted in lecture eight, in which Foucault takes up the contemporary political issue of social policy in France at the end of the 1970s. This lecture is highly revealing of the stakes involved in his inquiry into neoliberal governmentality. The transition to the neoliberal model in France was literally happening in front of his eyes as he was delivering his lectures. This new model completely overturned the socialist ideas that the aim of social policy was to remedy relative poverty and that society as a whole owed services such as health and education to each of its members (C-BB, 203–206). Foucault was deeply concerned about the "state phobia" prevalent in the social critiques of his day. Similar to his aim in *The History of Sexuality*, volume 1, which was to show that the fervent mission to liberate our repressed sexuality was fundamentally misguided, he was again trying to show how the most popular forms of social and political critique were in fact attacking the wrong enemy. "What is presently at issue in our reality . . . is not so much the growth of the state . . . but much more its reduction" (C-BB, 191). His problem was not the unlimited growth of the state, its omnipotence or its continuous and unified expansion. The risk was not that the unlimited expansion of the welfare state or the administrative apparatus on which it rested would inevitably lead to a totalitarian state like the Nazi or Stalinist state. "All those who share in the great state phobia should know that they are following the direction of the wind and that in fact, for years and years, an effective reduction of the state has been on the way" (C-BB, 191). In signaling the reduction of the state Foucault did not claim that the rise of neoliberal governmentality leads to a lack of actual government, however. What makes his critical interpretation of neoliberalism interesting and original is his analysis of it, not as an ideology or a political doctrine, but as a specific, rationally reflected and coordinated way of governing: a form of governmentality (see e.g. Burchell 1996; Rose 1996). Neoliberalism and the state

cannot be understood as simply antithetical to each other when they are understood to form a rationally coordinated set of governmental practices.

The key aim of neoliberal governmentality is to create social conditions that not only encourage and necessitate natural competitiveness and self-interest, but that produce them. It advocates competition as the dominant principle for guiding human behavior in society: competitiveness at all levels and at various scales of human activity – from the individual to the household, the nation, and the world economy – is paramount. It constructs a social order that safeguards competition in free markets in the knowledge that such an order is superior, not only economically but also morally and politically – the most conducive to securing its members' freedom and happiness. Individuals who do well in this competitive environment must accept this framework and act accordingly: make carefully calculated strategic choices between the most effective means, ways, and instruments. They must make long-term and short-term investments in different aspects of their lives and acquire sufficient economic knowledge to be able to calculate costs, risks, and possible returns on the capital invested. As Foucault notes, the individual's life is lodged, not within the framework of a big enterprise such as the firm or the state, but within the framework of a multiplicity of diverse enterprises connected up to and entangled with each other. The individual's very life – his or her relationships with private property, family, household, retirement – must make him or her into a permanent and multi-faceted enterprise (C-BB, 241).

Thus, Foucault emphasizes that neoliberal governmentality must be viewed as a particular mode of producing subjectivity: it produces an economic subject structured by different tendencies, preferences, and motivations than the political or legal citizen of a disciplinary society or a society of sovereignty (see e.g. Hamann 2009; Read 2009). The neoliberal subject is understood as an atomic individual whose natural self-interest and tendency to compete must be fostered and enhanced. He or she is a fundamentally self-interested and rational being who will navigate the social realm by constantly making rational choices based on economic knowledge and the strict calculation of the necessary costs and desired benefits. Under neoliberal governmentality society becomes a game in which self-interested, atomic individuals compete for maximal economic returns.

As Foucault saw it, the neoliberal governmentality first developed by the Ordoliberals in and around the 1930s in Germany had become the explicit program of most governments in capitalist countries by 1979 when he delivered his lectures. Since then this governmentality has become even more expansive and deeply ingrained. It has circumscribed our everyday life in the last thirty years to the extent that neoliberalism has not just been the dominant economic theory, it has been constitutive of our life-world and ultimately of ourselves. Its triumph does not mean that we have become a standardized, mass society of consumption and spectacle, as some social critics have insisted. It means, rather, that we live in a society that is oriented towards the multiplicity and differentiation of enterprises. We have become entrepreneurs of our lives, competing in the free market called society.

In sum, understanding who we are – undertaking a Foucauldian ontology of ourselves – requires exposing and analyzing the neoliberal governmentality dominant in our societies. But it also requires understanding its roots in classical economic liberalism, exposing its historical and theoretical tensions with biopolitics and pastoral power,

as well as tracing the genealogy of the modern state. Foucault initiated this critical project in his lectures, and it remains acutely pertinent for us to continue it.

Notes

- 1 Sections of this chapter draw on my book, *Foucault, Politics, and Violence* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2012).
- 2 “Je ne veut pas dire que la loi s’efface ou que les institutions de justice tendent à disparaître; mais que la loi fonctionne toujours davantage comme une norme, et que l’institution judiciaire s’intègre de plus en plus à un continuum d’appareils (médicaux, administratifs, etc.) don’t les fonctions sont surtout régulatrices. Une société nomalisatrice est l’effet historique d’une technologie de pouvoir centrée sur la vie” (FHS1, 190).
- 3 “la mise à mort, l’impératif de mort, n’est recevable, dans le système de bio-pouvoir, que s’il tend non pas à la victoire sur les adversaires politiques, mais à l’élimination du danger biologique et au renforcement, directement lié à cette élimination, de l’espèce elle-même ou de la race . . . La fonction meurtrière de l’État ne peut être assurée, dès lors que l’État fonctionne sur le mode du bio-pouvoir, que par le racisme” (FC-FDS, 228).
- 4 Martin Saar (2010: 39) argues that the threefold quasi-definition that Foucault offers in the fourth lecture must be understood as an ad hoc definition, since it is hard to see how something can meaningfully be said to be an “ensemble” of something, a temporal “tendency” and the “result of a process” at the same time, the latter only explained with the help of the term to be defined. He suggests that semantically the term aims at the whole sphere that can be said to be *gouvernemental*, i.e. relating to the instance and the act of government.
- 5 “Alors l’enjeu de ce cours que je voudrais faire cette année, ça serait en somme celui-ci . . . tout comme pour la prison on a essayé de passer derrière les institutions pénitenciaires proprement dites, pour essayer de retrouver l’économie générale de pouvoir, est-ce que, pour l’État, il est possible d’opérer le même retournement? . . . Est-ce qu’il est possible de replacer l’État moderne dans une technologie générale de pouvoir qui aurait assuré ses mutations, son développement, son fonctionnement?” (FC-STP, 123–124)
- 6 Pasquale Pasquino (1993: 79) notes that it became clear in his discussions with Foucault in the second half of the 1970s that the discourse on discipline had reached an impasse and could go no further. According to Pasquino, it threatened to lead to an extremist denunciation of power – envisioned according to a repressive model – that was unsatisfying from the theoretical point of view. If a close analysis of disciplines opposed the Marxist thesis of economic exploitation as a principle for understanding the mechanisms of power, this analysis in itself was not enough and required the investigation of global problems involving the regulation and ordering of society.
- 7 “Je crois qu’on a là une rupture importante: alors que la fin de la souveraineté se trouve en elle-même et qu’elle tire ses instrument d’elle-même sous la forme de la loi, la fin du gouvernement est dans les choses qu’il dirige; elle est à rechercher dans la perfection ou la maximalisation ou l’intensification des processus qu’il dirige, et les instrument du gouvernement, au lieu d’être des lois, vont être des tactiques diverses. Régression, par conséquent, de la loi, ou plutôt, dans la perspective de ce que doit être le gouvernement, la loi n’est certainement pas l’instrument majeur . . . ce n’est certainement pas par la loi que l’on peut effectivement atteindre les fins du gouvernement” (FC-STP, 103).
- 8 “À savoir le ‘libéralisme’, puisque c’est par rapport à lui qu’ils ont pris l’allure d’un défi. Dans un système soucieux du respect des sujets de droit et de la liberté d’initiative des individus, comment le phénomène ‘population’ avec ses effets et ses problèmes spécifiques peut-il être pris en compte? Au nom de quoi et selon quelles règles peut-on le gérer?” (FC-NB, 323).

- 9 Foucault notes that the meaning of “political economy” (*économie politique*) oscillated between two semantic poles between 1750 and 1810–20. Sometimes it aimed at a particular strict and limited analysis of the production and circulation of wealth, but in a broader and more practical sense it also referred to any method of government that could produce the nation’s prosperity (C-BB, 13).
- 10 In addition to the two characteristics of the liberal art of government – the market as the site of truth and the limitation of governmentality by the calculus of utility – Foucault takes up a third feature: the globalization of the market as an objective. Until the middle of the eighteenth century economic activity was seen as competition over limited resources: there was only a certain amount of gold in the world, so as one state became enriched its wealth had to be deducted from the wealth of others. According to the new liberal art of government expressed by Adam Smith and the physiocrats, competition under conditions of freedom could only mean that everybody profited. Competition in a free market would lead to maximum profit for the seller and, simultaneously, minimum expense for the buyer. For the first time Europe appeared as an economic unit and the whole world gathered around it to exchange its own and Europe’s products in the European market. This was not the start of colonization or imperialism, but heralded a new type of global calculation in European governmental practice: a new form of global rationality (C-BB, 56–57). A global market was thus set as an objective, even in this period.
- 11 “Ces questions, autrefois, c’était: est-ce que je gouverne bien conformément aux lois morales, naturelles, divines, etc.? C’était donc la question de la conformité gouvernementale. Puis cela était, au XVI^e et XVII^e siècle, avec la raison d’État: est-ce que je gouverne bien assez, assez intensément, assez profondément, avec assez de détail pour porter l’État . . . à son maximum de force? Et maintenant le problème va être: est-ce que je gouverne bien à la limite de ce trop et de ce trop peu, entre ce maximum et ce minimum que me fixe la nature des choses . . . ?” (FC-NB, 21).
- 12 Foucault discusses at length the theory of human capital developed by economists of the Chicago school such as Gary Becker and Theodore Schultz in the 1960s and early 1970s. This theory was an attempt to fill a gap in formal economic analysis by offering a unified explanation of a wide range of empirical phenomena that had either been given ad hoc interpretations or had baffled investigators. Becker, for example, refers to well-known phenomena such as the fact that earnings typically increase with age at a decreasing rate, and that unemployment rates tend to be negatively related to the level of skill. The idea of human capital explains such phenomena by treating behavioral choices such as education and on-the-job training as investments made in people. People enhance their capabilities as producers and consumers by investing in themselves. The most striking example that Foucault discusses is the mother–child relationship (C-BB, 229–230, 243–244). A neoliberal economic analysis would treat the time the mother spends with the child, as well as the quality of the care she gives, as an investment that constitutes human capital and on which she can expect a return. Investment in the child’s human capital will produce an income when the child grows up and earns a salary. The theory of human capital represents one striking example of the extension of economic analysis into a previously unexplored domain: it makes possible a strictly economic interpretation of a whole range of phenomena previously thought to be non-economic. See Becker 1962, 1964; Schultz 1962, 1971.

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Power and the Subject

AMY ALLEN

In his 1982 essay “The Subject and Power,” Foucault claims that the goal of his work over the preceding twenty years has been not to analyze power, but rather “to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects” (EW3, 326). Hence, he insists – contrary to the prevailing reception of his work at the time – that “it is not power, but the subject, that is the general theme of my research” (EW3, 327). From this angle of interpretation, he also offers a retrospective reconstruction of his oeuvre. His work, he claims, has focused on “three modes of objectification that transform human beings into subjects” (EW3, 326). The first mode of objectification concerns the “objectivizing” of the speaking, productive, and living subject through the discourses of linguistics, economics, and biology (EW3, 326).¹ The second mode investigates the objectivizing of the subject through what Foucault calls “dividing practices,” which means practices that divide the abnormal – the mad, the criminal, the sexually deviant – from the normal. The third mode – the focus of Foucault’s late work – explores the ways in which human beings turn themselves into subjects.

One noteworthy feature of this way of reconstructing Foucault’s oeuvre is the way that it situates his first major work, the *History of Madness* (HM). If one divides Foucault’s work up according to the standard chronological periodization – early, middle, and late – then *History of Madness* seems to belong with *The Order of Things* (OT) and *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (AK) in his early, archaeological, phase. But if one divides Foucault’s work up along the lines he suggests in this essay, then the *History of Madness* belongs with *Discipline and Punish* (DP) and volume 1 of the *History of Sexuality* (HS1), the masterpieces of his genealogical phase, and the thread that connects them is their focus on dividing practices. Which is to say that the thread that connects them is power: specifically, the role that power plays in dividing rational, law-abiding, and normal subjects from the mad, the deviant, and the abnormal. But this is just to say that these texts all centrally concern the relationship between the subject and power.

This is surprising only because, as Foucault himself notes, the word power rarely if ever appears in the 538 pages of the *History of Madness*. As he puts it: “When I think back now, I ask myself what else it was that I was talking about in *Madness and Civilization*². . . but power? Yet I’m perfectly aware that I scarcely ever used the word and never had such a field of analysis at my disposal” (EW3, 117). Not only that, Foucault also claims that his turn toward the explicit study of power in the early 1970s was motivated not by an interest in analyzing power for its own sake but rather by his overarching interest in the subject. “It is true,” he concedes, “that I became quite involved with the question of power” (EW3, 327), but this was (only?) because the existing tools for studying power – unlike the existing tools for studying relations of signification, production, and life – were inadequate for the analysis of dividing practices which was his central aim.

Moreover, Foucault claims that what is distinctive of contemporary power relations is precisely their relationship to the subject: “this form of power that applies itself to immediate everyday life categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him that he must recognize and others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power that makes individuals subjects” (EW3, 331). Whereas for feudal societies struggles against ethnic, social, and religious domination were most salient, and for the nineteenth century the struggle against economic exploitation was most prominent, for our age, the characteristic struggle is the struggle against subjection. As examples of this type of struggle, Foucault mentions the women’s movement, the prison movement, and anti-psychiatry (EW3, 330), though one might add to this list the gay rights/queer liberation movement, which Foucault’s work has done much to inspire. Struggles against domination and exploitation haven’t disappeared, nor are struggles against subjection entirely new, but the latter have come to the fore in our time, and this explains why the relationship between power and the subject assumes such a central role in Foucault’s work. In other words, Foucault’s attempt to untangle the relationship between power and the subject is a response to what he saw as the main political challenge of his time. As I have argued elsewhere (Allen 2008), Foucault’s 1980 claim that “one of the main political problems . . . nowadays” is “the politics of ourselves” (HL, 223), looks, in retrospect, remarkably prescient, inasmuch as it anticipated – even as it helped to inspire – many of the heated debates about the politics of identity and of recognition that have attracted so much attention in the last twenty-five years. Although recently critical attention has turned to Foucault’s analyses of biopolitics and neoliberalism, his account of the politics of our selves – which is an analysis of the multifaceted relationship between power and the subject – remains highly relevant for our own time, particularly, though not exclusively, for feminist and queer theory.

In what follows I will focus on three moments in Foucault’s lifelong engagement with this pressing political question of the relationship between power and the subject. The first moment involves his examination of madness, and his account of the relationship between the social-institutional and conceptual exclusion of madness and the constitution of the rational subject in modernity, as this is articulated in the *History of Madness*. The second moment focuses on his later account of subjection and normalization, as presented in his famous genealogical works, *Discipline and Punish* and *History of Sexuality*, volume 1. Foucault’s lectures on *Psychiatric Power* (C-PP) serve as a bridge between

these first two moments. The third moment involves his exploration of technologies of the self in the context of ancient Greek and Roman ethics. His concept of government provides the bridge between these latter two moments. In the conclusion of this essay, I discuss briefly the issue of the continuity or lack thereof between these three moments.

Power and the Subject, Take One: The *History of Madness*

Although it is true, as I noted above, that Foucault hardly ever uses the word “power” in the *History of Madness* – indeed, the term is not even listed in the index to the English translation – his claim that the book is nonetheless about power is remarkably plausible. This is already evident in Foucault’s analyses of the experience of madness in the Renaissance and the Classical Age. First of all, whereas in the Middle Ages there was still the possibility of a dialogue between reason and unreason and a place for the tragic consciousness of madness – a vision of madness as opening up a window onto the dark powers of the world – in the Renaissance, this tragic vision was gradually supplanted by a critical consciousness of madness. Foucault presents the emergence of the critical consciousness in broadly power-theoretical terms, as the gradual “mastery” of madness by reason. Hence, he claims that the obscuring of the tragic consciousness of madness by the critical consciousness is a process whereby madness ceases to be “a dark power that threatened to undo the world” and becomes “at one with the victory of reason and its definitive mastery, for the truth of madness is [now] to be interior to reason” (HM, 32).

Similarly, Foucault’s account of the Classical Age’s experience of madness uses the vocabulary of power. In his discussion of Descartes’s *Meditations*, made famous by his exchange with Derrida (see Derrida 1978; HM, appendices 2 and 3), Foucault claims that Descartes makes madness a “condition of impossibility for thought” (HM, 45). Descartes’s *cogito* is constituted on the basis of a prior exclusion of madness, a move through which madness is “banished” and Unreason is “driven underground” by a “sovereign exercise” of reason (HM, 47). This conceptual exclusion is mirrored by the social and institutional exclusion brought about by the great confinement. By means of these twin exclusions, reason in the Classical Age “reigned in a pure manner, triumphantly, and victory over unchained unreason was guaranteed in advance” (HM, 77). Through these exclusions, “the gesture of confinement created alienation” (HM, 79). Note that Foucault is here playing on the dual sense of the term “alienation,” which, in French, has both the straightforward meaning of “insanity” and also the connotation of “estrangement.” Hence, when he says that the gesture of confinement created alienation, this means both that it constituted madness/insanity as an object of possible knowledge, and that it did so precisely by alienating madmen from the rest of the social world – and even, he suggests, by alienating man from something that had previously been understood as internal to himself (HM, 79).

The use of terms like mastery, sovereignty, exclusion, and alienation in his discussions of the Renaissance and the Classical Age indicates that he understands the relationship between reason and madness as a power relationship. Moreover, in the Classical Age, this relationship can be observed not only at the social level – the emerging bourgeois social order of the Classical Age upholds its norms by confining madmen along

with sexual deviants, the poor, and libertines – but also at the level of individual subjectivity – individuals in the Classical Age constitute themselves as rational subjects by excluding the very possibility of their own madness.³ But the implicit theorization of power in relation to subjectivity in *History of Madness* is perhaps most interestingly presented in the final two chapters of the book, where Foucault contests the standard story of the “liberation” of the insane through the formation of the modern asylum in the nineteenth century.⁴ Through a detailed consideration of the “concrete situation” which formed the background for the asylums of Tuke and Pinel, the “mythical values” represented by them, and the “real process” at work inside them (HM, 464), Foucault systematically dismantles the myth of the asylum as the site of the liberation of the insane.

With respect to the first point, the “concrete situation,” Foucault resituates Tuke’s asylum in the context of attacks on Quaker religion for its presumed association with madness; he notes that in Voltaire’s *Lettres philosophiques*, the Quaker is presented as one who is moved by the breath of inspiration, which could either be the Word of God or the “senseless verbiage of unreason” (HM, 466). This, Foucault suggests, gave Quakers a special interest in the treatment of the mad (HM, 466), while the late eighteenth-century changes in English social welfare policies created a need for private assistance to the mad (HM, 467). Similarly, he resituates Pinel’s asylum in the massive social and political upheaval of the French Revolution (HM, 465–471). With respect to the second point, the “mythical values,” Foucault exposes the role that a mythical conception of nature – as the inalienable essence to which the alienated madman was restored through treatment (HM, 475) – played in Tuke’s asylum and that the myth of liberation from the despotism of the *ancien régime* played in Pinel’s (HM, 471–481).

But perhaps most important for understanding the implicit conception of the relationship between power and the subject is Foucault’s discussion of the third point, the “real process” at work in the asylum. For Tuke’s asylum, that real process operates through two mechanisms: the compulsion to work and the gaze (HM, 485). Tuke’s asylum required patients to work, not so that they might be economically productive, but solely as a moral rule that constrained the “harmful liberty of thought” to which the mad were prone (HM, 485). Still more effective was the gaze, which operated through the mechanism of what Tuke called the “desire of esteem” (Tuke, quoted in HM, 486); the asylum directors would invite the patients to tea-parties where they were required to dress up and obey norms of “politeness and propriety” (Tuke, quoted in HM, 486). Through these mechanisms, Tuke’s asylum organized the madman’s guilt (HM, 485), and used the organization of that guilt to compel patients to restrain themselves. Hence, “the partial suppression of physical constraint at [Tuke’s] Retreat was part of a whole, of which the essential element was the constitution of ‘self-restraint’, where the freedom of the mad, checked by work and by the gaze of others, was constantly threatened by an acknowledgement of guilt” (HM, 487). Moreover the cure, for Tuke, was linked to the madman’s consciousness of his guilt; only through such bad conscience was he “to return to his consciousness as a free, responsible subject, thereby regaining reason” (HM, 485).⁵

Unlike Tuke’s Retreat, which attempted to “rebuild around madness an atmosphere that resembled a Quaker community as closely as possible” (HM, 482), Pinel’s asylum sought to counteract the dangerous imagery and influence of religion, which was

thought to provoke insanity. And yet the real process at work in Pinel's asylum was strikingly similar to that of Tuke's. His asylum functioned through three mechanisms: silence, recognition as mirror, and perpetual judgment (see HM, 495–503). Through silence – literally, refusing to speak to patients who suffered from delusions – Pinel trapped patients “in a relation to the self that was of the order of guilt, and in a non-relation to others that was of the order of shame” (HM, 497). Through recognition as mirror – a therapeutic tactic whereby Pinel humiliated patients by comparing them with other patients whom they themselves regarded as mad – madness was “paradoxically stripped of its essential liberty, which was that of solitary exaltation; it became responsible for what it knew of its truth, and was imprisoned in its own gaze, which was constantly turned back on itself, finally chained to the humiliation of being an object for itself” (HM, 499). Through the mechanism of recognition, the madman was compelled to judge himself; but he was also judged from without, in the “judicial microcosm” of Pinel's asylum (HM, 500). For example, whereas in the Classical Age baths and showers had been used as treatments for the mad, owing to the prevailing medical theories about humors and black bile and so forth, in Pinel's asylum the cold shower became a punishment, pure and simple. In this world, “everything is organized so that the mad recognize themselves in the world of judgment that envelops them from all sides: they are to know that they are observed, judged, and condemned” (HM, 501).

These real processes of the asylum – work, the gaze, silence, recognition as mirror, and perpetual judgment – constituted a moral structure that was predicated on the organized guilt and shame of the madman. Only through the mechanisms of guilt and shame was the asylum able to replace physical restraint with the self-restraint of the patient. A central figure in this transformation was the doctor, who had, according to Foucault, played no role in the Classical Age's institutions of confinement. In the nineteenth-century asylums of Tuke and Pinel, by contrast, he became an essential figure (HM, 504). But he entered the asylum not as a medical expert on the etiology of diseases of the mind, but as a moral authority. He ruled the asylum “as the incarnation of reason, bearing the full force of the authority vested in him by the fact of his not being mad” (HM, 488). “If,” moreover, “the medical character could circumscribe madness, it was not because he knew it but because he mastered it; and what positivism came to consider as objectivity was nothing but the converse, the effects of this domination” (HM, 505–506). Hence the radical conclusion of Foucault's critique of psychiatric positivism in this book: the scientific “objectivity” of psychiatry is a myth; psychiatry is made possible as a body of knowledge by a prior, moral decision to regard some people as abnormal, deviant, mad. This decision, Foucault suggests, is not and cannot be justified by the findings of psychiatry because the very discipline of psychiatry is founded upon this decision. This does not make all of the subsequent observations generated by psychiatry false – in that sense, Foucault is not anti-psychiatry – but it does mean that the *positivism* of psychiatry, its pretense to engage in scientific inquiry that is objective and value-neutral, is a myth. Psychiatry is grounded in a social and moral logic that cannot be justified within its own terms.

As positivism began to take hold of psychiatry in the nineteenth century, and the discipline's roots in the moral authority of the doctor were forgotten, the doctor–patient couple came to symbolize the power relation between reason and madness. The more that patients blindly accepted the authority of the doctor and submitted themselves to

his will, “the more such patients became the ideal and perfect correlate of the powers that were projected onto the physician, pure objects with no resistance other than inertia, ripe to become precisely the hysterical woman in whom Charcot exalted the marvelous powers of her doctor” (HM, 509). Hence the doctor–patient couple is thoroughly structured as a power relationship: the doctor is an “alienating figure” (HM, 511) while the mentally ill person is “wholly alienated” (HM, 510); the doctor–patient couple is a relationship “in which all alienations are summed up, formed and resolved” (HM, 510). This doctor–patient couple as power relationship finds its culmination in the psychoanalytic situation, which imports all of the power structures of the asylum – the gaze, silence, judgment, and mirroring – into the person of the analyst. And this is why, although psychoanalysis attempts to reinstate a dialogue with unreason, “it cannot and will never be able to hear the voices of unreason nor decipher on their own terms the signs of the insane” (HM, 511).

So what does Foucault’s account of the birth of the asylum reveal about his understanding of the relationship between power and the subject at this point in his work? There are a few points worth noting. First, there is the way that Foucault characterizes the relationship between the mad subject and the doctor as a paragon of reason and moral authority. This is presented as a relationship of almost total domination, in which through the acceptance of the moral authority of the doctor the patient becomes a pure object while the doctor alone retains the subjective capacities for rational thought and moral judgment. Hence Foucault says that, in the nineteenth-century asylum, the battle between reason and unreason “was always won in advance, and the defeat of unreason was already inscribed in the concrete situation where the mad and the non-mad met. The absence of constraint in the asylums of the nineteenth century was not the liberation of unreason, but madness mastered in advance” (HM, 488–489). Second, as Foucault argues in the concluding chapter of *History of Madness*, “The Anthropological Circle,” this total mastery of madness was linked to the nineteenth-century anthropological understanding of man, inasmuch as such an understanding rests on an objectified understanding of man, and madness represents “the essential moment of [man’s] objectification” (HM, 525). In other words, man and madman are more closely linked in the modern world than ever, insofar as “they are joined by the impalpable link of a reciprocal and incompatible truth” (HM, 529): that I am a man only to the extent that I am not mad, that my manhood is constituted by the mastery of madness in advance through the mechanisms of internalized guilt and shame; and that being mad strips me of my manhood, renders me thoroughly dominated and alienated, an object of psychiatric and anthropological knowledge.

Power and the Subject, Take Two: From *Psychiatric Power* to Subjection

Foucault returns to the relationship between madness, subjectivity, and power – though now from the vantage point of his much more developed analysis of modern disciplinary power – in his 1973–74 lecture course on *Psychiatric Power* (C-PP). In the opening lecture, Foucault offers an interesting critique of the understanding of power that was implicit in his discussion of the asylum in the *History of Madness*. His first criticism of

his earlier work is that he focused too much on “representations” or “the perception” of madness (C-PP, 12–13). Rather than start from an analysis of representations, “which inevitably refers to a history of mentalities, of thought,” Foucault proposes now to start from “an apparatus [*dispositif*] of power” (C-PP, 13). Which is to say that his focus will now be on the ways in which an apparatus of power produces discourses, structures of thought, and forms of perception, representation, and experience; the focus will be, that is, on “the apparatus of power as a productive instance of discursive practice” (C-PP, 13). His second self-critical point concerns his prior reliance on notions of violence, institutions, and the family in articulating the relationship between madness, reason, and power (C-PP, 14–16). With regard to this second point, Foucault replaces his earlier focus on violence with an analysis of the “microphysics” of power which analyzes the ways in which power applies itself to the body (C-PP, 14); he replaces his focus on the institution of the asylum with an analysis of the “networks, currents, relays, points of support, and differences of potential that characterize a form of power” that is constitutive of institutions (C-PP, 15); finally, he replaces his focus on the family with a broader analysis of strategies of power relations that unfold within psychiatric practice (C-PP, 16).

Foucault’s discussion of a particular example from Pinel – the nineteenth-century French psychiatric reformer whose mythical status as liberator of the insane Foucault sought to debunk in the *History of Madness* – serves to illuminate the contrast between the two approaches. The example concerns Pinel’s “treatment” of a madman who refuses to eat by threatening him with physical punishment. This case had been discussed in *History of Madness* as an instance of perpetual judgment by means of which medicine is converted into justice, and therapeutics into repression (HM, 500–501), but when Foucault returns to this case in 1973, he understands it very differently. First of all, he sets up his discussion of this scene by noting the background assumption that the madman must be brought under control, rather than, as he would have been in the Classical Age, made to see the error of his ways. Hence, “what characterizes the madman,” for Pinel, “that by which one ascribes madness to him, is the insurrection of a force, of a furiously raging, uncontrolled and possibly uncontrollable force within him” (C-PP, 7). If, however, madness is the insurrection of a force, then “what else can cure be but the submission of this force?” (C-PP, 8). Hence, the cure scene is now understood as staging “a confrontation of two wills,” belonging to doctor and patient, respectively – it is “a battle, a relationship of force” (C-PP, 10). Moreover, the goal of this battle is “to provoke a second relationship of force, within the patient as it were, since it involves provoking a conflict between the fixed idea to which the patient is attached and the fear of punishment” (C-PP, 11). In other words, the goal of the first battle is to compel the patient to exert internal control over the force of his own madness.

As he had argued in the *History of Madness*, Foucault maintains in this lecture that effective control of the madman is not only the condition of possibility of cure but also of the medical knowledge of madness precisely because “exact observation is not possible without this discipline, without this order, without this prescriptive schema of regularities” (C-PP, 2). Hence, it is not that cure is made possible by medical knowledge but rather that “medical authority . . . functions as power well before it functions as knowledge” (C-PP, 3), and, in that sense, Foucault maintains once again that positivism

is founded on a myth. But notice how different Foucault's analysis of the doctor–patient couple as a power relationship is from his earlier account. This difference is not just a function of Foucault's much more explicit thematization of power and its relation to structures of knowledge and discourse – elements that were largely implicit in the *History of Madness* – but is also a result of his viewing the asylum not as a scene of total silencing, alienation, and objectification but rather as a confrontation of wills, an unstable relationship of forces, a “battlefield” (C-PP, 7). The effect of this shift is to preserve a space for struggle within the asylum itself, to understand the asylum itself as the site of a struggle.

Hence Foucault's reconsideration of this example from Pinel exemplifies the development of what he later called his “strategical model” of power (HS1, 102).⁶ On this model, power relations always involve a confrontation or struggle between opposing forces. Power is, he writes, “the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always local and unstable” (HS1, 93). It is omnipresent, not because it gathers everything up into itself, but because it “comes from everywhere” (HS1, 93); it is produced in all social interactions. “One needs to be nominalistic, no doubt,” Foucault cautions his reader, “power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society” (HS1, 93). Note that in the strategical model there are two senses of the term “strategic” in play. First of all, force relationships themselves are understood in strategic terms (HS1, 97); they are microphysical, tactical struggles and confrontations by means of which individuals, as Foucault would later put it, attempt to direct, control, or determine the conduct of others (see HL, 203). Second, these local tactical force relations converge into chains or systems that have an overall coherence, logic, or rationality to them. These are broader “strategies” that both make possible and are made possible by local, tactical struggles and confrontations;⁷ as examples of such strategies, Foucault mentions “the state apparatus,” “the formulation of law,” and “the various social hegemonies” (HS1, 93).

In his 1975–76 lecture course *Society Must Be Defended*, Foucault articulates his strategical model of power by contrasting it with the predominant conception of power in traditional political philosophy, which he calls the juridical model of power. This model understands power in terms of law and sovereignty and focuses on questions of legitimacy. Although this juridical model may have been an appropriate way of conceiving of power in pre-modern, feudal societies – in which sovereign power was the most salient form – one of Foucault's central claims is that it is not appropriate for conceptualizing power in modern societies. As Foucault sees it, modernity saw “the appearance – one should say the invention – of a new mechanism of power which had very specific procedures, completely new instruments, and very different equipment. It was, I believe, absolutely incompatible with relations of sovereignty” (C-SMD, 35). Hence, Foucault makes it clear that the adoption of this strategical model is based not on “speculative choice or theoretical preference,” but rather on the fact that this model best captures the distinctive features of power relationships in modern Western societies (HS1, 102).

In keeping with his nominalism, Foucault refrains from offering a theory of power. Rather, he constructs a conceptualization of power that can serve to guide his con-

crete historical analyses, and that will in turn be refined and perhaps even reformulated in light of those analyses. As he puts it, in response to the question of whether we need a “theory” of power: “since a theory assumes a prior objectification, it cannot be asserted as a basis for analytical work. But this analytical work cannot proceed without an ongoing conceptualization. And this conceptualization implies critical thought – a constant checking” (EW3, 327). Foucault’s conceptualization leads him to generate several methodological assumptions about how best to study modern power. First, power is spread throughout the social body rather than confined to its central institutions, such as the state; so when we study power, we should look for it at the extremities of the social body, at those points where it becomes “capillary” (C-SMD, 27). Second, power comes from below, from myriad mobile, microphysical force relations (HS1, 94); hence, our analysis of power should be ascending rather than descending (C-SMD, 30). Note that this does not mean that we cannot analyze large-scale patterns or structures of domination and subordination, only that these should be understood as the “terminal forms” that power takes, not as the paradigm cases of power relations (HS1, 92). Third, power relations are “intentional and non-subjective,” which is to say that they have an aim, a logic, and a rationality but that those aims, logics, and rationalities are not controlled by any individual or group of individuals (HS1, 94); hence, when we study power, rather than analyzing it in subjective terms we should study the ways in which subjects are constituted by power relations (C-SMD, 28–29).

Foucault employs these methodological presuppositions in his analysis of disciplinary power – a form of power that he takes to be distinctively new to the modern West.⁸ In *Psychiatric Power*, Foucault sketches out the central elements of disciplinary power by means of a contrast with the sovereign power which preceded it and with which modern disciplinary power has become intertwined (on the relationship between disciplinary and sovereign power, see C-SMD, 35–37). In sovereign power, an individual or group of individuals – the sovereign – exercises power over a multiplicity of subjects, or, rather, over subjects as multiplicities; hence sovereign power “is a form of power without an individualizing function, or which only outlines individuality on the sovereign’s side” (C-PP, 46). In disciplinary power, by contrast, there is “an elimination of individualization at the top” combined with a “very strong underlying individualization at the base” (C-PP, 55). In other words, no single individual or group of individuals exercises disciplinary power over others, and even those whose function it is to direct the disciplining of others – prison guards, psychiatrists, teachers, etc. – are in turn subject to disciplinary norms. To say that disciplinary power individualizes its targets is to say that it “fabricates and distributes subjected bodies” (C-PP, 55), which is to say that disciplinary power functions through subjection.⁹

Subjection, for Foucault, refers to individuals’ “constitution as subjects in both senses of the word” (HS1, 60). If we take this double meaning seriously, then subjection refers both to the subject as an effect of power and to the production through power relations of subjects who can think and act – as opposed to inert, passive objects (see C-SMD, 29). Once again, Foucault’s notion of subjection (*assujettissement*) can be understood by means of a contrast with the juridical conception of power. Whereas the juridical model of power presupposes “an individual who is naturally endowed . . . with rights, capabilities, and so on” (C-SMD, 43) and then asks under what circumstances

it is legitimate for such an individual to be subjected to the power of the state, Foucault begins his analysis with power relationships that are viewed as fundamentally productive rather than merely repressive. As he puts it: “we must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it ‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it ‘censors’, it ‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’. In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth” (DP, 194).¹⁰ Rather than “asking subjects how, why, and by what right they can agree to being subjugated,” we should strive to show “how actual relations of subjugation manufacture subjects” (C-SMD, 45). Hence, if power is productive for Foucault, then the individual subject is one of its primary products. “The individual is in fact a power-effect, and at the same time, to the extent that he is a power-effect, the individual is a relay: power passes through the individuals it has constituted” (C-SMD, 30). According to the juridical conception of power, the individual itself is unsullied by power relations; it is an “elementary nucleus” or a “primitive atom” on or against which power may subsequently be applied (C-SMD, 29). For Foucault, by contrast, the individual is an effect of power, but the individual is also always the “relay” of or conduit for the power relations that make her who she is.

Power and the Subject, Take Three: From Subjection to Care of the Self

With Foucault’s analysis of subjection, we have arrived at his most explicit articulation of the relationship between the subject and power, the one for which he is (rightly) famous. And yet Foucault’s notion of subjection raises a potential problem. If the individual is an effect of power, then does that mean that subjection is, for Foucault, a totalizing force from which there is no escape? Are individuals, for Foucault, nothing more than “standardized products of some discourse formation . . . individual copies that are mechanically punched out,” as Jürgen Habermas has put it (1987: 293)? Foucault’s claim, mentioned above, that struggles against subjection are the characteristic political struggles of our age suggests otherwise, as does his oft-noted insistence that “where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power” (HS1, 95). And yet, in his genealogical works of the 1970s, the notions of resistance and struggles against subjection, though present, are underdeveloped.

Foucault acknowledges this in a set of lectures delivered at Dartmouth College in 1980. There are, he claims, two sides to the critical genealogy of the modern subject that is so central to his project. If one wants to study the genealogy of the modern, Western subject, one must take into account not only techniques or technologies of domination – “techniques which permit one to determine the conduct of individuals, to impose certain wills on them, and to submit them to certain ends or objectives” (2005: 213) – one must also take into account techniques or technologies of the self – “techniques which permit individuals to effect, by their own means, a certain number of operations on their own bodies, on their own souls, on their own thoughts, on their own conduct, and this in a manner so as to transform themselves, modify themselves, and to attain a certain state of perfection, of happiness, of purity, of supernatural

power, and so on" (2005: 214). Foucault admits that in his previous work on asylums and prisons he focused too much on the former; his then current work on techniques of the self in ancient Greece and Rome in the context of his study of the history of sexuality was designed to correct this excessive emphasis on domination, to fill in this lacuna in his work. Moreover, in this lecture he underlines the importance of analyzing the "contact point" between technologies of domination and technologies of the self, which he calls "government" (2005: 214). "Power," he says, "consists in complex relations: these relations involve a set of rational techniques, and the efficiency of those techniques is due to a subtle integration of coercion-technologies and self-technologies" (2005: 214).

Hence, although in his late work Foucault shifts his attention to a study of practices and techniques of the self in ancient Greece and Rome, this study is understood as an extension of rather than a radical departure from his earlier work on disciplinary power and subjection. His study of these techniques of the self was prompted by but ultimately not limited to his investigations in the history of sexuality.¹¹ Nor was his interest in these techniques, which center on the notion of the care of the self, merely historical. As Foucault notes at the beginning of his 1981–82 lecture course on the *Hermeneutics of the Subject*, the care of the self was a "cultural phenomenon" in the Hellenistic and Roman world and an "event in thought," but one that "constitutes within the history of thought a decisive moment that is still significant for our modern mode of being subjects" (C-HS, 9).

In what way is the emergence of the care of the self as a cultural phenomenon and an event in thought significant for our modern mode of being subjects? In the opening lecture of the *Hermeneutics of the Subject* course, Foucault associates the care of the self with spirituality, understood as "the search, practice, and experience through which the subject carries out the necessary transformations on himself in order to have access to the truth" (C-HS, 15), and distinguishes spirituality from philosophy, a form of thought that "attempts to determine the conditions and limits of the subject's access to the truth" with reference to knowledge and knowledge alone (C-HS, 15). Hence philosophy in this sense of the term, as distinct from spirituality, emphasizes the Delphic injunction to know oneself. Whereas for the ancients this Delphic injunction to know oneself was situated within a broader and more encompassing spiritual demand to care for oneself, in modernity (at least since Descartes and Kant), philosophical knowledge of the truth about oneself has covered over and obscured this ancient imperative. Hence, Foucault writes, "whoever wishes to study the history of subjectivity . . . will have to try to uncover the very long and slow transformation of an apparatus of subjectivity, defined by the spirituality of knowledge and the subject's practice of truth, into this other apparatus of subjectivity which is our own and which is, I think, governed by the question of the subject's knowledge of himself and of the subject's obedience to the law. In fact neither of these two problems (of obedience to the law and of the subject's knowledge of himself) was really fundamental or even present in the thought of ancient culture" (C-HS, 319).

The ancient notion of care of the self is thus significant for us now inasmuch as it provides resources or tools for conceptualizing and developing alternatives to our modern mode of subjection, in which we are disciplined, normalized, bound to law, objectivized, and compelled to tell the truth about ourselves. But we have to be careful

here. Foucault is not suggesting a simple return to the precepts of Greek or Stoic ethics as a cure for what ails us. As he stated emphatically in a late interview: "I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people" (EW1, 256). And yet, as Paul Veyne has correctly pointed out, Foucault "considered one of [Greek ethics'] elements, namely, the idea of a work of the self on the self, to be capable of reacquiring a contemporary meaning, in the manner of one of those pagan temple columns that one occasionally sees reutilized in more recent structures" (1997: 231). Ancient Greek and Stoic ethics seems a promising resource precisely because it is not bound up with juridical and disciplinary forms of subjection and normalization. As Foucault says: "I don't think one can find any normalization in, for instance, the Stoic ethics. The reason is, I think, that the principal aim, the principal target of this kind of ethics, was an aesthetic one" (EW1, 254). Similarly, in the context of a discussion of Plato's *Alcibiades*, Foucault claims that "the idea of the bios as a material for an aesthetic piece of art is something that fascinates me. The idea also that ethics can be a very strong structure of existence, without any relation with the juridical per se, with an authoritarian system, with a disciplinary structure. All that is very interesting" (EW1, 260). Or, as Foucault's former teacher and longtime mentor Georges Canguilhem summed it up rather more pithily: "in the face of normalization and against it, *Le Souci de soi*" (1997: 32).

In order for ancient ethics and practices of the self to be made available as resources for conceptualizing and developing alternatives to our modern mode of disciplinary subjection, Foucault first has to show that ancient practices of the self are in fact very different from our own. Foucault explores how Christianity replaced the ancient ethical notion of creating oneself as a work of art with forms of self-knowledge and self-renunciation that are designed to enable individuals to attain spiritual purity. With this move, the Greek and Stoic problem of ethics as an aesthetics of existence was obscured and "covered over by the problem of purification . . . From that moment on, the self was no longer something to be made but something to be renounced and deciphered" (EW1, 274). In the wake of the Enlightenment, despite the waning influence of Christianity, the emphasis on deciphering and renouncing the self has not disappeared; instead it has been incorporated into the disciplinary structure of the human sciences. The Christian confessional has given way to the psychoanalyst's couch. As a result of these various contingent historical transformations, our contemporary mode of ethical subjectivation (HS2, 26) is markedly different from that of the ancients.

Different but not entirely unrelated. Classical culture did not simply disappear nor was it completely covered up; rather, as Foucault notes, "you find many elements that have simply been integrated, displaced, reutilized in Christianity" (EW1, 277–278). For example, Christianity takes up the notion of care of the self and puts it to work in pastoral power, which centers on the care of others. Similarly, the Christian pastoral adopts techniques of self-examination and conscience-guiding from the Stoics, Epicureans, and Pythagoreans, and it transforms these into techniques for deciphering the souls of its flock and ensuring their obedience (EW3, 298–325). The continuity between their techniques for attaining self-mastery and modern techniques of subjection sug-

gests another reason that Foucault turns to Greek ethics for resources for theorizing alternatives to disciplinary subjection. It is not just that Greek practices of the self are non-normalizing, non-objectivizing, and disconnected from law; it is also that our own modern modes of disciplinary subjection are related, however distantly, to ancient technologies of the self. It is this continuity that makes it possible for us to recover certain elements of ancient practices of the self; it makes them not just logical but live possibilities for us. In this sense, modern techniques of domination could be said to contain the resources for their own overcoming.

Foucault's discussion in the *Hermeneutics of the Subject* course of the importance of the notion of conversion in Hellenistic and Roman culture and philosophy helps to illustrate this idea. Foucault distinguishes the Stoic idea of conversion ([*se*] *convertere ad se*) from both the Platonic notion of *epistrophe* – which involves a turning away from appearances and toward oneself that is connected to the doctrine of recollection – on the one hand, and from the Christian notion of *metanoia* – which involves a dramatic self-renunciation followed by rebirth – on the other. “In the Hellenistic and Roman culture of the self,” Foucault claims, “conversion gets us to move from that which does not depend on us to that which does. What is involved . . . is liberation *within this axis of immanence*, a liberation from what we do not control so as finally to arrive at what we can control” (C-HS, 210, emphasis added). This is not a liberation from the body, as in the Christian conception of *metanoia*, but rather “the establishment of a complete, perfect, and adequate relationship of self to self” (C-HS, 210), and it is achieved not through recollection, as in the Platonic notion of *epistrophe*, but rather through “exercise, practice, and training; *askesis* rather than knowledge” (C-HS, 210). In Seneca, Foucault finds an account of a process of [*se*] *convertere ad se*, a process which “spins the subject around on himself, that is to say it performs the action by which, traditionally and legally, a master freed his slave. . . . It is a break with everything around the self, for the benefit of the self, but not a break within the self” (C-HS, 213).

One cannot help but hear, in this description of Seneca's understanding of conversion, powerful resonances with Foucault's own understanding of freedom: freedom, for Foucault, takes place within an axis of immanent power relations; it is an embodied practice; and it is connected to the spiral movement by means of which thought breaks free of its own discursive and non-discursive conditions of possibility.¹² This suggests that what Foucault saw in ancient Greek and Hellenistic thought and practice was not exactly an alternative to our modern experience of disciplinary subjection but rather a model for a contemporary philosophical and practical exercise, the object of which is “to learn to what extent the effort to think one's own history can free thought from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently” (HS2, 9).

Conclusion

Foucault was fond of retrospectively reconstructing the guiding thread of his research. I have already referred to two such statements – his claim in a 1976 interview (EW3, 111–133) that when he was writing the *History of Madness* he was really talking

about power even though he hardly ever used that term; and his claim in the 1982 essay “The Subject and Power” that it is not power but the subject that is the guiding thread of his work as a whole – but there are many more. To mention just one more example, in the *Hermeneutics of the Subject* lecture course, Foucault reinterprets his earlier work in light of the problem of the relationship between subjectivity and truth (C-HS, 229–230). What does this seemingly un-Foucauldian will to continuity, this drive to reinterpret his earlier work in light of his present concerns, tell us about Foucault?

To Foucault’s critics, it says that Foucault was fond of seeing continuity in his own work where it didn’t exist – of covering over the inconsistencies, contradictions, and radical changes in direction in his thought. To such critics, Foucault was in denial about the force of the deep contradictions that were central to his own thought (Habermas 1994). And yet the fascinating thing about these retrospective reconstructions is that, different as they initially seem from each other, each has a certain plausibility. One can plausibly read the *History of Madness* as being all about power, even though Foucault had not yet made that a central concept in his analytical framework. One can also productively read Foucault’s genealogical analyses of power as investigations into the discursive and non-discursive conditions of possibility of subjectivity. Similarly, one could, I think, just as easily organize one’s reconstruction of Foucault’s oeuvre around the relationship between truth and subjectivity as I have organized this essay around the relationship between power and the subject.

And yet Foucault also famously rejected the demand for consistency and continuity when it came from his critics. He described his books as experiences that were designed to transform himself and his readers (EW3, 239–243). As he says defiantly to his imagined critical interlocutor at the end of the introduction to *The Archaeology of Knowledge*: “Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and our police to see that our papers are in order. At least spare us their morality when we write” (AK, 17). Is this just another contradiction in the work of the theorist of discontinuity, who continually sought to articulate commonalities and continuities between his earlier works and his present concerns?

Of course the image of Foucault as a theorist who celebrated discontinuity for its own sake is a caricature. As he himself put it, “my problem was not at all to say ‘*Voilà*, long live discontinuity, we are in the discontinuous and a good thing, too’” (EW3, 114). A better image to keep in mind might be one that Foucault himself frequently used, that of the spiral (see, for example, EW1, 178; EW2, 74; EW3, 358). There’s a movement to Foucault’s thought – from madness as the condition of impossibility of thought to disciplinary subjection to the Stoic idea of conversion – a movement that takes us from the subject as founded on the exclusion of madness through the constitution of the subject by means of its subjection to disciplinary power through governmentality to the relationship of self to self. There is a kind of continuity here, a circling back around similar themes and problematics – power and subjectivity, yes, but also truth, reason, discourse, and knowledge – but a kind of discontinuity as well, a willingness and profound ability to rethink the same historical transformations from the ground up, using different concepts and new analytical frameworks as tools: neither a hermeneutic circle, nor a dialectical progression, but a spiral, an open-ended movement that takes us beyond ourselves.

Notes

- 1 Here Foucault clearly references his 1966 work, *Les Mots et les choses*, translated into English as *The Order of Things* (OT).
- 2 The English title of the abridged version of *History of Madness*, which was the version most widely available in France and the only version of this text available in English until 2006.
- 3 This is the main point of Foucault's analysis of Descartes. See HM, 44–47.
- 4 For an excellent discussion of this aspect of *History of Madness*, also in connection with this text's relation to Nietzsche, see Huffer 2010: ch. 2.
- 5 Again, see Huffer (2010: 104–108) for fascinating analysis of role of bad conscience in HM.
- 6 On the significance of this model, see Davidson 2003.
- 7 Foucault refers to this two-sided relationship between tactics and strategies as the “rule of double conditioning”; “one must conceive of the double conditioning of a strategy by the specificity of possible tactics, and of tactics by the strategic envelope that makes them work” (HS1, 99–100).
- 8 Note there is also another form of power distinctive to the modern West, which comes to the fore in Foucault's work starting with the last chapter of HS1 and running through the lecture courses of the late 1970s: biopower. Since biopower concerns the governance of populations rather than individuals – which are the targets of disciplinary power – I will not discuss it here. But it is important to keep in mind that Foucault's overall account of modern power analyzes the relationship between disciplinary and biopower, hence his claim that modern power is both individualizing – i.e., disciplinary – and totalizing – i.e., biopolitical, focusing on the management of populations.
- 9 In lectures two through four of *Psychiatric Power*, Foucault analyzes psychiatry as a site for the emergence of modern disciplinary power, and disciplinary power as central to psychiatric practice. See e.g. C-PP, 19–91.
- 10 Note here an interesting implicit criticism of the conception of power presupposed in the *History of Madness*, which tended to equate power with exclusion.
- 11 This becomes very clear when one reads the lecture courses that Foucault delivered at the Collège de France from 1981 to 1984. Whereas his published books – volumes 2 and 3 of the *History of Sexuality* (1985 and 1988) – focus on techniques of the self in the context of an overall history of sexuality, his lecture courses indicate a more general interest in the care of the self as part of an overall history of Western subjectivity and its relation to truth. See especially Foucault 2005.
- 12 For an insightful discussion of Foucault's understanding of freedom, see Oksala 2005.

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Power, Politics, Racism

BRAD ELLIOTT STONE

Society Must Be Defended, Foucault's 1975–76 lecture course at the Collège de France, offers us a powerful interpretation of power, racism, and politics. Inverting Clausewitz's claim that war is politics by other means, Foucault explains how politics is a kind of war – more specifically, a race war – and how this notion of war is discontinuous between the Classical and modern epochs. Conceived this way, Foucault offers a new way to think about race that, if correct, would change the way one would respond to racism. After all, if our current views of race and racism hinge on misguided and unclear notions of power and politics, our efforts to resist racism will ultimately be ineffective. In order to better understand and resist racism, we need to have different notions of power and politics. Foucault offers us these different notions.

This essay proceeds in three sections. In the first section I offer an overview of Foucault's conception of power. The new interpretation of power relationships as a kind of war calls traditional understandings of power into question and corrects our errors concerning the role of power in the constitution of knowledge, institutions, and subjects. Section two turns to the analysis of political power and describes the difference between sovereignty and biopower as political paradigms. At the heart of the difference between sovereignty and biopower is the role of life and death in political power. Whereas sovereignty uses power to make die and let live, biopower makes live and lets die. Biopower's interest in life, however, is limited to particular groups within the population. Groups deemed abnormal or otherwise degenerate are not promoted by the strategy of biopower and are, in this sense, allowed to die. This state of being-allowed-to-die is what Foucault denotes by the term "racism." The final section looks at Foucault's definition of race and racism. Beginning with an epistemic shift in the understanding of "nation," Foucault offers an account of how racism enters the political equation as a useful strategy of biopolitics.

Nietzsche's Hypothesis: Foucault's Account of Power

Foucault is commonly associated with his analyses of power and power relations. He contends that power is often misconstrued, leaving the actual operations of power unnoticed and therefore unfettered. In *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault articulates the need to move from what he calls the juridico-discursive model of power to a different model, one in which power is everywhere (even in resistance). This notion of power operates without appeal to laws and regulations; in fact, omnipresent power often disguises itself through such laws and regulations. In short, Foucault gives us a notion of power understood in terms of a proliferation of forces. In the lecture course *Society Must Be Defended* Foucault presents his notion of power in terms of "Nietzsche's Hypothesis": power is a kind of war between forces.

For Foucault, the analysis of power relations has fallen into a false dichotomy. On the one hand, power is understood in terms of "repression." The solution to this understanding of power is to seek "liberation" from this repression. On the other hand, power is understood as absolute domination, without the possibility of escape. Foucault calls this false dichotomy the "juridico-discursive" model of power. This model of power has long been in play in the West and is specifically connected to the notion of sovereignty, as we will discuss below. In order to arrive at a new understanding of power, we must get beyond this model.

Foucault outlines five major features of this model: (1) *the negative relation*: power is understood in terms of "rejection, exclusion, refusal, blockage, concealment, or mask" or as simply that force that says "no" (HS1, 83); (2) *the insistence of the rule*: power is a legal affair that merely divides things into that which is allowed and that which is forbidden; (3) *the cycle of prohibition*: power primarily exerts itself in the form of prohibitions and taboos; (4) *the logic of censorship*: power censors dissent and disallows even the existence of that which it forbids; and (5) *the uniformity of the apparatus*: power relations are uniform and congruent such that power "is exercised in the same way at all levels" (HS1, 84). Sexuality, Foucault contends, has been consistently analyzed in terms of this model. Under such a model, we say that power has denied sexual pleasure by prohibiting a large number of sexual acts that are considered taboo. Engaging in such activities is grounds for punishment. Under such a model, we respond by accusing power of censoring us and forcing us into silence about our sexual desires. This, we claim, works at all levels in the same way: the family, communities, schools, etc. The dominance of Victorian sexual mores is to be resisted by engaging in sexual activities freely, in spite of the dictates of the powers that be.

Such a response, Foucault contends, misses the true operations of power. Foucault challenges the juridico-discursive model of power, noting that such a model of power is

poor in resources, sparing of its methods, monotonous in the tactics it utilizes, incapable of invention, and seemingly doomed always to repeat itself. Further, it is a power that only has the force of the negative on its side, a power to say no; in no condition to produce, capable only of posting limits, it is basically anti-energy . . . centered on nothing more than the statement of the law and the operation of taboos. (HS1, 85)

If the juridico-discursive model of power accurately represents power, this would be a very worthless power. This makes Foucault suspicious of thinking of power in these terms. Power has to operate better than we have been led to believe.

Why have we been led to believe that power is simply a negative force that prohibits those things that we actually want to do? Foucault reminds us that “power is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms. Would power be accepted if it were entirely cynical?” (HS1, 86). We therefore have to explore the hidden elements and operations of power, avoiding the red herrings of repression and prohibition. Sovereignty, as we will see below, was a large part of the cover-up: “the representation of power has remained under the spell of monarchy. In political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the head of the king” (HS1, 88–89). We talk of power strictly from the perspective of the ruler and the ruled. Although there have been moments in history in which the populace has cut off the head of the king, thinkers have not cut off the *notion* of sovereignty as the proper model of understanding power relations.

Foucault suggests that we rid ourselves of “the theoretical privilege of law and sovereignty if we wish to analyze power within the concrete and historical framework of its operation” (HS1, 90). This will be extremely important in the analysis of race and racism. This negative picture of power will obscure the true operations of power at play, especially once the sovereign is no longer seen as the primary holder of power.

In lieu of the juridico-discursive notion of power that is grounded in law and sovereignty, Foucault proposes a model of power that addresses power in terms of “the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization” (HS1, 92). Power is not centralized, nor is it static; power is “the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always local and unstable” (HS1, 93). In short, there is a *proliferation* of force relations, multiple sites of unstable pools of power. This is what Foucault means when he tells us that power is everywhere: there is no one place to point and say “here is where the power is.” Instead, Foucault is referring to the fact that power “comes from everywhere” (HS1, 93).

Foucault gives us five “propositions” concerning the proliferation of force relations. First, the proliferation of force relations implies that “[p]ower is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared . . . power is exercised from innumerable points” (HS1, 94). The notion that there are those who “have power” and those who do not is false. Second, power is immanently inside other relationships. Power is not exterior; instead, power relations “have a directly productive role, wherever they come into play” (HS1, 94). Third, the “top-down” model of power espoused in the juridico-discursive model is denied. Power is heterogeneously diffused throughout the entire social sphere: from king to subject, from subject to king (in the case of revolt), from parent to child, from child to parent, etc. Fourth, power operates intentionally yet anonymously. Foucault asserts that “there is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and objectives. But this does not mean that it results from the choice or decision of an individual subject” (HS1, 95). Finally, Foucault is quite clear that “[w]here there is power, there is resistance . . . this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power” (HS1, 95). With power no longer being localized in persons and institutions, fighting against

such persons and institutions is accounted for in terms of the proliferation of forces. Wherever there is a majority there is a minority, and both sides are constituted in terms of power relations. These propositions challenge the juridico-discursive model of power by empowering all sides of any given battle. In any given struggle, there is no party that is power-less.

Foucault also highlights four rules that should be followed in order to ensure that we do not slip back into the juridico-discursive interpretation of power: (1) the *rule of immanence* (power does not operate external to knowledge and truth); (2) the *rule of continual variation* (power is not static but transformative); (3) the *rule of double conditioning* (each side of a power relation is “informed” by the other side while nonetheless being heterogeneous); and (4) the *rule of the tactical polyvalence of discourses* (discourse is not power-neutral; it therefore obeys all the rules given about power).

The advantage of Foucault’s theoretical shift is that we become able to see that power is in play regardless of the political or organizational arrangement. If this is the case, no one is power-less against the “powers that be.” Power is never absolute; it is precarious and unstable. On the one hand, this grants power the ability to be very flexible and reconfigure itself with maximum obscurity and effectiveness. On the other hand, however, this grants resistance an actual chance for success since power is susceptible to resistance to the point of being conditioned by it.

In short, power is a kind of volatile war in which the momentum can switch at any moment. Since power is not external to knowledge or discourse, there is no power-neutral position from which to participate in power struggles. In *Society Must Be Defended* Foucault presents this fact in terms of war. Inverting Clausewitz’s maxim that war is politics by other means, Foucault proposes that politics is itself a kind of war. The war model, however, is not limited to politics traditionally conceived: war is a model for all power relationships. Since these power relationships are ever-present in institutions, groups, discourses, and knowledge claims, the war model can be used to explain what traditionally would be considered “peaceful” or power-neutral.

Foucault refers to this as “Nietzsche’s Hypothesis”: “the basis of the power-relationship lies in a warlike clash between forces” (C-SMD, 16). Power is not static; it is precariously unstable. Therefore, there is always a clash of forces that bump into each other as they move. Some forces cluster together; others resist clustering. Repression, therefore, is not the weight of a dominant force over nondominant forces, but merely the triumph of one force cluster over another. Foucault tells us that

repression is not what oppression was in relation to the contract, namely an abuse, but, on the contrary, simply the effect and the continuation of a relationship of domination. Repression is no more than the implementation, within a pseudopeace that is being undermined by a continuous war, of a perpetual relationship of force. (C-SMD, 17)

For Foucault, repression is simply an effect caused by one power dominating the other. However, since power is unstable, the tables can be turned such that what used to be repressed can become that which represses the previous repressor.

Adherence to this hypothesis changes how we analyze power relations. Instead of focusing on sovereignty and the juridico-discursive model of power, we will look instead at forms of domination (ways in which one force overcomes another), not in an effort to “trace their origins back to that which gives them basic legitimacy” but to “identify

the technical instruments that guarantee that they function" (C-SMD, 46). To trace origins would require complicity with the history that a given power tells about itself. Instead we need to inquire into the conditions for the possibility of certain power arrangements occurring instead of other ones.

This inquiry, however, is never neutral. The price of Foucauldian methodology is that there is no objective, transcendental, capital-T Truth out there that adjudicates between warring forces. Philosophers traditionally believe that they proceed objectively and with a "pacified universality," but this is false since truth itself "is an additional force, and it can be deployed only on the basis of a relationship of force" (C-SMD, 53). There is no neutrality or universality. We can, however, be mindful of the forces at play in even our own philosophical techniques and claims. As Foucault puts it, "[t]here is no such thing as a neutral subject. We are all inevitably someone's adversary" (C-SMD, 51).

The consequences of this fact can be seen in the emergence of what Foucault calls "historico-political" discourse, which is a good way to describe Foucault's notion of genealogy. Foucault tells us that there are three main differences between historico-political discourse and traditional, "philosophico-juridical" discourse. First, there is a change in who speaks the discourse. Unlike the disinterested observer with "a view from nowhere," the modern historico-political thinker "cannot, and is in fact not trying to, occupy the position . . . of a universal, totalizing, or neutral subject . . . the person who is speaking . . . is inevitably on one side or the other" (C-SMD, 52). The accounts of politics, history, etc. given by a thinker will reveal, among other things, the thinker's own allegiances and hopes.

The second difference follows from the first. The historico-political thinker puts aside the abstractly universal rational schema of the classical theorist, whose goal was to present a beautiful, simple picture of political history. In its place, the historico-political thinker offers ugly, dirty, complicated stories of battle scars and serendipitous opportunities. In other words, the new political theory "posits, demands, an explanation from below . . . in terms of what is most confused, most obscure, most disorderly and most subject to chance" (C-SMD, 54). For example, history will no longer glorify the winners, as if Providence guided the victors to a sure and certain triumph. Instead, every fact will be laid bare, allowing one to strategize how to overcome the victors at a future time.

Finally, historico-political discourse "develops completely within the historical dimension" and resurrects "the blood that has dried in the codes," disallowing any notion of peace or finality (C-SMD, 55–56). This is in contrast to philosophico-juridical discourse, which seeks a sense of peace in history. The new discourse does not fall for the allure of tranquility: it always keeps war right under the surface, allowing instantaneous uprisings to spring up at any moment: the battlefield now includes the academic world, where all kinds of battles take place in books, lectures, and articles.

It is from this understanding of power as a war of forces that Foucault analyzes politics and racism. This offers us a different way of thinking about the operations of power than the traditional model. We will still be able to speak of political or racial repression, but from the very clash of racial forces instead of the traditional, fatalist way of describing repression in terms of powerlessness. Since power relations are unstable, there is always an opportunity for resistance. We will also have to be wary of the power that runs through our very way of analyzing race, since it will not be race-neutral but will instead "take a side" on the issue even when we are trying to be "objective."

From Sovereignty to Biopower

In this section I explicate Foucault's explanation of the difference between sovereignty and biopower. Although there are many differences between these two political strategies, I will focus on the control of life and death in both. Sovereignty is defined by Foucault in terms of making die and letting live while biopower makes live and lets die. It will be this understanding of biopower that undergirds Foucault's notion of race and racism.

Perhaps the reason sovereignty continues to serve as an appealing model for power is the large amount of violence that is associated with it, ingraining the idea of sovereignty into the memory of our culture. The sovereign had the power to put people to death. This expression of power is summarized by Foucault as the right "to make die and let live."

Foucault traces the sovereign control over life and death to the ancient concept of *patria potestas*, which "granted the father of the Roman family the right to 'dispose' of the life of his children and his slaves; just as he had given them life, so he could take it away" (HS1, 135). Unlike the Roman father, who could apply his *patria potestas* whenever he so desired, the sovereign only exercises the control over life and death in two situations. The first situation is that of war. In order to preserve the kingdom, the sovereign could "require his subjects to take part in the defense of the state; without 'directly proposing their death,' he was empowered to 'expose their life': in this sense, he wielded an 'indirect' power over them of life and death" (HS1, 135). When enemies approached, the sovereign has the power of life and death insofar as he can make his subjects put their lives at risk on behalf of the sovereign. In the war setting, the lives of the subjects were at the sovereign's disposal. War was the indirect control over life and death, given that a war hero could fight in a war and stay alive. However, the hero is only a hero insofar as the hero is willing to give his or her life for the cause.

The other situation in which the sovereign exercises the power of life and death is a more direct one: capital punishment. Foucault writes that "if someone dared to rise up against him and transgress his laws, then he could exercise a direct power over the offender's life: as punishment, the latter would be put to death" (HS1, 135). Any crime against the state could be construed as a crime against the sovereign's person. Therefore, whether in response to war or a capital offense, the sovereign exercised his control of life and death when his power was threatened, either by outside invaders, or internal traitors. In other words, the power over life and death could be used "only in cases where the sovereign's very existence was in jeopardy: a sort of right of rejoinder" (HS1, 135). The rejoinder was directly or indirectly the right to cause death, which in turn allows life insofar as life meant "not being required to die." Foucault writes that "[t]he sovereign exercised his right to life only by exercising his right to kill, or by refraining from killing; he evidenced his power over life only through the death he was capable of requiring" (HS1, 136). The sovereign can require the death of someone if the sovereign is in danger. Foucault calls this method a "deduction," which he describes as "a right of seizure: of things, time, bodies, and ultimately life itself" (HS1, 136).

In *Society Must Be Defended*, Foucault points out a "theoretical paradox" concerning the right of life and death. Foucault writes that

to say the sovereign has a right to life and death means that he can, basically, either have people put to death or let them live, or in any case that life and death are not natural or immediate phenomena . . . which fall outside the field of power . . . in terms of his relationship with the sovereign, the subject is, by rights, neither dead or alive. (C-SMD, 240)

In this configuration, death and life come from the sovereign. "Life" means that the sovereign could have one killed but chooses not to; therefore "life" in this sense is actually determined by the capacity of the sovereign to bring death, which Foucault describes as a "startling dissymmetry" (C-SMD, 240–241).

In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault illustrates the sovereign's capacity to take life in quite gruesome detail in the second chapter of the "Torture" section of the book. After a discussion of truth and torture, Foucault turns to the executions themselves. Executions had to be public events during the age of sovereignty; the point of the publicity was to demonstrate the sovereign's infinite power upon the body of the capital offender. Capital punishment for crime is justified within the parameters concerning the right of life and death. Foucault reminds us that

an offence . . . quite apart from the damage it may produce, apart even from the rule that it breaks, offends the rectitude of those who abide by the law . . . Besides its immediate victim, the crime attacks the sovereign: it attacks him personally, since the law represents the will of the sovereign; it attacks him physically, since the force of the law is the force of the prince . . . The intervention of the sovereign is not, therefore, an arbitration between two adversaries [the offender and the law] . . . it is a direct reply to the person who has offended him . . . [it] requires that the king take revenge for an affront to his very person. (DP, 47–48)

The sovereign takes the life of the offender in an act of revenge against the offender's violation of the sovereign's laws, which is considered an attack on the sovereign's person. As a result, every criminal is "a potential regicide" (DP, 53–54). The sovereign therefore actually uses his war powers to bring death to such an "enemy of the state," the internal equivalent of an external invader. However, within the context of the possible bringing of death upon the offender, the sovereign might decide to let the convict live. The sovereign used torture and execution as a means of demonstrating infinite power, and could therefore grant mercy by virtue of that same power.

Sovereignty became unable, however, to sustain its control of life and death effectively. Foucault points out that "[i]t is evident that the great spectacle of punishment ran the risk of being rejected by the very people to whom it was addressed . . . the executions did not, in fact, frighten the people" (DP, 63). There were several occasions in which the executed became a hero to the people. At other times the crowd revolted against the executioner and guards. Resistance to the infinite power of the sovereign (expressed in the public execution) became possible.

Around the same period of time (the beginning of the Classical period in the seventeenth century), there was a change in the function of history. In the age of sovereignty, history performed two main functions. The first function (the genealogical function) proved the legitimacy of the sovereign by connecting the ruler to the glorious heroes of antiquity. The second function (the memorialization function) chronicled the actions and decisions of the sovereign. This ensured that the importance of the sovereign (and

of sovereignty) would survive for future generations (cf. C-SMD, 66–67). These two functions of history would offer the history of power as told by power in order to justify such power. As Foucault notes, history in the age of sovereignty was “a sort of ceremony, oral or written, that must in reality produce both a justification of power and a reinforcement of that power . . . to establish a juridical link between those men and power . . . history is an operator of power, an intensifier of power” (C-SMD, 66).

New histories emerged at the beginning of the Classical period. Taken up by the oppressed and non-sovereign, history became a weapon against sovereignty. History became the discourse “that cut off the king’s head, or which at least does without a sovereign and denounces him” (C-SMD, 59). Instead of showing the greatness of the sovereign, these counterhistories would “break up the unity of the sovereign law that imposes obligations; it also breaks up the continuity of glory . . . It will be the discourse of those who have no glory” (C-SMD, 70). Foucault gives us several examples of such counter-historians: Boulainvilliers, Buat-Nançay, Montlosier, and Marat. These writers used history as a way to disprove claims made by the sovereign concerning his right or his power. For example, Boulainvilliers’ history of France’s Gallic past does not lead to any vindication of the French monarchy. Instead, it describes how the Franks overtook the Gauls by use of mercenaries and other military violences. As Foucault states in a later lecture,

Up to this point, history had never been anything more than the history of power as told by power itself, or the history of power that power had made people tell: it was the history of power, as recounted by power. The history that the nobility now begins to use against the State’s discourse about the State, and power’s discourse about power, is a discourse that will, I believe, destroy the very workings of historical knowledge. It is at this point, I think, that we see the breakdown – and this is important – of both the close relationship between the narrative of history on the one hand and, on the other hand, the exercise of power, its ritual reinforcement and the picture-book formulation of public right. With Boulainvilliers and the reactionary nobility of the late eighteenth century, a new subject of history appears. (C-SMD, 133)

Against the history of the sovereign, a counterhistory of resistance will emerge. One cannot help but think of the African proverb: “Only when lions have historians will hunters cease being heroes.” History becomes a way to keep sovereign power in check, forcing it into – contrary to sovereignty’s use of history – a brutal honesty about how things unfolded over time, revealing sovereign power not in terms of the use of right but the use of violence.

A more subtle method of power over life and death became necessary in order to handle the increased problematization and potential backfirings of sovereignty. Instead of death being the way in which power is enforced, power begins to take hold of life, making life itself more maximized and productive. As Foucault writes, “it is over life, throughout its unfolding, that power establishes its dominion” (HS1, 138). As power becomes a power of life, the model of sovereignty slips into the background (but it does not go completely away). Wars are “no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone” (HS1, 137). Likewise, crimes are crimes against the people. In both the case of war and the punishment of crimes, the title of Foucault’s lecture course says it all, it is “society,” no longer the sovereign, which “must be defended.”

The *Society Must Be Defended* lectures give us a clear account of biopower. Citing Hobbes, Foucault tells us that people enter into the social contract and form the Leviathan “because they are forced to by some threat or by need. They therefore do so in order to protect their lives . . . Isn’t life the foundation of the sovereign’s right? . . . Mustn’t life remain outside the contract to the extent that it was the first, initial, and foundational reason for the contract itself?” (C-SMD, 241). On this view, life has to be something more fundamental than the power of the sovereign since the power over life is given up so that a greater, combined force can become possible.

The age of biopower gives up the necessity of creating the Leviathan. “[I]n the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we saw the emergence of techniques of power that were essentially centered on the body, on the individual body” (C-SMD, 241–242). Compared to the model of sovereignty, a model in which individuality was surrendered to one who could represent the whole of the people, this new technique operates in the individuals themselves. This power is *disciplinary power*, which Foucault describes in *The History of Sexuality* as “an *anatomo-politics of the human body*” (HS1, 139, emphasis his). In the later part of the eighteenth century, there emerges a second non-sovereignty technique which “is not disciplinary . . . applied not to man-as-body but to the living man, to man-as-living-being; ultimately . . . to man as species” (C-SMD, 242). This power is *regulatory control*, described in *The History of Sexuality* as a “*bio-politics of the population*” (HS1, 139, emphasis his). Discipline and regulation constitute the two forms of biopower. The age of biopower is described as “an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations” (HS1, 140).

Foucault describes discipline in *Society Must Be Defended* as “all devices that were used to ensure the spatial distribution of individual bodies . . . and the organization, around those individuals, of a whole field of visibility . . . a whole system of surveillance, hierarchies, inspections, bookkeeping, and reports” (C-SMD, 242). In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault writes that discipline is the production of “docile bodies”:

discipline produces subjected and practiced bodies, “docile” bodies. Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience). In short, it disassociates power from the body; on the other hand, it turns it into an “aptitude,” a “capacity,” which it seeks to increase; on the other hand, it reverses the course of the energy, the power that might result from it, and turns it into a relation of strict subjection . . . increased aptitude and an increased domination. (DP, 138)

Discipline leads to the absolute control of all the minutiae of one’s life. As Foucault writes, “[f]or the disciplined man . . . no detail is unimportant, but not so much for the meaning that it conceals within it as for the hold it provides for the power that wishes to seize it” (DP, 140). Power operates in the little things, the minor details of one’s life; in fact, details so small that one often does not realize that one is being monitored and controlled. This is part of what Foucault calls “a ‘new micro-physics’ of power” (DP, 139).

Biopolitics, unlike discipline, does not hinge on individuals, but on populations. Foucault states in *Society Must Be Defended* that

the new technology that is being established is addressed to a multiplicity of men, not to the extent that they are nothing more than their individual bodies, but to the extent that they form, on the contrary, a global mass that is affected by overall processes characteristic of birth, death, production, illness, and so on . . . we have a second seizure of power that is not individualizing but, if you like, massifying, that is directed not at man-as-body but at man-as-species. (C-SMD, 242–243)

Life is at the center of this new technology, but not individual lives (which are still handled by disciplinary techniques). Biopolitics is about the group as a whole: birth and mortality rates, reproduction, fertility, and economic growth and decline (C-SMD, 243, 245). Foucault states that “[b]iopolitics deals with the population, with the population as political problem, as a problem that is at once scientific and political, as a biological problem and as power’s problem” (C-SMD, 245). Whereas sovereignty was unable to control individual people and collective groups, discipline and biopolitics could be more effective in those areas.

One of the main differences between discipline and biopolitics is that discipline seeks normalization, whereas biopolitics seeks regulation (C-SMD, 247). Society can be regulated into economic and biological cycles and processes. “Random events” must be somehow controllable. Biopolitics

brings together the mass effects characteristic of a population, which tries to control the series of random events that can occur in a living mass, a technology which tries to predict the probability of those events . . . or at least to compensate for their effects . . . a technology which aims to establish a sort of homeostasis . . . an overall equilibrium. (C-SMD, 249)

Everyone must be under control, be it directly (in the form of disciplining the body) or indirectly (control of the social whole in terms of biology and economics).

In order to correctly understand a given political situation, Foucauldian analysis recommends that we look not only at the role of the sovereign (recalling that the sovereign might no longer have its head but may operate in a different form), but also at the forms of disciplinary technique and population regulation that are at play. In the case of racism, one must avoid exclusively focusing on sovereign power (akin to the exclusive focus on the juridico-discursive model of power relations) and include analyses of how racial bodies are produced and how racial groups are regulated. Only then will race and racism be understood in their proper contexts. Only then can resistance to racism be effective.

Racism

We now turn to Foucault’s notion of racism. It is important to notice that one has to have done all the preliminary work of getting past the juridico-discursive model of power and freeing political discourse from the analysis of sovereignty before one can adequately grasp this notion. Foucault’s account of race in *Society Must Be Defended* is quite different from what is usually presented in discussions of race theory: “I do not want to trace the history of what it might have meant, in the West, to have an aware-

ness of belonging to a race, or of the history of the rites and mechanisms that were used to try to exclude, disqualify, or physically destroy a race" (C-SMD, 87–88). One usually starts with people of different races and then discusses the interactions between those people. Foucault proposes a different view: start with one group of people and divide that population into those who must live and those who are allowed to die.

As mentioned above, the beginning of the Classical Age marked the beginning of the decline of sovereignty and a shift in historical strategy. But it was not only the way that history changed. There was a change in object; a shift from the sovereign to "the nation." The notion of nation is important, Foucault tells us, since "it is this notion of nation that generates or gives rise to notions like nationality, race, and class" (C-SMD, 142). The idea of the nation existed in the age of sovereignty, but it was defined primarily in terms of the territory possessed by the sovereign: "a great multitude of men . . . inhabiting a defined country . . . circumscribed by frontiers . . . who . . . must obey the same laws and the same government" (C-SMD, 142). In short, as Foucault points out, "[t]he nation in its entirety resides in the person of the king" (C-SMD, 218). In the Classical Age, as sovereignty moves to the political background, the nation "does not stop at the frontiers but . . . moves from one frontier to another, through States, beneath States, and at an infra-State level" (C-SMD, 142).

In the age of sovereignty, "nation" and "race" were synonyms. To be of a particular race was to be part of the person of the king. Wars between races were therefore simply wars between states, the sovereign of one nation versus the sovereign of another. This "old world racism" still appears in anachronistic form.

A new notion of racism is born as the concept of race becomes freed from sovereign states. This new form of racism, state racism or biologico-social racism, holds that

the other race is basically not the race that came from elsewhere or that was, for a time, triumphant and dominant, but that it is a race that is permanently, ceaselessly infiltrating the social body, or which is, rather, constantly being re-created in and by the social fabric. In other words, what we see as a polarity, as a binary rift within society, is not a clash between two distinct races. It is the splitting of a single race into a superrace and a subrace. (C-SMD, 61)

State racism will be an internal affair. It will not be one nation versus another nation but a war between two groups (or races) *within* a society. As Foucault states, it is no longer "We have to defend ourselves against our enemies" or "We have to defend ourselves against [another] society"; it is now "We have to defend society against . . . the other race" (C-SMD, 61). The subrace is presented as if it were a biological danger to society. The state, which protects society, works to eliminate the contaminant. This gives birth to the notion of racial purity, to be discussed below.

Two areas that are directly affected by biopower are sexuality and racism. These two areas are co-determined: a single understanding of power interprets both (and both have been misunderstood due to their being thought of solely in terms of oppression and repression). The importance of sexuality to biopower is noncontroversial: birth rates, after all, require that people have sex and that particular forms of sexuality are promoted over others. The importance of racism to biopower is more controversial, as we will see below.

In the fifth part of *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault discusses the intersection of race and sexuality in terms of what he calls “the symbolics of blood.” Foucault states that blood

owed its high value . . . to its instrumental role (the ability to shed blood), to the way it functioned in the order of signs (to have a certain blood, to be of the same blood, to be prepared to risk one’s blood), and also to its precariousness (easily spilled, subject to drying up, too readily mixed, capable of being quickly corrupted). A society of blood – I was tempted to say, of “sanguinity” – where power spoke *through* blood . . . blood was a *reality with a symbolic function*. (HS1, 147, emphasis his)

Blood is the “life force” not only of the literal body in which it circulates but also of the symbolic “body politic” of a people. Foucault’s focus on the precariousness of blood is important because concerns about sexual activity and race hinge on anxieties about blood, either in terms of disease (venereal diseases, for example) or “mixed” blood (biracial offspring).

Foucault describes the move from “sanguinity” to sexuality in the text, although he acknowledges that sexuality does not completely replace the symbolics of blood, especially since “the thematics of blood was sometimes called on to lend its entire historical weight toward revitalizing the type of power that was exercised through the devices of sexuality” (HS1, 149). Similarly, the symbolics of blood, now in the form of “purity,” made way for the establishment of modern racism: “a whole politics of settlement, family, marriage, education, social hierarchization, and property... received their color and their justification from the mythical concern with protecting the purity of the blood and ensuring the triumph of the race” (HS1, 149). Race and sexuality become the modern vehicles for the concept of sanguinity.

In *Society Must Be Defended* Foucault focuses more on regulatory statistics and the notion of health and degeneracy than on the issue of blood. People’s sexual practices can indeed be the target of surveillance and discipline, but, more importantly, sexuality becomes the site of statistical data concerning marriage, fertility, and birth rates of a given population. An individual’s sexuality affected the overall population of the future, so disciplinary controls emerge to control the use of one’s body for the sake of the collective whole’s sexual health. Since diseases could be hereditarily passed on to subsequent generations (the problem of degeneracy), one had to be vigilant about one’s sexual acts as well as concerned with gender and sexual orientation. No one is to jeopardize the health of future generations.

There are those, however, who are already degenerate and need to no longer “infect” society. Racism is now no longer the antagonism of one “nation” (under one sovereign) against another “nation” (under a different sovereign), nor is it an aesthetic dislike of people with different phenotypical features. Modern racism results from a decision (albeit “anonymous” since it is an operation of power) about who can die, either directly (the Holocaust and other ethnic cleansing practices) or indirectly (perhaps not as heinous, but definitely more common than the direct forms). These indirect forms of “letting die” include decisions about whose crime and mortality rates can be higher, who needs medical insurance, and whose actions need more or less disciplinary control.

For example, in the United States, publicly funded education is funded in part by property taxes. Wealthier neighborhoods have more expensive houses, and therefore generate more revenues through property taxes. The wealthier neighborhoods' schools are better funded as a result. Wealthier people want "good schools" for their children, so they move into those neighborhoods, thus keeping property values high. Poorer neighborhoods, in contrast, tend to have more apartments than houses. The houses that are available are not as expensive, making for less property tax revenue. Public education in those neighborhoods is significantly inferior, and wealthier people will not live in those neighborhoods because (they claim) the schools are bad. As a result, children born into poorer neighborhoods receive a lower quality of education than children born into wealthier neighborhoods. Although this result seems uncontroversial, especially since wealthier people would have the option to send their children to private schools, the true controversy is that *public* education is so different depending on where one goes. Without a national curriculum and fairer funding for public schools, the American education system is indirectly *racist* since it lets poorer students receive a worse education at a time in which education is one of the main predictors of future success. Since poor students will not get an adequate education, they will always fall short in standardized testing, college admissions requirements, etc., which in turn forces them into a permanent underclass. This is a form of "letting die" that does not look like the traditional form of racism in America (e.g. Ku Klux Klan or segregated schools).

Foucault gives us a clear definition of modern racism in terms of biopolitical power:

What in fact is racism? It is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power's control: the break between what must live and what must die . . . It is a way of separating out the groups that exist within a population. It is, in short, a way of establishing a biological type caesura within a population that appears to be a biological domain. This will allow power to treat that population as a mixture of races, or to be more accurate, to treat the species, to subdivide the species it controls, into the subspecies known, precisely so, as races. (C-SMD, 254–255)

Within a population there can exist many "nations," as we have already shown. Of these nations, certain ones will be made to live and others will be allowed to die. No effort will be made to let those allowed to die to proliferate. This is what eugenics sought to secure: the elimination of those people, traits, genes, blood, etc. that are detrimental to the advancement of a particular group. In short, races will be sorted into those worth preserving and those not worth preserving. This notion of race is not limited to skin color and can include sexual orientation, level of ability, socio-economic status, and even political persuasion. Anything that can threaten the purity of "the race" (the dominant race) must be removed from society.

In the new configuration of racism, the death of those allowed to die is part of the health of those made to live. Foucault says that "the death of the other, the death of the bad race, of the inferior race (or the degenerate, or the abnormal) is something that will make life in general healthier . . . the enemies who have to be done away with are not adversaries . . . they are threats . . . to the population" (C-SMD, 255–256). Foucault chooses Nazism as the clearest example of this since it was a movement that saw to it

that one group of the population lived while ensuring the death of the other groups (Jews, Slavs, the mentally ill, the physically disabled, homosexuals, etc.). In *The History of Sexuality* Foucault notes that the Nazi regime is also the clearest example of mixing race and the symbolics of blood, although sexuality did not play as strong a role: "It is an irony of history that the Hitlerite politics of sex remained an insignificant practice while the blood myth was transformed into the greatest blood bath in recent memory" (HS1, 150). But the Nazi regime is not the only example of state racism and the power to kill. Foucault points out that we find the power to kill in capitalist and socialist states (Foucault does not give examples here, but one can point to Stalinism or Jim Crow America) and even in anarchism. Foucault finishes the lecture course with the Dreyfus affair in France, stating that "[u]ntil the Dreyfus affair, all socialists, or at least the vast majority of socialists, were basically racists" (C-SMD, 263).

Racism is a necessary part of biopolitics because it allows society to take on the right to kill that once belonged to the sovereign: "In a normalizing society, race or racism is the precondition that makes killing acceptable . . . If the power of normalization wished to exercise the old sovereign right to kill, it must become racist" (C-SMD, 256). Racism is a kind of war waged by society on behalf of the dominant race. Its goal is the "elimination of the biological threat" of the other races (C-SMD, 256). If biopower is necessarily racist, we can say that the beginning of the Classical Age marks the start of a racist age. The question Foucault asks at the end of the *Society Must Be Defended* course is a poignant one: "How can one both make a biopower function and exercise the rights of war, the rights of murder, and the function of death, without becoming racist? That was the problem, and that, I think, is still the problem" (C-SMD, 263).

It is this concept of racism that one must have in mind if one wishes to critically resist racism. Racism is still quite prevalent in many societies given Foucault's description. In this sense, racism goes beyond the narrow issue of skin color aesthetics, as it is often described in the United States context, and instead thrives in questions concerning health care, crime, incarceration, birth rates, mortality rates, insurance premiums, and the quality of schools in a given neighborhood. It is also found in the regulatory and disciplinary enhancement of the dominant race. Members of this dominant race are often unaware of the power forces at work in their persons and communities, and assume that the plight of those allowed to die is due to a lack of will, ability, desire, etc., a plight that, if only "they" would get their act together, could easily be overcome.

One powerful result of Foucault's description of modern racism is that it does not simply account for the challenges of racism of those who have been racially oppressed. It also accounts for the ways in which those in the dominant race "enjoy" privilege. This enjoyment is not a liberty to behave as one desires; instead, this "privilege" is actually a sum of disciplinary controls and regulatory expectations. Even those in the dominant race are determined through and through with power relations. In Foucault's account of racism, everyone is affected. Thus, it becomes everyone's problem, opening the possibility of resistance to anyone, regardless of whether they are the alleged victims of racism or not. Everyone is a victim of racism insofar as its operations go forth without critical reflection and resistance.

In conclusion, Foucault offers us important ways to rethink power and politics that help us not to be deceived by false understandings of the power at play in experience,

which in turn leads to more effective strategies of resistance. Although Foucault's notion of race and his analysis of racism seem foreign to the race-based struggle faced by many in their everyday experience, Foucault offers an analysis of the discourses and apparatuses of power in play in modern racism. At the level of discourse and power, one finds the hidden operations of racism that must be addressed if there is to be any possibility of understanding the forces that turn us into the subjects that we become.

Foucault, Religion, and Pastoral Power

JEREMY CARRETTE

*"Religion is a political force."*Michel Foucault, *Religion and Culture*, 107

In his 1975 *Discipline and Punish* Foucault refers to the work of the French Catholic priest and educational reformer Jean-Baptiste de La Salle (1651–1719) as representative of a wider apparatus (*dispositif*) of power based on a concern for “detail,” which would frame the modern period. For Foucault, La Salle offered “the great hymn to the ‘little things’ and to their eternal importance” (DP, 140). It was from La Salle’s 1706 work *Conduite des écoles chrétiennes* (*Conduct of Christian Schools*) that Foucault drew out the evocative passage on the “detail” of body posture for handwriting; where the pupil was informed, along with other precise regulations, that a “distance of two fingers must be left between the body and the table” and that the “right arm must be at a distance from the body of about three fingers and be about five fingers from the table” (DP, 152). La Salle’s work praises “little things” because they “lead to greater,” to greater motives, feelings, rewards, and, ultimately, to God. Foucault uses La Salle to show how the dynamic of observing “detail” was part of the history of Christian theology and part of the inheritance of the modern, disciplinary, West. “Discipline,” Foucault writes, “is a political anatomy of detail” and, as he rightly pointed out, that “‘detail’ had long been a category of theology and asceticism” (DP, 140). Detailing the body was a distinct feature of Christianity and it showed how “deployments of power are directly connected to the body” (HS1, 151).

The example of La Salle illustrates an emerging framework of religious power and underlines the importance of religion within Foucault’s genealogical examination. For example, in *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault shows how important Christian monasticism had been in setting up the timetable, the architecture, and the daily exercises of modern institutions. Schools, barracks, hospitals, prisons, and workshops carry the

“laicized content” of not just a religious past but of a “mystical calculus of the infinitesimal and the infinite”; a hidden theological calculation between bodily detail and a belief in an other-worldly salvation (DP, 140). This dynamic of “detail” and an “infinite” marks out Foucault’s own sense of the power of religion; or rather the apparatus (*dispositif*) of power within religious institutions. In the introductory volume of his history of sexuality, the concern shifts to the institutional practice of confession and the “codification of the sacrament of penance by the Lateran Council of 1215” (HS1, 58). It is also here that for the first time he specifically engages with the apparatus (*dispositif*) of the Christian pastoral system (HS1, 21, 22, 23, 113).¹

In order to clarify his methodological approach in the history of sexuality, Foucault points out that he is not offering a “theory” of power but an “analytics” of power. By this he means the process of defining how power – the relations between things – establishes a distinct “domain” or space of analysis (HS1, 82). He wants to understand the types of thinking and analysis that are made possible through relations of power, rather than assert a specific representation of power; that is, to see power as a set of operations rather than as a thing in and of itself, such as the representation of power as juridical. Foucault’s engagement with religion, therefore, is part of his mapping of a specific “analytics” of religious power (its tactics and strategies) and the way it operates. This concern with “the power of the church,” and the Counter-Reformation period in particular, had in fact been evidenced as early as 1961 in his *History of Madness* (HM, 52). Such work supports an argument that Foucault has a sustained interest in matters of religion for understanding the present. This should not make us overplay the place of religion, however, because Foucault neither marginalizes nor privileges religious power. But he does recognize how Western society is inescapably constituted by religious – or, more accurately, Christian – thought and practice. He recognizes how religious power continues to have influence in the contemporary world.

In *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction* we can identify an “analytics” of religious power based on four characteristics: (1) detail; (2) an “infinite” or “mystical calculus,” by which he means a justification, or salvation, “beyond” time and history (DP, 162; cf. RC, 131–132); (3) a focus on the body; (4) a focus on confession or discourse. These elements are not set up in isolation but always within specific configurations within the religious institution. The “detail” focuses on the “body,” is framed by the speech act of “confession,” and is justified inside a “mystical calculus of the infinitesimal and the infinite” (DP, 140). This last characteristic of religious power, the “infinite,” plays an important analytical role, not least because it provides a religious rationale distinct from the “technical rationality” of modern institutions, such that the relations of power are set up “for the conquest of salvation,” a “beyond,” rather than the “subjection” that never reaches its “limit” in the “technical rationality” of modern disciplines (DP, 140, 162). All of these characteristics of religious power, identified by Foucault in the mid-1970s, are carried forward in the late 1970s under the rubric of “pastoral power.” As Foucault declared, summarizing his February 15, 1978, Collège de France lecture: “Religious power, therefore, is pastoral power” (C-STP, 205). Following this understanding, we can see that the concept of pastoral power is a culmination and a refinement of Foucault’s thinking about religious power, rather than, as is sometimes assumed, a new field of analysis developed in 1978 in relation to governmentality. The publication of the 1977–78 Collège de France

lectures in 2004, and the subsequent debates around these lectures, gives us a new opportunity to rethink the nature of Foucault's understanding of religion and power through the notion of an "analytics" of power and to illustrate how the notion of pastoral power underlines the significance of Foucault's interest in religion as a political reality.

In this essay, I want to show how Foucault's discussions of pastoral power relate to a wider "analytics" of religious power set down in 1975 and 1976 before he deploys the language of the "pastoral." I wish to show how "pastoral power" is a gathering together of a pre-existing analytics of religious power. This will entail demonstrating how the key analytics of pastoral power set out in his 1977–78 Collège de France course, *Security, Territory, Population*, are already in play in Foucault's work. Locating the discussion of pastoral power from 1978 in the historical trajectory of *Discipline and Punish* is part of a deliberate strategy of integrating Foucault's thinking on religion. It is to read the Collège de France lectures alongside Foucault's published work. However, in this approach I do not wish to neglect the innovative features of the Collège de France lectures and the very important additions they provide, but rather to show how pastoral power is not just a historical and transitional concept to governmentality studies but part of a longer development of Foucault's thinking about religion and power. They echo aspects of the earlier work and evolve in the late work. In shifting the discussion of pastoral power to a wider trajectory, I will also consider the question of whether pastoral power persists after the historical shift to governmentality. In the process, I will map the specific features of Foucault's idea of pastoral power in the 1977–78 Collège de France course and, aided by the "dry and schematic character" (C-STP, 204) of these lectures, I will examine one of the most neglected aspects of pastoral power, the theological relation of pastoral power, something brought to light in the 1977–78 course. In conclusion, I will address the question of why Foucault believed pastoral power contained a series of paradoxes, something I think we can understand by considering the notion of the "infinite." But in order to carry out this reading of Foucault's work on religion and pastoral power, it is necessary to first establish something of the problematic of religion within Foucault. This takes us to the important and contested preliminary question of the place and significance of religion in Foucault's thinking.

The Fascination with Religious Power: Cultural Reality, Not Belief

The question of religion in Foucault's work is caught in the complex and much-debated distinction between "religion" and the "secular." The terms are interdependent and shaped by the "rules of *exclusion*" within the modern state, that is the state separation from what is deemed "religious" and its removal of religion to the private rather than the public realm (AK, 216). As Philippe Büttgen (2007: 1137–1139) argues in his reading of pastoral power in the 1977–78 lectures and Foucault's late work, there is a "refusal of secularization" (a refusal to separate religion and politics) in Foucault's recognition of the inheritance of pastoral power in modern society. He believes Foucault's approach is "en bonne part dirigée contre les théories de la secularisation" ("in good part directed against the theories of secularization") (Büttgen 2007: 1138).

The contemporary persistence of religion in the political world and the recent revision of secularization theories by such scholars as Peter Berger (1999) does give greater credence to Foucault's genealogical inclusion of religion, especially when most on the political left ignored it as a valid social concern. However, there remains a tension in Foucault scholarship as to the overall significance of religion to Foucault. Although he was brought up in the ambiance of French Catholic society, partly educated in a Catholic school, spent time during his late work in a Dominican library (the Bibliothèque du Saulchoir, which held his archive for many years), and is buried in a Catholic cemetery, there is nothing to suggest that he was anything other than an acknowledged atheist (Macey 1993: 192, 415). But he did not ignore the social and cultural reality of religion. He was rather fascinated by it and famously missed an interview to watch the installation of John Paul II in 1978, during a period when he was fascinated by pastoral power. Furthermore, Foucault did not dismiss his Catholic past, declaring in a 1983 interview: "Yes, I have a very strong Catholic background, and I am not ashamed" (Foucault 1983: 11).

There is also no denying that Foucault engaged with theologians and utilized religious ideas in his work (Bernauer 1999; Carrette 1999). Nonetheless, secondary scholarship in both France and the Anglophone world has been slow to appreciate the significance of the religious tropes of Foucault's work.² The scholarly engagement with Foucault's religious texts is complicated in France by the 1905 separation of church and state and the different academic codes of legitimacy such separation generated. It is striking that in the French academic milieu of the "laïque" separation of church and state, and the longer historical removal of knowledge-as-belief in favor of knowledge-as-science, the appreciation of religion in Foucault's work holds much ambivalence. For example, Büttgen (2007: 1130) can declare: "Le pouvoir pastoral ne relève pas d'une 'histoire religieuse,' sa dimension religieuse ou sacrée n'intéresse pas Foucault" ("Pastoral power is not related to a 'religious history,' its religious or sacred dimension does not interest Foucault"). In this vein Büttgen (2007: 1130) wrongly reads and dismisses the work of Bernauer and Carrette as part of a "théologie foucauldienne" ("Foucauldian theology"), missing the place of reading Foucault's texts as part of the academic study of religion in the Anglophone world, where religion is taken seriously as a cultural reality rather than as an assertion of belief. This is not to say that there have not been any theological applications of Foucault's thinking (see, for example, Tran 2011), but these are distinct from those seeking to show Foucault was fascinated by religion as a cultural phenomenon (see Carrette 2000). We need to read Büttgen's statement as part of a confusion of *religion as faith* with *religion as cultural reality*: Foucault was interested in the latter, not the former, except in so far as the former shaped the latter.

Besides the obvious textual evidence for Foucault's interest in religion in his main works, there are interviews that enable us to locate Foucault's reading of religion effectively within a wider historical, philosophical, and cultural analysis. In an anonymous 1978 interview, "On Religion," Foucault states clearly his fascination with religion (Voeltzel 1978; RC, 106–109). He responds to his interviewer's negative perception of the church and the clergy as a "sinister piece of theatre" by stating: "my position is exactly the opposite. I think the church is wonderful." Later he confirms: "Historically, what exists is the church. Faith, what is that? Religion is a political force" (RC, 106–107).

This statement provides a good overall positioning of Foucault's work on religion. He is interested in religion as a historical reality, has little interest in the reality of belief or faith, but takes religion seriously within an analysis of political power; as can be seen, also, in his controversial fascination with the Iranian Islamic revolution in 1979.³

Religious power is an important part of Foucault's historical and cultural reading of the world and part of his refinement – not quite rejection – of the Marxist models of religion as ideological power. Foucault's positioning of Marx, alongside economist David Ricardo, in the new "arrangement of knowledge" shaped by the "historicity of economics" and the "finitude of human existence" meant that he played down the disruption and revolutionary nature of Marx's thinking, which in turn meant Marx's ideas of religion as ideology were limited to a nineteenth-century epistemological arrangement (OT, 253–263; RM, 104–106). As Foucault makes clear (C-STP, 215–216), the notion of pastoral power is necessary because of the inadequacy of interpreting religious phenomena in terms of ideology (or beliefs) alone, rather than as "strategies and tactics." The "infinite" horizon, as I am framing it here, is important in so far as the "play of theoretical elements" provides a moral justification and gives a "basis to these tactics in rationality" (C-STP, 216 n.). The "infinite" and "mystical calculus," what Foucault (RC, 131–132) later calls "the promises of the beyond," are the rational justifications for the "transformations" of religious power as they operate through detail and the body. It is worth remembering that Foucault resisted simple readings of Marx's view of religion as the "opium of the people" and points to the sentence immediately before it – "which is never quoted" – that saw religion as the "spirit of a world without spirit" (PPC, 218). Religion provided inner motivations and hopes for new forms of subjectivity in an oppressive world. Foucault's analytics of religious power is a correction of the Marxist distortion of Marx's text and shows religion has a historical value as a set of power relations irrespective of the reality behind its truth claims.

The Debate about Pastoral Power

In the three phases of Anglophone scholarship on Foucault, set by the successive waves of translation and interpretation, first, of his major works, second, of *Dits et écrits*, and most recently of the Collège de France lectures, we see the gradually widening appreciation of "pastoral power" as a central concept within Foucault's reading of religion (see Carrette 2007, 2011). In the first wave, shaped by the initial reception of Foucault's works in the English-speaking world, "pastoral power" is discussed in its first public appearance through Foucault's two Tanner Lectures on Human Values, "'Omnes et singulatim': Towards a Criticism of 'Political Reason'" (EW3, 298–325); delivered on October 10 and 16, 1979 at Stanford University, reworked from previous public lectures at the Collège de France and in Tokyo (C-STP, 115–134; RC, 115–130). Bernauer (1990: 162) was correct in seeing these lectures as "selective" readings of Christian experience, but "decisive in expanding his [Foucault's] horizon beyond modernity." In the second phase of scholarship, determined by the various translations of *Dits et écrits*, there is an appreciation of a wider set of comments on "pastoral power," as, for example, in his University of Tokyo April 20, 1978 paper, "Sexuality and Power" (RC, 115–130; cf. Carrette 1999: 41). This phase also saw an appreciation of the inter-relation of

Foucault's ideas of "pastoral power" and the later "hermeneutics of self" and "political spirituality"⁴ (Bernauer and Mahon 1994). In the secondary literature at this time there was an appreciation of Foucault's interweaving of the pastoral modality with techniques of renunciation in confessional practice, which shape the "fragments" of the unpublished fourth volume of the *History of Sexuality* (RC, 43–47). In the present, ongoing, third phase, mapped by the reception and translation of the Collège de France lectures, there has been a revival of interest in "pastoral power"; a reflection of the extended discussion of the concept in the 1977–78 Collège de France course (Büttgen 2007; Churlew 2010; Golder 2007). O'Farrell (2005: 46–47, 150) gathers together Foucault's references to "pastoral power" and rightly states from the vantage point of the 1977–78 course publication that: "It has yet to be seen what impact these lectures will have, but they provide enlightening and substantial clarifications of Foucault's ideas on the State and of his notions of governmentality."

Davidson (2009: xviii) is correct to suggest that because the "main legacy" of the 1977–78 course has been "governmentality," other features have been "undervalued", including the political-ethical axis with which Davidson is concerned and also, we may note, pastoral power, which is often reduced to a transitional concept. The issue of whether "pastoral power" is to be seen as a "transitional" concept or, as I am arguing here, an "integrated concept" within a longer analytics of religious power returns us to the place of religion in Foucault's wider work. What I am suggesting here is that the 1977–78 Collège de France course offers us a way into a deeper set of textual issues that connect "pastoral power" to the paradox of self-renunciation (the Christian sacrifice of the self to find the self) in Foucault's 1980 Dartmouth lectures, "About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self" (RC, 158–181), and to Foucault's work on the founder of Western, Christian monasticism John Cassian, "The Battle for Chastity" (RC, 188–197). What is also clear, and rarely appreciated, is that before the publication of the 1977–78 Collège de France course, pastoral power was largely captured according to Foucault's 1979 Tanner Lecture summary and used merely as shorthand for an "individualizing power." The picture becomes more complex in the 1977–78 Collège de France course when we see the depth of Foucault's theological exploration and his analysis of the dynamics of salvation–law–truth. In 1978, pastoral power is extended in its conceptual vitality, reconfiguring the entire relationship between religion and politics. But before explaining this point, let me disentangle the idea of "pastoral power" and its central link to the wider analytic of religious power.

Pastoral Power in Foucault: Paris, Tokyo, Stanford, and Beyond

The debates about "pastoral power" in Foucault's work are all based on public lectures – "work in progress" – that were never published in completion (C-SPT, 135). Pastoral power remains therefore a concept that, on Foucault's own admission, is a "sketch" – a draft of more complex historical details – with much more work to be completed. Respecting the tentative modeling, we can map nine distinct elements of Foucault's discussion of "pastoral power," based on the main 1977–78 Collège de France lectures on the topic and the subsequent lectures emerging from the Collège de France exposition: (1) the method of approach; (2) the historical and geographical origin of pastoral

power; (3) the general characteristics of pastoral power; (4) the Greek avoidance of pastoral power; (5) the Christian institutionalization of pastoral power; (6) the relation between political and pastoral power; (7) the distinctive Christian features of pastoral power; (8) the counter-conducts of pastoral power; and (9) the reorganization of pastoral power from the sixteenth century. I will examine each of these areas in the respective sections below.

It is, first, impossible to appreciate the apparatus (*dispositif*) of pastoral power without understanding Foucault's method of approach and the way this opens a new understanding of Christian theology. Foucault's analysis of religious power uses a specific "decentering" method to reveal a set of hidden operations. Instead of reading the church and theology in its own terms and according to its own discursive framework, he provides the subterranean analytic of power and shows how theological ideas and practices relate to the process of individualization.

Foucault explains that his approach to pastoral power uses the same methodology that he used within his more "general project," as in his study of "disciplines" in the army, hospitals, schools, and prisons (for example in *Discipline and Punish*), where he carried out a "triple displacement." The first shift was to move outside the "institutional-centric" approach, which entailed "going behind the institution" to find the "overall perspective," what Foucault calls "a technology of power" (C-STP, 116–117). This is a refusal to read the institution in terms of its own explicit discourse (such as the theological claims of salvation made by the church) and an attempt to read it in terms of its "techniques" of power – through the genealogical method. The second shift was to move out of the "functional" approach to institutions and back into the "general economy of power," that is, to read "strategies and tactics" instead of functions. This is to refuse the claims that the practices of, for example, the church relate to salvation and relocate the practices back to questions of power. The final decentering shift was to refuse "a ready-made object" (such as madness or sexuality) in order to identify the way a "field of truth" (knowledge) is constituted, the way objects are created as a means of ordering and controlling through a system of knowledge-practice. Foucault's decentering method shows that in order to understand governmentality we need to understand the "strategies and tactics" behind Christian theology; that is, the technologies behind the theology. Pastoral power is a religious technology of power through which the modern forms of governmentality are constituted. As Davidson (2009: xix) appreciates, the shift from a discourse of governing to one of conduct and counter-conduct is "one of the richest and most brilliant moments in the entire [1977–78] course."⁵ Foucault's reading of pastoral power is therefore a decentering mechanism, a genealogical way of reading history according to power and the body, but it is at the same time a recognition of the importance of the theological to such a history.

Having considered the method of approach to pastoral power, we can now address the first set of features of pastoral power in the 1977–78 Collège de France lectures (elements 2 to 6 in my above outline), which deal with its historical formation and pre-Christian features. Here Foucault explains the metaphorical nature of "pastoral" in terms of the shepherd and the care for the flock. This metaphor provided an effective model for governance, because it offered a clear sense of individual care and guidance. The historical and geopolitical origin of pastoral power is identified in the pre-Christian, Mediterranean East; in Egypt, Assyria, and Mesopotamia and in the Hebrews, where

the notion of pastoral power was “intensified” (C-STP, 124). In the Hebrew tradition pastoral power is reserved, with the exception of King David, as a term for God’s relationship to the people. Once the location of the term is mapped, Foucault then puts forward his four basic characteristics of pastoral power, which are further explored in the subsequent lectures in North America and Japan. There is a slight blurring at the margins of the metaphorical schema in the various presentations around the world, perhaps confirming Foucault’s sense in 1978 that it was a “very clumsy schema” (C-STP, 129). However, we can abridge the slight variations in his four features of the shepherd metaphor according to the following ideal model of pastoral power:⁶

- 1 It is “not exercised over a territory” [“a flock rather than a land”].
- 2 It is “fundamentally a beneficent power” or “a power of care” towards salvation [“the shepherd gathers together, guides and leads his flock” and saves it from danger].
- 3 It is a “dutiful” and “devotional” power [the shepherd “keeps watch” over the flock].
- 4 It is “an individualizing power” [“individual attention is paid to each member of the flock”].

Once the central model is in place, Foucault provides a “vague sketch” (C-STP, 135) of the very different deployment of the shepherd-flock metaphor in Greek literature (Homer, Pythagorean writing, and Plato). In this literature the metaphor is largely “negative” or within an “invariant” legal context, as in Plato’s notion of the magistrate as shepherd (C-STP, 143, 147). It is not that the metaphor is absent (it is used for the doctor, farmer, gymnast, and teacher) but it is, rather, used for “minor” or “subordinate” roles and not the political order (C-STP, 146). As Foucault notes, in Plato’s *The Statesman* there is a clear sense that “to act like a shepherd” would be below the status of a politician (C-STP, 146). This sets the scene for Christianity and its positive valuation and expansion of the pastoral theme. As Foucault makes clear: “the real history of the pastorate as the source of a specific type of power over men, as a model and matrix of procedures for the government of men, really only begins with Christianity” (C-SPT 148). Importantly, Foucault makes the point that there is a gap in research on pastoral power. He recognizes that his work is not “undertaking the history” of the pastorate and the “techniques employed,” which in his view “has never really been undertaken.” Working within the limits of his model, Foucault acknowledges that the shepherd–flock relationship is “only one aspect of the multiple, complex, and permanent relationships between God and men” and that before Christianity there was no specific pastoral institution (C-STP, 151–152).

The key aspect of pastoral power is the way it is institutionalized in the Christian church. In Christianity, pastoral power “envelops all” and the “laws, rules, techniques, and procedures” become institutionalized. The sophistication of the mechanisms means that pastoral power will become “the keystone of the whole organization of the Church,” from Christ as “the great shepherd of the sheep” (in the biblical books of John and Hebrews), to the bishops “in charge,” and the “abbots” as heads of religious communities, and right down to the problem of whether priests can be shepherds, which is found in texts on pastoral power from the medieval period (C-STP, 152–153). All this creates a “pastoral organization,” a religious power, which is “distinct from

political power.” This distinction is in line with Foucault’s earlier model of religious power in *Discipline and Punish* and it contains the same tension in holding together a “detailed” technology and an “infinite”; religious power is both a “terrestrial power” and one “directed towards the world beyond” (C-STP, 154). This holding together of an immanent practice and a transcendent sanction is the heart of Foucault’s idea of religious power and it emerges again in his later reading of the Islamic revolution in Iran.

Despite his controversial judgments about Iran, there is consistency in the modeling of religious power and pastoral power across his work. The “infinite,” or transcendent, horizon provides a political leverage outside of history to motivate action in history. For Foucault, the revolt of the Islamic revolution was based on a “promise and guarantee of finding something that would radically change their subjectivity.” The Islamic revolution was something “‘outside of history’ as well as in it” (RC, 218; PPC, 131–132). This paradox of “in and out of history” shows how religious power in all Foucault’s work operates on the recognition of a rationality of “the beyond,” the “infinite,” which is “not an ideological cloak but the way to live revolts” (RC, 132). Foucault’s work on pastoral power holds important insights for thinking about the relation of religious and political power on this basis, insights that have yet to be fully appreciated; but first we must examine the distinct nature of pastoral power in Christianity (the seventh element of pastoral power in my outline).

Christianity and Pastoral Power

The central achievement of Foucault’s discussion of pastoral power is to show how Christianity takes hold of the pastoral processes and expands them in unique ways according to the three theological dynamics of salvation, law, and truth (the Christian “infinite” in *Discipline and Punish*). Foucault underlines how pastoral power is “essentially different” from previous deployments and that it constitutes the “background” of the processes that form the modern state (C-STP, 164–165). In consideration of Christian texts from the third to the sixth centuries, Foucault takes the three theological abstractions of salvation, law, and truth and decenters them through his method of reading theology according to its technology of power. These theological abstractions have received little attention, but they provide the genealogical basis of the modern state rationality. Foucault does not find the unique aspect of Christianity at the level of salvation–law–truth, which, as acts of guiding (salvation), prescribing (law), and teaching (truth), are not unique. It is rather the “subtleties of the bond” between pastor and sheep, the specific relation of “reciprocity” of pastor and sheep, with its mutual relationship of responsibility for salvation, and the “distribution” to the whole community, that are original in Christianity (C-STP, 168–169, 172). For Foucault there are four “absolutely specific and unprecedented principles” within the Christian idea of pastoral power: the principle of “analytical responsibility” (the pastor accounts for every sheep), the principle of “exhaustive and instantaneous transfer” (the merits and faults of the sheep will be counted as those of the pastor), the principle of “reversal” (the pastor must die for the sheep), and the principle of “alternate correspondence” (the imperfections of the pastor will count as ways to edify the sheep).

It may seem that these specific principles of the Christian pastorate have little to do with the rationality of the modern state, but they provide for Foucault a “prelude” to governmentality in the sixteenth century. At the decentered level, salvation provides a technology of power based on an “economy of faults and merits,” which becomes in the modern individual a process of “analytical identification,” an identification based on self-examination (C-STP, 172, 184). The theological notion of law is a technology of power that creates “obedience and submission,” which in modern rationality establishes subjection (*assujettissement*), and the theological idea of truth creates a technology of power that creates an inner truth through direction and conduct, which is carried forward as “subjectivation” (the internalization of truth to an inner secret). These latter forms of pastoral power are carried forward into Foucault’s unpublished fourth volume of the *History of Sexuality*, the fragments of which can be found in various published lectures (C-SPT, 123; RC, 154–157, 158–181, 188–197; TS, 9–15). Foucault’s work on John Cassian and the regulation of the number of nocturnal emissions for the monk is an example of the self-examination and self-censorship established within the Christian pastorate (C-STP, 166; RC, 188ff; see Carrette 2007). The modern government inherits from the Christian pastorate these individualizing dynamics of dissecting the self, servitude, and a relation to truth within the self. For Foucault, “the modern Western subject makes the pastorate one of the decisive moments in the history of power in Western societies” (C-STP, 185). What Foucault’s reading confirms is how early Christian theological abstractions have an importance for understanding the processes of modern government. He decenters religious belief and practice as technologies of power and reveals their force within the modern political rationale.

Pastoral Power and Counter-Conduct: Avoiding the Gaze

Given his understanding of the relation between power and resistance, it is not surprising that Foucault explores the “immediate and founding correlation of conduct and counter-conduct” (C-STP, 196) in the pastoral system, the eighth element of pastoral power in my outline. Foucault takes a broad historical view in his framing of a series of both internal and external dimensions of the resistance to pastoral power. Importantly, he maps religious counter-conduct on to wider socio-political struggles such as the ending of feudalism, the rise of urban economies, and the changing status of women (C-STP, 196). He also provides a sense of counter-conducts in other institutions, such as desertion from the army, secret societies like the Freemasons, and forms of medical dissent, such the refusal of medical rationality (C-STP, 198–200). Foucault also considers other “external blockages” in the resistance to Christianity in what he calls “extra-Christian practices,” such as witchcraft and heresy. Foucault also recognizes economic structures as presenting “external blockages,” but he is more concerned with the points of resistance “within the field of the pastorate” (C-STP, 194).

Foucault not only maps the place of religion in cultural history but considers it necessary to examine “the major purely religious transformations of the pastorate” (C-STP, 203). While not dwelling on the doctrinal level, the doctrinal remains a distinct part of his analysis, as we can see in his consideration of the priest’s sacramental power and the Eucharist (C-STP, 209–210). The doctrinal elements are discussed within

Foucault's examples of counter-conduct developed in Christianity in the Middle Ages: asceticism, communities, mysticism, Scripture, and eschatological beliefs. These examples enable him to show how the forms of counter-conduct "redistribute, reverse, nullify, and partially or totally discredit pastoral power" (C-STP, 204). They are breakages, ruptures, "exaggerations," or "reversals" in the pastoral technology, often emerging as excesses or points of tension in the very mechanisms of control (C-STP, 207, 211).

Although Foucault does not fully theorize the elements of counter-conduct, we can argue that the force of resistance emerges through a validation of inner experience that overcomes the external demand for submission. This becomes most evident in his discussion of mysticism, where issues of authority and experience are brought into focus. Mysticism holds "the privileged status of an experience that by definition escapes pastoral power" (C-STP, 212). A similar shift occurs through the self-mastery that is exercised in asceticism. The ascetic "experiences" a movement to a new stage of greater difficulty and self-mastery, which is then used against the order of submission (C-STP, 212). Equally, the counter-conducts of resistant communities against the priest's power, counter-readings of Scripture against authority, and eschatological beliefs holding out a promise "disqualifying the pastor's role" provide new hermeneutical possibilities to validate experience, and allow new orders of experience to emerge in the individual or group against pastoral power (C-STP, 74).

In the first example of counter-conduct in pastoral power, asceticism, Foucault shows how pastoral power subverts the original demand for submission through the production of new subjectivities of resistance. In effect, pastoral power produces the practices that will in time undermine it. This counter-conduct of asceticism illustrates how the self-mastery required by submission creates a new self; it illustrates how subjects of resistance emerge within dominant regimes, something explored by Judith Butler (1997: 15).⁷ However, Christianity, while incorporating aspects of asceticism, was not an ascetic religion (STP, 207). Foucault shows that Christianity was a "confessional" religion, highlighting the "endless mill of speech" of the Christian pastorate and the "verbalization of the thoughts" (*exagoreusis*) (HS1, 21; RC, 179).

The dynamic of counter-conduct can most vividly be seen in Foucault's recalling of a "famous story of a woman" given by the Oberland Friends of God. The story forms part of Foucault's wider mapping of the rejection of the "priest's sacramental power." The woman of the story, although not mentioned by name or in detail in the lecture, is Ursule, a young girl of Brabant, who in 1288 chose a cloistered and solitary life, but who confessed to the priest her carnal temptations following years of ascetic practice and denial (see C-STP, 224 n. 63). In Foucault's account we are told that the priest "considered this natural," with the suggestion that the desire *should* be fulfilled. The following night God appeared to Ursule and questioned her confession, telling her to keep her "secrets" to herself, against the direction of the priest. The story enabled Foucault to show the emergence of resistance to pastoral power; something that would develop strongly in the dissenting movements of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, such as the Anabaptists, Waldensians, Hussites, and Quakers. All these religious groups emphasized individual and inner truth, which was the key for later forms of governmentality.

In *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction* (HS1, 86) Foucault indicates that power is tolerable when there is a “mask” of power. Removing the “mask” is a tactic of counter-conduct. This can be seen most clearly in the counter-conduct of mysticism. Mysticism plays a double role in Foucault’s work, because in *Discipline and Punish* it operates as the inspiration of disciplinary regimes, through spiritual techniques of “authoritarian perfection,” but in *Security, Territory, Population* it is something that “escapes examination” (DP, 161–162; C-STP, 212). The dynamics of resistance turn on the “game of visibility” (C-STP, 212). This ocular power has long been appreciated in Foucault’s work, from the gaze in *Birth of the Clinic* to the panopticon in *Discipline and Punish* (see Flynn 1993: 273–286). We also know the importance of the look of God in the monastic cell, where on the walls – “written in black letters” – it says: “God sees you” (DP, 294). In the mystical, Foucault (C-STP, 212) points out that there is a reversal of the gaze from being seen to seeing. It is a move towards a self-seeing (“the soul sees itself”) and a seeing of God inside the self (the soul “sees itself in God and it sees God in itself”). Effectively, the mystical “escapes the structure of teaching” and “short-circuits this hierarchy.” It is the “immediacy of communication” that breaks the pastoral order and allows a shift of authority towards personal experience. The mystical also allows a “play of alternations” across binary constructions: night/day, dark/light, loss/return, absence/presence, and ignorance/knowledge. This “play of alternations” allows a new power of “ambiguous experiences,” which leads to a “communication of silence.”⁸ The excursion into mysticism in the 1977–78 lecture course is not something new to Foucault, but rather something he entertains in a qualified way in his early exploration of Bataille, surrealism, and the avant-garde in the 1960s (RC, 19ff, 57–71; Carrette 2000: 71–72, 90). In 1978, it is not Bataille’s erotic mysticism, but mysticism as a counter-conduct, that subverts the pastoral system of the church; it questions authority and truth through the immediacy of experience.

The Continuation of Pastoral Power

One of the debates surrounding Foucault’s notion of pastoral power is whether it persists in the modern world or whether the shift to governmentality during the foundation of the Classical period (1580–1650) was a distinct break from this model of power (C-STP, 236). The main reason for the ambiguity is that Foucault never follows up his numerous suggestions of the persistence of pastoral power and appears at times to indicate breaks and ruptures with the emergence of governmentality. We can unravel the problem through the 1977–78 lectures, which will address the final element of pastoral power in my outline, the reorganization of pastoral power from the sixteenth century.

Foucault is emphatic in the February 15 lecture that pastoral power “has never been truly abolished.” He also suggests that he is “very likely still mistaken” when he situates the “end of the pastoral age in the eighteenth-century” (C-STP, 148). He continues by arguing that “in fact pastoral power in its typology, organization, and mode of functioning, pastoral power exercised as power, is doubtless something from which we have still not freed ourselves” (C-STP, 148). Later, in the March 1 lecture, we learn that in the seventeenth century and at the beginning of the eighteenth century “many pastoral

functions were taken up in the exercise of governmentality,” albeit from within political rather than religious institutions (C-STP, 197). Furthermore, in the March 8 lecture, while considering the redistribution of pastoral power, he clearly states that “pastoral power does not disappear in the sixteenth century” (C-STP, 229). It is not a simple “transfer of pastoral functions from Church to state,” but rather a more “complex phenomenon” and an “intensification of the religious pastorate” in both its “spiritual” and “temporal extensions” (C-STP, 230). The “extensions” of pastoral power during the Reformation and Counter-Reformation and the “great transformation” at the time of Descartes would appear to be not so much a disappearance of pastoral power as an intensification at the points of “intersection” between forms of conduct (family, religious, public, government, education of children, etc.). Pastoral power does not disappear; rather, it “intersects” in different ways with other forms of power.

The idea of the “intersecting” of types of power in the modern period is both confused and illuminated by Foucault’s utilization of Thomas Aquinas. Foucault uses Aquinas to illustrate the historical transition from pastoral power to state government. In the March 8 lecture Foucault examines Aquinas’s *De regno* and his “analogies” of government: “God–Nature–Pastor/father of the Family.” God’s power provides a model for each level of government, through successive imprints. These levels of government create for Foucault a “theological-cosmological continuum,” God’s sovereign power, the natural order and government of men. Foucault suggests that this continuum is “broken” in the sixteenth century. However, what is confusing is the fact that Foucault makes a set of subtle qualifications about what is broken. He suggests that “the relationship of the sovereign, or of a person who governs, to God, to nature, to the father of a family, and to the religious pastor” is not broken, but rather “established on a different basis” (C-STP 234). There is a “fundamental crossover” to a different “epistemic” order (C-STP, 234; OT, 71). In a direct echo of the language and ideas of his 1966 work *The Order of Things*, Foucault in 1978 sees the medieval and Renaissance cosmos as holding an anthropocentric order of “resemblance and analogy,” “marvels, and signs,” where one “deciphers hidden truths” (C-STP, 236; OT, 17ff). This world carried God’s pastoral government, but Foucault declares that this “disappeared” when the world of “analogy and cipher” was replaced by “mathematical or classificatory forms of intelligibility” (C-STP, 236; OT, 73–75). The cosmic realm was replaced by the “public realm,” *res publica*, through a “de-governmentalization of the cosmos.” The suggestion is that the Thomistic “theological-cosmological continuum” was decoupled and a new order emerged. It is clear that for Foucault pastoral government “disappeared” between 1580 and 1650, with the emergence of the Classical period, but there remains the suggestion that aspects of pastoral power persist “according to a completely different system” (C-STP, 234, 236).

The Paradox of Pastoral Power

In examining Foucault’s notion of “pastoral power” we can see how it relates to previous discussions of religious power and through the notion of self-examination opens future work on the technologies of the self in Christianity. The value of reading pastoral power through the wider analytics of religious power, with all its implicit reactions and

reversals, can be seen in the way it forms part of Foucault's "decentering" method across all his work; the reading of religion through power, as a set of force relations within the social field. However, the "decentering" approach does not sever the relationship of power to the abstract theological rationality. Salvation–law–truth remain part of the genealogical analysis of pastoral power and La Salle's "little things" in *Discipline and Punish* require a relationship to the "infinite." This correlation between abstract theology and the technology of power is the most under-theorized aspect of Foucault's notion of pastoral power, which the publication of the 1977–78 course enables us to understand more fully. There is, however, one outstanding issue that needs addressing in order to fully appreciate Foucault's thinking about pastoral power: the fact that Foucault believed that pastoral power had *many* paradoxical aspects (C-STP, 154).

It is significant that Foucault deliberately wishes to stress a series of paradoxes in pastoral power (C-STP, 130). First, there is the paradox that pastoral power is concerned with both the collective and the individual, *omnes et singulatim* ("everyone together and each individually"), what he refers to as the "paradoxical distributive character of pastoral power" (STP, 128, 168–169). Second, there is the paradox that Christianity has been one of the "most creative" and also most violent traditions (C-STP, 130). Third, there is the paradox that the "pastor's weaknesses may contribute to the salvation of the flock," the failure contributing to the success by allowing edification in the special bond between the pastor and his sheep (C-STP, 172). Fourth, we see the emergence of ideas about the paradox of the sacrificial self. This becomes clearer in the later discussions of the Christian technology of the self, where there is "no truth about the self without a sacrifice of the self" (C-STP, 170; RC, 180). Finally, there is the "fundamental feature" of pastoral power; the paradox that it is both "distinct" from political power and concerned with the worldly order of everyday conduct (C-STP, 154). Why, we might ask, are there so many paradoxes in pastoral power?

The paradoxes reflect something of the way religious power brings challenges to the historical process by means of other-worldly values. I would like to suggest that the paradoxes that Foucault identifies in pastoral power relate to the tension between action in the world (the historical-political order) and the hidden, or other-worldly, theological order, the operation of a "mystical calculus of the infinitesimal and the infinite" (DP, 140). It is this mechanism that drives pastoral power and – paradoxically – allows for counter-conduct, not least in the ambiguity of mysticism, which for Foucault is the "play of alternatives" of binary thought, in so far as it brings a hidden world into the present order of values. The "infinite" allows a space for the justification of the religious practice of power. There is an appeal outside the historical world to a transcendent order of representation outside the world, what Foucault called in *The Order of Things* "a metaphysic of the infinite"; in contrast to the "analytic of finitude" (knowledge built on the finite forms of existence and found in the modern figure of "man") (OT, 316–317). Religious power is generated by postulating a different order to sanction action, as in the Islamic revolution, where the power of "revolt" arose from an appeal to a transcendent order. The metaphysic of infinitude and the analytic of finitude cause the paradoxical tensions within pastoral power because the former challenges the logic of the modern political state – finite existence – by adding a theological dimension to the historical process. In the modern state there is no logic of salvation to make sense of the pastoral reversals.

Conclusion: Religion and Politics

Foucault explains that he talked “at such length” about and “insisted” on the theme of the pastoral because it resituates the relationship between religion and politics (C-STP, 191–192). The innovative aspect of Foucault’s reading of the relationship between religion and political power is that he shifts the relationship between religion and politics from church and state to “pastorate and government.” It is the “mixed” figure of “minister, with all the ambiguity of this word” that captures the underlying relationship (C-STP, 192). Foucault, in effect, develops a relationship to the theological abstractions through the technology of power. He shows how there is a vital connection between the technologies of power in the pre-Classical metaphysics of infinitude and the arts of modern, finite government through the individualizing processes. The priority Foucault gave to pastoral power is significant not only for its “decisive” historical importance, but also in showing something of how “religion is a political force.”

Notes

- 1 In this text, Foucault’s concern is predominantly with the pre-Reformation church and the Catholic Church of French society, although he indicates in a footnote (HS1, 21 n. 4) that he will address the Reformed Pastoral in his next volume, the intended second volume of his history of sexuality, *La Chair et le corps* (*The Body and the Flesh*), which was abandoned and reworked. Foucault (FR, 358) developed material for his “Christian book,” *Les Aveux de la chair* (Confessions of the Flesh), which remains unpublished in accordance with his final request. See Carrette 1999 for the existing fragments of this unpublished fourth volume of the *History of Sexuality*.
- 2 For a consideration of work on Foucault and religion see Bernauer 1990; Bernauer and Carrette 2004; Bernauer and Mahon 1994; Carrette 1999, 2000, 2010; McSweeney 2005; O’Farrell 1989.
- 3 See “Iran: The Spirit of a World without Spirit” (PPC, 211–224); “Is It Useless to Revolt?” (RC, 131–134); cf. Afary and Anderson 2005.
- 4 The concept of “spirituality” is a complex term in Foucault’s late work holding both religious and philosophical connotations; see Carrette (forthcoming) for a discussion of the concept in Foucault’s work.
- 5 It is the shift from the Greek Church Father Gregory Nazianzen’s notion of *oikonomia psuchôn* (economy of souls) to the Latin “regimen animarum” (government of souls), to the French sixteenth- and seventeenth-century notion of “conduct” (*conduite*). The shifts in Foucault’s thinking may suffer from an easy conflation of religious and political terms, but they demonstrate his central thesis of interacting realms of power.
- 6 My outline seeks to clarify the blurring of features in points 3 and 4 in the 1978 lectures and his 1979 Tanner Lectures and the quotations are taken from these two sources, with the 1979 quotations in square brackets.
- 7 Judith Butler (1997: 15) writes of “the subject both as the *effect* of a prior power and as the *condition of possibility* for a radically conditioned form of agency.”
- 8 Silence plays an important role in Foucault’s work and forms part of the counter-logic of counter-conduct (see Carrette 2000: 25–43).

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Space, Territory, Geography

JEREMY W. CRAMPTON

Introduction

Foucault's engagement with space, territory, and geography occurs throughout his work and in many different registers. Some components of this engagement are well known, such as his early remarks on heterotopias (other spaces) and the panopticon, while others, such as the concern with territory, are less often recognized. In some cases material from Foucault's archives is only now yielding new insights, for example on urban spatial form.

This essay will provide an overview of Foucault's work on three interrelated but distinct concepts: space, territory and geography. One difficulty to be acknowledged at the outset is that these issues are rarely a central focus of his concerns. Foucault often thinks of spaces, territory, and geography as components of larger issues such as discipline (regulating behavior of individuals), health (especially public health) and governmentality (the techniques and politics of governing both individuals and populations). The upshot of this tactic is that we must trace Foucault and geography across a number of scattered texts, and that after having done so, it is still necessary to go beyond Foucault to develop his ideas. Nevertheless, for those willing to accept this challenge, new insights into familiar Foucauldian issues can be obtained.

A second difficulty is that Foucault does not define these terms or directly problematize them in the context of other scholarship. Although the "spatial turn" in the social sciences and humanities began during his lifetime (for an overview of the key players see Hubbard, Kitchin and Valentine 2010) he has proved more of an influence upon it, rather than a part of it. However, as we shall see, he certainly engaged with many of the same issues, starting with his early piece on heterotopia discussed below.

The first part of this chapter will offer a brief contextualization of the key terms space, territory, and geography. The second part will examine some of Foucault's most

well-known and overt engagements with geography including the heterotopia and spatial partitioning. The third part will explore how Foucault went beyond these concepts to more richly worked geographical analyses in three areas: health, discipline, and governmentality.

Space, Territory, and Geography: Contextualization

“Space” is a polyvalent term that until the early twentieth century could be read simply as objective absolute space within which “objects exist and events occur” (Smith 2008: 95). Foucault rarely treats space this way, preferring to treat it as an element of power, discipline, or governmentality. In *History of Madness* and *Discipline and Punish* for example, Foucault demonstrates that space can be used to separate out the unwanted (e.g., lepers). Here space is relational (it gets its meaning from how subjects are mutually situated) rather than absolute (a coordinate space). Similarly, territory has often been seen as an areally bounded space over which the state or government operates across different scales (local, regional, national, etc.). Where Foucault spoke of territory, as for example in his work on governmentality (C-STP), it was as the problematic of the qualities of a territory and its security, rather than its areal extent (C-STP, lecture of January 11, 1978).

“Geography” is a broad term that encapsulates not only space and territory, but also the study of anything spatial. The initial subjects of the discipline of geography in Western countries were physical landscape processes (especially geomorphology), and the interrelationships of the environment to the social sphere (for example, the distribution and migrations of human populations were concerns as long ago as the later nineteenth century). Cartography is the study of mapping at various scales (local, regional, and national), initially as a technical subject covering map design, projections, and production, but today also informed by studies of its role as a form of power/knowledge. Today, geography is diverse and is comprised of the study of the physical environment and of a broadly conceived human geography that engages the work of Foucault (for an overview see Crampton and Elden 2007).

In sum, for Foucault space is not a pre-existing terrain. Rather, in his work it is the very “production of space” (Lefebvre 1974/1991) and its relation to power that is at stake.

Heterotopia and Interviews on Geography

A prominent spatial term associated with Foucault is heterotopias, or different spaces. Foucault suggests that heterotopias (a word he coined) are neither everyday spaces nor utopias, but are for one reason or another spaces of alternative possibilities (Foucault never specifically defined them). Heterotopias are discussed on three occasions, all in 1966: in the preface to *The Order of Things* (OT), in a radio discussion (Foucault 2006), and in “Of Other Spaces” (EW2, 175–185; FDE2a, no. 360). The latter was only published shortly before his death. In *The Order of Things* heterotopias arise following his laughter at Borges’ fantastic Chinese encyclopedia which transgresses what we take to

be natural boundaries and which “threaten[s] to collapse our age-old distinction between the Same and the Other” (OT, xv; see also Borges 1999). After the laughter dies down Foucault is left with a “nagging” suspicion that the hidden point here is not just odd categories, but what he calls the “heteroclite” or strange groupings. So, rather than disorder, *other* orders. And, he asks, where would these other orders exist but in a heterotopia or “unthinkable space” (OT, xvii)?

Foucault observes that if utopias afford consolation, heterotopias are disturbing. They destabilize language by undermining its assumed coherence, its order. For Foucault the Borges encyclopedia challenges “spatial coherence” (OT, xix). Our traditional image of China is of a rigidly ordered static landscape, but now we can see that “these orders are perhaps not the only possible ones or the best ones” (OT, xx).

The radio piece *Les Hétérotopies* generated the lecture “Des espaces autres” (“Of Other Spaces”) which was delivered in March 1967 at an architecture conference (EW2, 175–185). It covers a fairly loose array of geographical concepts, which has generated a vast secondary literature (Google Scholar reveals over 5,000 references). Foucault begins by saying that “space has a history” (EW2, 176). First there is a space of absolute locations and things in their places. Then with Galileo (and, one might add, Descartes), there emerges a space of extension. Today we have spaces of “emplacement” (spatial relations, ensembles and circulations), but Foucault leaves this notion largely undeveloped, except to say that we need *histories* of spaces (he suggests libraries, festivals, and museums), a suggestion we shall return to below.

Other heterotopias include what Foucault calls “elsewheres” (e.g., those places such as the school or military academy where the first expressions of male sexuality can take place elsewhere than in the family space); “deviant heterotopias” (rest homes, prisons, and hospitals, where things can take place that are outside the norm, a concept he will more fully investigate in C-AN); and “mutating” heterotopias, for example the cemetery. In the last case, he notes that cemeteries were located in the heart of the city until the eighteenth century. But by the nineteenth century they were moved to the suburbs to assist with managing disease. We see here Foucault already forming ideas connecting geography and government that would be major concepts in his thought in 1974–75 relating to “urban medicine” and urban planning (see the discussion of the 1974 Rio lectures below).

Taking up the idea of the heteroclite from *The Order of Things*, Foucault also considers those places that juxtapose incompatible emplacements (OT, p. xvii). These include the cinema, which is at once two-dimensional and three-dimensional, and the garden as a deeply symbolic series of overlays that try to reproduce the world, with at its center the navel, prefiguring the panoptic menagerie at Versailles that is discussed in *Discipline and Punish* (DP, 203).

We sometimes enter heterotopias under duress (prisons) or ritually (Scandinavian saunas, which Foucault might have experienced during his time there in the 1950s). Sometimes the entrance is a kind of secret entrance (e.g., the American motel where one enters the room directly from one’s car with one’s lover).

Finally, Foucault sketches the relation of heterotopias to non-heterotopic space (EW2, 184). Heterotopias could partition off an illusory space (e.g., the brothel) or create a different, perfected space (e.g., the colony; on this see Legg 2007; Stoler 1995). The heterotopia has remained an enigmatic and challenging idea, although with some

exceptions (Saldanha 2008; Soja 1989, 1996), one perhaps taken up largely outside geography.

Foucault further discusses geographic questions in two interviews. In a 1976 interview "Questions on Geography" (reprinted in *Space, Knowledge and Power* [SKP], 173–182) with the editors of the journal *Hérodote* founded by the French geographer Yves Lacoste, Foucault is asked why he has seemingly been silent on geography. At first, Foucault turns the question back on the interlocutors:

It's up to you, who are directly involved with what goes on in geography, faced with all the conflicts of power which traverse it, to confront them and construct the instruments which will enable you to fight on that terrain. (SKP, 174)

However, over the course of the interview Foucault comes to acknowledge that space can be conceptualized in terms of power. He also rejects the devaluation of space in favor of time. In an example he will repeat in a later interview, he points out that during the 1960s to examine space meant that one was "hostile to time" (SKP, 178) and thus "reactionary and capitalist" which he finds is "an absurd discourse" (EW3, 361; FDE2a, no. 310). In a comment that would be important in the cartographic discipline, he sees the map as a form of power/knowledge (Harley 2001). Later, taking a suggestion from a question, he begins to play with the idea of the production of identity through geographical borders, as if people who lived in a certain territory were "inmates" (SKP, 179). By the end of the short interview he reassesses:

I have enjoyed this discussion with you because I've changed my mind since we started. I must admit I thought you were demanding a place for geography like those teachers who protest when an education reform is proposed, because the number of hours of natural sciences is being cut. (SKP, 182)

Then, in a now familiar statement he says "[g]eography must indeed necessarily lie at the heart of my concerns" (SKP, 182).

Intrigued, Foucault decided to return to the journal with some questions of his own for the editors themselves, something he very rarely did. Foucault's four questions reflect his key interests of the mid-1970s: the strategic relations between knowledge and power; if and why geographers wanted to make their discipline a "science"; what power means and who "has" it; and finally the possibilities of a geography of medicine (SKP, 19–20). In response, the journal assembled a number of geographers, who highlighted the issues of scale, power, strategy, and warfare. In 1976 Lacoste had just published his book *La Géographie ça sert d'abord à faire la guerre* (*Geography Is Above All for Making War*) and this provided a backdrop to the exchanges. Foucault was praised for not conceptualizing space as an objective absolute (SKP, 23–37).

In a 1982 interview "Space, Knowledge, and Power" (EW3, 349–364; FDE2a no. 310) Foucault clarified what he had said to *Hérodote* about the politics of architecture. Foucault interprets architecture (that is, urban spatial orderings and form) as part of the "techniques of the government of societies" (EW3, 349). By "government," a key concept for Foucault, he means the question of how and to what extent populations should be managed and regulated. Architecture and urban form, like public health,

required many new forms of mapping (Robinson 1982) which fall under the concern of “political men” (EW3, 350).

The interview then turns to the built environment of Paris, which was fundamentally rethought during the Second Empire by the Haussmann Plan, which gave Paris its iconic boulevards and rational structure, but also spatial divisions of class (Harvey 2003). However it was not necessarily the spatial disciplines of architecture that did this, Foucault observes, but the political men and the engineers at places such as the *École des Ponts et Chaussées* (an engineering polytechnic) and the *École des Mines* who “thought out space” (EW3, 354; see also C-SMD, 181, 250–251).

These two interviews, which roughly bookend his work on government of others, testify to the continuing interests he had in space, knowledge, and power. In a widely quoted comment he remarks that “space is fundamental in any exercise of power” (EW3: 361).

Government and Territory, The Panopticon, and Biopolitics of Space

Government and territory

Foucault’s analysis of governmentality and its implications for space and territory is picked up in the Collège de France lectures he gave in 1977–78, in the course entitled *Security, Territory, Population* (C-STP). The lectures are in many ways continuous with the geography interviews. They are part of more richly worked analyses that took Foucault’s spatial engagements well beyond heterotopia and the suggestive but largely latent geographic sensibility of the interviews discussed above. However, Foucault’s conceptualizations of territory are at best partial if not sometimes problematic, and some caution is required in working with them.

He begins the course by invoking a classic definition of political power, namely that “sovereignty is exercised within the borders of a territory” (C-STP, 11). The definition of territory as an areal extent over which the state governs derives from a well-known formulation by Max Weber: the state is that which exercises a monopoly on violence within a given territory (Weber, Baehr, and Wells 2002). But Foucault complicates this definition. For him, territory is not a single object, but heterogeneous. Additionally, territory itself is internally differentiated, and therefore its various qualities and aspects require multiple treatments by sovereignty. It is these diverse relations between power, territory, and space that he discusses in the lectures.

Foucault is sometimes understood in these lectures to shift away from territory toward governance. Indeed in the key fourth lecture he says the title of the lectures should really be “a history of ‘governmentality’” (C-STP, 108). Yet this does not mean that territory drops out. Foucault treats territory not as terrain, but as governmental problematic. As Elden has argued, this problematic is specifically calculative; for example, government must collect calculable knowledge about its territory (e.g., through mapping and national censuses) that can be analyzed by disciplinary experts in spatial demography and epidemiology to assess urban health (Elden 2007). The rise of the scientific disciplines of statistics and thematic cartography in the

nineteenth century is explained by Foucault in terms of the rise of the technologies of government.

Foucault illustrates his argument with the example of the town. It was administered differently from other spaces within the territory, it was geographically confined, and it was much more mixed economically and socially than rural areas. The town therefore faced a problem of its relationship to the surrounding territory, specifically how goods, people, and money could best circulate.

However, Foucault's analysis is somewhat different from that of Marx on capital circulation. Foucault argues that the town reflects in microcosm how the state should be governed as a whole. It should have a "good spatial layout" (C-STP, 14) that permits not just material flows, but also flows of ideas and orders. The well-governed state is the mobile state. It is also the "well-capitalized" state, with a strong urban center (capital city). An ideal town (such as one actually built from scratch in France called Richelieu) should be neither randomly laid out nor homogenous, but spatially differentiated, with residential areas (houses spaced far apart), and commercial areas (a closely spaced grid to allow for circulation of goods).

Urban spatial ordering and partition (*quadrillage*) was of interest to Foucault from the early 1960s. In the *History of Madness* (1961) he discusses how lepers are to be excluded and spatially marginalized at the edges of towns, a medieval precursor of a later (mid-seventeenth-century) process he calls the Great Confinement. In his lectures on the abnormal (C-AN), and in *Discipline and Punish*, he presents a contrast between the spatial strategy of exclusion of the lepers and that of dealing with the plague. In the latter, the plague victims were not exiled but subject to "spatial partitioning and control" (C-AN, 44).

Outlining a seventeenth-century order for dealing with the plague in an urban environment, he highlights the way the town was partitioned and surveilled, "a segmented space, observed at every point" (DP, 197). Here the danger and the threat are already inside the gates, and so every effort must be made to prevent mixing and circulation (including calling the potentially sick to windows to display themselves to a supervisor). By contrast, the strategy with the leper (who is only a figurehead for the "real population" of beggars, vagabonds, madmen, and the disorderly, see DP, 199) is spatial exclusion, the strategy of "exile-enclosure" (DP, 198).

In the face of increased circulation (trade, population movements, access between town and country, even flows of water and air and the diseases they may bring) Foucault points to two spatial problems addressed since the seventeenth century. First, what are the dangers of urban space – does it bring on disease, revolts, and epidemics? Second, how are space and power related, especially given increasing circulation and mobility? By the nineteenth century, for example, this would become the question of whether war would be rendered less or more likely by movements of people and increased familiarity.

New strategies were required to deal with these problems – new technologies of government for ensuring "security." Security has to work with the material geographical givens rather than from scratch (C-STP, 19). Towns and cities were being opened up, their city walls were being suppressed, wider streets were being built for better circulation, and these streets were being connected to a network of roads outside the town. There was the insecurity of all sorts of arrivals, many of them undesirables who

were thought to come from the country. All this required surveillance, knowledge, and monitoring to separate the good circulation from the bad. Foucault discusses how circulation therefore became one of the objects of “police,” which two hundred years ago meant the set of laws and regulations to make good use of the state’s forces “while preserving the state in good order” (C-STP, 313).

The lecture of February 1, 1978 is clearest about territory and government. Foucault notes that in the anti-Machiavellian literature such as that of La Perrière “the definition of government does not refer to territory in any way: one governs things” (C-STP, 96). But what are these things? They are critically men in their relationships with things (resources, wealth, means of subsistence) and territory (its borders, qualities, climate, dryness, fertility). Territory, then, does not drop out in the consideration of governmentality. Rather, what Foucault emphasizes is that the Weberian notion of the state (the sovereign with the monopoly of power over an essentially undifferentiated terrain) has to be abandoned. When you have the geographical movement of all sorts of goods and people, it is not possible to apply strict sovereignty with a monopoly on violence (see also the discussion in C-SMD, lecture of March 17, 1976).

Expanding on his notion of the policing of space, Foucault notes five concerns it dealt with: the relationship between territory and the number of its inhabitants; food production and agricultural policy; public health; population as labor; and circulation (C-STP, 323–326). In public health for example it is necessary to think about the geographical distribution of good “air, aeration, ventilation” (C-STP, 325) given the theory of miasmas (unwholesome vapors thought to carry disease; the germ theory of disease would not be accepted until the 1880s). Similarly, for circulation, this includes not just material circulation of goods and men (and hence the condition of roads, navigability of canals and rivers, the condition of bridges and so on) but also

[t]he set of regulations, constraints, and limits, or the facilities and encouragements that will allow the circulation of men and things in the kingdom and possibly beyond its borders. (C-STP, 325)

Summarizing, Foucault invokes the notion of the milieu, which, following his mentor Georges Canguilhem, he identifies with Lamarck but also with Newton and physics. The milieu can account for circulation and thus “action at a distance” (C-STP, 20). This is another way of talking about the government of others, but with the spatial foregrounded. Town planners understood cause and effect over space: overcrowding in one part of the city means more miasmas. More miasmas mean more disease and deaths across the city, which means more miasmas and so on. In sum, it is no longer the question of the sovereign ruling over the territory, having a monopoly on violence. Territory is differentiated, and it is cut through with all sorts of circulations and movements. It is a complex problem for government.

We find a similar concern for urban planning and health in several collaborative projects Foucault undertook that studied the spatial rationalities of the state (Elden 2008). These studies mesh with but also deepen his work from the 1970s onwards but are relatively unknown, due to their largely unpublished status.

In five interlinked studies in the early 1970s that he carried out with Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, and François Fourquet, the team studies “equipments,” in the context

of towns, green spaces, “equipments of normalization” (Foucault’s particular contribution), and urban planning (FL, 105–112). “Equipments” refers to towns, territories, and collective resources or urban infrastructure used collectively. In managing the territory for example (*aménagement du territoire*), and for permitting production, it is necessary to “normalize” circulation by road, that is, to regulate it within certain limits (for more on normalization see C-SMD, lecture of February 25, 1976). This required engineers, customs agents, and those who would manage the flows of people going by road, who in turn had to be trained in standard, normalized ways. The road “is a crystallization of state power” (FL, 106).

In 1975 Foucault also did collaborative work with the architect Bernard Mazeret on “habitat,” a topic we do not normally associate with Foucault. Habitats, or suitable living environments, might be linked across different milieus through mechanisms of circulation. Nevertheless his approach contains some typically Foucauldian themes: habitat as hygiene, architecture, civil engineering, and disciplinary knowledges. There are some interesting details (such as sidewalks and crossroads where public and private spaces intersect) as well as a return to questions of circulation and the opening up of cities discussed above, the suppression of city walls, boulevards, and so on (Elden 2008).

The Panopticon and geosurveillance

One of Foucault’s most well-known discussions is the treatment he gives to the panopticon (“all-seeing”) in *Discipline and Punish*, the architectural principle associated with the English social reformer Jeremy Bentham in the late eighteenth century (Bentham 1995). This principle, which informed the spatial layout of prisons, schools, and other spaces, rests on the ability of the watchers to see the inmates, but not be seen in turn. The secondary literature on the panopticon has expanded Foucault’s small, illustrative moment in the book to include surveillance across a variety of spatial scales. Foucault situates Bentham’s project – realized in hundreds of actual prisons around the world – in his critique of visibility and the gaze (*le regard*). In a 1977 interview (PK, 146–165; FDE2a, no. 195) he explains that he encountered the panopticon while working on the origins of clinical medicine, and reveals that for him it was always more than just about prisons, having emerged from his work on the clinic and the institutionalization of the medical gaze.

The principle was this. A perimeter building in the form of a ring. At the center of this, a tower, pierced by large windows opening on to the inner face of the ring. The outer building is divided into cells each of which traverses the whole thickness of the building. These cells have two windows, one opening on to the inside, facing the windows of the central tower, the other, outer one allowing daylight to pass through the whole cell. All that is then needed is to put an overseer in the tower and place in each of the cells a lunatic, a patient, a convict, a worker or a schoolboy. (PK, 147)

The series of possible occupants of the cell serves to illustrate Foucault’s larger concern with the “disciplinary society” (a society which regulates individual behaviors: see DP, 209; it is first mentioned in C-PP, lecture of November 21, 1973). One way to achieve the disciplinary society is by exercising control over space using the panopticon’s

surveillant capacities. But how exactly are space and power tied together? Foucault's answer is a historicizing one: we need a history of spaces.

A whole history remains to be written of *spaces* – which would at the same time be the history of *powers* (both these terms in the plural) – from the great strategies of geo-politics to the little tactics of the habitat, institutional architecture from the classroom to the design of hospitals, passing via economic and political installations. (PK, 149)

Thus as we have seen throughout this essay, space itself is not the target of analysis, but rather space and its relations to power/knowledge.

Although Bentham did not invent the panopticon, Foucault points out that he “formulated and baptized it” (PK, 148). Foucault observes that Bentham's panopticon is one of those “Columbus's egg” situations in the political order: something that appears obvious, but only afterwards (DP, 206; FSP, 208, reference elided in the English translation). Nor was it merely a utopian dream, but one that actually was brought into existence at many sites around the world (PK, 164).

One such site, the Eastern State Penitentiary (ESP) in Philadelphia (operative 1829–1971 and still extant) is briefly discussed by Foucault in *Discipline and Punish* (DP, 123–126, 237–239). Built by the city's Quaker fathers, it was known as the “Separate System” of imprisonment, in which prisoners were confined to individual cells and not permitted to congregate with each other. Here the detainee was expected to quietly reflect in solitary confinement on his sins as a penitent (hence penitentiary). As Foucault notes, confinement had monastic origins. Extraordinary measures were taken at some institutions to prevent communication or contact with the outside world. At ESP the guards wore cloth slippers over their boots, so that they could not be heard patrolling the corridors (Johnston 1994). But reflection was not enough: “the prison, through an administrative apparatus, will at the same time be a machine for altering minds” (DP, 125). This was achieved through several principles, principally those of spatial isolation and surveillance (DP, 236–239).

The design of the panopticon ensured the placement of the isolated prisoner within a “field of visibility” (C-SMD, 242). At ESP a variant on the design of the panopticon was achieved (see Figure 19.1). This design featured the same central rotunda of



Figure 19.1 Model, Eastern State Penitentiary, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Operational 1829–1971. Photo by author

Bentham, but instead of an outer ring of cells, mirrors allowed guards to see down radiating “spokes” or corridors.

In practice, total one-way surveillance was not achieved at ESP or other panopticon-influenced prisons. For one thing, the original pure design was soon modified as more prisoners arrived, exceeding the original capacity of the prison (Teeters and Shearer 1957). This meant that additional wings and blocks were added into the interstices of the original spokes, which were not observable from the central guard tower. This constituted “dead ground” outside of the surveillance. Cells that were meant for solitary confinement now had two or even three prisoners, permitting fraternization. Secondly, prisoners found ways to bypass the restrictions on communication. They could for example tap on piping that ran between their cells, and this resistance or non-compliance necessitated further surveillance of the “disciplinary space” (DP, 143).

As Foucault makes clear, the point is how the panopticon is deployed as a political technology. The effect of the panopticon is not to apply a heavy hand of rule but to make it “lighter, more rapid, more effective, a design of subtle coercion for a society to come” (DP, 209), and “a question of distributing individuals in a space in which one might isolate them and map them” (DP, 144). There were three processes in the transition to disciplinary society:

- 1 Discipline became “positive” (e.g., it increased individual skill levels) rather than preventative; a matter not of “levying violence” (DP, 219) but of investing bodies in depth as objects of knowledge (DP, 217). Power and knowledge work hand in hand for Foucault as “power/knowledge” rather than as “ostentatious signs of sovereignty” (DP, 220). In later lecture courses (*Society Must Be Defended*, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, and *Security, Territory, Population*) Foucault replaced discipline (which deals mainly with individuals) with the idea of “biopower” (which incorporates some aspects of discipline but is more targeted at governance of populations). The two are explicitly compared in SMD (lecture of March 17, 1976).
- 2 Discipline is adept at spreading, multiplying, and penetrating into forms of life. Disciplinary power is “capillary” (DP, 198).
- 3 There is the emergence of state control of forms of discipline, as exemplified by the police and mechanisms of surveillance, especially spatial or geosurveillance (although Foucault does not himself use this term, it captures his concerns).

Contemporary geosurveillance (defined as “the surveillance of geographical activities,” Crampton 2007: 390) includes a wide range of possible targets such as migration, travel, and the distribution of people and things in territories or spaces. Two forms are identifiable, geosurveillance of the *individual subject*, and of *groups or populations*. In the case of the individual subject, digital spatial mapping and “locative” technologies allow people and objects to be geosurveilled, that is, to be tracked, marked, noticed, and logged as they move from one place to another. It includes RFID (radio frequency identification) chips, location-based services, cell phones, GPS, and many other locative technologies. Public awareness of geosurveillance is growing, with appearances in popular culture (Dodds 2011).

The second category of geosurveillance focuses on monitoring groups and populations as a whole. For Foucault a population is not just a sum of individuals, it is an object of inquiry in itself. It has its own regularities, for example birth, death, and reproduction

rates. In Foucauldian terms, discipline refers to power at the level of the body, while “biopower” refers to power at the level of the population (EW3, 298–325).

Foucault therefore connects surveillance to two specific aspects of power: one centered on the individual through discipline and optimization of capabilities – an *anatomo-politics* – and one centered on the population as a “species body” or a *bio-politics* (HS1, 139, see also 25–26; C-STP, 104–106; C-SMD, lecture of March 17, 1976; SKP, 161). His argument is that by the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (the “Classical” period), there was increasing emphasis on administering populations, alongside the disciplining of individuals. In the modern state, “governments perceived that they were not dealing simply with subjects, or even a ‘people,’ but with a ‘population,’ with its specific phenomena and its peculiar variables: birth and death rates, life expectancy, fertility, state of health, frequency of illnesses, patterns of diet and habitation” (HS1, 25). Surveillance of groups was necessary in order to garner knowledge of them. These knowledges included knowledge of spatial distributions as collected for example in the national censuses.

Emergence of biopolitics of space

Foucault fleshes out more geographical detail in three important lectures he gave in Rio de Janeiro in 1974 (Foucault 2004; EW3, 134–156; Foucault 2007). The lectures examine the relationship between a number of biopolitical themes: the politics of calculation and statistics (from the German *Statistik*, “state-istics”), and the relations of territory and the population. As such they form a useful bridge between his earlier work and the work on governmentality and biopower that will occupy him in the late 1970s.

In the first lecture he makes the case that medicine works at what he calls the level of “life itself” (Foucault 2004: 11). What he means by this is that during the eighteenth century four public health developments took place that have overt geographic overtones: (1) medical authorities acquired the power to make administrative decisions regarding towns and districts; (2) the decisions included regulating the environmental quality of air, water, and terrain; (3) certain geographic locations were recognized as being more suitable than others for locating medical facilities (disease is contagious and therefore hospitals should not too near but also not too distant from residential areas); (4) health became increasingly characterized by a “calculative” politics which sought to contrast the “dangerous individual” (Foucault 2004: 15), who exhibits abnormal behavior, with normal behavior (see also EW3, 176–200).

The second lecture introduces the biopolitical: “the body is a biopolitical reality; medicine is a biopolitical strategy” (EW3, 137). Biopolitics has geographical outcomes in a number of ways. First, there are geographies of knowledge; it is not evenly distributed. If medicine began to come under the purview of the state, it did so at different times in different places. Germany, as an unstable amalgamation of smaller states, developed a *Staatswissenschaft* or science of the state long before France or England. And it did so precisely because of its geopolitical situation. But German geopolitics does not develop in isolation; there is a politico-historical context of the rise of the modern state, the development of the disciplinary society and the geographical distribution of scientific knowledge.

Second, the focus of medicine was the city. Eighteenth-century cities were “a jumbled multitude of heterogeneous territories” (EW3, 142). Urban spaces had particular problems and this required a specifically “urban medicine.” Foucault argues that this is not a medicine for or of people, but rather “of the living conditions of the existential milieu,” that is, the environment (EW3, 150). If previously the threat had been perceived to come from the countryside, with its vagabonds and itinerants, there was now an “urban fear” (EW3, 144). There was fear of overcrowding of the population, of urban epidemics, excessively tall buildings with multitudes of tenants, and health panics like that over the Cemetery of the Innocents (the site of mass burials in Paris that caused a sanitary panic in the 1770s; see EW3, 144). These heterogeneous elements were thought to be easier to govern if they could be standardized. Furthermore, cities transformed the “working poor” into a class, the proletariat, which could confront the rich in protests or even revolution. Foucault again discusses the plague quarantine with its now familiar components of spatial orderings and separation, observed by a strict surveillance.

Some of the urban problems were solved by spatial reallocation, for example graveyards were moved to the suburbs. Where there was the problem of circulation (of individuals but also of air and water) there was urban redevelopment. Overcrowded slums were torn down. Meanwhile water flows needed to be understood to prevent dirty and clean waters from mixing, especially regarding the city’s water supply, as was done in London during the mid-1850s cholera epidemic by the spatial epidemiologist John Snow. These developments led, in turn, to Paris’s first hydrographic map in 1742 (EW3, 149) after the hydrographic agency *Dépôt des Cartes et Plans de la Marine* was established in 1720 (Konvitz 1987).

Third, Foucault examines the relationship between medicine and the labor force, particularly the urban poor (EW3, 151ff). The rich and the poor were no longer able to live next to each other; such juxtaposition was both a health and a political hazard for the city. Paris underwent large-scale urban restructuring during the Second Empire; it was growing, with nearly two million people by 1876, and was “overwhelmed” by its medieval structure and narrow, chaotically organized alleys and thoroughfares (Harvey 2003: 95).

In the third lecture (SKP, 141–151) Foucault is interested in how the hospital became medicalized, and once again he underlines the spatial components of public health. He suggests that hospitals only became places of medical treatment relatively recently. While there were hospitals previously, they were largely there for the poor to go to in order to die. Prefiguring his analysis in *Discipline and Punish*, he argues that hospitals eliminated disorders in order to prevent needless deaths of valuable men (e.g., soldiers in the army); established oversight (*surveiller*) of patients; and provided a new controlling authority to regulate and discipline the management of men; all of which culminated in a spatial analytics:

Discipline is above all, analysis of space; it is individualization through space, the placing of bodies in an individualized space that permits classification and combinations . . . [it] is a technique of power, which contains a constant and perpetual surveillance of individuals. (SKP, 147)

Taking apart the characteristics of hospitals, Foucault finds more spatial attributes (SKP, 149ff). The hospital should be located well, and not in some dark place but one under the sanitary control of the city. Its internal structure too, was rethought, in accordance with studies that revealed that deaths of women in labor were higher in rooms near to wounded men. Perhaps each patient should get their own “small individualized space environment” which could be adjusted as necessary; a kind of flexible internal architecture. As can be seen from these discussions, for Foucault space, territory, and geography are political techniques. Furthermore, they are analyzed in conjunction with power, knowledge, and government.

Conclusion

At the beginning of his 1976 lectures Foucault takes stock of his research to date and announces that he is drawing to a close his work of the last four or five years:

I felt a bit like a sperm whale that breaks the surface of the water, makes a little splash, and lets you believe, makes you believe, or want to believe, that down there where it can't be seen, down there where it is neither seen nor monitored by anyone, it is following a deep, coherent, and premeditated trajectory. (C-SMD, 4)

This is a useful metaphor for thinking about Foucault's spatial engagements. They do not necessarily always lie on the surface, and it is not clear how coherent they are. As this essay has shown, Foucault's “spatial combat” (Johnson 2008) is not the hidden key to his work, but rather an aspect that he turned to throughout his life as a tool of analysis in order to think through power/knowledge (for his reception by French- and English-speaking writers, see Fall 2007; Hannah 2007).

His reception has of course not always been uncritical. One of the most oft-leveled critiques of his work is one he heard in his own lifetime, namely that his conceptualization of power appears to leave no room to escape it, no purchase point to organize resistance, and thus that his account is politically disabling. This critique has been made by Marxists and feminists (McWhorter 1999), and political geographers (Jessop 2007; Smith 2000). Harvey for example places Foucault alongside other “postmodernists” in rejecting any metanarratives:

So while there are, in Foucault's celebrated dictum, “no relations of power without resistances” [HS1, 95] he equally insists that no utopian scheme can ever hope to escape the power-knowledge relation in non-repressive ways. He here echoes Max Weber's pessimism as to our ability to avoid the “iron cage” [Weber et al. 2002] of bureaucratic-technical rationality. (Harvey 1990: 45)

Yet Foucault's engagements with space, territory and geography yield many points of leverage, both in his own work and in that of his readers. For example, Foucault's traces can be found in geographical work dealing with spaces of sexuality (Brown and Knopp 2006), territory, mapping, and immigration policy (Hannah 2000), as well as the geographical governmentality of colonialism (Legg 2005). Hannah's recent work

on the German census boycotts of the 1980s (Hannah 2010) draws on Foucault to examine how the state invokes “epistemic sovereignty” or the singular right to knowledge concerning its populations through censuses and other means. Hannah contests the asymmetry of this right and suggests a number of practical alternatives such as locally based data-sharing cooperatives. Today, a number of countries no longer perform a national census (Germany, the Netherlands) or are making them more voluntary (Canada) or constrained (e.g., Mexico and France, which do not collect race-based data).

Another criticism is that Foucault’s spatial sensibility was ultimately blind to space’s “aliveness” because of his focus on spatial order. For Thrift there is a “blindness to the outcome of [Foucault’s] own reasoning when it comes to space, and especially to the difference between the archive [understood as a categorization of the past] and the diagram [understood as shaping present and future]” (Thrift 2007: 55). For Thrift, Foucault’s spaces are inert and lack dynamism, and are blind to processes of production. However, to make this claim is to ignore Foucault’s work on circulations and movements discussed above, or how geography is a necessary technology of government, for example through mappings.

Foucault does not offer a “theory of space” but rather a “spatial history” (Elden 2001) or genealogy. Thus it has rather been left to other commentators to develop Foucault’s spatial projects. Some of the work here has been done by Gregory (1994), Driver (1985), and Philo (1986, 1989). Heterotopia has also figured prominently in geographical work, as discussed above. Within cartography and geotechnology such as geographic information systems (GIS) there has also been a productive engagement with Foucault’s work. The British historical geographer J. Brian Harley was the first to appropriate Foucault in cartography (Harley 1988, 1989), although his readings were fairly superficial. Nevertheless his work has been influential in forming critical cartography and GIS (Crampton 2010).

If Foucault’s spatial engagements have recurred throughout his career, they do not form a coherent whole. From his sketches of spatial order as heterotopia, to the more richly worked analyses of urban spatial separation and circulations, to work on “action at a distance” (Ettlinger 2011) in the context of health, discipline, and governmentality, Foucault’s work on space, territory, and geography remains enigmatic and provocative. Deleuze may have called him a “new cartographer” (Deleuze 1988: 23), but many of the contours of his geography remain to be mapped.

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Part IV

Sexuality, Gender, and Race

Toward a Feminist “Politics of Ourselves”

DIANNA TAYLOR

“I will call subjectivization the procedure by which one obtains the constitution of a subject, or more precisely, of a subjectivity, which is of course only one of the given possibilities of organization of a self-consciousness.”

Michel Foucault, *Politics, Philosophy, Culture*, 253

Introduction

Good reasons exist for feminism’s long-standing criticism of the modern Western conceptualization of subjectivity. The model of an unfettered, sovereign agent both valorizes and posits as universal the particular experience of white privileged men, construing everyone else as ethically, politically, and intellectually lacking and thus in need of constraint and oversight. At the same time that they have critiqued the androcentrism of the modern Western subject, many feminists have also reconceptualized subjectivity – from Donna Haraway’s cyborgs, to Rosie Braidotti’s nomads, to Maria Lugones’s world-traveler.¹ Such reconceptualizations reflect the view that feminism does not need (and is indeed hindered by) the modern Western subject, and that subjectivity may be defined in ways that are not grounded in and therefore do not merely rearticulate a privileged white male perspective. Feminist willingness to dispense with a certain formulation of subjectivity should not, however, be taken as willingness to dispense with subjectivity as such. Given that within Western philosophy the subject continues to be considered the necessary ground for ethics and politics, or any critique of ethics and politics, insofar as feminism aims to promote women’s emancipation feminists have largely retained the concept. Moreover, within a context in which their objectification by the culture contributes to women’s subordination, many feminists see the assertion of subjectivity in and of itself as emancipatory. In sum, while prevailing

notions of subjectivity are open to critical interrogation, for most feminists, subjectivity as such is not.²

The feminist view of subjectivity as facilitating or even as being central to emancipatory ethical and political projects goes a long way toward explaining the “tension” that continues to characterize the relationship between feminism and the work of Michel Foucault.³ Feminists have generally found Foucault’s analyses of the workings of modern power and his genealogy of sexuality useful in analyzing and critiquing gender oppression. Yet given Foucault’s critique of prevailing ethical and political concepts, categories, and principles generally, and his apparent willingness to dispense with the concept of subjectivity more specifically, questions endure concerning the value of his work for feminist ethics and politics. Is Foucault capable only of facilitating identification and critical analysis of how gender oppression manifests itself within modern Western societies? Or does his work offer resources for developing potentially emancipatory modes of thought and existence that can in turn inform an emancipatory feminist ethics or politics more specifically? The following essay, which focuses on the political, answers the latter question in the affirmative.⁴ I show that Foucault’s critique of subjectivity as such facilitates his articulation of alternative ways of constituting, understanding, and relating to ourselves. Insofar as this is the case, his view of subjectivity as simply one possible mode of self-constitution, -understanding, and -relation does not undermine but rather helps to define and further the political import of his work for emancipatory movements like feminism.

I

Foucault illustrates throughout his work the extent to which modern Western subjectivity is implicated in the production and proliferation of normalizing relations of power. Modern power, Foucault argues, is not possessed and wielded by a sovereign but instead proliferates throughout society by means of norms. Norms become normalizing when they have been performed repeatedly to the point that they are no longer seen as sociohistorically generated phenomena, but rather simply as inherent human behaviors. These behaviors come to be seen not only as natural but also as “normal” and, therefore, as desirable. As Foucault describes it, the defining feature of normalization is the linkage of increased capacities with dramatically decreased ways of exercising them, such that persons become adept at performing only a very limited range of activities.⁵

Foucault views normalization as a problem, ultimately, because it is a mechanism of domination. If a society deems as normal and therefore acceptable only certain, narrowly defined ways of thinking and acting, critical and creative engagement with the world that might challenge the status quo of normality appears threatening. Such engagement is thereby inhibited – primarily through being characterized as “abnormal.” This reinscription of prevailing societal norms in turn circumscribes the circulation of power within society. Insofar as Foucault equates freedom not with our ability to get outside of power but rather with the existence of multiple and varied ways of navigating power relations, from his perspective such circumscription moves a society toward domination, a context in which individuals or groups are deprived of their

capacity to act and are instead merely subjected to being acted upon or determined. For Foucault, subjectivity is a normalizing norm. Within the modern West, subjectivity is not seen as a mode (let alone as merely one *possible* mode) of constituting, understanding, and relating to ourselves. Subjectivity is in fact not seen as something we *do* at all; from our perspective, we simply *are* subjects. To the extent that we are unable to conceive of ourselves otherwise, over time we become highly efficient precisely at being subjects at the expense of any and all other possible modes of self-constitution, -understanding, and -relation.

While the normalizing effects of subjectivity are apparent in his 1975 Collège de France course *Abnormal* and his books *Discipline and Punish* and volume 1 of *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault focuses and extends his critique of the subject in his 1980⁶ and 1982 Collège de France courses (*On the Government of the Living* and *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*), as well as in public lectures he presented and interviews he gave during the same time period. In a genealogy that is both detailed and far-reaching, Foucault shows that, within ancient Greek, Hellenistic Greek and Roman, and early Christian contexts, persons constituted themselves as subjects through various practices (for example, meditation, memorization of the past, examination of conscience, self-writing, diet, exercise). These practices were grounded in and in turn expressed not only the familiar philosophical notion "know thyself," but also the cultural/spiritual notion "take care of yourself." Modern philosophy adopted the former, philosophical form of self-constitution, and Foucault invokes the distinction between philosophically and spiritually based subject formation in part as a way of identifying the different relationship that exists between the subject and truth within modern and pre-modern contexts. Modern subjects are considered *prima facie* capable of accessing truth. Subjectivization is therefore characterized by practices of knowing that involve investigating the nature of this access and attempting to determine its "conditions and limits" (C-HS, 15). Spirituality, by contrast, "postulates that the subject as such does not have right of access to the truth and is not capable of having access to the truth" (C-HS, 15). To obtain that right, the subject must "be changed, transformed, shifted, and become, to some extent and up to a certain point, other than himself" (C-HS, 15). In short, pre-modern subjectivity is characterized by a process of "conversion."

Within an ancient context – specifically, within the work of Plato – conversion takes the form of the *epistrophē*. This is a three-stage process that involves, first, "turning away from appearances" and toward the self; second, "turning around toward oneself," and determining to care for oneself; and, third, "recollecting" – recalling one's true self and returning to one's "ontological homeland" (C-HS, 209). So conceived, the *epistrophē* is "governed" by three principles: the opposition of appearance and reality, the liberation of the soul from the body, and the interconnection of knowing oneself and knowing the truth; it leads persons from "the world below to the world above" (C-HS, 210). Hellenistic and Roman conversion occurs within and focuses on liberation within "the immanence of the world" (C-HS, 210). It entails movement away and therefore "liberation from what we do not control so as finally to arrive at what we can control"; it functions to establish an "adequate" relation of the embodied self to itself; and, finally, it focuses not on knowing but on *askēsis* – exercise, practice, and training (C-HS, 210). As with ancient conversion, the process entails a "turning" of the self toward itself, described in terms of "consider[ing] yourself,"⁷ "observ[ing]yourself,"⁸ "turning your

gaze back on yourself" (C-HS, 225),⁹ and "applying your mind to the self" (C-HS, 213).¹⁰ In contrast, early Christian conversion, *metanoia*, involves not a turning of but rather a break within the self; the term connotes a "radical change of thought and mind" (C-HS, 211). *Metanoia* is less a process and more an "upheaval," a single, sudden transition from one form of existence to another: "death to life," "mortality to immortality," "darkness to light," "the reign of the devil to that of God" (C-HS, 211). The break that occurs in *metanoia* is specifically a break with, a sacrifice or renunciation of one's previous, sinful self in the name of truth and salvation (C-HS, 250).

In analyses of three early Christian practices of conversion – baptism, penitence, and confession – Foucault illustrates the interconnection of truth and self-sacrifice that characterizes early Christian self-constitution. At the beginning of the third century, baptism underwent several important changes, one of which represents a reconceptualization of the nature of truth itself (Landry 2009). While previously baptism had been "intended to teach about and initiate believers into the Truth," it now acquires the function of purifying the soul (Landry 2009: 115). Truth is no longer something external to the individual about which she or he can be educated. It has instead become an internal expression of a soul that is in its proper state, a state that can be attained only through renouncing that part of oneself within which "the satanic element [lurks]" (Landry 2009: 116).

With the contents of the soul now playing the crucial role in the emergence of truth and, hence, the possibility of salvation, the need to access those contents becomes imperative. Penitence and confession facilitate such access through requiring ongoing examination of the self and interpretation of the soul's contents. In both practices, an external authority must perform this interpretation. Foucault indicates that "canonical penitence" developed as a mechanism by means of which heretics, who had destroyed the relationship to the truth originally established through baptism, could repair that relationship and rejoin the Christian faith (Landry 2009: 117). This was possible, he asserts, "only if . . . [the heretic] exposes himself voluntarily to a sort of martyrdom to which there will always be witnesses" (Foucault 1980c).¹¹ As Foucault describes it in a lecture he delivered in 1980, early Christian penitence is not an act. Rather, it is a status that involves the repeated (Foucault describes penitence as a "long-term affair"), public execution of a variety of practices (such as wearing "sack clothes," covering the head in ashes, and fasting) that make manifest the state of the soul and thereby demonstrate on the body the authenticity of repentance. "In brief," Foucault explains, "penance insofar as it is a reproduction of martyrdom is an affirmation of change – of rupture with one's self, with one's past, with the world, and with all previous life." The entire reconciliation or reintegration process is referred to as *exomologesis*: "manifesting the truth" (Foucault 1980c).

This "model of martyrdom which haunts *exomologesis*," Foucault argues, also characterizes *exagorasis*, the "analytical and continuous verbalization of thoughts" that comprises formal confession within a monastic context (Foucault 1980c). If thoughts – "not desires, not passions, not attitudes, not acts" – are seen to reflect the contents of the soul, then self-examination and -analysis alone are inadequate to the task of its purification. The only way to separate pure thoughts from those bearing the mark of Satan is to bring forth in words – to confess – the entire contents of one's thoughts (and therefore of one's soul). This verbal confession must be made to someone with the

knowledge and authority to interpret its contents and, hence, to perform the necessary process of separation/purification. Anything associated with Satan "[was] incompatible with," and would therefore resist being exposed to, the light: the most difficult thoughts to verbalize were the ones most in need of being expressed. Confession can thus be seen to function as a mechanism of *metanoia*: "Since under the reign of Satan the human being was attached to himself, the verbalization as a movement towards God is a renunciation of Satan. It is for the same reason a renunciation of oneself. Verbalization is a self-sacrifice" (Foucault 1980c).

What exactly gets sacrificed in the break within the self that *metanoia* effects? According to Foucault, it is the subject's own will. Unlike penitence, to which there is ultimately an identifiable end, the dynamic character of thoughts requires that one perpetually put the contents of one's soul into words – that one regularly confess throughout the course of one's entire life. Moreover, because self-examination is not sufficient, because one must express the contents of one's thoughts to another person, the relationship between the subject and the authority upon whom she or he must rely for the truth is permanent. Obedience thus lies at the core of the hermeneutical self-relation that confession establishes: to be a subject is at the same time to be subjugated, to be abject. Within the context of penitence and confession alike, the "acts" by means of which the self is "punished" (in the case of penitence) or subjugated (in the case of confession) "must be indissociable from the acts by which [it] reveals [it]self." Confession, like penitence, is "haunted by martyrdom," as is the self-relation to which these practices give rise (Foucault 1980c).

Of the three models of conversion Foucault has considered, then, it is precisely the self-relation established within early Christian self-constitution that, he argues, ultimately "gets transmitted . . . to the whole of Western culture" and thus characterizes modern Western subjectivity (C-HS, 257). By creating a context in which individuals gain an understanding of themselves as "object[s] of knowledge," baptism lays the ground for the hermeneutical self-relation that emerges within the context of confession (Landry 2009: 115). Moreover, moving from baptism to penitence to confession we see obedience to authority – a relationship of dominance and subjugation – becoming increasingly central to, and therefore reproduced and reasserted by, the process of subjectivization. Clearly, the picture of self-abnegating obedience Foucault draws clashes with the modern Western view of the subject as an agent possessing the ability and the freedom to know and tell the truth about both itself and the world it inhabits. Presented with the systemic problem of how to "[save] the hermeneutics of the self and [get] rid of the necessity of sacrifice of self which [is] linked to this hermeneutics," modern Western thought continues to exert concerted and sustained efforts to construct and substitute a positive notion of subjectivity (the autonomous subject) for the self-sacrificing subject (Foucault 1980c).¹²

Foucault himself regards obedience as counter to freedom. But because he conceives of this opposition differently, he also posits different means for countering it. The genealogy I have been considering makes clear that increasingly assiduous assertion of subjectivity is not a mechanism of emancipation. Asserting subjectivity is normalizing. Such an approach reinforces the prevailing view of subjectivity as both positive and given, thereby reproducing the obedience and subjugation to which it is bound, effectively masking its self-sacrificing character, and making critique appear at best

unnecessary and at worst destructive. To the extent that subjectivity continues to be considered what we are and must be, on the one hand, and as the sole mechanism for the exercise of our freedom, on the other, over time we become increasingly efficient at constituting, understanding, and relating to ourselves exclusively as subjects. We therefore find ourselves caught in a self-destructive cycle in which increasingly more effective enactment of our own subjugation is experienced as emancipatory.

Foucault's point that substituting a positive formulation of subjectivity for a negative one simply reproduces this destructive cycle calls for critical interrogation of efforts to rethink subjectivity in feminist terms. A brief appraisal of two broad feminist strategies for such rethinking helps to illustrate why. While feminists have made important advances beyond what Joan Scott described in 1988 as the "equality-versus-difference debate," neither the theoretical nor the practical problems the debate raises concerning asserting women's difference from men, on the one hand, and women's equality with men, on the other, have been totally alleviated (Scott 1998). Theoretical versions of difference and equality arguments may be found within care ethics and liberal feminism. Difference arguments attempt to revalue stereotypical feminine qualities (caring, interconnectedness with others, empathy, putting the needs of others before one's own). Equality arguments reject stereotypical notions of femininity as oppressive but maintain and strive to achieve traditional notions of autonomy, individuality, and agency. With respect to practice, women continue to struggle to be taken seriously specifically as women, as illustrated by, for example, the fact that women faculty members within the discipline of philosophy are consistently rated lower than their male counterparts on student course evaluations. Studies show that women faculty members who exhibit stereotypical feminine qualities (i.e., who exhibit difference) receive high ratings for likeability but low ratings in terms of professionalism. Women faculty members who exhibit qualities perceived as professorial (academic rigor, assertiveness) are perceived as professional but unlikeable (see Superson 2002). Similar dilemmas were apparent in the 2008 presidential primaries and campaign, where both Hillary Clinton and Sarah Palin, albeit for different reasons and in very different ways, struggled to be taken seriously as women candidates, to be seen as both feminine (different) and "strong leaders" (equal).¹³

Difference and equality arguments alike aim to replace (again, in different ways) the oppressive aspects of women's subjectivity with positive ones. Yet by retaining the form and logic of modern Western subjectivity, these strategies also retain and thus reassert the self-sacrifice in which subjectivity is securely rooted. Within the context of feminism, the normalizing and therefore oppressive effects of self-sacrifice as characterized by obedience and conformity resonate in a particularly acute way. Self-sacrifice reinscribes women's subordination and, thus, validates their subjugation.¹⁴ Putting the needs of others before one's own is a stereotypical feminine attribute that is considered to be natural and therefore normal for women. Women are certainly expected to put the needs of their children ahead of their own, but they are generally also expected to put their male partners and even their male co-workers before themselves, and to subordinate their own interests to those of the group in social and professional contexts. Failure to conform to this standard of femininity renders women not only bad mothers, partners, colleagues, and employees, but also unfeminine and therefore abnormal. To the extent that self-sacrifice is considered to be normal female behavior, however, it is

not valued in women: the reality is that a self must possess worth in order for its sacrifice to be meaningful.

Foucault's work makes clear that the normalizing effects outlined above cannot be countered by reconceptualizing women's subjectivity, whether in terms of difference from or equality with men. From a Foucauldian perspective, by asserting subjectivity as a mechanism of emancipation both difference and equality strategies effectively mask and therefore perpetuate normalization. By concealing the interconnection of subjectivization and self-sacrifice that characterizes modern Western subjectivity, these strategies sustain the illusion that there is no need for critical analysis that might elucidate subjectivity's normalizing effects and facilitate emancipation. In short, feminist reconceptualization strategies, like the substitution strategies deployed within the tradition of Western philosophy, perpetuate the cycle of normalizing self-constitution, -understanding, and -relation noted above.¹⁵ In light of the interconnection of subjectivity with what is from a feminist perspective a particularly pernicious manifestation of subjugation, Joan Scott's assertion that feminists "need theory that will enable us to articulate alternative ways of thinking about (and thus acting upon) gender without either simply reversing the old hierarchies or confirming them . . . [a]nd that will be useful and relevant for feminist political practice" (1988: 33) remains apt. The next section of this chapter argues that Foucault provides resources for developing such theory and practice.

II

Through exposing subjectivity as neither necessary nor emancipatory, Foucault illustrates that alternative ways of constituting, understanding, and relating to ourselves are not only called for but also possible. Identifying resources for articulating such alternatives within the context of late antiquity, he suggests that modes of self-constitution, -understanding, and -relation that are oriented toward the material world, reinforce neither a will to knowledge nor self-sacrifice, and entail an ongoing process of becoming other than what one currently is have the potential to counter subjectivity's normalizing effects. Unlike the ancient *epistrophē* and early Christian *metanoia*, Hellenistic and Roman conversion facilitates the emancipation of embodied subjects within instead of offering an escape from the world. It orients persons toward what they are able to control and therefore change within a given set of circumstances, and it encourages development of means (*askēsis* – exercise, practice, and training) by which such change might be undertaken.

More specifically, this conversion that is "neither *epistrophē* nor *metanoia*" appeals to Foucault because of its focus on the self as a mechanism of transformation (C-HS, 217). Self-constitution in late antiquity, according to Foucault, serves no other purpose than to cultivate a relation of the self to itself.¹⁶ As illustrated in his analysis of Plato's *Alcibiades*, within the context of the *epistrophē* one concentrates on oneself in order to prepare to engage in a certain kind of relation to others: Alcibiades has to learn how to properly relate to or "care for" himself before, and specifically so that, he will be able to care for others in his capacity as a ruler of Athens.¹⁷ In Christian self-constitution, as I have shown, one concentrates on oneself for the purposes of being able to interpret or

decipher one's thoughts so that one may be prepared for a relationship with God. In the self-constitution of late antiquity, by contrast, "[t]he self is the definitive and sole aim of the care of the self" (C-HS, 177).

The distinctive character of the self's relation to itself in late antiquity is made further apparent when one considers the differing treatments of the notion of salvation within these three models of conversion. For Plato, the notion of salvation is interconnected with the idea of care of the self and others: "one must be saved, one must save oneself, in order to save others" (C-HS, 180). For the early Christians (and, hence, as Foucault points out, for us today), "[s]alvation effectuates a crossing over: It takes one from evil to good, from a world of impurity to a world of purity" (C-HS, 181). In late antiquity, however, the Greek verb *sōzein* (to save) and the noun *sōtēria* (salvation) are defined much more broadly and variously than in ancient and early Christian contexts. Moreover, some of these meanings are positive: being "suitably armed and equipped to defend [one]self"; "escaping domination or enslavement"; self-preservation ("maintaining yourself in a continuous state that nothing can change"); and, finally, "ensuring happiness, tranquility, serenity . . . for yourself" (C-HS, 183–184). None of these meanings, Foucault asserts, connotes a break with the material world or a break within the self. "[S]aving yourself," he asserts, "is an activity that takes place throughout life and that is executed solely by the subject himself" (C-HS, 184). Salvation is not a privileged end-state that one comes to occupy; it is "an activity, the subject's constant action on himself, which finds its reward in a certain relationship of the subject to himself . . . salvation ensures access to the self that is inseparable from the work one carries out on oneself within the time of one's life and in life itself" (C-HS, 184–185).

When Foucault refers to a "self" in his analysis of the transformative self-relation that Hellenistic and Roman modes of conversion facilitate, he seems to be invoking little more than the activity of relating – the ongoing work that gets performed as a means of constantly calling into question anything that that work might produce.¹⁸ As I see it, this activity of continually circling back reasserts what, for Foucault, the self-sacrifice demanded by modern Western subjectivity threatens to destroy – not the will, but critical and creative capacities. In order for new modes of self-constitution to be possible, we need to exercise our critical capacities such that subjectivity is no longer viewed as what we necessarily are but, rather, as the epigraph to this essay suggests, simply as one possible form our self-relation might take. As I have shown, and as Foucault reiterates throughout his work, we constitute ourselves in and through relations of power. Nevertheless, *we do constitute ourselves* and can therefore do so differently than we have done up to this point, a reality that subjectivity, as a mode of being, denies. As a normalizing norm, subjectivity makes us highly efficient at a single way of understanding and relating to ourselves and the world in which we live; put differently, it cripples our ability to imagine and create new ways of relating to ourselves, other people, and the world. Anti-normalizing modes of self-relation will therefore entail critical and creative activity, such that in addition to assessing what obedience to a single mode of existence has cost and continues to cost us, we can begin to develop and experiment with ways of living that increase our capacities without simultaneously limiting the ways in which those capacities may be expressed. Cultivating a self-relation characterized by thinking differently, innovation, and experimentation is for Foucault "the undefined work of freedom" that characterizes a politics of ourselves (EW1, 316).

Foucault is aware that, despite their value in offering a critical perspective on our existing mode of self-relation, we cannot simply and uncritically adopt Hellenistic and Roman practices of self-constitution within a contemporary context. Insofar as this is the case, I see Foucault articulating the spirit of Hellenistic and Roman self-constitution in the following three contemporary practices, identified in an interview he gave in 1980: (1) refusal, that is, refusing "to accept as self-evident the things that are proposed to us"; (2) curiosity, "the need to analyze and to know, since we can accomplish nothing without reflection and knowledge"; and (3) innovation, "to seek out in our reflection those things that have never been thought or imagined" (Foucault 1980a).¹⁹ Like the self-constitution of late antiquity, the practices Foucault describes here are practical in the sense that they orient people toward rather than away from their current circumstances; they also promote critical engagement with rather than conformity to such circumstances. And Foucault makes clear that he sees a self-relation characterized by these practices as an alternative to modern subjectivity: "I think that the modern theory of the subject, the modern philosophy of the subject, might well be able to accord the subject a capability for innovation, et cetera, but that, in actuality, modern philosophy only does so on a theoretical level." Furthermore, Foucault argues that the modern theory of the subject "is not capable of translating into practice this different value which [he is] trying to elaborate in [his] own work." But he also indicates that he sees refusal, curiosity, and innovation as part of an overall "strategy . . . as part of an effort to bring things back to their original mobility, their openness to change" (Foucault 1980a). By promoting openness to change, these practices counter normalization and therefore possess emancipatory potential within a contemporary context. They create conditions under which power relations are fluid rather than static, such that increased capacities can lead to alternatives rather than reproducing what already exists. Taken together, they offer a critical and creative mode of relating to ourselves that is both ethical and political. It is ethical insofar as it involves a relation of the self to itself – a relation that, as I have indicated, does not emulate the modern hermeneutics of the subject. The self-relation is political in the particular sense of what Foucault refers to as a "politics of ourselves"; it concerns "what we are willing to accept . . . to refuse, and to change" not only in ourselves but also in "our world" and "in our circumstances" (Foucault 1980b). A self-relation characterized by refusal, curiosity, and innovation extends beyond the self in important ways; it involves critical engagement with the present, and is therefore concerned with sociopolitical, and not merely individual, change and emancipation. Moreover, when one changes one's mode of relating to oneself, this in turn alters the way in which one interacts with other people and conducts oneself in the world more broadly.

Refusal, curiosity, and innovation are not stages, with the "real" work of freedom taking place in the last stage; Foucault makes clear that the work of freedom is not linear. Rather, this work creates conditions under which, in negotiating multiple and shifting relations of power, persons are able to variously refuse, critically analyze, and innovate. Hence his own refusal to lay out what a politics of ourselves entails: "I don't tell people," Foucault asserts, "'Make love in this way, have children, go to work' . . . I'm not a prophet, I'm not an organizer, I don't want to tell people what they should do, I'm not going to tell them, 'This is good for you, this is bad for you!' I try to analyze a real situation in its various complexities, with the goal of allowing refusal, and curiosity,

and innovation" (Foucault 1980a). Interestingly, Foucault's interviewer follows this response by asking how Foucault incorporates the practices he has been discussing into his own life. Foucault replies: "But that's nobody's business!" and then proceeds to reiterate his previous point by explaining that his primary concern is not, as his response might suggest, protecting his own privacy, but instead encouraging critical questioning of the modern impulse to have other people tell us what to do and decide what is good for us. "What is good," Foucault asserts, "is something that comes through innovation. The good does not exist . . . in an atemporal sky, with people who would be like the Astrologers of the Good, whose job it is to determine what is the favorable nature of the stars. The good is defined by us, it is practiced, it is invented. And this is a collaborative work" (Foucault 1980a).

III

Foucault's description of practicing the good helps to explain why his critique of the subject is not distinct from but rather an essential component of a politics of ourselves. As I have suggested, refusal, curiosity, and innovation are practiced together; they mutually support and challenge one another in what I would describe as an agonistic manner. We constitute ourselves precisely through this continual circling back in a critical way relative to what we have created. While these connections seem clear enough within the context of Foucault's work, I have found it somewhat difficult to conceptualize concrete manifestations of refusal, curiosity, and innovation in other than major historical movements or events – such as the New Social Movements and, more recently, the presidential campaign and election of Barack Obama in the USA. And yet Foucault insists that a politics of ourselves is practiced in daily life and includes the ordinary. Thinking through these issues has yielded what I consider to be two concrete, ordinary ways of putting into practice the values Foucault espouses: constituting oneself as other than what one appears to be to others, and constituting oneself as other than what one appears to be to oneself. In what follows I consider how these ways of engaging in refusal, curiosity, and innovation might characterize a feminist politics of ourselves – a politics that counters the gendered order of things and furthers women's ability to engage in the practice and work of freedom without relying upon subjectivity.

When I was in high school I was caught skipping an afternoon's classes with my best friend. She had forged notes for us both. Mine was identified as a fake, and I was suspended for a day both for skipping and for refusing to name names and betray my friend. Upon returning to school I found myself obliged to provide all of my teachers with an official document explaining why I had not been present the previous day. After reading the document, my (male) high school biology teacher looked at me and exclaimed: "And I always thought you were a nice girl!"

Ah, yes, the nice girl. I have never aspired to niceness. When applied to girls and women niceness invokes stereotypical femininity: weakness, passivity, and insipidness. In short, niceness signifies that one is not to be taken seriously; it is intended to keep girls and women in their gendered places. I have discovered, however, that, appearing to be nice, a woman may find herself in positions where, were she not nice, she could

wield a bit of influence. In my professional life, I have been elected department chair, an officer of my faculty governance body, and to several influential university committees. And in each of these contexts, it was made clear to me that I was expected to go along with certain agendas. People have been just as surprised as my high school biology teacher, however, when they discover I am not nice, in that I need to be taken seriously – not because I am trying to beat the male-dominated academy at its own game, trying to move up through the ranks and thus reproduce the system, by asserting myself as a subject: this is equality feminism. Rather, I need to be taken seriously because I actively engage in and encourage ongoing critical questioning of standard operating procedures – including my own self-relation – all the while not appearing to be someone who would do so.

My example illustrates Foucault's point that the work of freedom always occurs within the context of constraint, and that countering normalization therefore entails loosening the connection between increased capacities and increased power by maximizing enabling aspects of existing norms and practices and minimizing constraining aspects. The same sexist norms and practices that constrain me as a ("nice") woman have also facilitated my ability to practice refusal, curiosity, and innovation. Thus they enable me to promote anti-normalizing change. With respect to my self-relation, I have refused to be what others have said I am or ought to be; I have critically questioned what it says about me and the society in which I exist that I am continually perceived to be what I am not; and I have sought out a way of life that challenges stereotypical constructions of femininity. Constituting myself/being constituted in these ways has loosened the connection between increased capacities and increased entanglement in relations of power not only in my relationship to myself, but also within the broader university context in which I work. I have protected colleagues from measures that would have negatively affected their professional lives and also secured resources for others whose contributions to the university and the profession of philosophy have not been adequately recognized. I have helped bring into being and ensure the continued existence of faculty committees that have effectively worked to bring about and secure improvements in important aspects of faculty life. Could these accomplishments have been achieved in other ways? Perhaps. But it's clear to me that appearing to be what I am not is in fact what placed me in a position of being able to promote positive change in the particular ways I have described. And while outing myself as "not nice" may result in my not being elected to certain official positions within the university, such a development would simply support Foucault's point that freedom is work; I would need to re-examine what I am willing to "accept, refuse, and change" within the context of the new circumstances in which I find myself. Ultimately, such re-examination keeps power relations open and navigable, and thus enables the work of freedom to continue by way of refusal, curiosity, and innovation.

Practicing being other than what I appear to be to others in the ways I have described has afforded me the opportunity to practice being other than what I appear to be to myself. I have learned that my way of being "not nice," and therefore appearing strange to others, violates gender norms in ways of which I was not aware and never intended and which, when confronted with the fact that I am perceived as engaging in such violation, have made me appear strange to myself. My own view is that I violate norms of niceness in order to counter normalization, to promote a context within which mul-

tiple, diverse, conflicting, and even apparently contradictory modes of thought and existence can flourish. Doing this, as I have pointed out, involves practicing critique as well as creativity. Nice women aren't critical, they don't create conflict, and they are therefore easily dismissed – and yet outspoken, critical women are regularly marginalized with as much ease as nice women. So I have been surprised by the fact that as an outspoken and critical woman I have not (yet) been marginalized. Indeed, it has been made clear to me that I am taken seriously in ways – for example, as providing effective leadership within and on behalf of the faculty – that have surprised me and given me pause.

I think that allowing oneself to be other than what one appears to be to oneself, to be other than what one thinks one is, involves not merely acknowledging but actively taking up as part of one's way of relating to and constituting oneself the reality that what one thinks one is doing is never really what one is doing. In short, it is to allow oneself to be surprised by oneself, to adopt a critical perspective relative to one's own self-understanding. Being other to ourselves encourages us to see ourselves differently, but it doesn't mean we become what others perceive us to be. Rather, being other to ourselves than what we appear to be entails cultivating the space that the difference in how others see us and the way we see ourselves creates. In his description of the process of "turning the gaze back on the self" that characterizes Hellenistic and Roman self-constitution, Foucault seems to present this turning as a way of bringing the self into as close a proximity to itself as possible. He describes it in terms of "presence of self to self in the distance of self from self" (C-HS, 223). I also think, however, that the idea of being present to oneself in the distance of the self from itself incorporates those moments when we surprise and thus appear strange to ourselves, into how we relate to and constitute ourselves: we can cultivate a self-relation in which we encounter and come into proximity with ourselves precisely within that space of being distanced from ourselves.

To return to my example of my own experience, rather than rejecting or uncritically accepting the way others view me, I can critically engage my own self-understanding (counterer of normalization) within the gap created by my surprise at the way I am perceived (a leader). I don't think of myself as a leader and, just as with niceness, I have no aspirations toward it. But, just as appearing but not being nice can be subversive for me as a woman so can – precisely, I think because of its strangeness to me – a mode of relating to myself that engages the apparently contradictory characteristics of norm violator and effective leader and, through that engagement, cultivates a way of constituting myself as an outspoken woman who is taken seriously. As I have described it here, the anti-normalizing work of freedom entails examining what one is willing to "accept, refuse, and change" relative to one's own ways of understanding, constituting, and relating to oneself. Performing that work both reflects and promotes critical and creative capacities, as opposed to self-sacrifice and obedience. A self-relation characterized by refusal, curiosity, and innovation does not entail a break with a previous, now reviled iteration of ourselves that is in need of (perpetual) renunciation; nor does it tie us to a single mode of being by means of a dual requirement and promise of truth. Rather, the self-relation that Foucault posits involves an ongoing, critical relationship of the self to itself that continually opens onto new opportunities for and ways of being other than what we currently are. Foucault tells us that "there are times in life when

the question of knowing if one can think differently than one thinks, and perceive differently than one sees, is absolutely necessary if one is to go on looking and reflecting at all" (HS2, 8). As I have endeavored to show here, this challenge to think and see differently with which Foucault presents us pertains not only to our relationship to world in which we live, but also to how we constitute, understand, and relate to ourselves.

Conclusion

To be sure, Foucault's critique of subjectivity, and the politics of ourselves to which it gives rise, appear to and in many ways in fact do conflict with prevailing feminist views about how to articulate and engage in effective politics. As I see it, however, the case Foucault makes against the assertion of subjectivity as a mechanism of emancipation is sufficiently compelling to warrant consideration of what his critique offers in terms of both tools for developing alternatives and alternatives themselves. Considering what Foucault has to say does not mean feminists necessarily have to adopt it, and it certainly doesn't mean they ought to uncritically accept it. Nonetheless, exploring in what ways and to what extent Foucault's work is compatible with feminism even (especially?) within the realm of politics can prove valuable. If it does nothing else, this exploration resists the possibility that in their current iteration questions about the extent of the political relevance of Foucault's work – or the work of any thinker – for feminism will circumscribe feminist engagement with that thinker and, perhaps inadvertently, inhibit or even prevent feminists from exploring new ideas for themselves. In this capacity such questions would serve a normalizing function; in a sense they throw us back upon the idea that Foucault's work possesses only a circumscribed relevance. Insofar as a transformative and anti-normalizing politics of ourselves functions to challenge emerging limits and thereby prevent them from crystallizing, feminists might practice a politics of ourselves relative to feminism, allowing it to be other than what it appears or we believe it to be, allowing it to be strange to us and to itself. In doing so we cultivate a mode of relating to feminism, and of feminism relating to itself, within the space between how it has seen itself and how it is seen in order to be other than what it has been and currently is.

Interestingly, what I am suggesting echoes a fairly early perspective on feminism's relationship to Foucault. In their introduction to a 1988 collection of essays, Irene Diamond and Lee Quinby characterize this relationship in terms of a possible "friendship grounded in political and ethical commitment," where that commitment is to the "dismantl[ing] [of] existing but heretofore unrecognized modes of domination" (Diamond and Quinby 1988: ix). For these two feminists, the appeal to friendship connotes a relationship that is "not without tensions," but within which tension plays a productive role insofar as it fosters reciprocity. "Both Foucault and feminists," Diamond and Quinby write, "have pointed to the ways in which friendship provides a model for nonhierarchichal, reciprocal relations that run counter to the hierarchical modes that have dominated Western society" (Diamond and Quinby 1988: ix). Especially relevant here is the capacity of the friendship they advocate between feminism and Foucault to promote tensions that "check closure and sustain reflexivity" (Diamond

and Quinby 1988: ix). “By respecting differences without seeking absorption or dialectical synthesis,” Diamond and Quinby write, “feminist and Foucauldian analyses can interact with each other to create dialogical rather than monological descriptions. Such an enterprise is admittedly difficult, but . . . not inherently impossible because of the ways in which these two otherwise rather different approaches . . . converge” (Diamond and Quinby 1988: x).

As evidenced in both my own and Diamond and Quinby’s work, a crucial point of convergence between feminism and Foucault is the shared emphasis on refusing to accept what we are told we must be and experimenting in ways that open onto not yet thought or imagined ways of living. Again, for me as well as for Diamond and Quinby, these critical and creative, anti-normalizing practices get articulated and asserted precisely within the space of tension between feminism and Foucault. Insofar as this is the case, (re)creating and maintaining this space, as well as the conditions for its possibility, is not tangential to but rather functions as part of the political work of practicing freedom.

Notes

- 1 See Haraway 1990; Braidotti 1994; Lugones 1987.
- 2 Judith Butler’s work provides an obvious exception to this perspective.
- 3 I am referring here to the title of Caroline Ramazanoğlu’s edited volume. See Ramazanoğlu 1993 (*Up Against Foucault: Explorations of Some Tensions Between Foucault and Feminism*).
- 4 As I note later, part of what I show in this essay is the interconnection of ethics (which Foucault conceives of as the relation of the self to itself) and politics (which Foucault conceives of as the relation of self to others).
- 5 My article “Normativity and Normalization” (Taylor 2009) provides a thorough analysis of Foucault’s conceptualization of normalization.
- 6 All references to the 1980 course refer to and may be found in Landry 2009.
- 7 This phrase is from Marcus Aurelius.
- 8 This phrase is from Seneca.
- 9 This phrase is from Seneca.
- 10 This phrase is from Plutarch.
- 11 “Christianity and Confession” (Foucault 1980c). This is the second of the two Howison Lectures that Foucault delivered at UC Berkeley on October 20 and 21, 1980. I am referring to the version that is housed in the IMEC (Institut Mémoires de l’Édition Contemporaine) Archive folder number FCL 3.4, FCL2. A03–04. Slightly different versions of these lectures were delivered at Dartmouth College in November 1980. The Dartmouth lectures appear in RC, 158–181.
- 12 Foucault is not, nor am I suggesting that he is, saying that the hermeneutical self-relation generated within early Christianity retains the same character within a modern context. Nor is he saying (nor am I suggesting) that the practices through which that self-relation gets generated (baptism, penitence, and confession) stay the same. What he is saying, on my reading, is that despite various changes, the self-sacrificing character of that self-relation continues to “haunt” modern subjectivity. Within both contexts, albeit in different ways, the subject experiences this self-relation merely as positive because the relation itself masks over the cost of attaining the status of subjectivity. Taking the practice of confession as an

example, in both early Christian and modern contexts the subject experiences confession as positive (it provides access to truth) when in fact that practice implicates the subject in a relation that requires a kind of subjugation – in both cases, I argue, of one's critical and creative capacities. Jean-Michel Landry's analysis of Foucault's 1980 course supports my view that Foucault invokes a contemporary politics of ourselves as a means of countering the obedience that continues to characterize modern subjectivity. He argues that Foucault's intention in the 1980 course is to elucidate how we have come to "view ourselves as an identity to uncover or as a psychology to decipher" and therefore to develop ways of viewing ourselves differently (Landry 2009: 123).

- 13 See Susan Brison's astute analysis of Palin in Brison 2008.
- 14 It is important to note that self-sacrifice clearly plays itself out in the lives of different women in different ways at least in part due to issues of race, social class, and sexuality.
- 15 I am not rejecting equality and difference strategies. Rather, I see them functioning as strategies of liberation rather than practices of freedom. Liberation, from a Foucauldian perspective, releases persons from states of domination in which their lives are simply dictated to them; for this reason it is incredibly important. At the same time, Foucault makes clear that liberation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the practice of freedom. See "The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom," EW1, 281–302.
- 16 Timothy O'Leary provides an important critique of Foucault's reading of Hellenistic and Roman self-constitution. At the same time, O'Leary acknowledges the importance of the insight Foucault draws from his (mis)reading. See O'Leary 2002.
- 17 See C-HS, lectures of January 13 and 20, and February 3, 1982.
- 18 On this point I obviously differ with O'Leary, who contends that Foucault retains the notion of "material which in some sense can be said to be prior to the subject." See O'Leary 2002: 118.
- 19 I am referring here to the version of this interview, "Power, Moral Values, and the Intellectual. An Interview with Michel Foucault by Michael Bess, November 3, 1980," that is housed in the IMEC Archive (folder number FCL2. A02–06). The interview is also available in *History of the Present* 4 (Spring 1988) and online at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/historydept/michaelbess/Foucault%20Interview>.

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Infamous Men, Dangerous Individuals, and Violence against Women

Feminist Re-readings of Foucault

CHLOË TAYLOR

From his many studies of psychiatric institutionalization to his work on the prison, Michel Foucault provides a sustained and influential critique of medical and penal practices of involuntary confinement. While Foucault scholarship has tended to be sympathetic to this critique, his analysis of psychiatric and penal cases involving violence against girls and women has been deemed problematic in the feminist literature. In discussing these cases, Foucault is concerned with the legal-penal consequences of such violence for male perpetrators while showing little interest in their victims, scrutinizing power relations between violent men, medicine, and the law while leaving power relations between violent men and their victims unanalyzed. Best known in this regard are Foucault's discussions of the case of Charles Jouy and Sophie Adam in *The History of Sexuality*, volume 1, and *Abnormal*, and his related comments about rape and statutory rape in "Confinement, Psychiatry, Prison" and "Sexual Morality and the Law" (see PPC). The Jouy-Adam case concerns the nineteenth-century rape of a minor by an adult that Foucault characterizes as "inconsequential bucolic pleasures" in *The History of Sexuality* and that he blames on the victim in *Abnormal* (HS1, 31; C-AN, 292). In "Sexual Morality and the Law" Foucault argues for abolishing statutory rape laws, while in "Confinement, Psychiatry, Prison" he asks why rape is any worse than a "punch in the face" (PPC, 209). These texts immediately gave rise to heated feminist critique, a critique that has continued for over thirty years (Plaza 1978; Woodhull 1988; Soper 1993; Hengehold 1994; Alcoff 1996; Cahill 2000, 2001; Sawicki 2005; Taylor 2009; Oksala 2011). Focusing on his work on "infamous men" and the "dangerous individual," this essay will argue that there are other instances in Foucault's oeuvre in which he is similarly insensitive to violence against women, although these cases have drawn less critical attention. The twofold aim of this essay will be, first, to examine what is at stake for Foucault in his writings on infamous men and dangerous individuals whose infamy and dangerousness involved violence against women, and, second, to problematize Foucault's failure to attend to gendered power relations in these texts.

Infamous Men

Foucault begins a number of works by describing his own laughter. Most famously, he opens *The Order of Things* with an account of his laughter over a passage in Borges, a laughter which, he says, “shattered . . . all the familiar landmarks of my thought” (OT, xv). In the first lecture he gave in 1975 at the Collège de France, collected in *Abnormal*, Foucault starts by reading aloud two psychiatric testimonies delivered in penal cases dating to 1955 and 1974. Having anticipated his auditors’ laughter over these “expert” statements, and no doubt chuckling as he read them, he notes that these are texts that deserve to be attended to precisely because they have the threefold quality of being “scientific” discourses of truth (that is, they are spoken by people with a certain institutional training that is taken to be scientific), of having the power to kill, and of making us laugh. As Foucault observes, “discourses of truth that provoke laughter and have the institutional power to kill are, after all, in a society like ours, discourses that deserve some attention” (C-AN, 6). These psychiatric penal testimonies are laughably unscientific and morally pompous, and yet they are taken seriously in courts of law and the consequences they have are thus life and death matters. Foucault writes at a time when capital punishment is still practiced in France, and he also includes the permanent incarceration of an individual under his understanding of death; whether a literal or a social death, lives are snuffed out as the result of discourses such as these that are ridiculous but claim and are granted a scientific truth status in courts of law. While one of the expert testimonies he reads involved a sensational case – a woman’s murder of her child at the incitement of a man – the other example is banal, the kind of case seen daily in courts of law without making headlines, and thus Foucault adds the adjective “everyday” to describe these discourses (C-AN, 6). These testimonies are extraordinary discourses in that they are simultaneously scientific, absurd, and capable of killing, and yet they have become mundane in our society.

Foucault opens his 1977 text, “The Lives of Infamous Men,” by once more describing his laughter, writing:

This is not a book of history. The selection found here was guided by nothing more substantial than my taste, my pleasure, an emotion, laughter, surprise, a certain dread, or some other feeling whose intensity I might have trouble justifying, now that the first moment of discovery has passed. (EW3, 157)

Foucault is introducing a collection of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century *lettres de cachet* and the familial petitions and police reports that resulted in these letters. As with the psychiatric penal statements from three centuries later, Foucault notes that these texts involve the “everyday” – not necessarily because that is how frequently they were written but because, like the mandating of penitential confession, they mark an important moment in history when power incited men and women to speak of their everyday miseries and lent them an ear. Once more, these are texts which, in addition to being everyday discourses are also discourses that combine the comic and the fearful: they make Foucault laugh due to the grandiose language employed to describe the banal, even while he finds them dreadful since they are all that remains of existences snuffed

out by the very words in question – “stifled” by these lines that make us laugh, “(as one stifles a cry, smothers a fire, or strangles an animal)” (EW3, 158).

“The Lives of Infamous Men” thus introduces an “anthology of existences” (EW3, 157) stifled, smothered, or strangled by confinement. Foucault tells us that the two texts that inspired the collection concerned a man placed in Charenton in 1707 for “hiding from his family,” leading an “obscure life in the country,” and lending money “without security,” and a friar, placed in Bicêtre six years earlier, whose “greatest crimes,” making him a “veritable monster of abomination,” were sodomy and atheism (EW3, 158). Referring no doubt to his *History of Madness*, Foucault observes that he made use of similar documents a “long time ago” and that then as now what drew him to these writings was the “resonance” he felt with these “lowly lives reduced to ashes in the few sentences that struck them down” (EW3, 158). Foucault’s reference to “resonance” suggests that we too could have our lives snatched from us by a few such lines uttered by the right people in the right places. In particular, Foucault sees the *lettres de cachet* as the historical predecessor of psychiatric internment. The disparity between the insignificance of the “crimes” and “madnesses” described in these texts and the “thunderbolts” that they called down constitutes the absurdity of these documents that provoke Foucault’s laughter, even while they make him shudder.

One of the criteria of selection for the texts included in this collection was that the texts themselves were to have “played a part in the reality they speak of” (EW3, 160). Not memoirs or portraits, not descriptions of events after the fact, these are texts that did something, that constituted an action, that were an “instrument of a retaliation . . . an episode in a battle” (EW3, 160). Each text that Foucault includes is an encounter with power, extinguishing the existence that it describes: “These discourses really crossed lives; existences were actually risked and lost in these words” (EW3, 160).

Like the Catholic confessional discourses that preceded them and like the psychiatric-penal statements that would follow, the *lettres de cachet* archives contain texts that deserve our attention because in them we see power working in a new way. Dating to an era of sovereign power – a power that Foucault defines as the right of *death* – we nevertheless see power beginning to manage *life*. A sporadic and spectacular form of power is now intervening in the unspectacular quotidian. What we hear in these brief lines are the voices of ordinary people speaking to their king of “insignificant disorders or such ordinary woes” (EW3, 164), petty skirmishes and pitiful resentments, “excesses of wine and sex” (EW3, 169), police reports that resulted in “infamous” – that is to say non-famous – individuals being incarcerated. What we see, therefore, is a power from above that operated in response to petitions from below, and thus something like a dispersion or democratization of sovereign power as well as a historically unprecedented stooping of sovereign power to intervene in the “little racket” (EW3, 161) of its subjects. “An absolute abuse?” Foucault asks, for this is how the *lettres de cachet* are usually theorized; he responds:

Maybe so, yet not in the sense that the absolute monarch purely and simply abused his own power; rather, in the sense that each individual could avail himself, for his own ends and against others, of absolute power in its enormity – a sort of placing of the mechanisms of sovereignty at one’s disposal, an opportunity to divert its effects to one’s own benefit, for anyone clever enough to capture them. (EW3, 168)

The *lettres de cachet* and the petitions and reports that surround them are thus a curious case of sovereign power engaged in activities that foreshadow biopolitics, a democratization of an undemocratic power, a moment of collaboration or transition between two forms of power. At this moment, “the body of the *misérables* is brought into almost direct contact with that of the king, their agitation with his ceremonies” (EW3, 172).

Since *lettres de cachet* were most often sought by individuals wanting family members incarcerated, Foucault also argues that the century of such letters is of significance for a history of technologies of power since they paved the way in France for a thorough penetration of the family by regulatory forms of power (EW3, 168). This penetration of the family by biopower will be taken much further in the centuries to come by psychiatry, a development that Foucault explored in works such as *Psychiatric Power*, *Abnormal*, and *The History of Sexuality*, volume 1.¹

Although Foucault makes nothing of this fact, with this democratization of power and its solicitation from and penetration of the family, the right to complain to the king was notably opened to both sexes. Foucault writes that *lettres de cachet* were usually “requested against someone by his entourage – his father and mother, one of his relatives, his family, his sons or daughters, his neighbors, the local priest on occasion, or some notable” (EW3, 167). In fact, each of the three cases of complaints involving women that Foucault cites in “The Lives of Infamous Men” describes disputes between husbands and wives. One complaint concerns “a wife who lacks all sentiment of religion, honor, probity, and even humanity” (EW3, 165).² This request for a *lettre de cachet* from a disgruntled husband of a “loose woman” seems typical of the other texts that Foucault describes in the comical-horrible disparity between the deeds recounted and the punishment sought. Two other cases concern women as plaintiffs. One comes from a wet-nurse, the mother of four children, abandoned by her husband and seeking to have him incarcerated to “prevent opprobrium and infamy for me and my family, by rendering incapable of doing any injury to society a bad citizen who will not fail to bring it harm” (EW3, 165). Whatever compassion we may feel for this deserted mother in an age before child support, this case too seems consistent with the others Foucault describes. Finally, however, Foucault cites “the wife of Nicolas Bienfait,” who

“takes the liberty of representing very humbly to your Lordship that said Nicolas Bienfait, coachman, is a highly debauched man who is killing her with blows, and who is selling everything having already caused the deaths of his two wives, the first of whom he killed her child in the body, the second of whom after having sold and eaten what was hers, by his bad treatment caused her to die from languishment, even trying to strangle her on the eve of her death . . . The third, he wishes to eat her heart on the grill, not to mention many other murders he did. My Lord, I throw myself at the feet of Your Highness to beseech Your Mercy. I hope that from your goodness you will render me justice, because my life being risked at every moment, I shall not cease praying to God for the preservation of your health . . .” (EW3, 171)

Though in the very next line Foucault states that all the cases he discusses are “homogenous” and “monotonous,” and that they all involve the same disparity between the “minuscule order of the problems raised and the enormity of the power brought into play” (EW3, 171), this last case in fact stands out, at least to this reader. Perhaps it is because Foucault assumes that lies, exaggeration, and hypocrisy were obligatory in

these texts that he does not think that a domestic violence and serial murder accusation is significantly different from a sodomy, atheism, or abandonment accusation. Perhaps with the mention of “other murders he did” Foucault assumes this plaintiff exaggerates. Or maybe the pettiness of complaining that her husband is eating and spending what is not his along with her description of wives murdered makes Foucault trivialize the latter. However, if indeed this is a case of a woman being beaten to death by a man who has killed two wives before her and has an extensive history of violence, who seeks protection from the king because her life is in danger, this case seems different from those of “ne’er do well sons” and “oddball” usurers (EW3, 159).

Since, in *Psychiatric Power*, Foucault describes the power of the father in the traditional family as one of sovereign power (C-PP, 80), the husband who beats his wife or child to death is a sovereign snuffing out a life, stifling an existence, as one “strangles an animal” – as this particular coachman apparently strangled a wife – just like the *lettres de cachet*. One wonders, therefore: Why does Foucault not note this *other* history of an abusive sovereign power upon which light is also shed by such petitions to the king that he found in the archive? Why is it that when a coachman-husband-sovereign snuffs out the lives of his wives this is part of the mediocre, mundane, and minuscule order of things, whereas when the king-sovereign snuffs out the life of the serial wife-killer it is a “thunderbolt”? Why is one snuffing out so much more noteworthy than the other, when both entail lives being stifled through sovereign interventions in the everyday lives of subjects? With the traditional family, after all, we have the interesting case of a sovereign who is always involved in the everyday skirmishes of his *misérables*, whose bodies he has already touched. If we take seriously Foucault’s claim that the power of husbands over wives and of fathers over children was a form of sovereign power in the traditional family, then the cases of abused wives and daughters petitioning the king are quite different from cases of disgruntled husbands and fathers petitioning the same king: in the latter case it is merely the case of one sovereign asking a more powerful sovereign to intervene on his behalf, whereas in the former case it is an insurrection in power, a *misérable* challenging the validity of her sovereign’s power, calling sovereign power down for herself in order to cut off the head of her king.

Strangely, when Foucault gives a list of the kind of people described in these texts, he writes of

a stroke of misfortune that caused the vigilance of officials or of institutions, aimed no doubt at suppressing all disorder, to pick on this person rather than that, this scandalous monk, this beaten woman, this inveterate and furious drunkard, this quarrelsome merchant, and not so many others who were making just as much of a ruckus. (EW3, 163)

What Foucault fails to see is that the “beaten woman” is not struck with misfortune or “picked on” when officials or institutions pay attention to her complaint. Her case is not like the others. On the contrary, she is the one petitioning the officials, asking for their intervention. For her, this new vigilance on the part of officials and institutions may even be a positive development in power.³ This raises the question: What if we are not appalled or filled with dread at the thought that certain men have had their lives snuffed out by certain interventions of power into the everyday? What happens to Foucault’s argument if we observe that the lives of *some* subjects *already* involved such

interventions of sovereign power in their everyday lives, but that they were being beaten and killed rather than protected by them? For these figures in history, and for those readers who feel a resonance with *their* lives and not with the lives of their abusers, these fragments of the history Foucault is examining are not uncomplicated, but they may not be self-evidently comic or dreadful either. They may even remind us of what Foucault tells us: that power is not always bad even if it is always dangerous.⁴

The Dangerous Individual

Foucault opens “About the Concept of the ‘Dangerous Individual’ in Nineteenth-Century Legal Psychiatry” with a description of a 1975 case of a serial rapist who, having admitted to his crimes, remains persistently silent while a judge questions him about his motives and impulses. Eventually an exasperated juror exclaims, “For heaven’s sake, defend yourself!” (EW3, 176) Here, we have, in Foucault’s words,

a judicial system designed to establish misdemeanors, to determine who committed them, and to sanction these acts by imposing the penalties prescribed by the law . . . we have facts that have been established, an individual who admits to them – one who, consequently, accepts the punishment he will receive. All should be for the best in the best of all possible judicial worlds. The legislators, the authors of the legal codes in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, could not have dreamed of a clearer situation. And yet it happens that the machinery jams, the gears seize up. Why? Because the accused remains silent . . . The accused evades a question that is essential in the eyes of a modern tribunal but would have had a strange ring to it 150 years ago: “Who are you?” (EW3, 176–177)

Foucault observes that there has been a collapsing of separate worlds of discourse, of the juridico-legal with the Christian tradition of confession and its heirs – psychological discourses of self-disclosure. Foucault is noting a similar kind of dissonance in this case as in the *lettres de cachet*: a juridico-legal form of power is being infiltrated by or is collaborating with a more everyday and all-encompassing form of power. The law today seeks to know the interior lives and intimate details of its subjects in order not only to judge them but also to manage them. This management reaches far beyond the serving of a sentence or fulfilling of a debt. A criminal’s motives and history, and her remorse or lack thereof must be revealed in order for the law to perform its new functions. These functions are not only to punish her but to transform her or to detain her indefinitely if it deems that she is beyond reform. For criminal justice, this means that the criminal is not simply the individual who committed a crime to whom the penalty for that crime may be applied. She is now a psychological entity who must be understood in terms of the degree of risk that she poses to society (EW3, 178).

What this means is that the law no longer punishes individuals merely for what they have done but also for what psychiatric “experts” state that they *are*: a danger to society. These are the psychiatric expert statements that Foucault describes in *Abnormal* that, like the *lettres de cachet*, are “everyday discourses of truth that can kill and provoke laughter” (C-AN, 6). As a consequence of these changes or hybridizations in the role

of law, if a criminal today serves his sentence and is released only to reoffend, the legal system is thought to have failed in its task, is reproached for having released a known or knowable risk back into society. As a result, Foucault argues, the criminal justice system has come to resemble – and to be informed by – something like the accident-management practices of insurance companies (EW3, 190–200).

This is a dramatic change in how the function of the law is understood and raises serious ethical issues for Foucault. While he acknowledges that “A form of justice applied only to what one does is probably purely utopian and not necessarily desirable,” he thinks that the other extreme, one in which the law is authorized to “intervene against individuals because of what they are” represents “dreadful dangers” and that “a horrifying society could emerge from that” (EW3, 200). In an interview, Foucault states that “No society like ours would accept a return to the pure ‘juridical’ (which would penalize an act, without taking its author into account) – or a slide into the pure anthropological, where only the criminal (or even the potential criminal) would be considered, independently of his act” (EW3, 463). What Foucault argues in this interview, however briefly, is that rather than trying to maintain a balance between these two extremes, both of which are horrifying, we need to try to think of “another system” of criminal justice altogether.

But how did we ever get from a once purely “juridical” legal system to one that risks falling too heavily on the side of the “anthropological”? How did psychiatry with its claims to be able to predict criminal risk – to know criminals as anthropological kinds – infiltrate the law to the degree that it has if these are indeed different “universes of discourse”?⁵ These are the historical questions that Foucault explores in “About the Concept of the ‘Dangerous Individual.’”

In his writings on psychiatry Foucault is consistently concerned with tracking the ways that psychiatry, which started out as a dubious *aspect* of medicine, staked out its claim not only as a *field* of medicine but as a form of social hygiene that would leave the hospital and the clinic to penetrate all other institutions and aspects of life. In numerous texts, Foucault examines the tactics used by psychiatry to gain access to schools, workplaces, the family, and, what is at stake in the current discussion, the criminal-justice system. As he notes, while at the beginning of the nineteenth century the law already exculpated individuals deemed mad, and thus the realm of psychiatry was not entirely irrelevant to that of law, madness was considered self-evident even to the non-discerning eye. Individuals legally exculpated by madness were in obvious states of furor or dementia, and medical opinion was not required to recognize them. Up to the end of the eighteenth century, the relationship between law and medicine was what Foucault would call the “principle of the revolving door” (C-AN, 32) – when medicine came in, law went out; when law came in, medicine went out. The decision as to whether an individual was to be handed over to the medical authorities did not itself require any medical expertise. An individual was either obviously insane or she was legally responsible – there were no shades of grey between these poles, no infiltration of one realm by the other, and where one fell with respect to the two poles was an uncomplicated matter.

All this was to change over the first half of the nineteenth century: first, psychiatry, which had just managed to distinguish between the criminal and the insane in order to establish its own domains and institutions, would muddy these waters again,

claiming that there was a form of insanity that was pure and monstrous criminality. In this way, psychiatry audaciously tackled the great crimes, and moreover claimed to recognize madness where non-experts could not. Second, psychiatry would introduce shades of grey between the obviously mad and the criminally responsible. As would occur in the case of Pierre Rivière, a criminal might now be kept within a penal rather than a medical institution and yet find his sentence reduced due to medical considerations. Psychiatrists no longer went out the revolving door when the law came in, in other words; they stayed present, speaking in courts of law even about those who would remain in the penal system, and even about those who were not obviously mad. In these maneuvers, Foucault suggests that the diagnosis of monomania was critical.

Monomania was a psychiatric diagnosis proposed in the early nineteenth century to explain cases in which an apparently sane individual engaged in a violent crime with no apparent motive: a previously loving mother kills her daughter and cooks her thigh with cabbage; a woman beheads her neighbor's child and tosses the head out the window despite feeling neither love nor hate for the girl or her family; a boy murders his foster-mother and can give no explanation for his act; a woman gives birth to one infant after another for the sole purpose of killing them.⁶ In each case, the individual in question shows no signs of madness but has no motive and can give no explanation for her crime. While such individuals, having committed a capital offense and showing no signs of furor or dementia, would once have been uncontentious candidates for the scaffold, now psychiatrists urged courts to spare their lives since they suffered from the temporary insanity of monomania. The very essence of monomania was crime. There were no other symptoms of this madness than the crimes themselves. Thus "homicidal mania is the danger of insanity in its most harmful form: a maximum of consequences, a minimum of warning" (EW3, 185). Foucault argues that the purpose of this diagnosis for psychiatry was to posit insanity as the ultimate danger to society, thereby granting to those with an expertise in this danger a crucial authority: a "trained eye" alone might spot dangerous individuals before they acted and thereby prevent unthinkable crimes.

By 1870, Foucault argues, psychiatrists abandoned the concept of monomania because it proved paradoxical in at least two ways: first, the diagnosis assumed that the more unprecedented, out of character, unmotivated, and thus apparently free an act was, the more determined it was; second, if the very essence of this form of madness was crime, then no one, not even a psychiatrist, could foresee it before its symptom – a crime – had occurred, and thus psychiatrists were powerless to protect society from this danger until it was too late. Although it was ultimately untenable for these reasons, Foucault argues that the concept of monomania was crucial for the encroachment of psychiatric power into the realm of penal justice during the first half of the nineteenth century and is significant in a history of the relation between psychiatric and penal institutions because it is where the concept of "the dangerous individual" – so important today – first unfolded. Foucault's most sustained consideration of a monomania diagnosis concerns the case of Pierre Rivière, to be discussed below. Similar worries arise regarding Foucault's discussion of this case as with respect to "The Lives of Infamous Men." Most notably: Foucault is again far more concerned with (and, in this case, admiring of) a violent man than with the women who suffered from his violence, and power relations between men and women and within the family are again overlooked in favor of an analysis of power relations between violent men, medicine, and the law.

Pierre Rivière

Foucault's publication of "*I, Pierre Rivière, Having Slaughtered My Mother, My Sister, and My Brother . . .*" is his most extensive study of a dangerous individual, and of an individual suspected by ten doctors to suffer from monomania, while three doctors claimed he was sane.⁷ Rivière's case can be seen as exemplary of the struggles of psychiatrists in the first half of the nineteenth century to establish themselves as protectors of society and agents of social hygiene, capable of predicting danger in the form of madnnesses not detectable to the non-medical eye. Dr. Vastel writes of Rivière that his 1835 murder of his mother and two siblings "confirmed what could be predicted of him" (PR, 127), while Dr. Leuret writes that "Pierre Rivière ought to have been placed in confinement; the young man was too ill to be left at large" (PR, 166). Both doctors imply that had Rivière's abnormal behavior led the villagers to bring him to a doctor earlier, the tragedy of a triple murder might have been avoided. Dr. Vastel also warns that a "return to saner ideas may not last long, and if not guilty, he is at least dangerous and should be confined in his own interests and above all in the interest of society" (PR, 136).

Foucault and his seminarists published Rivière's memoir along with the medical evaluations of the parricide and of his victims' corpses; police reports concerning the scene of the crime and the arrest and initial interrogations; statements from villagers who were witnesses to the crime or to Rivière's character; court documents from Rivière's trial that show the jury as divided on the question of Rivière's sanity as were the doctors; newspaper reports that cover Rivière's case from the date of the murder until his suicide in prison four years later; and, finally, a series of essays by Foucault and his seminarists analyzing the dossier. Foucault writes of the collected archival documents that:

in their totality and their variety they form neither a composite work nor an exemplary text, but rather a strange contest, a confrontation, a power relation, a battle among discourses and through discourses. And yet, it cannot simply be described as a single battle; for several separate combats were being fought out at the same time and intersecting each other: the doctors were engaged in a combat, among themselves, with the judges and prosecution, and with Rivière himself (who had trapped them by saying he had feigned madness); the crown lawyers had their own separate combats as regards the testimony of the medical experts, the comparatively novel use of extenuating circumstances, and a range of cases of parricide that had been coupled with regicide . . . the villagers of Aunay had their own combat to defuse the terror of a crime committed in their midst and to "preserve the honor of a family" by ascribing the crime to bizarre behavior or singularity, and, lastly, at the very center, there was Pierre Rivière, with his innumerable and complicated engines of war . . . (PR, x–xi)

Foucault explains that he and his co-authors wanted to "draw a map of these combats, to reconstruct these confrontations and battles, to rediscover the interactions of those discourses as weapons of attack and defense in the relations of power and knowledge" (PR, xi). Like the documents described in "The Lives of Infamous Men," Foucault sees the documents collected in this volume as acts of battle rather than as descriptions of battles. In particular, he argues that Rivière's text, rehearsed in the parricide's mind

before the crime and written after it, could not be separated from the acts of murder. Rivière's claim to be the author of the crime was inseparable from his authorship of the memoir, the latter asserting his sanity and thus the murderous agency which a majority of doctors nevertheless denied him.

Despite the intrinsic interest of the Rivière case in terms of the relationship between medicine and law which Foucault explores in "About the Concept of the 'Dangerous Individual'" and other texts, he writes, "To be frank . . . it was not this . . . that led us to spend more than a year on these documents. It was simply the beauty of Rivière's memoir. The utter astonishment it produced in us was the starting point" (PR, x). Foucault refers to the "beauty" of Rivière's memoir two more times, writing of "a text in whose beauty some were to see a proof of rationality . . . and others a sign of madness" (PR, xi), and arguing that "Its beauty alone is sufficient justification for it today" (PR, 199). As Adrian Howe has observed, Foucault scholars "Enraptured by [their] master's account," repeat the language of "beauty" in describing this text, citing several examples (Howe 2008: 102–103). Beyond such aesthetic appreciation, Foucault writes that he and his seminarists decided not to "interpret" Rivière's memoir or to "subject" it to any "commentary" due to "a sort of reverence and perhaps, too, terror for a text which was to carry off four corpses along with it, we were unwilling to superimpose our own text on Rivière's memoir. We fell under the spell of the parricide with the reddish-brown eyes" (PR, xiii).

Despite this claim, Foucault and the other seminarists *do* interpret Rivière's memoir; indeed, they interpret the memoir heavy-handedly, arguing that Rivière's murder and memoir were undertaken for entirely different reasons than their author claimed. Most remarkably, while Foucault interprets Rivière's text as an "engine of war" (PR, xi), Jean-Pierre Peter and Jeanne Favret interpret Rivière's "madness" and murder as a form of class revolt (PR, 177). While Rivière ends his memoir by anticipating his death that will "put an end to all [his] resentments" (PR, 121), Peter and Favret interpret these resentments to be about poverty (PR, 177–178). Although Peter and Favret write eloquently of the plight of peasants in France, their interpretation ignores the fact that Rivière murdered *other peasants*. Moreover, Rivière does not rail in his memoir against taxation or epidemics, hunger or cold, contracts, the crushing of peasant uprisings, or any of the other forms of peasant oppression that Peter and Favret describe. What he rails against is the tyranny of women. As John Ingham has written, "The notion that Rivière was in rebellion against the liberal order of contractual relations stretches the text. Rivière detested not the contract system so much as the growing legal standing of women" (Ingham 2007: 139). In particular Rivière resents his mother because of the legal battles she waged against his father over property and child custody; he killed his sister and brother because they sided with their mother. As Julie Marcus has argued, by killing these three family members, Rivière annihilated a female-headed household that was revolting against a father-headed household, killing "the mother-led family in its entirety" (Marcus 1989: 67–69). Rivière's mother was in the third trimester of pregnancy at the time, and a judge had granted her custody over her unborn child against her husband's claim. Her son struck her and his other victims with many more blows than was necessary to kill them, crushing their skulls and all but severing their heads from their bodies. Rivière devotes the majority of his memoir to recounting his mother's sins as well as his indignation that judges took his mother's side in her legal

proceedings against his father. In his mind, his mother's domestic and legal rebellions justified her death.

That Rivière was motivated by a hatred of women is recognized in all of the nineteenth-century texts responding to his memoir and his crime. Esquirol writes that Rivière murdered half of his family with a pruning bill "to free the world from the yoke of women" (PR, 164). The report of the district prosecutor states: "His aversion to women was constantly noted" (PR, 10). Witness after witness states that Rivière feared and loathed women and female animals more generally. Rivière writes, "I regarded my father as being in the power of mad dogs or barbarians against whom I must take up arms," and wanted to resuscitate Roman laws that gave the father the right of death over his wife and children (PR, 105). Describing his plans for speaking to his judges, Rivière writes,

I would come to Vire and give myself up to the district prosecutor or the police inspector; then I would make my declarations that I would die for my father, that no matter how much they were in favor of women they would not triumph, and my father would be quiet and happy thenceforth; I thought I would also say: in former times one saw Jaels against Siseras, Judiths against Holoferneses, Charlotte Cordays against Marats; now it must be men who employ this mania, it is the women who are in command now in this fine age which calls itself the age of enlightenment, this nation which seems to be so avid for liberty and glory obeys women, the Romans were far more civilized, the Hurons and the Hottentots, the Algonquins, these peoples who are said to be idiots are even more civilized, never have they debased strength, it has always been the stronger in body who have laid down the law among themselves. (PR, 108)

Rivière hoped that his act would not only relieve his father from the burden of his wife but that it would bring him glory and be exemplary, beginning a new age in which the tyranny of women would no longer be tolerated and men would rule once more.

Feminist criminologist Adrian Howe has problematized Foucault's treatment of the Rivière case on many levels, beginning with his reverence and aesthetic raptures for the memoir. She asks, "From whose perspective is this a beautiful text? Under what discursive conditions is it feasible to feel reverential towards such a bloody text?" (Howe 2008: 100) Indeed, Jane Caputi's study of serial sex killers, from Jack the Ripper to Ted Bundy, shows that such figures consistently become objects of admiration, fascination, and identification for other men, resulting in a range of phenomena from songs, poems, books, and films to copycat killings. (Caputi 1987: 14–62) Epitomizing misogyny, woman-killers are routinely described as "geniuses" (Caputi 1987: 21), much as Rivière's intelligence is marveled over by Foucault, and recognize themselves as cultural heroes. This not only encourages them to continue their killing sprees but results in false confessions and fake documents sent to the police from fans identifying with the killers (that lead the police off the real killers' trails), and imitation killings. Many of the serial sex killings dating from the 1880s to 1980s studied by Caputi, like that of Rivière, include matricide (Caputi 1987: 65–75). In every case the killer's mother is blamed by media and psychiatrists for her son's criminality, as Rivière's mother was and continues to be villainized.⁸ In such a way, women are blamed for their own deaths and for those of other women, while the male killers are admired. These are thus some of the

repercussions of the kind of “spellbound” fascination for a misogynist murderer that Foucault, his seminarists, and other commentators on the Rivière case express.

Howe is also critical of the privileged status that Foucault grants to the memoir, and his claim that it must not be subjected to interpretation. She notes that Foucault and his seminarists in fact interpret the text in such a way as to render invisible the violence against women and children that it justifies. For Foucault, Rivière was engaged in battles with doctors and the law; for Favret and Peter, he was revolting against the plight of the peasantry and the contract system. What each of these authors fails to note is that “The blade on the murder weapon (a pruning bill) was actually aimed with deadly force at three hapless members of the killer’s family” (Howe 2008: 101). Foucault, Howe observes, betrays a “staggering blindness” to the domination of women, to the fact that Rivière’s mother is described as raped and beaten throughout his text, and that she and her daughter were lethally punished for resisting this fate. Rivière’s father is described “slapping” his wife on multiple occasions (PR, 66, 84, 93). Rivière himself tells us that the view of the neighbors was that “he beats her like a hunk of beef” (PR, 89). He writes,

Some people said to my father: I would like to bed with her if only to put her in a rage. My father put another bed in the house, my sister slept in it, and he bedded with my mother, and as she would not send Jules to bed anywhere else, all three of them bedded together. Since their great quarrels my father had had no carnal intercourse with her. Nevertheless if only to enrage her he wanted to try on the first or second night. My sister Victoire heard. Then she said: oh my god my god what are you doing to her? Look you, he said to her, what business of yours is it, I am doing to her what men do to their wives; ah, said she, let her be since she does not want it. Yes, my father said to her, I am going to leave her alone too. He bedded with her several nights and then seeing that she did not leave him any feather cover on his side or feathers in the pillow, and she was doing all she could to cause mischief, he preferred to sleep in the other bed . . . (PR, 88)

Protesting against being slapped and raped under her children’s eyes, Rivière’s mother cries, “Do I have to be so ill used by a wretch who is being the death of me at night . . . ?” (PR, 93). As with the domestic abuse of a wife that appears in “The Lives of Infamous Men,” Foucault and his co-authors, and most other commentators on the Rivière case, make nothing of these descriptions of gendered power relations and gendered violence, of Pierre Rivière’s and his father’s beatings of his sister and mother, or of the women’s tactics of resistance that ranged from legal proceedings to physical struggles to the denial of blankets and pillows.

In her analysis of the Rivière dossier, feminist anthropologist Julie Marcus has observed that although the secondary literature has sympathetically accepted Rivière’s representation of his mother, and has hence reiterated the view that Anne Brion was a “shrew” who more or less deserved to be killed, in fact there is evidence that we are only getting one side of the story. As Marcus notes, it is significant that Brion was *winning* her court cases against her husband. Although Rivière interprets this to mean that a so-called enlightened age was in fact barbarically enslaved to women, we might rather take this fact as evidence that Brion’s complaints were more justified than comes across in her matricidal son’s memoir. Marcus compares Rivière’s killings to contemporary domestic murders in which men, enraged by losing custody and divorce battles,

kill their wives and children and themselves rather than accepting the court's decisions. As Marcus also notes, the villagers of Aunay were divided in their opinions about the marital disputes: while many of the men interviewed blamed the dead wife, at least some villagers blamed the husband. Interestingly, this is also true of the Norman peasants who were involved in the making of René Allio's film of "*I, Pierre Rivière . . .*". One peasant woman sympathizes with Anne Brion, noting that it was understandable that she would refuse to live with her husband, that she did not want to live in her mother-in-law's house, that she loved her own home and wanted to be independent (Allio 1976). The peasant who plays Pierre Rivière's father criticizes, not Anne Brion, but Rivière senior, pointing out that this man did not attend sufficiently to his eldest son since he did not notice Pierre's great love for him or his despair and what it might drive him to do.

Most significantly, Julie Marcus criticizes Foucault for failing to analyze the "most immediate relations of power" of all in his consideration of this case, those in the family (Marcus 1989: 81–82). Although Foucault analyzes familial power relations at an abstract level in a number of texts (HS1; C-AN; C-PP), it is remarkable that he forgets these analyses in his consideration of concrete cases of domestic violence, focusing exclusively on the legal and medical struggles that arose only later and as a result of this prior strife.

Conclusions

In "Matricidal Madness in Foucault's Anthropology: The Pierre Rivière Seminar," anthropologist John M. Ingham critiques Foucault's fascination with "male agonism," which, Ingham argues, blinds him to tragedy. As a result of favoring a "Homeric epic" approach in their interpretations of the Rivière dossier, Foucault and his seminarists

ignore the humanity of the villagers and the efforts of villagers and professionals alike in seeking a result fair to Rivière and to the community. Efforts to ascertain facts are discounted as self-serving, and there is not much sympathy for the mother, a woman victimized, horribly, first by her husband and then by her son . . . Instead, we are invited to share the enthrallment with Rivière, to identify with the eccentric young man who . . . imagines sociality as war . . . The psychiatrists along with almost everyone else were concerned with the justice of executing a young man who was emotionally and mentally disturbed, but for Foucault, the psychiatrists were interfering with Rivière's self-willed rendezvous with death . . . (Ingham 2007: 151–152)

Andrew Cutrofello is right to respond to Ingham that "To protest that well-intentioned therapists or social workers are simply trying to help suffering individuals is not enough to preclude the possibility that such people may also and even thereby be operating as conduits of the flow of biopower" (Cutrofello 2007: 161). As Cutrofello goes on to note, Foucault might have acknowledged the good intentions of the psychiatrists even while arguing persuasively that such experts are "part of the problem rather than part of the solution" (2007: 162). Nevertheless, Ingham is insightful in pointing out that Foucault overlooks certain aspects of the Rivière archive in order to maintain his interpretation

of the texts as an astonishing war, and that what he overlooks is both problematic and symptomatic.

In particular, Rivière's transition from desiring glory through murder to suicidal remorse for that murder is not recognized by Foucault as a sign of emotional confusion and suffering, but as a "trap" that the young man laid for psychiatrists, a strategy he used to undermine doctors. The doctors' interventions to spare Rivière's life, and his successful suicide some years later, are not recognized as acts of compassion and despair, but as engagements in war. Rivière's father's attempts to save his son's life, his pleading with his son to sign a request for an appeal despite his son's wish to die – his forgiveness of and ongoing love for his murderer son, which that son had not anticipated – are not noted. These sufferings of grief and love are ignored in order to facilitate a heroic and militaristic reading of the archive as weapons of war.

The problem is that such glorifications of battle seduce, as Rivière was seduced by them, as Foucault's seminarists and readers are seduced by and repeat the "master's" rapture, as copycat killers are seduced by the heroicization of men who kill women and thus emulate them. Such seduction perpetuates violence and also misrepresents the supposed glory and pleasure involved: while Jack the Ripper most likely committed suicide after his fifth, final, and most gruesome murder⁹ – a murder involving mutilations so extensive that they are estimated to have taken two hours – "sightings" of the Ripper were almost immediately reported in Liverpool, Paris, and New York, while so-called "Ripperologists" and "Ripperophiles" continue to speculate about their hero's identity to this day – a doctor, a butcher, or Edward, Duke of Clarence, Queen Victoria's grandson and crown prince of England (Caputi 1987: 22–23). Just as the Ripper's likely post-murder suicide is not accepted by his fans, so Rivière's post-murder despair is ignored by Foucault in order to maintain the desired image of Rivière as an embattled hero who tricks, trips up, and baffles the doctors, much as the Ripper is thought to have toyed with the London police in his (or his impersonator's) admired, light-hearted, and cheeky missives. Yet Rivière writes of his post-murder state: "chasms gape beneath my feet, earth swallow me; I wept, I fell to the ground . . . Ah heaven, why have you granted me existence, why do you preserve me any longer . . . I went on not knowing whither I went . . ." (PR, 113) The record of the court hearings notes that "Pierre Rivière barely replies to the questions he is asked and seems absorbed in the most gloomy thoughts. When he is shown the bill still stained with his victims' blood, he averts his gaze and he is heard to utter a long and dismal groan, and to say: I am in haste to die" (PR, 140). Rivière attempted suicide in prison during his trial. In prison after the trial, "Rivière believed himself to be dead and refused to take any sort of care of his body; he said he wanted his head cut off, which would not hurt him at all because he was dead" (PR, 171). Isolated in prison because he was deemed dangerous to other prisoners, Rivière succeeded in killing himself. This extensive testimony to pain is ignored by Foucault in order to glorify the matricide as a hero. Like Rivière himself prior to the murders, Foucault remains entranced by battles and war, by violence and struggle, and this is thus all that he chooses to see in these texts.

In "The Lives of Infamous Men" Foucault remarks that in publishing the documents that he is describing, he will be accused of always attending to the same kinds of discourses – discourses that he characterizes as acts, battles, and weapons. Yet he defends himself, asking:

Is it not one of the fundamental traits of our society, after all, that destiny takes the form of a relation with power, of a struggle with or against it? Indeed, the most intense point of a life, the point where its energy is concentrated, is where it comes up against power, struggles with it, attempts to use its forces and to evade its traps. The brief and strident words that went back and forth between power and the most inessential existences doubtless constitute, for the latter, the only monument they have ever been granted: it is what gives them, for the passage through time, the bit of brilliance, the brief flash that carries them to us. (EW3, 161–162)

I wonder if it is not this kind of assumption that led both Foucault and Rivière astray. Like many young men who dream of battle, Rivière anticipated that the murder of his mother and siblings and his trial and death would be acts of heroism and glory. Like many soldiers who find themselves at war, Rivière was disappointed in his hopes. He had thought that his trial would be a moment of “brilliance,” “a flash,” the most “intense point of a life,” after which he would be prepared to die – and this is how Foucault reads it, like the legal-penal documents of other trials – but in fact it was not so. Rivière was too deadened with remorse and despair to enjoy the consternation he had caused. Like many male historians, like Rivière himself in his pre-murder readings of history, Foucault focuses on battles, and yet, with many feminist historians, we can call into question whether battles and confrontations are the most intense, most significant, most brilliant aspects of individual or collective existences. We might also ask what is being overlooked when these battles – and not other battles, and not the unembattled aspects of existence – are all that we see. This essay has argued that some of the aspects of existence that Foucault fails to see in his dogged focus on what he reads as agonistic medical-legal battles and power relations between men include the family, gender relations, the victimization of women and children, suffering, and love.

Notes

- 1 For an overview of Foucault's discussions of familial power and the biopoliticization of the family, see Taylor 2012.
- 2 In *Abnormal*, Foucault cites the case of a mother seeking the incarceration of her son (C-AN, 37–38).
- 3 This point is of course not uncomplicated from a Foucauldian perspective since in the long term such biopolitical interventions in women's lives may have pernicious results for women, both in so far as they result in the regulatory control of women's lives and in so far as the kinds of measures of protection and punishment that the state takes – incarceration, surveillance measures such as parole and probation, psychiatric treatment – may merely exacerbate the problems that they purportedly seek to address, producing recidivism. Nevertheless I would maintain that having the option of seeking state protection from domestic violence is by and large a positive development in power for women and children, and that despite the profound and complex problems with current practices of state intervention in domestic violence, it is a better world for women and children when the state does take such violence to be a concern than when it doesn't.
- 4 Foucault stated in an interview: “My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always

- have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to hyper- and pessimistic activism." See "On the Genealogy of Ethics" in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983.
- 5 This phrase is from J. M. Coetzee's *Disgrace* (2000 [1999]: 58), where he describes a scenario similar to that with which Foucault opens "About the Concept of the 'Dangerous Individual.'"
- 6 Foucault discusses these and other similar cases in Lectures 5 and 6 of *Abnormal* (C-AN, 109–166).
- 7 In addition to his publication "*I, Pierre Rivière . . .*" Foucault discusses the case in a number of other writings. See, for instance, his discussion of Rivière in *Abnormal* (C-AN, 20), in which he situates the case in terms of psychiatric constructions of danger, and two interviews – "Pourquoi le crime de Pierre Rivière" and "Le Retour de Pierre Rivière" – in which he discusses René Allio's film (FDE, 106–108 and 114–123).
- 8 For a study of contemporary representations of the dangerous individual's mother/dangerous individual mothers, see Feder 2007.
- 9 While this remains speculative, Jane Caputi writes that "After this most savage murder [of Mary Jane Kelly on November 9, 1888], in Colin Wilson's words, 'Jack the Ripper left 13 Miller's Court and walked out of history.' No other murders occurred which could be definitely ascribed to the Ripper and the word in police circles was that the Ripper had committed suicide and that his body had been fished out of the Thames in December 1888" (Caputi 1987: 22).

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Foucault's Eros

For an Ethics of Living in Biopower

LYNNE HUFFER

This essay reappraises Foucault's first major book, *History of Madness*, published in French in 1961 (FHF), as a foundational text for understanding sexuality in modernity. At stake in this reappraisal is the place of sexual ethics in contemporary queer theory, a field that takes Foucault's writings about sexuality as perhaps its most important philosophical source. In elaborating an anti-normative conception of sexual plurality, queer theory has drawn overwhelmingly on volume 1 of *The History of Sexuality* (HS1) to the exclusion of other works by Foucault. While this focus on Foucault's critique of the repressive hypothesis has generated an important challenge to the damaging effects of sexual specification, it has failed to situate that challenge as part of Foucault's sustained anti-foundationalist critique of Western reason. That critique begins with *History of Madness*. The story Foucault tells there about the disappearance of unreason and the rationalist objectification of madness is also a genealogy of sexual deviance as the modern result of that process.

As a story about sexuality, *History of Madness* exposes the explicitly normative contours of Western rational morality. By tracing, over the course of several centuries, the fracturing normative logic that produces modern madness as mental illness out of the pre-modern split between reason and unreason, *History of Madness* also narrates the gradual emergence of a modern sexual subjectivity and the proliferating forms of sexual perversion that are the focus of HS1. Referring in HS1 to the sexual *dispositif* as a heterogeneous ensemble that makes modern subjects intelligible to themselves, Foucault articulates a historical link between sexuality and madness: "we have arrived at the point," he writes, "where we expect our intelligibility to come from what was for many centuries thought of as madness" (HS1, 156). In a 1977 interview, Foucault further clarifies this link. With the nineteenth-century birth of "the great technology of the psyche," Foucault asserts, "sex became both the hidden truth of rational consciousness and the decipherable meaning of madness" (FDE2a, 230; FL, 208; translation modified).

In *History of Madness* Foucault tells a story about the silencing of the mad as a rational and ethical exclusion that links the apotheosis of reason and science in modernity to the emergence of bourgeois morality. Foucault traces the rise of a bourgeois "city of morals" (HM, 74) through the exclusion and confinement of those who are perceived as deviating from reason. Those figures of unreason include, among others, sexual deviants such as prostitutes, onanists, sodomites, and debauchers. Foucault describes the apparatus for the confinement of unreason as "an ethical institution" (HM, 73) with a "moral charge" (HM, 73): the rationalist exclusion of unreason is also an "ethical condemnation" (HM, 72). Over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, unreason as the "shadow of the bourgeois city" (HM, 74) gives way to the productive logic of modern normativity. Emerging out of confinement at the end of the eighteenth century, unreason takes on the shapes of increasingly specified figures of madness who appear, "in their positivity" (HM, 79), as "candidate(s) for prisons, asylums, and punishment" (HM, 80). Among them are the hysterics, nymphomaniacs, and homosexuals that usher in a contemporary sexual order characterized by what Foucault calls in HS1 the "implantation of multiple perversions" (HS1, 48).

Starting with this story about the production of perversions as deviations from a rational moral order, in this essay I focus on the ethical stakes of rationalized sexuality in biopower, the form of power Foucault describes as the "life of the species" (HS1, 146) that biology invented in the nineteenth century as "life itself" (HS1, 143). Explicitly transposing his engagement with life from a moral frame of good versus bad to one in which "everything" is at stake, Foucault once said: "My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad" (EW1, 256). An ethical engagement with sexuality across Foucault's oeuvre takes seriously Foucault's point about danger; it suggests the importance of an uncertain but faithful ethical courage as an alternative to the Enlightenment moral telos of normative constraint and liberation. It also suggests that there is more at stake in the struggle for sexual freedom than the eudaimonistic practices his readers have sometimes defended through HS1's tactical shift from "sex-desire" to "bodies and pleasures" (HS1, 157). At stake in biopower is not the "liberation" of individual bodies into an orgiastic life of happiness and pleasure but a life-ordering grid whose threat to masses of bodies and "the whole space of existence" (HS1, 144) requires an erotic ethics of the other.

Sidestepping the lure of individual "bodies and pleasures," I follow instead an erotic path through the sexual *dispositif* in Foucault. Classically conceived as a mad form of love, in Freud's modern borrowing eros becomes another name for "life." Beginning with the erotic murmur we can hear in *History of Madness*, I trace eros as an archaic name for modern life that contests the scientific objectification of life as *bios*. In both HM and HS1, Foucault reverses Freud's prior reversal of ancient mad eros into modern rationalized life; in that re-reversal, eros emerges as a new name for an unreasonable, corporeal ethics of living in the biopolitical present. This ethics is not a code: it is neither normative nor systematic. Rather, it startles and surprises us. It pierces us like an arrow and scrambles us like a poem. Its erotic intensities transform us.

I develop my argument about an erotic ethics in Foucault in four parts. The first part, "My little mad ones, my little excluded ones, my little abnormals," situates my philosophical concerns in the context of the distinctively archival method that is a hallmark of Foucault's thinking. Recalling my own archival encounter with unpublished traces

of Foucault's work, I reflect on a rare moment of autobiographical sexual confession in Foucault as a question about Foucault's ethical relation to "society's shadow," those he calls the "excluded ones." In the second part, "*History of Madness* and the Moral Geometry of Modern Sexuality," I pursue the question of Foucault's ethics by examining the historical rise of the sexual *dispositif* as a function of morality, subjectivity, and truth. In doing so, I consider queer theory's contradictory position vis-à-vis moral norms as a failure to engage sexual ethics as a historical problem. I then reframe the story *History of Madness* tells about the Cartesian exclusion of madness from the *cogito* as an ethical exclusion; that discursive exile of the mad is paralleled by the mid-seventeenth-century confinement of those whom today we might label as queer. The third part, "Sex Play in the Archive," returns to the archive as the material site of Foucault's practice as a thinker. Revisiting *History of Madness* through the lens of Foucault's essay "Lives of Infamous Men," I demonstrate how Foucault works strategically to retrace and interrupt a morally coded sexual ethics through an archival, desubjectivating ethical practice that is explicitly erotic. Finally, in "Foucault's Ethics of Eros," I develop this conception of a Foucauldian ethics of eros as a transformative thinking-feeling of life in biopower. If bios is a life form captured by modern power, eros names biopolitical life's transfiguration into new possibilities for living.

"My little mad ones, my little excluded ones, my little abnormalities"

As a queer feminist scholar, for many years I had followed other queer theorists in their obsessive focus on HS1 for an understanding of sexuality in Foucault. Then, in September 2006, I spent a month in the Foucault archives at the Institut Mémoires de l'Édition Contemporaine (IMEC) in Normandy. The major result of that archival experience was a strong, previously unacknowledged sense of the importance of *History of Madness* to Foucault. In document after document, Foucault refers to his first major book as one that holds the key to the rest of his writings.

This is not to say that I found the Truth about Foucault in the archives. I found, instead, a messy tangle of documents that complicated what Foucault repeatedly calls games of truth. While at the archives I listened to the recordings of some of Foucault's courses at the Collège de France, examined some documents related to his anti-prison activism in the early 1970s, then spent most of my time carefully reading a 1975 interview with the French philosopher and journalist, Roger-Pol Droit. Foucault had consented to engage in a fifteen-hour conversation with Droit over the course of several sessions, the culmination of which would be its publication as a book with Flammarion. It appears that Foucault was dissatisfied with the results; refusing publication and returning the money he had received as an advance. Droit subsequently published small parts of the interview, but most of it remains, in unedited and unpublished form, as 400 typed manuscript pages available for consultation at IMEC.

I suspect that one of the reasons Foucault disliked this interview so much was its insistent tilt toward biographical concerns. Over and over Foucault remarks on his recourse to biography in his attempts to answer Droit's questions. Toward the end of the interview, as things unravel and Foucault respectfully declares he is not satisfied with the result of their work together, he describes an experience of "suffocation."

Foucault complains that these suffocating questions “to me and about me” forced him to resort to biographical answers.¹

I understand the discomfort and gasping for breath. For, although in other interviews Foucault asserts that his thinking is clearly shaped by autobiography, Droit's insistence on mapping Foucault's writings solely in psychobiographical terms is striking. In addition, the sheer length of the interview makes it appear more despotic in its attempts to pin down this self, this “Foucault,” than most of the shorter interviews. Given Foucault's lifelong effort to undo the self – to interrogate the humanist illusion of an unsplit, self-identical, coherent “I” – his discomfort with the insistence makes sense.

Surprisingly, however, what emerges out of all this discomfort at being pinned down is a personal sexual confession: a first-person utterance that appears to reveal the innermost secret of a self. As the conversation turns to the topic of madness and Foucault's first major book, Foucault reminds Droit that, although *History of Madness* marks the beginning of his writing efforts, his interest in madness has never left him: “for twenty years now,” he says, “I've been worrying about my little mad ones, my little excluded ones, my little abnormals” (Foucault 1975: 25–26).

But why, exactly, Droit wants to know, did Foucault insist on writing *History of Madness*? Foucault responds:

In my personal life, from the moment of my sexual awakening, I felt excluded, not so much rejected, but belonging to society's shadow. It's all the more a problem when you discover it for yourself. All of this was very quickly transformed into a kind of psychiatric threat: if you're not like everyone else, it's because you're abnormal. If you're abnormal, it's because you're sick. (Foucault 1975: 29)

In light of Foucault's well-known doubts about a repressive hypothesis that conceives of modern sexuality as an inner secret to be hidden or revealed, this unpublished confession is startling. Indeed, it raises questions about what Judith Butler and other modern theorists of sexuality inspired by Foucault have consistently asserted, that Foucault “always resisted the confessional moment” (Butler 1990: 110). Here in this interview conducted precisely at the time Foucault was writing what would become his influential critique of the Freudian theory of repression, his revelation of a “moment” of “sexual awakening” appears to repeat the dualistic logic of secrecy and exposure he challenged in HS1.

Or does it? To be sure, Foucault's declaration of his “sexual awakening” looks, at first glance, like the paradigmatic closet structure – from darkness to light, from ignorance to knowledge – that Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick famously identified in *Epistemology of the Closet* as “inexhaustibly productive of modern Western culture and history at large” (Sedgwick 1990: 68). But a closer look at Foucault's remark suggests there is another sexual logic at work here. Plotted against the modern epistemology of the closet analyzed by Sedgwick – where “knowledge means in the first place sexual knowledge” and “ignorance, sexual ignorance” (Sedgwick 1990: 73) – Foucault's sexual self-exposure doesn't quite match the standard truth-telling structure by which queers are typically enjoined to come out. Indeed, if Foucault stages a certain kind of coming out here, its scenic backdrop is not an Enlightenment landscape where darkness, dualistically, gives

way to light. Rather, Foucault's "sexual awakening" leaves him in the penumbra, the partially eclipsed space of "society's shadow."

I want to resist the temptation to read Foucault's statement in a biographical mode, where its shadowy imagery might be illuminated by referring to France in the mid-twentieth century as a homophobic landscape not conducive to queer coming out, as a time and place where "abnormals" continue to be consigned to "society's shadow" even if they are able to come out to themselves. Such a socio-historical reading would miss, I think, important conceptual nuances that are relevant to Foucault's position as a founding thinker of sexuality and eventually queer theory. Foucault's autobiographical transformation of the dark/light structure of Western sexual thinking complicates what at first appears to be a seemingly straightforward, if rare, quasi-public instance of coming out by Foucault. Here in his description of his sexual "awakening," his feelings of "exclusion," and the shock of a "psychiatric threat" that would label him as "abnormal" and "sick," Foucault declares his fidelity to those who belong to the penumbral space of "society's shadow," those he calls the "excluded ones": "my little mad ones, my little abnormals." And in that fidelity Foucault does not come out in the classic sense: he does not assert the triumphal truth of a self's inner sexual core. Rather, in its partial emergence and eclipse the "I" is destabilized: it dissipates at the very moment of its self-disclosure. In its fidelity to a shadowy, inchoate, shifting "we" that cannot be pinned down as Truth, the "I" becomes part of the anonymous, murmuring, historical residue of rationalism's exclusions.

History of Madness and the Moral Geometry of Modern Sexuality

Toward the end of his life, in his final interview, Foucault asked: "why have we made of sexuality a moral experience?" (FL, 472). The question highlights his lifelong interest in the relation between sexuality and moral norms. The question also engages, indirectly, the ways in which morality is tied to truth. That link is made explicit in *History of Madness*, which narrates the historical relation between morality and truth in the rise of the rational, bourgeois subject: the modern sexual subject Foucault will put on display in HS1. This question of sexuality as a moral experience linked to truth is also relevant to the Foucauldian foundations of queer theory and, specifically, the historical problematization of sexual ethics.

In asking, retrospectively, about the *becoming* of sexuality as a moral experience, Foucault explicitly conceptualizes sexual morality as a temporal unfolding. At the same time, although Foucault poses the question as a historical problem that sent him to the texts of the ancient world, he asks it here, in his final interview, from within modernity, as an entry point for understanding sexuality from the point of view of a history of the present. Rethinking the implications of this later, ethical Foucault – his minute dissection of technologies of the self in the Greco-Roman and early Christian worlds as ethical practices of freedom – I reconceive his ethical project as spanning his entire oeuvre, from *History of Madness* and *The Order of Things*, through the genealogical work on punishment and sexuality in the 1970s, and ending with the project on ethical subjectivation in the early 1980s. In that context, I want to enlist Foucault's ethical approach to sexual subjectivity as a way to reconsider the problem of ethics in queer theory.

Unlike Foucault, queer theorists have been reticent to engage with ethics. The thinness of ethical thinking in queer theory stems, in my view, from a number of factors; the most pervasive of these is an implicit queer distaste for a conception of ethics as morality that dominates everyday thinking, professional ethics, and many traditional moral philosophies. Given the history of ethical systems that have morally condemned even the most benign forms of sexual deviation from the norm, the pervasive queer disengagement from ethics is not surprising.

Those queer theorists who do discuss ethics have implicitly adopted the approach of Continental ethicists who, following Nietzsche, distinguish between ethics and morality in a challenge to the exclusionary violence of moral norms: the same kind of violence Foucault alludes to in his evocation of his "little excluded ones," his "little mad ones," and his "little abnormals." Queer theorists Janet Halley and Gayle Rubin, for example, both differentiate between morality and ethics in favor of the latter, but do not include any clear articulation of exactly how to differentiate their normative claim-making ethics from the normative claim-making of traditional morality (Halley 2006; Rubin 1993). The same could be said of queer theorists Michael Warner and Tim Dean who, implicitly rejecting morality and embracing ethics, both argue for what appears to be a fairly traditional conception of ethics as moral autonomy (Warner 1999; Dean 2009). At the more radical end of the queer ethics spectrum, antisocial theorists Leo Bersani and Lee Edelman reverse common conceptions of ethics as relational moral norms into a nonrelational negative ethics (Bersani 1987; Edelman 2003). Yet even this negative ethics makes a normative claim of its own. As Beauvoir once pithily put it: "the assassination of a painting is still a painting" (Beauvoir 1976: 55).

This queer antipathy to engaging normative morality highlights queer theory's contradictory position with regard to moral norms and normativity itself. To begin, while the implicit ethics-versus-morality distinction we find in some queer theory may be heuristically and politically useful, it does not adequately respond to the Foucauldian problem of the historical link that binds sexuality to morality: precisely the link *History of Madness* unfolds. Second, the distinction does not resolve what Judith Butler calls a "paradoxical condition for moral deliberation" that Foucault's lifelong work on subjectivity goes to great lengths to explore (Butler 2005: 10). That is, ethical subjects must negotiate their historically specific relation to morality even as their ethical practice both acknowledges and interrupts the force of morality in their own production as subjects. From this perspective, if we define ethics, in its broadest sense, as reflection that responds to the Socratic question – how should one live? – Foucault's sustained work on ethics allows us to reframe queer theory's rejection of moral norms. If queer theory's primary ethical stance has been the negation of sexual morality, it has quickly found itself in the contradictory position of upholding queer anti-normativity as an inviolable moral norm of its own. That contradictory stance dramatizes the crucial Nietzschean point highlighted by Beauvoir: simply negating moral norms will not prevent the rebounding force of new moralities precisely at the site where morality has been contested.

Foucault's historical question – why have we made sexuality into a moral experience? – thus opens a slightly different post-Nietzschean path through the thicket of sexual ethics. The ethical experience of what Foucault calls desubjection (*dé-subjection*) (EW3, 241; FDE2a, 862) – a self-caring, self-undoing practice of freedom in relation to

others – requires a retraversal of the historical space that binds ethics to morality. And that retraversal involves a return to the paradoxical position of the moral subject Butler describes, where even a resistant negotiation of ethics demands a recognition of one's production as a subject by and within morality. In recalling that paradox, we can also refine the broad Socratic question – how should one live? – by remembering Foucault's definition of ethics as the historical interrogation of the relation between subjectivity and truth (EW1, 289–290), and to view that interrogation as simultaneously pursuing the question of a manner of living and, at the same time, jamming the machinery of moral-subject-production. To ask about ethics in this genealogical sense is to ask about the historical constitution of a subject that is also unraveling: a non-self-identical form of desubjectivation.

More specifically, with regard to sexuality, this Foucauldian approach to ethics begins with the assumption that the modern subject is both a moral subject and a sexual subject: indeed, it is within the *dispositif* of a *morally inflected* sexuality that we become intelligible to ourselves as subjects. Further, modern sexual subjectivity comes at the cost of what Foucault calls *assujettissement* (subjectification) (FHS1 30; HS1 21, translation modified): a subject-producing subjection that simultaneously creates and subjugates sexual subjects within an increasingly differentiated grid of deviance and normalization. Importantly, in *History of Madness* Foucault embeds this process of subjective sexualization in a genealogy that links the rise of rationalism to bourgeois morality: rationalism and morality go hand in hand in the modern system that both incites and imprisons us as sexual beings. Foucault teaches us that we cannot leap free of sexual morality by ignoring it, denouncing it, or simply calling for a new ethics. Rather, the “enormous, distant, and so well hidden land of morality” (Nietzsche 1969: 21) must be retraversed if we are ever to diminish its violence.

In *History of Madness*, Foucault narrates the history of a rational moralism that both produces and excludes sexual deviants; he does so by tracing the rise of rationalism during the Classical Age, a 150-year period that extends from the mid-seventeenth century to the end of the eighteenth century. He begins his tale about the rise of reason in the second chapter, “The Great Confinement,” with a passage from the first of Descartes's *Meditations*:

Unless perhaps I were to liken myself to madmen, whose brains are so damaged by the persistent vapours of melancholia that they firmly maintain they are kings when they are paupers, or say they are dressed in purple when they are naked, or that their heads are made of earthenware or that they are pumpkins, or are made of glass. (in HM, 44)

Foucault reads this passage as a moment of rupture in the history of reason and unreason. Indeed, reason itself (*ratio*) becomes an event that not only divides the Renaissance from the Classical Age but also divides the thinking from the nonthinking subject. This event is a coup, epitomized by Descartes, in the establishment of the sovereignty of the thinking subject who abolishes madness as alien to truth. As Foucault puts it, “thought, as the sovereign exercise carried out by a subject seeking the truth, can no longer be devoid of reason” (HM, 47). Madness becomes the “condition of impossibility of thought” and the mad, as a result, are excluded from thinking (HM, 57). In this system that confers sovereignty on the thinking subject – I think therefore I am – to be excluded

from thinking is to be excluded from being. To be mad is to be disqualified as an "I," as a subject. Importantly, *History of Madness* describes an array of "mad" figures of sexual deviance, including not only sodomites and homosexuals (HM, 87–88, 91), but also hysterics (HM, 277–296), libertines (HM, 387), prostitutes and debauchers (HM, 89, 445), nymphomaniacs (HM, 235, 322), and other sexual "abnormals." In Foucault's reading of the Cartesian exclusion of madness from the *cogito*, to be sexually deviant is to be mad: to fail to be a subject. It is, as Foucault puts it when referring to himself, to belong to "society's shadow."

Importantly, in Foucault's account, this Cartesian exclusion of madness from the *cogito* corresponds to an institutional exclusion. This exclusion takes the form of the "great confinement" when, in 1656, 1 percent of the Parisian population was locked up in the General Hospitals. Foucault describes in detail the juridical and institutional practices that resulted in the confinement of those consigned by reason to a place of exile inside the walls of Paris, "in the shadow of the bourgeois city" (HM, 74). In this juxtaposition of Cartesian subjectivity with institutional practices of confinement, Foucault exposes the moral stakes of systems of social control carried out in the name of reason. Confinement becomes, for Foucault, the most visible structure of a classical experience of madness that includes both the rise of exclusionary philosophical reason and, concomitantly, an upheaval within an "ethical experience" (HM, 83).

In this way, Foucault clearly articulates how the Cartesian exile of the mad and the sexually deviant is also the result of an ethical choice: "When the classical age locked up those who through sexually transmitted diseases, homosexuality, debauchery or prodigality had demonstrated a sexual freedom that previous ages might have condemned but had never dreamt of assimilating to forms of insanity, it brought about a strange moral revolution" (HM, 91). The institutionalization of those excluded from the *cogito* turns the space of their confinement into a "moral institution" whose directors have a "moral charge" to uphold "the great ethical pact that underpins human existence" (HM, 73). Further, those who are confined are excluded by the social, economic, and ethical order of an emerging bourgeoisie whose norms are those of family morality. Lumped together into the great space of unreason, reason's exiles within become, increasingly, an undifferentiated mass of others: the poor, the infirm, libertines, prostitutes, magicians, alchemists, beggars, debauchers, sodomites, *précieuses*, nymphomaniacs, homosexuals. They live together, within reason and within the city, as the bourgeois subject's repudiated shadow: a "negative of the city of morals" (HM, 74). Thus, the Cartesian "birth" of modern reason marks the "birth" of a self-replicating, bourgeois, dualistic moral logic of light and dark, good and bad: born is a "strange republic of the good . . . in the shadow of [a] bourgeois city" (HM, 74) where "the character of the marginal [is] produced by the gesture of segregation itself" (HM, 79).

More important for a history of the present, many of those locked up are those who, today, remain the exemplary objects of moral reflection and moral policing, those we might call queer: libertines, prostitutes, masturbators, sodomites. From a contemporary perspective, then, Foucault's narrative about madness and the confinement of his "little abnormals" is not simply a historical recounting of social and institutional practices of confinement at a particular time and place. More crucially, it is a philosophical critique of Cartesian rationalism and an analysis of the costs of rationalism's conceptual and ethical exclusions. As a result, "our scientific and medical knowledge of

madness rests implicitly on the prior constitution of an ethical experience of unreason" (HM, 91). Together, Cartesianism and bourgeois values in the seventeenth century form a new "imaginary geometry of morality" (HM, 86) through the rationalist, moral "great confinement" of an unintelligible, sexually deviant madness. Over the next two hundred years, that classical confinement will be inverted and reversed to produce modern sexuality as the site of our intelligibility and our freedom. The modern subject of that new moral geometry will be released from the confinement of the *ancien régime* into the "caged freedom" (HM, 436) of positivist psychology, sexology, and eventually psychoanalysis: "freed" into the repressive logic of sexual confession and a twentieth-century proliferation of perversions that persists to this day.

Sex Play in the Archive

In light of the historical frame for sexual exclusion *History of Madness* offers, how might we rethink the question of sexual ethics? How might the modern moral geometry to which the "great confinement" gives birth be transformed? How might our present-day objectification as sexually specified points on a grid of normalization be resisted? Unlike queer theorists, Foucault does not contest sexual normalization through the nay-saying dismissal of normativity itself in an attempt to leap outside morality. Rather, in Nietzschean fashion, he works to transform that geometry from within.

In his later work on ethical subjectivation, Foucault introduces the concept of transformation into moral systems: practices that might alter a modern, bourgeois, morality-based ethics that both binds and produces us as sexual subjects. Indeed, in the second volume of *The History of Sexuality, The Use of Pleasure*, Foucault describes "ethics" as a subset of "morality," which he divides into three categories: (1) a moral code; (2) the conduct of those who follow the code; and (3) "subjectivation," or "ethics": the way individuals constitute themselves as subjects of the code (HS2, 30). Foucault further argues that while every morality includes all three elements, some systems emphasize behavioral codes ("code-oriented moralities") while others emphasize subjectivation ("ethics-oriented moralities"). Thus, if code-based moralities are modern systems of normative values such as those rejected by queer theory, what Foucault calls "ethics-oriented moralities" open possibilities for transformative desubjectivations that can potentially alter those systems. As Charles Scott argues, to ask the question of ethics in this retraversing, post-Nietzschean sense *must* mean to insist on "the noun" – *the question* – over and above its "prepositional object" – *ethics* (Scott 1990: 1). Such an insistence on the question pries ethics open to produce what Scott calls "an interruption in an ethos" (Scott 1990: 4). To ask the question of ethics from this perspective is to ask "how questioning can occur in a manner that puts into question the body of values that led to the questioning" (Scott 1990: 1).

Foucault works strategically to retrace and interrupt the "imaginary geometry" of a morally coded sexual ethics he famously calls "catastrophic" (FL, 473). That retraversal begins with the ground of morality: the rational Western subject. Specifically, Foucault puts into question the subject of truth: the ethical agent whose moral judgments presume epistemic certainty about the world. This is precisely where *History of Madness* becomes a key work for understanding modern ethical desubjectivation

in Foucault. Given the problematization of subjectivity and truth, Foucauldian ethics directly engages the rational moral subject whose complex creation and undoing (as unreason) *History of Madness* traces. Just as this book begins, in Foucault's reading of Descartes, with an interrogation of the subject of truth, so too Foucault's later work on ethics begins with the *question* of the rational moral subject.

This conception of ethics is consistent with Foucault's own retrospective view of his life's work as an extended interrogation of the problem of the relation between subjectivity and truth. "I have always been interested in this problem," Foucault tells his interlocutors in a 1984 interview. And further, this problem begins with "madness":

As I said when we started, I have always been interested in the problem of the relationship between subject and truth. I mean, how does the subject fit into a certain game of truth? The first problem I examined was why madness was problematized, starting at a certain time and following certain practices, as an illness falling under a certain model of medicine. How was the mad subject placed in this game of truth defined by a medical model or a knowledge? (EW1, 289–290)

Foucault further clarifies this relation that links madness, subjectivity, and truth by insisting on his attempts to undo the self-identical Western subject in all his work:

What I rejected was the idea of starting out with a theory of the subject – as is done, for example, in phenomenology or existentialism – and, on the basis of this theory, asking how a given form of knowledge was possible. What I wanted to try to show was how the subject constituted itself, in one specific form or another, as a mad or a healthy subject, as a delinquent or nondelinquent subject, through certain practices that were also games of truth . . . [The subject] is not a substance. It is a form, and this form is not primarily or always identical to itself. (EW1, 290)

Significantly, Foucault played these truth games when he entered the archive, the space where he encounters his "little mad ones," his "little excluded ones," his "little abnormals." In his 1977 essay "Lives of Infamous Men," Foucault revisits the archive that holds the documents – the police reports, doctors' notes, bureaucratic procedures for hospitals and asylums, and those infamous letters sent to authorities by family members to have their kin locked up, known as *lettres de cachet* – that formed the basis of *History of Madness* fifteen years earlier. He speaks in that essay of "the intensity that sparks through" the archival traces, of "the jostling violence of the facts they tell" (EW3, 157). He uses the word "intensity" again and again to evoke these "flash existences," these "poem-lives," from "the first intensities that motivated [him]" in the 1950s when he was writing *History of Madness* to "the intensity they [still] seem to have" when he returns to them in the mid-1970s (EW3, 159). And the archives themselves are traversed by intensities, for they hold in their shadows "particles endowed with an energy all the greater for their being small and difficult to discern" (EW3, 161). Each archival trace is a particle of life: "the most intense point of a life, the point where its energy is concentrated" when it "comes up against power" (EW3, 162).

These particles of life are not what we might call *bios* or "life itself": they are not the biological molecules to be found through the microscopic technologies of modern biopower. They are not a substance, and the intensity of which Foucault speaks is not

an essence or property of the lives themselves. Rather, the intensity is the result of their encounter with power: “the most intense point of a life . . . when it comes up against power” (EW3, 162). But unlike the rationalist ordering of life in biopower, this intensity is erotic because it solicits the senses and engages the real: “Real lives were ‘enacted’ [‘jouées’] in these few sentences” (EW3, 160; FDE2a, 240), sentences whose re-reading produces in Foucault “an emotion, laughter, surprise, a certain dread,” even “stupefaction” (EW3, 157). It is the corporeal stuff of life-as-eros that transforms Foucault in an encounter whose form is both “physical” (EW3, 158) and poetic: “traps, weapons, cries, gestures, attitudes, ruses, intrigues,” bodies that lived and died (EW3, 160). This erotic intensity distinguishes these lives not only from scientific bios but also from literary figures: “none of the dark heroes that [literature has] invented appeared as intense to me as these cobblers, these army deserters, these garment-sellers, these scriveners, these vagabond monks, all of them rabid, scandalous, or pitiful” (EW3, 160), Foucault writes. Unlike literature, the erotic intensity of these “poem-lives” comes, quite simply, from “the mere fact that they are known to have lived” (EW3, 160).

Indeed, it is in the “play” of these “poem-lives” in their “encounter with power” – momentarily “illuminated” by a “beam of light” (EW3, 161) – that they become, in Foucault’s hands, erotic. Importantly, the clash with power alone is not enough to make these lives visible to us. Rather, it is in Foucault’s own cognitive, corporeal, and affective encounter with these texts “trailing the fragments of a reality they are a part of” (EW3, 160) – in his own historico-philosophical game of power – that these lives become “poem-lives” with an erotic intensity: a flashing luminosity that “snatche[s] them from the darkness” (EW3, 161). That archival darkness is a site of violence where the remains of deviants struck down are preserved. In the archive Foucault encounters the fragmented traces of sodomites, usurers, “scandalous monk(s),” and “the feeble-minded” (EW3, 158), all “reduced to ashes” and stifled, “as one stifles a cry, smothers a fire, or strangles an animal” (EW3, 158). However, through that encounter both Foucault and the violated life of the archival “body” are transformed: “life” is eroticized in a new clash between the poem-lives and power. This sex play in the archive creates new, loving configurations of the shadows and profiles of an archival body constituted by a violent sexual *dispositif*. In that sense, Foucault’s living encounter with the archives is an erotic, strategic one, like the sexual or amorous game of power he describes in “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom”: in his approach to the archives, he “wield[s] power over the other” (EW1, 298), the “little abnormal” he finds in the darkness. But in that encounter between knower and known – between Foucault and his “little mad ones” – the relation of power becomes like the “open-ended strategic game” (EW1, 298) Foucault finds in “sexual or amorous relationships” (EW1, 298). Remembering that Foucauldian “power relations are both intentional and nonsubjective” (HS1, 94) and that their “strategies” are “anonymous, almost unspoken” (HS1, 95), this transformation occurs through a shift in the relation between the subject and truth: truth-seeking conceived as the one-sided pursuit of an object by a subject becomes, instead, an “open-ended” experience of desubjection where the archive – the known – acts on the knower. Thus, “the situation [of power] may be reversed” (EW1, 298) by an erotic, ethical listening that undoes the subject in his will to knowledge, producing vibrations, physical sensations, and feelings in the knower that, paradoxically, cannot be known or named. The power play that is recorded in the dusty

archive – the site that preserves the traces of rationalism's wounding – is thereby transformed in a new game of power which, in Foucault's poetic refashioning of those lives, becomes "a part of love, of passion, and sexual pleasure" (EW1, 298). This strategic reversal in an archival game of power gives an ethical, erotic shape to what I earlier called Foucault's fidelity to those who belong to "society's shadow," his fidelity to his "little abnormals." I call that peculiarly Foucauldian fidelity an ethics of eros: an alternative thinking and practice of living within modern biopower.

Foucault's Ethics of Eros

Foucault's erotic ethical voice is both crucial and difficult to hear. The few scholars who have analyzed eros in Foucault have focused almost exclusively on his treatment of Plato and the practice of *askēsis* in his chapter on "Erotics" in *The Use of Pleasure*. John Rajchman, for example, uses Foucault's return to the Greeks to suggest that he "re-eroticized the activity of philosophical or critical thought for our times" (1991: 1) by linking truth with eros. "Foucault's problem about truth," Rajchman writes, "was . . . the problem, in short, of a 'new erotic'" (1991: 88). Rajchman specifically links eros to the "*parrhesiac* situation" (1991: 140) of "frank speech" or truth-telling in the ancient world: "we might again become uncertain and curious as to how to tell the truth about our eros, and the eros of doing so. And so we might give a more precise sense of the 'wonderment' or 'bewilderment' through which philosophy had sought to describe the passion to know, or the 'will to knowledge.' We might define a kind of critical 'curiosity'" (1991: 141). Rajchman also argues that the "question of truth and eros" involved Foucault "in a long and involuted reflection on ethics" that Rajchman links, specifically, with "the passion of thought" (1991: 2). This sense of Foucault's ethics defines both its power and what Rajchman calls its "difficulty for us" in our own "experience of thought" (1991: 27). This experience of thought is an ethical experience, both for Foucault in his encounter with the other and for us when we encounter Foucault.

Along slightly different lines, the Italian philosopher Mariapaola Fimiani has sketched an erotic ethics in Foucault by conceptualizing the ancient tension between eros and rhetoric within the frame of Hegelian recognition (*Anerkennung*). Fimiani presents Platonic eros as a mode of Socratic care (*epimeleia*), an other-oriented form of relation that produces, through the antagonism of the encounter between *erastes* and *eromenos* (lover and beloved), an experience of inversion, the doubling of existence, and a practice of living "in common" (Fimiani 2009: 91, translation mine). Contrasting Foucault's presentation of Platonic eros in *The Use of Pleasure* with his analysis of the Stoics in *The Care of the Self* and his 1981–82 course, *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*, Fimiani highlights the retreat of eros in imperial Rome and the concomitant rise of more rigid, ascetic practices of self-care (*cura sui*) in Stoic philosophy. Tracing through Foucault a Stoic "de-eroticization of listening" and simultaneous "contraction into solitude" (2009: 120, translation mine), Fimiani narrates the loss of a Greek erotic ethics that was characterized by the reversibility of amorous relations and the fragile plurality of communal life. Like Rajchman, Fimiani ultimately interprets Foucault's writings on the Greco-Roman world as an interrogation of modernity. Recalling Greek

eros as the inverted, antagonistic self-doubling of existence into a community of lovers, Fimiani offers a post-Hegelian conception of modern sociality and politics guided not by the sublated ideal of a reconciliation of conflict in absolute knowledge but, rather, by what Paul Ricoeur calls a “mutilated recognition” (Ricoeur 2004; Fimiani 2009: 151, translation mine). If “the erotic constitutes a decisive passage in the complex thematics of *Anerkennung*,” Fimiani writes, Foucault theorizes “a microphysics of amorous relations . . . that mutilates recognition” and promises only “slow, partial, provisional solutions to conflicts” (2009: 56, 161, translations mine). The more humble, wounded, mutilated Hegel that Fimiani finds in Foucault is not, however, a political failure. Rather, in Fimiani’s view the concept of an erotic, mutilated recognition opens contemporary thought to a new “ethical power” (2009: 164, translation mine) and a rearticulation of political life. Ultimately, Fimiani’s Hegelian rereading of the genealogy of the subject in Foucault brings into relief the circular link between the subject and truth, the importance of experience in Foucauldian subjectivation and desubjectivation, and the role of love in the present-day reconstitution of an ethico-political community.

Extending Rajchman’s and Fimiani’s attention to eros in Foucault’s work on antiquity, I argue, somewhat differently, that Foucault’s rethinking of eros begins in *History of Madness* and persists over the course of his entire oeuvre as part of his critical approach to the historical present.² Over the course of this work, eros, like unreason, appears and disappears: in the love poetry of Louise Labé (HM, 13) and the “lyrical homosexuality” (HM, 88) of the Renaissance; in *Rameau’s Nephew*’s “embrace of the lure of the sensible” (HM, 351) or the “return to immediacy” (HM, 351) in Hölderlin’s late poetry; in the “porous body” (HM, 290) of the hysteric “maddened by love” (HM, 280). Rather than pinpointing eros as a distinctively Platonic term revisited by Foucault in his return to the ancient world, I view it as a concept that Foucault refashions from the perspective of our present age. That perspective includes, significantly, its modern Freudian meaning as “life.” Specifically, in *Civilization and its Discontents*, Freud introduces *eros*, the polar opposite of *thanatos* or death, as the life force or libidinal energy that lies at the origin of civilization itself (Freud 1962). Importantly, in theorizing eros “through a fictive anthropology or prehistory of the ‘primal’” (Rajchman 1991: 108), Freud also recodes it in explicitly modern, scientific terms by placing “biological sexual instincts firmly at the root of erotic phenomena” (Bartsch and Bartscherer 2005: 2). Not only life but the origin of life, Freud’s primal eros paradoxically marks the culmination of the biological, developmental conception of life as bios that underpins modern biopower. He thereby also establishes, as Bartsch and Bartscherer put it, “the dominant analytical paradigm for approaching eros throughout much of the twentieth century” (Bartsch and Bartscherer 2005: 2).

Freud’s twentieth-century “erotic archaism” (Rajchman 1991: 108) both highlights and mystifies the scientific displacement of irrational, ecstatic, Platonic eros by the biological “life” of modern reason. Recoded in modernity as sexuality, eros-as-bios is the contemporary result of the great division between reason and unreason that Foucault identifies in *History of Madness* with the Cartesian moment. Specifically, in the post-Cartesian world that follows the great confinement, Foucault notes the loss of a premodern “homosexual lyricism” he links to an erotic “Platonic culture” (HM, 88). That erotic culture not only associates love with unreason – as “a blind madness of the

body" – but also places "Unreason . . . in a position of knowledge" as "the great intoxication of the soul" (HM, 88). Through eros, Foucault links premodern homosexual love to Unreason as a form of knowledge. But with Descartes and the great confinement, both the "mad" love and the "mad" knowledge Foucault associates with eros will be excluded, banished by the "I" of the modern Western *cogito*. Eventually swallowed up by *bio-logos* over the course of the nineteenth century, eros re-emerges in Freud as a mystification of modern, scientific life-as-bios through the tragic theme of the lost origin of civilization. From *History of Madness* to HS1, eros appears, paradoxically, as a disappearance: a profile dissolving at the edge of the horizon, a shadow cast as it falls. Eros becomes the name for that which is lost in the moral rationalization of modern sexuality as the site of our intelligibility. In a movement that leaves eros behind as the unintelligible form of a fading unreason, it can only re-emerge, in the historical present, as an atemporal rupture – as the lightning-quick flash of a "mad" mode of knowing – within the scientific specification of the sexual *dispositif*'s ever-proliferating list of perversions.

What does it mean, then, to reinvoke eros in the context of a Foucauldian ethical subjectivation? It does not mean to pluck it, unchanged and illuminated, from the ancient place in which it is born. To retrieve, today, those bodily practices or forms of relation that resemble what we think eros might have once been is to distort its otherness and, more generally, to betray the alterity of a history ruptured by epistemic breaks that cannot be bridged. Eros is not a timeless form of lyrical expression, nor is it a trans-historical libidinal energy that persists as the force of life itself. Rather, eros is the name we can give to a mode of living both expressed and unexpressed, both appearing and not: an uncertain, embodied, disruptive encounter of subjects with others. Eros names a Nietzschean practice of historical retraversal (Pippin 2010: 41): a genealogical excavation of the land of sexual morality where the *cogito* lives. This erotic retraversal is an ethical, self-transformative, self-undoing labor that exposes the Cartesian "I" to its own limits as a rational moral subject.

The material site of this retraversal is, for Foucault, an archive: the Foucauldian site par excellence of a self-transformative erotic practice. It is not in the bathhouse or the sex club but in the archive that the ethical relation between subjectivity and truth is erotically altered. As Foucault puts it in "Lives of Infamous Men," the knowing subject becomes, like a fable, "marked by a touch of impossibility," pierced by an arrow, "traversed and transfigured" by other lives that cannot be fully known, calculated, or measured (EW3, 173). The fabular subject-object relation of this modern *theatrum mundi* is the result of a self- and other-altering practice that negotiates the biopolitical limits of the imaginary and the real, playing the "game of the 'exemplary fabulous'" (EW3, 173). And if this transformation pushes thinking to its edges, it does not reproduce a Cartesian mind-body split that would negate the erotic corporeality of thinking. Rather, Foucault's archival game of truth juxtaposes corporeal pain with bodily pleasure – the paradoxical piercing of eros – as part of a complex process of thinking-feeling. Restaging historical bodies struck down by rationalist violence, Foucault does not make them live again. But the intensity of his encounter with the remains of that violence – remains Foucault describes, variously, as a collection of dried flowers, a heap of ashes, or the bureaucratic traces of claw-marked flesh (EW3, 161) – produces a cognitive-affective transformation in the thinking-feeling of our present. This is the sense in

which Foucault's history writing is an ethical, erotic practice. Eros is a name for the ethical disposition that impels Foucault to retrace the archive, again and again: to expose, interrupt, and think-feel differently the rationalist wounding of modern biopower.

From this perspective, Foucault's ethics of eros can be conceived as a transformative thinking-feeling of life: if bios names a life form captured by modern power, eros names biopolitical life's transfiguration. In *Hermeneutics of the Subject*, Foucault defines bios, or life, as the object of techniques: bios as "the correlate of a *tekhne*" (C-HS, 486) and "a material for an aesthetic piece of art" (C-HS, 485). Pursuing this idea in "On the Genealogy of Ethics," Foucault explains that "the general Greek problem was not *tekhne* of the self, it was the *tekhne* of life, the *tekhne tou biou*, how to live" (EW1, 260). And if life is an art in the specific context of modern biopower, the stakes of that life are not simply the disciplining of individual bodies, but the ordering of life itself. Indeed, if bios has become, in the modern era, that which is managed, measured, and calculated within the subjectivating grids of science, Foucault's call to transform bios is a call to transform the modes of rational morality through which that ordering is carried out.

If eros is the ethical practice of a subject in relation to truth, as a practice of life it is an ethical intervention into the modern fashioning of life as bios. As a refashioned form of unreason, erotic life interrupts the rationalist management of life in biopower. It does so through "limit-experiences" (EW3, 241) that undo the subject by "wrenching the subject from itself" (EW3, 241). In that interruption of bios by eros the subject-object relation of modern knowledge is transformed: eros performs the transformation of the knowing subject in relation to itself and others.

That transformation of Foucault in the archives extends to the desubjectivating experiences of his readers. As Foucault puts it in reflecting on *History of Madness* in a 1980 interview:

My problem is not to satisfy professional historians; my problem is to create for myself, and to invite others to create with me, by way of a precise historical content, an experience of what we are, not only our past but also our present, an experience of our modernity that might transform us. Which means that at the end of a book we would establish new relationships with the subject at issue: the I who wrote the book and those who have read it would have a different relationship with madness, with its contemporary status, and its history in the modern world. (EW3, 242; FDE2a 863, translation modified)

Understood in relation to Foucauldian genealogy, such a transformation of the subject in the modern epistemic field necessarily engages not only the contemporary practices of subjects in society but also the relation of those subjects to the alterity of history. In that sense, Foucault's genealogical approach to the past as a history of the present can be understood as a lifelong labor that works with the traces of forms of bios. In modernity, bios becomes the life of biological science, life as the object of modern scientific techniques. Foucault's genealogies of the present can thus be viewed as conceptual and affective modes of working with modern life. But, whereas rationalist modes of knowing capture "life itself" as the object of knowledge, Foucault approaches bios in its erotic plurality, as "lives," through an archival art that is his ethical philosophy-as-life, his philosophical life, his engagement with living as a thinking-feeling, erotic philosopher.

Finally, Foucault's erotic attention to historical traces of living in *History of Madness* and "Lives of Infamous Men" contrasts with what Nietzsche calls the "hallowed custom with philosophers" to engage in "unhistorical thinking" (Nietzsche 1969: 25). Foucault, like Nietzsche, is an anti-philosophical, historical philosopher (but anti-historical in his histories) who allows the philosophical to touch the non-philosophical – what Foucault calls "experience" in his tribute to his teacher, Jean Hyppolite – and thereby to transform him (FDE1a, 810–811). This approach to traces of living is Foucault's *ars erotica*, his artistic practice as a feeling thinker and his conception of art as a way of living. Unlike the pre-given packages of traditional scientific, historical, or belletristic literary forms, art opens the possibility of self-and-other transformation. Art is fiction-making, an ethical *poiesis*: the awakening of new ways of living with others.

Some might call this ethics of eros nothing more than the irrational, romantic, mythical dream of a hovering little god with a bow. And indeed, from the time of the publication of *History of Madness*, Foucault has been accused of romanticizing the irrational and mystifying the real. But to accuse Foucault of such mystification in order to dismiss him is to refuse the ethical risk of a thinking-feeling whose stakes include "everything": not only individual lives trapped in archives but, in biopower, "life itself." As Foucault puts it in HS1: "what might be called a society's 'threshold of biological modernity' is reached when the life of the species is staked on its own political strategies" (FHS1 188; HS1, 143, translation modified). The same Enlightenment that, through sexuality, makes the subject intelligible to itself – "made man the offspring of an imperious and intelligible sex" (HS1, 78) – also manages and orders biological life. In its most virulent form, biopower paves the way for "Nazism," a "racism of expansion" (HS1, 125), and the "eugenic ordering of society" (HS1, 149). In its more common, current form, biopower unfolds at the molecular level where, as Nikolas Rose puts it, "there is nothing mystical or incomprehensible about our vitality – anything and everything appears, in principle, to be intelligible" (Rose 2007: 4). To risk an erotic ethics is, in this light, to take the poetic risk of the incomprehensible.

We might well conclude, then, that this poetic risk is indeed the legacy of a romantic, irrational, myth-making Foucault. Of course, had we followed a different path, we might just as easily have concluded (as some in fact have) that Foucault's writings are positivist, rationalist, and scientific. In this essay I have focused on Foucault's *unreason* – the erotic, not-quite-rational dimension of his thinking – as a largely untapped resource for intervening in a present where erotic life is threatened. Indeed, Foucault's willingness to approach the edges of unreason even as he displays a formidable capacity to reason is perhaps the most important aspect of his ethical courage: the modern, parrhesiastic, self-risking courage to expose one's own life, to take the risk of unreason, to be poetically faithful to "society's shadow."

"Unreason," Foucault writes, "would be the great memory of peoples, their greatest faithfulness to the past, where history is always indefinitely contemporary" (HM, 105). From *History of Madness* to Foucault's last course, *The Courage of Truth*, it is this *faithful courage to risk unreason* that characterizes Foucault's ethical approach to an "always indefinitely contemporary" (HM, 105) history. By immersing himself, again and again, in the penumbral archive where the metaphorical ashes of real lives are stored, Foucault engages in a half-imaginary, half-real *poiesis* of the past that transfigures the contemporary forms of our own intelligibility. Initially struck down in their clash with power,

those lives Foucault encounters flicker again through a different attention than the recording, calculating, ordering gaze of biopolitical surveillance. Struck by eros, Foucault's archival poem-lives alert us to a shadowy world of the incomprehensible made illegible, paradoxically, by a modern age where "anything and everything" has become intelligible. In the contemporary ordering of a life with "no shadow" (DP, 201), the erotic intensities of those other (small "e") enlightenments both tease and haunt us. They warn us of the ongoing dangers of (big "E") Enlightenment subjectification and, at the same time, impel us to change: to resist biopower's rationalization of life by taking the risk of the poetic and the incomprehensible.

Notes

- 1 These and subsequent citations are from Michel Foucault, "Entretien avec Roger-Pol Droit" (Foucault 1975), translations mine.
- 2 For a book-length development of this argument, see Huffer 2010.

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The Missing Link

Homo Economicus (*Reading Foucault and Bataille Together*)

SHANNON WINNUBST

“the appearance of sexuality as a fundamental problem marks the transformation of a philosophy of man as worker to a philosophy based on a being who speaks”

Michel Foucault, *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, 50

Foucault only wrote one essay explicitly on the work of Georges Bataille, “A Preface to Transgression.” Occasioned by Bataille’s death, even that one appears to have been somewhat forced – an act of public obligation, albeit one rooted in deep affection. For the rest of Foucault’s oeuvre, Bataille’s name most often surfaces at junctures where Foucault wants to invoke a strange kind of nostalgic hope that he fears is slipping away. Often uttered alongside the names of Nietzsche, Blanchot, and Artaud, the name of Bataille signals *what is still possible* – to think, to do, to live. For example, as Foucault tells his audience in his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France in 1970,

All those who, at one moment or another in our history, have attempted to remould this will to truth and to turn it against truth at that very point where truth undertakes to justify the taboo, and to define madness: all those, from Nietzsche to Artaud to Bataille, must now stand as (probably haughty) signposts for all our future work. (AK, 220)

The name of Bataille also signals that rare turning of historically habituated thought against itself, a turning that Foucault often fears is dying a slow death in the late twentieth century. And the name of Bataille signals what Foucault aspires towards – a true expression of love at its sweetest core, admiration.¹

Perhaps this is why Foucault does not write about him directly. Freud tells us that we incorporate lost love objects into our own psyches, taking on their most beloved qualities as characteristics we also possess. The temptation to offer a psychoanalytic account of Foucault’s love for Bataille is admittedly quite tempting, largely because so perverse, given Foucault’s conflicted relationship to psychoanalysis.² But my intention

A Companion to Foucault, First Edition. Edited by Christopher Falzon, Timothy O’Leary, and Jana Sawicki.
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here is, ironically perhaps, to wrest this “love story” from the throes of the eroticism that has beleaguered readings of both Bataille and Foucault and, in so doing, to open up fresh ways of reading these two thinkers together that will, in turn, produce fresh objects of inquiry: the influence of Bataille on Foucault’s thinking runs far deeper than some kind of mutual obsession with eroticism and the titillations of transgressive, dirty sex.

My argument is that the influence of Bataille on Foucault’s thinking is so formative that it simply goes unmarked in his texts. By developing a reading of Bataille that takes up his ontology of excess energy in his later writings on political economy, I contest the usual readings of Bataille’s influence (on Foucault and on all other later twentieth-century French theorists) as the grand thinker of limits and transgression. Indicating a much more profound role in Foucault’s thinking, I argue that Foucault’s epistemological project of thinking the historically unthought is animated by what Bataille calls his own “Copernican transformation: a reversal of thinking – of ethics” (Bataille 1991: 25).³ Bataille calls this mode of thinking “general economy,” the very phrase Foucault uses in the first volume of *The History of Sexuality* to signal his specific project of putting the repressive hypothesis “back within a *general economy* of discourses on sex in modern societies since the seventeenth century” (HS1, 11, my emphasis). It is this radical reorientation of thinking itself away from the epistemological and political projects of modernity, where clarity and precision are the sole principles of argumentation and evaluation, that, I argue, marks Bataille’s pervasive influence on Foucault.⁴

My efforts in reading Foucault with Bataille are not, therefore, structured by the promise of a prized, esoteric key to the secret of all of Foucault’s texts: each of these thinkers eschews such hermeneutic scaffoldings. Rather, I read Bataille’s texts alongside those of Foucault in an effort to enrich our readings of both thinkers. The mode of reading offered here is bidirectional: I argue that Foucault answers the fundamental question asked by Bataille – namely, the question of how to respond to the ontological imperative of a nonproductive expenditure of excess energy – in historical terms that still give voice to Bataille’s profound hesitancy about the domesticating effects of such historical accounts. At the same time, by developing a reading of Bataille that emphasizes his work on political economy, rather than the themes of the sacred and eroticism that consume most scholarship about him, I will also argue that Foucault’s later genealogies of normalization must also be read in relation to the economic. I will thus develop a reading of Bataille’s *Accursed Share* alongside Foucault’s lectures on neoliberalism, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, not only to develop a specific example of the benefits of reading these two thinkers together, but also to argue that they help us see how *homo economicus* is a crucial, if currently missing, link in much of our thinking about twentieth-century biopolitics.

Can *Jouissance* Have a Social Value?

In his post-World War II, three-volume work on political economy, *The Accursed Share*, Bataille asks the same basic question he asked in his 1933 essay, “The Notion of Expenditure”: can humanity willfully negotiate, epistemologically and psychologically, nonproductive expenditure? For Bataille, all of human living ultimately bends to one

imperative: “energy . . . must ultimately be spent lavishly” (Bataille 1991: 22). It must be squandered, sent up in smoke. And the inability to see this – to think it, to grasp it, much less to do it intentionally – constitutes the fundamental problem of ethics.

From his early essays of the 1930s to his later, post-war work, Bataille is consumed by this problem, sometimes quite personally. He frames it as an ontological problem of human consciousness, hemmed in by insufficient epistemological and evaluative principles, especially in modernity. Our finitude, so it always seems to Bataille, keeps us from grasping the world in its most general contours. We are always confined to limited viewpoints – or what Bataille calls “restricted economies” – of various historical manifestations. Bataille situates his writing differently, emerging from “the general point of view based on the exuberance of living matter as a whole” (Bataille 1991: 39). He insists on taking into consideration “a play of energy that no particular end limits: the play of *living matter in general*” (Bataille 1991: 23) wherein “energy is always in excess: the question is always posed in terms of extravagance” (Bataille 1991: 23).

To do so is no easy feat, particularly in contemporary cultures of modernity and advanced, bourgeois capitalism. Our habits run too intensely in the counter-direction: our modes of rationality insist on clarity, precision, and linear chains of concepts; our modes of evaluation demand utility and clearly defined *teloi*. Consequently, most of Bataille’s writing is consumed with the attempt to do the impossible – to give voice to this very different view of meaning, thinking, and living. This effort to articulate that which surpasses us, “to realize one’s ends [by carrying] out a movement that surpasses them” (Bataille 1991: 21), tortures Bataille’s prose. Indeed, as he tells us in the opening pages of volume 1 of *The Accursed Share* along with so many other places, it even tortures Bataille himself. He is utterly aware that this is an impossible movement: in the moment we express this ontological movement of excessive energy, we always already reduce it to the domesticated terms of restricted, contained meaning, epistemologically and ethically. Bataille is trying to express a movement that fundamentally cannot make sense.

It is no wonder, then, that he writes so often of sacrifice. As a practice of intensified limits, sacrifice instantiates one of those all too rare moments that are both exquisitely painful and pleasurable. Whether in anguish or ecstasy, in violence or laughter, in sacrifice or eroticism, Bataille is drawn to such practices. His texts provide us with both endless accounts of them as well as performative instances of them, inviting and provoking us to undergo this exquisite *jouissance* – this intensified pleasure that is finally indistinguishable from pain – that marks the breaking forth of this excessive energy into our restricted lives. Sex and death, the twinned roots of religion for Bataille, are the privileged domains in which this luxurious squandering of all energy most often bursts forth into the mundanity of lives otherwise emptied of such ebullition. Fundamentally, however, these moments of *jouissance*, these moments in which “*the subject [is] at its boiling point*” (Bataille 1991: 10), subvert all efforts at articulation: the *jouissance* of nonproductive expenditure is fundamentally insubordinate.

Given this tortured attempt to express the impossible, to give restricted form to the movement of energy that disrupts all form, Bataille’s efforts at articulation absorb most of his work. He scans life forms, both human and non-human, for instances of this glorious waste. His earlier work, including the pseudonymous fiction, fastens mostly on immediate social psychological formations in which nonproductive expenditure punctuates

banal life into glorious, even sacred, moments: the extravagance of jewels that grants them their social significance; the violence of sacrificial practices that invoke the sacred; the infamous practices of potlatch that grant social stature; and so on.⁵ As his work develops, particularly post-World War II, Bataille's approach to this persistent problem divides into two different emphases: the *Atheological Summa* and *The Accursed Share*.

The *Atheological Summa* deepens the pre-war work's emphases on the ontological impossibility of any directly positive social value for this insubordinate *jouissance*, casting the problem in more difficult socio-psychological examples, such as the prolonged meditations on the image of Chinese torture victims in *Inner Experience* and the violent prostitute-as-God of *Madame Edwarda*. The tension in these texts is Bataille's insistent refusal to domesticate these intense experiences of ecstatic violence, suffering, anguish, and guilt – his refusal, as Amy Hollywood argues, “to provide a narrative for them that risks covering over their sheer horror” (Hollywood 2002: 83). Hollywood thereby draws out an important strand of scholarship on Bataille that frames his fundamental question of nonproductive expenditure in the terms of finitude, history, and language.⁶ In this way, Bataille is read as giving voice to the ontological impossibility of articulating the movement of pure, excessive energy that resists and disrupts the restricted economies of meaning made possible through language and its historical forms.⁷ The only social value granted the insubordinate *jouissance* of nonproductive expenditure is, accordingly, its function as a limit, granting value to things such as extravagant jewels only through an absurd inversion of the usual codes of social value, grounded in utility and morality.

We find a rather different track in the other part of Bataille's post-war writing, *The Accursed Share*. Still writing from the ontological position of “the play of living matter in general, [wherein] energy is always in excess” (Bataille 1991: 23), Bataille ventures into the possibility of exploring this movement of energy in historical formations. The three volumes are, as he tells us over and over, works in political economy. But it is political economy turned on its head, taking “‘expenditure’” (the ‘consumption’) of wealth, rather than production, [as] the primary object” (Bataille 1991: 9). It is a three-volume examination of the movement of that “excess energy, translated into the effervescence of life” (Bataille 1991: 10). He offers this overview of the work:

I will begin with a basic fact: The living organism, in a situation determined by the play of energy on the surface of the globe, ordinarily receives more energy than is necessary for maintaining life; the excess energy (wealth) can be used for the growth of a system (e.g., an organism); if the system can no longer grow, or if the excess cannot be completely absorbed in its growth, it must necessarily be lost without profit; it must be spent, willingly or not, gloriously or catastrophically. (Bataille 1991: 21)

Without departing from the commitments of his earlier work and *The Atheological Summa*, Bataille turns to historical formations, ranging from ancient religious practices of the Aztecs to contemporary economic policies of the Marshall Plan, to address the question of *how* this nonproductive expenditure – the root of insubordinate *jouissance* – has appeared in various historical formations. As he says, the energy must be spent. It must burn. But the question takes on more explicitly ethical and political contours in *The Accursed Share*, becoming the question of *how* it will burn: gloriously or catastrophically?

With a great deal of attention to his method of “general economy,” Bataille thereby turns to a variety of historical formations in *The Accursed Share* to postulate accounts of how this excessive energy has burned. The method of general economy thus treads into the dangerous possibility of domesticating that insubordinate *jouissance* which is the mark of excessive expenditure in our human lives. The result is paradoxical, to say the least: while still honoring the ontological impossibility of articulating *jouissance* that saturates Bataille’s other writing, the method of general economy also manages to throw the question of nonproductive expenditure into historical light, by drawing a vast array of heterogeneous connections between various domains of living. Insistent on writing from the perspective of the subject who is undergoing nonproductive expenditure, Bataille casts to the wind the modern disciplining mandate of concise boundaries and methods of “clear and distinct” inquiries. In the terms of his work on the ontological limits of rational, moral, meaningful experience, this undergoing is expressed as insubordinate *jouissance* that cannot take on any social value other than that of the limit. But in the terms of his work on locating moments of that *jouissance* in various historical terms, Bataille frames this insubordinate *jouissance* as acts of consumption that are a part of all societies. Specifically, by beginning “with an account of the historical data [and] relating their meaning to the *present data*” (Bataille 1991: 41), Bataille examines how the prohibition against waste becomes the founding law – the grounding and initiating law – of modernity, particularly as exacerbated by the emergence of market, bourgeois capitalism. True to his method of general economy, he does so by focusing on two domains of modern experience in *The Accursed Share*: economics and sexuality.

Why Doesn’t *Jouissance* Have a Social Value?

It is more difficult to argue that Foucault explores one fundamental question across his oeuvre. His early archaeological work of *The Order of Things* and *The Archaeology of Knowledge* examines how specific historical domains (“epistemes”) shift, interlock, overlap, and diverge across three centuries, from the fifteenth to the eighteenth. The work often seems so formal that the specificities of his topics – representation, natural history, and economics – virtually disappear into the schematics of his connections: the early charges of structuralism leveled against him were not so outrageous. In the later genealogical work, it is almost as if the specificities get their sweet revenge: the devil is in the details, whereby Foucault intensifies the multiplicities and discontinuities of historical formations to argue against some of the most treasured illusions of Western liberalism, such as the allegedly increasing humanism in practices of confinement (*History of Madness*⁸) and incarceration (*Discipline and Punish*), or the alleged progressive liberation of sexual desires (*History of Sexuality*, volume 1). Foucault’s extensive genealogical work, including his lectures at the Collège de France, is a persistent effort to uncover and interrogate the multiple mechanisms of normalization at work in Western cultures in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The problematic of the constricting of life-forms thus consumes Foucault’s thinking. For example, across the work of *The History of Madness*, *Discipline and Punish*, and *The History of Sexuality*, volume 1, Foucault consistently shows how “unruly” forms of

human living are domesticated into ever narrower concepts of sanity, rationality, humanism, and normality; the uncoded, irrational behavior of the mad is constrained by the institutionalization of the insane; the technologies of surveillance supplant those of direct violence as a way to control newly codified criminal persons and populations; and the discourses of sexuality implant an ethics of individualism and an intensified desire to produce societies of docile bodies, rather than random acts of meaningless pleasures. With a personal anguish that sometimes rivals Bataille's, Foucault both laments and battles against the narrowing and normalizing of possible ways of living that he sees as the fundamental threat of modernity. The work is, to say the least, intensely historical.

The early, clichéd image of Foucault as the exotic French thinker of transgression is thus, as such images and clichés are so often, not without some truth.⁹ Like Bataille, Foucault witnesses the constriction of possible ways of living over and over. But while Bataille framed this as the inevitable ontological condition of human finitude, whereby that insubordinate *jouissance* takes on social value only by inverting the accepted norms of restricted values, Foucault ferrets out the specific epistemologies and politics of historically shaped restricted economies of meaning. With this emphasis on the historical and the ongoing concern about the constriction of ways of living, especially the increasingly domesticated experiences of pleasure,¹⁰ Foucault reframes Bataille's question about the ontological possibility of *jouissance* as a positive social value into the problem of historical formations: *why doesn't jouissance take on a more direct social value?*

For Foucault, Bataille's central insight about the impossibility of containing and controlling the excessive energy of life in restricted economies of meaning and morality does not preclude the evaluation of better and worse historical negotiations of this defining condition of finitude. In his genealogies of disciplinary power and biopolitics, Foucault relentlessly questions the modern insistence on a narrative of progress. Even when such work questions some of our most sacred values, such as the interdiction against sex with children (as in the infamous example of Jouy in the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*), Foucault does not shy away from asking whether the proclamations of progress, such as those of humanism or liberation, are really as ethical as they appear. To make such assessments, however, Foucault takes his ethical barometer from an ontology that is much more akin, I am suggesting, to Bataille's insistence on the excessive expenditure of energy.

Foucault's work is thus not a break from this central Bataillean problematic of how to negotiate this excessive expenditure, but rather a further venturing into the kind of historical analyses that Bataille turns towards in *The Accursed Share*. Foucault's span of such a bewildering array of topics (madness, criminality, sexuality) becomes, in this vein, a continuation of Bataille's methodological turn to "general economies" – a turn that, in its disparate objects of study, allows for a historical look at the problematic of expenditure and *jouissance* that we find in Bataille without submitting it to the Hegelian machine of dialectics. Foucault shared with many of his contemporaries the fear that Hegel was standing, "motionless, waiting for us" (AK, 235), at the end of our anti-Hegelian tricks: he feared the totalizing grasp of rationality and all of its forms. But his immersion in Bataille's meditations on expenditure and *jouissance*, which I will argue becomes his own meditation on "bodies and pleasures," anchors Foucault in an ontology of excess that allows one of his central transformations: the historicizing of

rationality. Once he is attuned, as Bataille is, to seeing a wild, unruly excess of life-forms in the world, Foucault can allay these fears of the Hegelian, totalizing menace of an ontologically fundamental rational order. Reason becomes, rather, the historically specific modes of various kinds of rationality at work in this modern, disciplining, normalizing society of endless surveillance: reason is thoroughly and always embroiled with power. Reason is historical and political.

Consequently, our undergoings of expenditure and *jouissance* are also historical and political. When Foucault laments the loss of *ars erotica* and “bodies and pleasures” in *The History of Sexuality*, volume 1, or claims that we “know nothing of pleasure” in an interview in 1982 (EWI, 129), he is not lamenting the ontological condition of human finitude, but rather the foreclosures and constrictions of normalizing regimes of sexuality – an argument that is perhaps all too well known by now.¹¹ But in the earlier essay on Bataille, “A Preface to Transgression,” he locates this emergent discourse of sexuality in a different register: the death of God. Emphasizing Bataille’s work in the *Atheological Summa*, with nods to his fiction, Foucault reads Bataille’s language of sexuality as intimately tied to Bataille’s ongoing efforts to instantiate the sacred – to provoke and undergo the insubordinate *jouissance* of expenditure. This pairing of sexuality and the sacred indicates to Foucault what is lost in the modern normalizing discourses of sexuality, as well as of criminality, madness, abnormality, and so on. As he writes in “A Preface to Transgression,” thirteen years before diagnosing the ruse of the Repressive Hypothesis:

a rigorous language, as it arises from sexuality, will not reveal the secret of man’s natural being, nor will it express the serenity of anthropological truths, but rather, it will say that he exists without God; the speech given to sexuality is contemporaneous, both in time and in structure, with that through which we announced to ourselves that God is dead. (EW2, 70)

Bataille’s meditations on the erotic and sacrificial practices of the Aztecs, the Gnostics, ancient Islam, Lamaism, and so on, indicate precisely what is cut off from us in the modern disciplining regimes that Foucault will come to call “biopolitics.” The lament and anguish of this loss drive Foucault’s disparate genealogies: he shares Bataille’s obsession with expenditure and *jouissance*.

Having undergone Bataille’s tortured expressions of the insubordinate *jouissance*, Foucault remains forever in touch with that rare, anguished ecstasy. But he also sees that the initiation of modernity through the prohibition of waste, which is Bataille’s formulation of the foreclosure of nonproductive expenditure, has ushered in new kinds of regulatory, disciplining rationality that render the possibility of encountering the *jouissance* of pure expenditure less and less common – and more and more catastrophic. And so it is to these new forms of constricting, normalizing rationality and power that Foucault turns.

Why Economics?

When Foucault reads Bataille as the thinker unrivaled in grasping how “the thought that relates to God and the thought that relates to sexuality are linked in a common

form" (EW2, 72), he also locates a fundamental shift in the conception of the human in philosophy. As we see in "A Preface to Transgression," the death of God shifts the location of infinity from an experience of exteriority – that is, where "God" functions as "a word which surpasses all words" (EW2, 72) – to one of interiority, to which the emergent discourse on sexuality then lays claim. The death of God thus forces the discovery of languages other than religiosity and theology in which to express the insubordinate *jouissance* of limitless excess. And as Foucault describes it, Bataille shows us with utter lucidity how "the language of sexuality has lifted us into the night where God is absent" (EW2, 70). Animating the dynamics of transgression and limits, especially while holding out the promise of a sacred truth in a fully profane world, the discourse of sexuality takes on the play of infinity that the discourse of religion once carried. Of course, the results are rather disappointing: the "transgressive" language of sexuality, with all its promises of liberation and salvation, turns out to be central to the apparatus of domestication. As Mark Jordan quips, "the announcement of the death of God prepares for the advent of sexuality in expected and unexpected ways – by creating a vacuum to be filled but also by demanding an erotic theodicy But instead of Dionysus we get the regime of managed copulation, of identities, of hygienic genital control. We wanted Dionysus; instead we got Krafft-Ebing – or, worse, the American Freud" (Jordan 2011: 47).

For Foucault in this early essay and for the majority of scholarship on Bataille deriving from the *Atheological Summa*, this problematic of the transformation of the experience of the infinite in the wake of the death of God gets framed as the twinned problem of language and transgression.¹² In short, framed as a question of experiencing the infinite, the death of God is read as the death of religious experiences of the sacred, which is then compensated for by a turn to language as another site of the infinite. The death of God thus presents Foucault's entire generation of French thinkers with their most defining, shared horizon: the linguistic turn. In that turn, one of Foucault's major contributions in this transition from God to language is the critical role of sexuality – an insight he explicitly links to his readings of Bataille. But in reading Bataille through *The Accursed Share* and its emphases on economics, I want to latch on to a few short paragraphs at the end of "A Preface to Transgression" and suggest there is one further missing link in this chain of transformation from God to sexuality and language: *homo economicus*.

Towards the end of the essay, Foucault briefly invokes Bataille's critique of the Marxist conception of economics – namely, Bataille's insistence that we approach the question of economics through the dynamics of excess and consumption, rather than through lack (need, hunger) and production. Foucault then glosses quickly to the emergent realm of discourse that absorbs his attention when engaging with the Bataillean thematic of excess: the discourse of sexuality. But in these brief sentences, we are reminded of broader textual connections between Foucault's extensive examinations of economics in both *The Order of Things* and *The Archaeology of Knowledge* and Bataille's work on the relations of eroticism to economics in the three volumes of *The Accursed Share*. Taking this brief mention of economics in "A Preface to Transgression" seriously, we begin to see how Bataille and Foucault are both engaged, albeit from the different perspectives elaborated above, in a nexus of overlapping anthropologies wherein the human condition is conceived as fundamentally religious, sexual, linguistic – and

economic. For Bataille, these overlapping anthropologies form the knot of human ontology. For Foucault, the more historically minded thinker of the pair, these overlapping anthropologies function as markers for a series of historical transformations, albeit discontinuous and non-causal, from *homo religiosus* to *homo economicus* to *scientia sexualis* and the linguistic turn.

For both thinkers, however, the anthropology of *homo economicus* brings unusual dynamics into play, and – particularly given how undertheorized these aspects have been in scholarship on both figures – I want to draw them out further. For Bataille, the examination of *homo economicus* initiates an unusually prolonged historical examination: in the first volume of *The Accursed Share*, entitled *Consumption*, he traces how Calvin introduces a fundamentally economic theology into the Protestant transformation that forever changes religious discourse. The rest of volume 1 and most of volume 3 is then an extensive examination of various economic developments of the time, especially those of Soviet industrialization, the Marshall Plan, and communism, more broadly. For Foucault, the inquiry into the historical formations of *homo economicus* is the most discontinuous of thematics across his oeuvre. It absorbs much of his early work, but then virtually falls out of his writing entirely as he turns to his genealogical projects on the various discourses of normalization – with one notable exception, the 1978–79 lectures on neoliberalism at the Collège de France, *The Birth of Biopolitics*. Consequently, despite all the work on economics in *The Order of Things* and *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault never explicitly integrates any examination of the economic into his various genealogical projects. That is, he never addresses the exact contours of the economic in this chain of anthropological transformations – especially in the shift from the death of God to the discourse of sexuality. By offering a reading of Bataille's *Consumption* alongside Foucault's *The Birth of Biopolitics*, I hope to sketch some of this missing link. And, along the way, I will also offer a concrete textual example of the benefits of reading these two thinkers together.

From *Homo Religiosus* to *Homo Economicus*: The Calvinist Turn

In this post-Marx era of advanced capitalism, most discussions of the religiosity of capital turn on the question of some form of drug use. In an extension of Marx's infamous charge that religion is "an opiate of the masses," capital and its lures of products and technologies are now regularly read as supplanting all previous, pre-modern senses of the divine. When reading capital as a religion, no one really challenges this Marxist conception of religion as an opiate to make life palatable. The debate is merely about which kind of opium (or some other drug) is preferred by the masses. We find a rather different approach in Bataille's reading of the very earliest roots of capitalism in the theology of John Calvin.

In charting the Protestant break from Catholicism, Bataille traces the true ontological break to the figure of Calvin, not Luther, precisely because it is Calvin who creates a theology for the political economy of nascent capitalism. While Luther famously argued against the Catholic practices of usury and purchasing indulgences, the core of Luther's protest for Bataille was against the *use* of material wealth, not against the existence of luxury and wealth itself. The problem for Luther was not excess itself:

the extravagant cathedrals and abbeys, the idle priests and monks, were not abhorrent to Luther in and of themselves. Rather, in quintessentially Bataillean terms, the problem was the putting to use of that glorious excess, which manifested a perverse confusion of the economic and the religious domains. For Luther, the Catholic urge “to make the Church the earthly radiance of God” (Bataille 1991: 121) achieves precisely the opposite, reducing divinity to the base materialism of things: the church “had succeeded less in making earth heavenly than in making heaven banal” (Bataille 1991: 122).

Consequently, Luther insists on “a decisive separation between God and everything . . . that we can *do* and *really* carry into effect” (Bataille 1991: 121), resulting in a strictly negative system of theology and morality that sunders this material world from the transcendent realm that connotes true divinity. This strictly negative system, however, does not fundamentally break from the view of the economy that runs through Catholicism. Just as the Catholic cosmology, whether through extravagant rituals, idle meditation, or squandering altruism, orients all productive resources toward the nonproductive glory of God, so too Luther’s protest against such “uses” of wealth still upholds the fundamental aversion to business and commerce that was inherent in the Catholic conception of the economy. For the more radical break that, albeit ironically, introduces a social ontology of commerce into the heart of Protestant theology, Bataille follows both Max Weber and R. H. Tawney and turns to Calvin.¹³

Unlike Luther’s “naïve, half-peasant revolt[,] Calvin expressed the aspirations of the middle class of the commercial cities” (Bataille 1991: 115). Giving nascent forms of capitalism their theological scaffolding, Calvin “generally recognized the morality of commerce” (Bataille 1991: 122). The difference from Luther turns on how to deal effectively with the production and consumption of excessive, nonproductive wealth, with Bataille emphasizing the question of consumption. Shorn of its Catholic meaning, to glorify God, wealth becomes for Calvin the hallmark, though never the cause, of God’s grace. He subsequently answers Luther’s dilemma about how to reorient the meaning of luxury and wealth by taking, as Bataille puts it, “the overturning of values effected by Luther to its extreme consequence” (Bataille 1991: 123). Recognizing the inherent production of excess as integral to the economic practices of capitalism, Calvin renders it theologically meaningful through, ironically, the praise of utility. His argument goes something like this: because we can only account for this plane of material existence, we must work diligently as God’s creatures; if excessive wealth emerges from this useful labor, this is merely a sign of God’s grace, not an achievement of our own work. The Protestant work ethic thus emerges in all its glory, so to speak, precisely as the negation of any such glory. As Bataille writes, “[t]he true sanctity of Calvinist works resided in the abandonment of sanctity – in the renunciation of any life that might have in this world a halo of splendor. The sanctification of God was thus linked to the desacralization of human life” (Bataille 1991: 124). Calvin completes Luther’s corrective realignment of the religious and the economic domains – i.e., the separation of the church and the economy – precisely by setting the economic free from any transcendent religious meaning. The gloryless activity of humankind becomes the only religious or moral mandate of Calvinist Protestantism: we become transformed from *homo religiosus* to *homo economicus*, set loose to become all that we can be – namely, masters of commerce.

Bataille thus argues that the transformation into *homo economicus* occurs in the very interior theology of Western *homo religiosus*. When Luther severs human work from religious expression, he sets in motion the desacralization of human experience that Calvin then carries to its limit in his valorization of the work ethic and utility. But utility is not a possible register for the expression of being “ferociously religious” (Bataille 1985: 179), as Bataille passionately describes his counter-attack against modernity’s desacralization of life. Utility is the exemplary restricted economy for Bataille. It is precisely the teleological domestication of all energy, the counter-logic *par excellence* of nonproductive expenditure. As such, it is ontologically not possible to glorify utility. The religious breaking forth of insubordinate *jouissance* occurs through the overcoming of utility, as Bataille shows over and over. In rendering utility and the labor to attain it humanity’s singular value and singular mode of meaning-making, Calvin thereby severs the *jouissance* of religious consciousness from both possibility and valorization. While it may take another three centuries for God to die, Calvin strikes the first blow.

For Bataille, the plight of modern humanity occurs on this post-Calvinist plane of desacralized labor. The ontological knot of religion, economics, sexuality, and language is played out, over and over, in Bataille’s endless phenomenologies of acts and practices that break loose from the restricted economy of utility and work, initiating participants into that moment of insubordinate *jouissance*. In those analyses, these rupturing moments indicate how the narrowed, contained systems of meaning ultimately cannot ground their own ultimate values: jewels, potlatch, sacrifice all signify the highest of values. But in this analysis of Calvin in *The Accursed Share*, the historical account of the emergence of this social ontology of commerce and labor emphasizes that the attenuation of the sacred in capitalism turns on the redirection of the meaning of consumption from a sacred to a profane meaning.

Marx undoubtedly helped nail shut God’s coffin with his analysis of religion as an opiate for the masses, but his analysis ultimately turned on the role of production and labor as the core problematic of capitalist ideology. As Foucault notes in those brief lines on the economic in “A Preface to Transgression,” “in a form of thought that considers man as worker and producer . . . consumption was based entirely on need, and need based itself exclusively on the model of hunger” (EW2, 84). The Marxist critique of capitalism as an ideology, with its reading of religion as a mere ruse to keep laborers content in their state of alienation, turns on an ontology of lack; religion is only conceived by Marx as answering a need, a hunger, a lack that should properly be fulfilled by meaningful activity in our labor. In contrast, Bataille’s ontology of excess, of a profligate expenditure as the ontological imperative of energy, leads him to both an economic analysis centered on consumption and a conception of religion as the expression of excess, not need. Religion is always already an opiate for Bataille: it is always already the wild undergoing of *jouissance*. The danger that Bataille’s consumption-centered analysis of Calvin exposes is the attenuation of this kind of religious *jouissance* – this kind of wild, excessive, and thoroughly meaningless consumption. In the world of commerce and labor, religion is reduced to exactly the terms of utility and its ontology of lack: it merely feeds a hunger. Consequently, because the energy must be spent, the twentieth century is the bloodiest of human history.

Of course, this reading of the twentieth century is precisely the observation that Foucault makes in his final chapter of *The History of Sexuality*, volume 1, where he

introduces his notion of biopolitics. For Foucault, this is one of the most devastating effects of biopolitics, whereby wars “are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity” (HS1, 137). Read as a Batailleian concern with how the insubordinate *jouissance* of nonproductive expenditure will erupt, we can also see the correlation of increased violence in the twentieth century with the paired emergence of *scientia sexualis* and recession of *ars erotica* more clearly: with fewer and fewer possibilities for the sexual squandering of *jouissance*, the excessive energy is burned up violently. But what is happening with the religious expressions of *jouissance*? And how is this linked to the emergence of *homo economicus* traced by Bataille and, in his earlier work, by Foucault? I turn now to Foucault’s lectures on neoliberalism, which he reads as the heart and lifeblood of biopolitics, in order to see how this post-Calvinist attenuation of religiosity is taken up in the practices of neoliberalism, wherein the discourses of sexuality reign supreme. In other words, I turn to the next transition in the chain of anthropological transformation – namely, the transition from *homo economicus* to *scientia sexualis*, complete with its displacement of *ars erotica*.

From *Homo Economicus* to *Scientia Sexualis*: The Neoliberal Domestication of *Jouissance*

In *The Birth of Biopolitics*, Foucault argues that we are turned inside out by the social rationality of neoliberalism that takes root in Western cultures across the twentieth century.¹⁴ In politico-economic terms, we are transformed from rights-bearing citizens into entrepreneurs and consumers. Insisting that neoliberalism is not merely the latest ideological instantiation of capitalism, Foucault focuses on the new social epistemologies, ontologies, and subjectivities created in neoliberalism without reducing them to older schematics of interpretation, such as Marxism or liberalism.

Situating neoliberalism in a longer historical context than that of most contemporary scholarship,¹⁵ ranging from eighteenth-century French and British economists to German ordoliberals of the 1930s to 1950s, and the Chicago school of the 1960s and 1970s, Foucault argues that neoliberalism emerges out of an intensification of the fundamental commitment of liberalism: the separation of the economy and the state. (Whereas Calvin was concerned with the separation of the economy and the church, neoliberalism intensifies the role of the economy; notice that neither of these is the classic liberal concern with the separation of the church and state.) This intensification transforms into a new social rationality that is internalized by subjects and externalized by governmental practices. Not a truncated, state-centric operation of abstract politics or elite class ideology, the social rationality of neoliberalism – a form of what Foucault calls “governmentality” – pervades our educational systems, saturates youth culture, dominates political discourse (despite one’s party allegiances), and helps to structure such intimate decisions as the choice of life partner, whether (and how) to rear children, where to live, how to work, and even how to have fun.

In the lectures, Foucault develops an astute genealogy of the various transformations in economic practices and theories, along with their gradual incursion into our concepts and practices of subjectivity. Just as with his work in sexuality, criminality,

and madness, Foucault focuses on how the neoliberal social epistemology of enterprise comes to function as a social ontology with the causal power to produce new kinds of subjectivities. When the early neoliberal theorists¹⁶ approach the worker as “an entrepreneur of himself” (C-BB, 226), they frame the worker as an actor and producer of his own wealth: the worker becomes “human capital” (C-BB, 227). And with this category, neoliberals are off to the races: “they are led to study the way in which human capital is formed and accumulated, and this enables them to apply economic analyses to completely new fields and domains” (C-BB, 227). Human capital becomes the barometer for all of life’s activities: reproduction, and the choice of partners to be involved, becomes a matter of genetic calculation of future human capital; childrearing – “time spent, care given, as well as the parents’ education” (C-BB, 229) – becomes a form of investment in human capital; medical care, public health and hygiene, and even migration all become matters for careful calculation of “investments we have made at the level of man himself” (C-BB, 231). Through this neoliberal transformation of “the human” into “human capital,” Foucault locates the emergence of a subjectivity that, hailing it as “one of the most important theoretical transformations in Western thought since the Middle Ages” (C-BB, 271), he calls a “subject of interests.”¹⁷ As neoliberalism takes root as a widespread cultural discourse, the market becomes the horizon in which subjectivities and values are formed; more specifically, market-centric economic calculation – and all its attendant profit-seeking epistemologies and individualist social ontologies – becomes the mode of rationality for self-reflection and the barometer for individual success.

The fundamental values of work and utility that are sanctified in the infamous Protestant work ethic are thus fading from prominence in the contemporary milieu of neoliberalism. While we may still express allegiance to them, particularly, as in the US, as well-worn vehicles for xenophobic nationalism, we reserve our true admiration for those who achieve economic success with the smallest effort or labor: the great entrepreneurial innovation is great precisely because it grants success with minimal effort. “Maximize interest, minimize labor!” This becomes the slogan of these neoliberal times, severing grace from effort even more radically than the Calvinist theology of commerce. Despite paying ongoing lip-service to those sacred cows of a work ethic and utility, we respond to their interpellation as a faint nostalgic call, heeding rather the kinetic circuit of interests, whatever guise they may assume: compulsive workouts at the gym; the latest hip trends of diet or fashion; quick new fixes for enhanced mental stimulation, whether organic, synthetic, or virtual; and, of course, savvy market transactions, no matter the object or market of exchange. These are the activities and interests of the “subject of interests” that Foucault describes as the fundamental change in subjectivity enacted in the ascendancy of neoliberalism in the early twentieth century.

Foucault characterizes these “interests” as the bedrock for all decisions: “[the] principle of an irreducible, non-transferable, atomistic individual choice which is unconditionally referred to the subject himself” (C-BB, 272). Interests are those irrational and sometimes ineffable connections, whether positive or negative, that we have to experiences; they are the reasons we care about things; they are what psychoanalysis calls cathexes. In previous ontologies, Christianity, liberalism, and even Marxism, interests were conceptualized as tied to desire, which was driven by a lack – that hunger and need which Marx read capitalism as alienating and religion as, subsequently, drugging

with soporific illusions. In the social rationality of neoliberalism, these “interests” are unhinged from fulfilling any need or lack or desire: they are detached from any register of evaluation other than that of endless self-enhancement. In Lacanian terms that may be helpful here, these “interests” can be seen as the pure circuit of the drive, deriving enjoyment not from the act of eating, but from the repetitive stuffing of the mouth.¹⁸ Compulsive repetition, indifferent to the object, becomes the meaning of “enjoyment” for the neoliberal subject, displacing any teleological story of a subject fulfilling a need.

But if this “subject of interests” really does function akin to the function of the drive in Lacanian psychoanalysis, then there is also no *jouissance* here. For Lacan, the paradoxical character of *jouissance* as a pleasure so intense that it is painful (and, vice versa, as a pain so intense that it is pleasurable) derives from its excessive character: the *plus de jouir* of *jouissance* is precisely what makes it impossible to sustain. For Bataille and Foucault, too, *jouissance* is always momentary, fleeting. As Foucault puts it in an interview, “the kind of pleasure I would consider as *the* real pleasure would be so deep, so intense, so overwhelming that I couldn’t survive it. I would die” (EW1, 129). Of course, in the three volumes of *The History of Sexuality* as well as other interviews, Foucault goes on to develop the impossibility of this kind of intensive pleasure, which I am calling *jouissance*, as the problem of the normalization and domestication of pleasure itself in the regime of sexuality. *Scientia sexualis* displaces all possibility of *ars erotica*. In so doing, the discourse of sexuality dupes us (at least) doubly: it holds out the promise of a secret truth, while simultaneously offering only the most anodyne possibilities for sexual pleasure as the passage to that truth. But in a crucial distancing from the discourses of sexuality, neoliberalism makes neither of these overtures: it does not promise any meaning transcendent to the pure kinesis of its circuit precisely because it claims to offer direct, ongoing *jouissance*.

Another slogan of neoliberalism is thus captured in the rhetorically paradoxical phrase, “too much is never enough,” which I see repeatedly on T-shirts on college campuses.¹⁹ Paired with the previous “maximize interest, minimize labor,” we can finally see how neoliberalism takes up Bataille’s persistent question about the imperative squandering of nonproductive, excessive energy: it claims to embrace it directly. As the circuit of the drive, neoliberalism’s kinetic subject of interests demands constant pleasure. Unlike the Calvinist and liberal attempt to form restricted economies based on utility or labor and thereby render the excess squandering of energy taboo, neoliberalism claims to embrace the *jouissance* of such expenditure directly. It lays claim to excess as its central social value – and thus kills it. As the T-shirt so elegantly tells us, this direct undergoing of *jouissance* is impossible to sustain – biologically, psychologically, or socially. Neoliberalism’s claim to undergo it directly and constantly is thus lacking: the excess, the *plus du jouir*, comes up short. “Too much is never enough.” While the T-shirt, written with the ironic detachment that characterizes advanced capitalism, celebrates the excessive excess of these grand times (where even “too much” is not quite apt to capture this grand excess), it also tells us the truth of neoliberalism: the excess is not, finally, what it claims to be. Indeed, as both Bataille and Foucault see so lucidly, forms of human living in the twentieth century know nothing of real pleasure, nothing of *jouissance*. Reading them together, we come to see how this attenuation of pleasure is written into the very proclamation of excessive pleasure that is codified in the theories, practices, and values of neoliberalism.

But if *jouissance* is supplanted by mere enjoyment, if we finally know nothing of pleasure, then Bataille's and Foucault's shared question remains: how will the excess energy be burned? Gloriously or catastrophically? For both Bataille and Foucault, this is the ethical question of our neoliberal age.

The argument I have developed here operates in two registers. First, I argue that the influence of Bataille on Foucault is more profound than the dominant readings about eroticism and transgression suggest. Rather, most of Foucault's central concerns, ranging from his early efforts to escape dialectics to his later rejection of the repressive hypothesis and attempt to describe the production of new pleasures, can be fruitfully read as springing from a fundamentally Bataillean ontology of expenditure. I argue that Foucault can be read as giving historical expression to that ontology, thereby extending Bataille's projects of reconceiving ways of living from the perspective of "general economy."

Given this animating influence of Bataille on Foucault, the second register of the argument examines the particular theme of economics in both thinkers. Both Bataille and Foucault can be read as expanding the usual poststructuralist anthropology derived from late twentieth-century French theorists, which emphasizes the linguistic turn as the response to the death of God, to include sexuality. Through attention to the discourses of economics in both thinkers, I argue that they also offer genealogies of *homo economicus* as a crucial aspect of this poststructuralist anthropology. Particularly in the rise of neoliberalism that we are currently witnessing across the globe, this examination of economics is central to the shared Bataillean–Foucauldian projects of rethinking the possibilities for living meaningful lives – of rethinking ethics.

Notes

- 1 Historically, Foucault's assistance in the posthumous publication of Bataille's *Œuvres complètes* as well as his frequent contributions and editorial consultation to *Critique*, a journal founded by Bataille, clearly indicate the esteem with which he held Bataille and his work. (See "A Preface to Transgression," EW1, 70.)
- 2 See Huffer 2010 for a recent, thorough account of Foucault's complex relationship to psychoanalysis.
- 3 Perhaps more than any of the French theorists imported into the United States in the late 1970s and 1980s, the figures of Bataille and Foucault became iconic as the sexy thinkers of limits and transgression. Stories of Bataille's involvement in sacrificial experiments with the Collège de Sociologie in the woods outside Paris or of Foucault's infamous LSD trips in the desert of California and S/M experiments in Berkeley bathhouses swirled about each of these to create a biographical lore of both thinkers as seekers of "limit-experiences," driven by the shared domain of doubled intensity, sexuality, and death. Both Amy Hollywood (2002) and Michel Surya (2002) debunk these stereotypical readings of Bataille, and many critics have discredited the problematic biography of Foucault by James Miller (1993) that celebrates him as this exotic, transgressive *provocateur*; on Miller's treatment of Foucault, see especially Jay 1995.
- 4 For a more sustained argument of how both Bataille and Foucault take their distance from the Cartesian, modern epistemology of clarity and distinction, see *Queering Freedom* (Winnubst 2006a), especially the introduction, and chs. 4 and 6, and "Bataille's Queer Pleasures:

- The Universe as Spider or Spit" in *Reading Bataille Now* (Winnubst 2006b), where I also position Bataille and Foucault vis-à-vis both Lacan and queer theory.
- 5 For the most explicit exposition of these examples, see "The Notion of Expenditure" in *Visions of Excess* (Bataille 1985). For fictional accounts of struggles with these kinds of examples, see especially *Story of the Eye* (Bataille 1987).
 - 6 These are also the terms of both Foucault's and Derrida's early essays on Bataille and thus fit into early interpretations of both thinkers, wherein Bataille became situated as a precursor to the French poststructuralist "linguistic turn" that absorbed Anglo-American receptions in the 1980s and, taking cues from that singular essay he wrote on Bataille ("A Preface to Transgression"), Foucault becomes his most loyal heir. See Botting and Wilson 1998 for an expansive account and critical appraisal of this narrative.
 - 7 For an excellent early exposition of Bataille in these terms and his consequent role as a corrective to constructivist readings of Foucault, see Jay 1995. Jay concludes his essay with a concern about the ambiguity and even insufficiency of deriving an ethics from the work of Bataille or Foucault; while I do not make the turn to ethics explicitly in this essay, I argue that attention to the economic, particularly as we find it in both *The Accursed Share* and *The Birth of Biopolitics*, gives much more concrete ways to answer this ethical concern.
 - 8 As an earlier work (1961), *The History of Madness* is not technically a "later" genealogical work, thereby frustrating even this attempt to schematize Foucault's thinking along historically developmental lines.
 - 9 See note 3 above for examples of such views.
 - 10 Foucault does not use the term *jouissance* to describe his concerns about pleasure largely because of his distancing from psychoanalysis. By using the term to describe Bataille's concerns with an intensive pleasure that can force the disaggregation of the self and the normative forms of sociality that it subtends, I suggest that Foucault's persistent concern with the domestication of pleasures is closely tied to the same set of concerns, which I am shorthand as "*jouissance*." I develop this dynamic further across the essay, especially in the final section.
 - 11 See Huffer 2010 for a timely caution against domesticating Foucault's reading of sexuality in *History of Sexuality*, volume 1 into a discursively produced phenomenon. Huffer argues for reading *History of Sexuality*, volume 1 alongside the earlier *History of Madness* for a much more robust understanding of Foucault's sense of "experience." In a very similar vein, Martin Jay, Fred Botting, and Scott Wilson all argue that Bataille's roots in Foucault's thinking help to move us beyond the reading of Foucault as offering a "naïve discursive mediation of 'experience.'" (Jay 1995: 169)
 - 12 See Jay 1995 as an exemplar of such readings.
 - 13 Bataille's reading of Luther and Calvin relies on R. H. Tawney's *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, which he uses to accentuate the economic shifts at work in Max Weber's reading of the emergence of Protestantism and capitalism. See Bataille 1991: 115–118.
 - 14 Neoliberalism is arguably one of the most frequently circulating terms in current academic and non-academic political conversations. Accordingly, it invokes a remarkably elastic set of meanings that run the gamut of political fealties: it can refer, for its advocates, to the enlightened state of a free market that is the essence of democracy or, for its critics, to the evils of the economic doctrines of globalization, particularly as linked to the IMF and World Bank (Brown 2005; Dean 2010; Fukiyama 1992; Habermas 2003; Harvey 2005; Sachs 2005; Stiglitz 2003). As an economic doctrine, neoliberalism argues from two core beliefs: (1) that the freedom of the market is necessary and sufficient to distribute public resources; and (2) that the individual is the fundamental unit of sociality and is driven essentially by self-interest. Culturally, these principles came to be associated with Thatcherism and Reaganomics, the first two national administrations to embrace neoliberalism

explicitly in the 1980s. But as much scholarship currently argues, neoliberalism has become the standard framework for economics and politics in capitalist-democratic nations (Harvey 2005; Ong 2006). Scholarship on neoliberalism in the humanities consequently divides into two approaches: (1) the argument that these two core principles are tools of the elite class' ideology (Duggan 2003; Harvey 2005; Giroux 2008; Goldberg 2009); (2) the argument that these two core principles have been so fully internalized by society that they now constitute both the world-view and self-understanding of individuals within neoliberal societies (Foucault in C-BB; Brown 2005; Dean 2010; Lemke 2002; Žižek 2009).

- 15 Most scholarship, such as that of David Harvey, Henry Giroux, Joseph Stiglitz, and Lisa Duggan, locates the emergence of neoliberalism primarily in the Chicago school of the 1960s and, consequently, frames it as an ideology that is vulnerable to Marxist critique. See especially Ong (2006: 10–12) for an overview of these genealogies of neoliberalism.
- 16 Foucault draws extensively on Chicago school theorists for these developments, especially Gary Becker and T. W. Schultz.
- 17 Foucault locates the emergence of this “subject of interests” in English empiricists such as John Locke and David Hume, thereby locating a split subjectivity at the heart of modern discourses of the Rights of Man. See *Birth of Biopolitics*, Lecture 11.
- 18 See Lacan 1981: 167. I am indebted to Jodi Dean's suggestion of this concept for interpreting neoliberalism; see Dean 2010.
- 19 I see this phrase repeatedly on “Save the Tatas” t-shirts on various college campuses in the US. The connection to breasts as somehow “excessive beyond excess,” but only socially valued when cancerous, warrants much further discussion.

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Genealogies of Race and Gender

DAVID-OLIVIER GOUGELET AND
ELLEN K. FEDER

More so than any other category, race and gender are central to the way in which we conceive of ourselves as subjects. We conceive of ourselves as “raced” and as “gendered” human beings, and implicit in that process of self-conception is a host of assumptions concerning both race and gender we often treat as established truths. That is, at the heart of the stories we tell ourselves about our own identities are other stories, stories about what it is to be raced or gendered, stories that purport to reveal something to us about “the way things are.” In turn, the stories we inherit help to inform the manner in which we articulate the world for ourselves, as though the content of concepts such as race and gender were fixed and stable, as though the categories that together constitute subjectivity for us were part not only of the way things are, but of the way they have always been.

The question of a genealogy of race and gender is first and foremost a question of methodology: to adopt a genealogical method in an inquiry concerning these categories of race and gender is to ask: What can we learn about race and gender when we treat them not as fixed, ahistorical categories, but as the products of a number of historical processes? In what ways have both gender and race been constructed over time, and to what ends? By bringing to bear the critical tools provided by Foucauldian methodology on the construction of race and gender in the specific historical case of Levittown, this essay will explore the manner in which the stories we inherit and take for granted concerning identity and difference, the stories that inform our sense of “the way things are,” are shaped historically by the operation of a number of institutions and discourses. Moreover, this essay will argue that the significance of these institutions and discourses becomes apparent only once they are placed within the context of the play of relations of power and the deployment of bodies of knowledge.

Genealogical Method

In “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” the text that, along with his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, marks his explicit turn to the problem of power, Foucault explains that genealogy, in its analysis of singular events, rejects any notion of historical linearity, evolution, or teleology, an approach that is evident not only throughout Nietzsche’s writings, and in particular his writings on morality, but also throughout Foucault’s work on power, work that any genealogy of gender and race should take into account.

Foucault summarizes this methodological approach by proposing that genealogy “opposes itself to the search for ‘origins,’” understood in this sense as the search for that originary locus where one might find the exact essence, perfection, or truth of a thing, whether morality, race, or gender (FDE2, 140/LCP, 144). In other words, genealogy, whatever its object, must never take the form of a search for what Foucault, following Nietzsche, calls the *Ursprung*, to the exclusion of the “vicissitudes of history”; on the contrary, while the search for an ideal, metaphysical origin purports to be history, genealogy seeks precisely to do away with the “chimeras of the origin,” qua locus of essence, perfection, or truth (FDE2, 140/LCP, 144). Thus, genealogy is a critical method. Whereas the form of historical analysis to which both Nietzsche and Foucault are opposed seeks originary, true identity, linear development, and finality, genealogy finds only dispersion, a discontinuous history of singular events, and the play of emergence and chance.

Indeed, rather than the perfect, metaphysical *Ursprung*, Foucault explains, terms like *Herkunft* (descent, provenance) or *Entstehung* (emergence) more properly denote the origin with which genealogy concerns itself (FDE2, 140/LCP, 144). In its analysis of its object’s descent, genealogy concerns itself with a beginning, with a kind of origin, but this beginning should be understood as a pre-subjective beginning, prior to any identity or unity. In this respect, to trace the descent of a concept like race or gender is to account for the proliferation of events that underlie the apparent unity and identity not only of these concepts, but of the discourses and practices within which they are deployed. That is, genealogy emphasizes the singular events that we find at the origin of things – be they concepts, institutions, or discourses – and maintains them in their “proper dispersion”; it identifies the accidents, the errors, the conflicts, in short, the play of forces, that “gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us” (FDE2, 141/LCP, 146).

Now, in the same way that traditional, metaphysical history attempts to find the origin of a thing in an uninterrupted continuity, so too does it conceive of the emergence of a thing in terms of a final term; metaphysical history assumes that a thing has a telos, and that this telos is unchanging. But when one adopts a genealogical perspective and focuses instead on the *Herkunft*, the emergence, of a concept like race or gender in terms not of an unchanging finality but of discontinuous events, what becomes apparent?

According to Foucault, genealogy reveals that we cannot think the origin of a concept, discourse, practice, or institution in terms of the function it currently serves, for they, like everything else, are the product of a continuous, dynamic, and fluid play of forces, of moments of domination in which certain forces overpower other forces

and subjugate a thing to their ends. The *Entstehung* therefore marks the “entry of forces; it is their eruption, their leap from the wings to center stage” (FDE2, 144/LCP, 150). As an object of genealogical analysis, the *Entstehung* of a given discourse or practice is crucial in that it is at the moment of a thing’s emergence that the play of forces that produce it can be analyzed. In that respect, genealogy accomplishes what archaeology did not; it reveals the relations of power within which concepts such as race and gender are constituted and deployed. That is to say, genealogy shows that the play and struggle of forces are at every moment of history codified and inscribed in any number of discourses, techniques, and mechanisms.

Consequently, even as it arguably marks the explicit appearance of the question of power within Foucault’s work, the passage of “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” devoted to the origin, qua *Entstehung*, also entails a different kind of emphasis on the question of knowledge (*savoir*) and its connection to power. As Foucault notes, genealogy seeks to “reestablish the various systems of subjection: not the anticipatory power of meaning, but the hazardous play of dominations” (FDE2, 143/LCP, 148). In other words, genealogy gives an account of the pre-subjective play of forces that, during a given historical epoch and at their various points of emergence, produce the concepts, values, discourses, practices, and institutions which, taken as a whole, constitute an epoch’s episteme.

Thus, as with any other concept, genealogy ought to approach those of race and gender, as well as the myriad discourses, truth-claims, and practices that accompany them, not as fixed and stable, as though resulting from a linear and ordered historical evolution, but rather as the products of a continuous and fluid play of forces. Genealogy ought to approach the concepts of race and gender, as well as the truth-claims made about them and the discourses within which they are deployed, as a series of stories told within different historical epochs and produced by the domination of one set of forces over another: for Foucault, as for Nietzsche, knowledge, practices, and institutions are historicized, such that each is the product not of a metahistorical, teleological movement, but of an aleatory game of dominations. Accordingly, power is operating in the telling and receiving of stories – whether in the form of concepts, discourses, truths, or practices – and is bound to the knowledge that our stories and histories give us.

This intimate connection between power and knowledge is central to genealogy, and it is one Foucault would articulate explicitly in *Discipline and Punish*, the first book he would publish after *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. In the introductory chapter to that text, “The Body of the Condemned,” Foucault lays out a number of the methodological principles guiding his genealogy of modern punitive mechanisms, amongst which is the principle whereby genealogy rejects the notion that “knowledge [*savoir*] can exist only where power relations are suspended and that knowledge can develop only outside its injunctions, its demands and its interests” (FSP, 36/DP, 27). Genealogy demonstrates that, far from excluding one another, power and knowledge “directly imply one another,” in the sense that, on the one hand, there exists no power relation without “the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge” and, on the other, there exists no knowledge that does not at the same time presuppose and reinforce a network of power relations (FSP, 36/DP, 27). Thus, Foucault proposes, relations of power produce knowledge, that is, make certain discourses and practices possible, and knowledge in turn serves as a support for the very power relations by which it is constituted.

This principle – expressed by Foucault through his use of the composite term “power/knowledge” – is central to any genealogical analysis, as it implies that the play of discourse, the truth-claims made within those discourses, and the techniques and mechanisms that take those discourses as their point of support can never be entirely isolated from the power relations that constitute them and which they in turn reinforce and codify. Consequently, Foucault notes, these “power-knowledge relations” should not be analyzed on the basis of whether or not the subject might be free of power relations, and therefore able to know, for that kind of analysis commits the error of assuming that power and knowledge are separate from, and exclude, one another. Rather, any genealogical analysis must account for the fact that the knowing subject, the object of knowledge, and the modalities of knowledge are all the effects of a network of power relations and historical transformations that constitute them. As Foucault had noted in his tribute to Nietzsche, the object of genealogy, in its descent and at its point of emergence, is pre-subjective, which means that knowing is not the activity of a sovereign subject who would then produce a corpus of knowledge. Rather, all three – the subject, the object of knowledge, and the modalities of knowledge – are the effects of the “processes and struggles that produce [power/knowledge] and of which it is made up.” In other words, they are the effects of a play of forces that determine “the forms and possible domains of knowledge” (FSP, 36/DP, 28).

Toward a Genealogy of Race and Gender

Now, with these methodological considerations in mind, what would it mean to trace a genealogy of the relations between gender and race, to treat race and gender – as well as the discourses, truth-claims, and mechanisms to which they are intimately connected – not as monolithic and ahistorical objects, but as the products of a continuous and changing play of power relations, of which they are the effects and for which they serve as support? What can genealogy reveal about gender and race, about their relation, and about the strategic roles the knowledges and mechanisms constructed around them have played in the constitution of modern subjectivity?

While Foucauldian methodology can provide us with the critical tools necessary for understanding and addressing the complex manner in which gender and race have historically been produced, Foucault’s own work provides little guidance in terms of how the production of race and, in particular, gender might be addressed. Indeed, even as many feminist thinkers have found Foucault’s later work useful in analyzing the production of gender and the specific regime of power within which gender operates, a number of theorists, such as Teresa de Lauretis, Judith Butler, and Jana Sawicki, have also taken Foucault to task for his failure to address the production of gender in any sustained way; as de Lauretis states, “Foucault’s theory . . . excludes, though it does not preclude, the consideration of gender” (de Lauretis 1987: 3). Thus, though the genealogical method can serve to illuminate the modern production and operation of gender, Foucault’s own writings tell us little about the role of gender in relations of power.

Conversely, as he moved from an analysis of disciplinary power to one of what he would in his 1976 lectures, *Society Must Be Defended*, call “biopower,” Foucault did provide a sustained genealogy of the concept of race. But it is important to note that

the concept of race of which Foucault provided an analysis in his work of the mid-1970s is very specific, one whose production and function are inextricably tied to the operation of biopower. Indeed, the concept of race Foucault addresses, first in *Abnormal* and subsequently in *Society Must Be Defended*, is a concept of race tied to the function of biopower as guarantor of the health and well-being of a population of living beings. In these lectures Foucault describes the emergence during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of types of racism whose domain of intervention consisted of those abnormal individuals who, by virtue of the risk they posed to the health of the population as a whole, were to be normalized or, in the most extreme cases, eliminated from the population entirely. In *Society Must Be Defended*, Foucault describes this as a form of racism that stipulates that a single race

is given as the one true race, the one that possesses power and is entitled to define the norm, against those who deviate from this norm, against those who represent so many dangers to the biological heritage. (FC-FDS, 53/C-SMD, 61, translation modified)

And in *Abnormal*, Foucault had made a point of distinguishing this novel form of racism against the abnormal at work in the regime of biopower from what he called “traditional, historical racism,” or “ethnic racism,” which is to say the kind of racism found in anti-semitism or in those discourses which asserted the superiority of Caucasians with respect to other races (FC-AN, 299/C-AN, 316–317). In those lectures, he had described this form of racism as “the racism against the abnormal,” as a form of racism against “the individuals who, as carriers of a condition, a stigmata, or any defect whatsoever, may more or less randomly transmit to their heirs the unpredictable consequences of the evil that they carry within them, or rather of the non-normal that they carry within them” (FC-AN, 299/C-AN, 316). Thus, while noting that the two forms of racism were intimately related, and that there quickly arose between traditional ethnic racism and the racism against the abnormal what he described as a “series of interactions,” Foucault was sure to note that the form of racism whose genealogy he would later trace in *Society Must Be Defended* was only one form of racism amongst many. Moreover, the concept of the abnormal operating at its heart remained distinct from, even if related to, the concept of ethnic race that underlay more traditional forms of racism.

Now, along with the genealogy of race and racism Foucault provides in his work on biopower, one could also trace a genealogy of race that attempted to account not only for the production of race in a setting different from that of nineteenth-century Europe, such as the United States during the twentieth century, but also for the manner in which the production of race and that of gender came to be interwoven in the production of the contemporary subject. Taking as its object the example of the construction of Levittown, such a genealogy would examine the intersection of the forms of power – namely, the regulatory power of the state and disciplinary power – evident in the making of new communities in the US during the 1950s and 1960s, and would do so in terms of the roles of race and gender within the operation of that power. Indeed, the story of Levittown provides an opportunity to examine the way in which a regulatory form of power, concerned with the production of a “new whiteness,” dovetailed with the disciplinary enforcement of the proper roles of men and women in such a way as to construct not only a modern subjectivity, but a novel community as well.

Levittown: Constructing Gender and Race

The 1947 founding of Levittown, New York – the first of what would become a succession of Levittowns and similar housing efforts in the years after World War II – inaugurated a historic shift in the conception of housing and the construction of living in the United States. Motivated by a desire to provide returning veterans with affordable housing, the building firm Levitt & Sons, founded by Abraham Levitt and run at the time by William Levitt, acquired 4,000 acres of land in Hempstead, NY, and began to build the planned community that would eventually become the first of three Levittowns. The construction of Levittown emphasized speed and efficiency through mass production: each identical house lining Levittown's gently curving streets was "designed to be a self-contained world," with a fully equipped kitchen, a Bendix washing machine installed in the laundry alcove, and an expansive living room that would eventually have a television set built into the wall (Hayden 1984: 6). Roads were constructed to allow the working husband convenient access to New York City via the newly built Long Island Expressway or the Long Island Railroad; homes were equipped to satisfy the needs of his wife and children.

The construction of Levittown marked the first time that a working class, composed almost entirely of returning GIs and their families, could afford to live in the suburbs. In the post-war period, the expansion of the Federal Housing Authority, together with the GI Bill (the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944), provided financing for projects such as William Levitt's, and allowed veterans to purchase homes with minimal down payments and guaranteed low-interest mortgages for up to thirty years. It was not only possible for working-class families to leave the cramped quarters they often shared with in-laws and extended family in the city, it actually cost less to buy one of the new suburban houses than to rent a smaller apartment in the city. The proud new owners, some of whom waited days in line at the Hicksville, New York sales office for the opportunity to buy one of Levitt's little "boxes," formed a community made of growing families like themselves: so much like themselves that the first issue of Levittown's newsletter included the observation that "our lives are held closely together because most of us are within the same age bracket, in similar income groups, live in almost identical houses and have common problems" (quoted in Jackson 1985: 235).

The homogeneity that characterized Levittown was not accidental. As we will see, a significant role was played by the state, through federal financing of mortgages, in the creation of this American dream. The first important government player was the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC). Established at the urging of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933, HOLC protected families against foreclosure – an increasing problem since the Depression – by introducing the long-term mortgage. The process of assessing the government's new investment in housing produced in turn an important innovation in real-estate appraisal:

With care and extraordinary attention to detail, HOLC appraisers divided the cities into neighborhoods and developed elaborate questionnaires relating to the occupation, income, and ethnicity of the inhabitants and the age, type of construction, price range, sales demand, and general state of repair of the housing stock. (Jackson 1985: 197)

The method of appraisal established by HOLC employed a rating system with letter and color “codes” that corresponded to the estimated desirability of a specific block in every major city; these codes were recorded on “secret ‘Residential Security Maps’” circulated in HOLC, and clandestinely made available to crediting banks (Jackson 1985: 199). An area categorized as being of the first or highest quality was designated grade A, and denoted by the color green. The fourth and least desirable was grade D and designated red (hence “red lining”). Newness of housing and “homogeneity” of a neighborhood’s inhabitants (shorthand for “American business and professional men”) were valued over older housing and ethnic or “mixed” residential composition (officially characterized, in HOLC’s terms, as Jewish “infiltration”) (1985: 197). The notation of a “‘rapidly increasing Negro population’ and the resulting ‘problem in the maintenance of real estate values’” would be ample cause for a downgraded designation, sometimes expressed in the term “hazardous” (1985: 201).

The Federal Housing Authority took over where HOLC left off. Beginning with its founding in 1934 as part of FDR’s New Deal, the FHA stimulated the building of suburban developments and innovated the standardization of housing that Levittown would epitomize ten years later. Adopting the HOLC appraisal system, the FHA trained its underwriters to evaluate a neighborhood’s “appeal” and “protection from adverse influences” in addition to the assessment of adequate utilities and transportation (Jackson 1985: 203, 207). The valued “homogeneity,” along with housing legislation’s stated preference for single-family houses, prefigured the terms on which Levitt’s federal support depended. Not only did the FHA establish a body of requirements and guidelines specifying the preferred dimensions of lots and housing (and, by implication, family size), it encouraged racialized zoning and endorsed restrictive covenants to prevent what it called “inharmonious racial or nationality groups” from lowering the value of the government’s investment (1985: 208).

In the postwar period, the policies of the FHA not only encouraged young European American families – among them the Catholics and Jews who had themselves been barred from suburbs before the war – to forsake ethnic enclaves in the city for the American dream, but, as George Lipsitz writes,

ethnic differences became a less important dividing line in American culture, while race became more important. The suburbs helped turn European Americans into “whites who could live near each other and intermarry with relatively little difficulty.” But this “white” unity rested on residential segregation and on shared access to housing and life chances largely unavailable to communities of color. (Lipsitz 1995: 373–374)

Access to the suburbs, in other words, brought with it admission to the “whiteness” that had characterized suburban living since its origins. The production of a simple racial division between white and black was dramatically reflected in the increasing difference between the suburb and city. Of the neighborhoods ethnic whites left behind, many were destroyed in the urban renewal following the war, while others became minority areas of another stripe, ever more densely occupied as a result of the housing shortage aggravated by urban renewal (Jackson 1985: 206; Lipsitz 1995: 373). Although white ethnic neighborhoods thrived before the war, demographers Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton recount that, “unlike black ghettos, immigrant enclaves

were never homogeneous and always contained a wide variety of nationalities, even if they were publicly associated with a particular national origin group" (Massey and Denton 1993: 32). Massey and Denton suggest that this heterogeneity contributed to a lower "degree of isolation" relative to blacks in ghettos, a contributing factor that made ethnically identified neighborhoods, whether Jewish, Irish, Italian, or Greek, a "fleeting, transitory stage in the process of immigrant assimilation" (1993: 33).

The expansion of the category of whiteness that attended the opening of the suburbs to ethnic European Americans also entailed what Lipsitz describes as a "possessive investment in whiteness" (Lipsitz 1995: 371). Lipsitz argues that this "investment" – conceiving of whiteness as an exclusive "property" to be cultivated and, more importantly, protected (Harris 1993) – had been encouraged "from the start," i.e. from the first European settlement of the suburbs (Lipsitz 1995: 371). However, the racism on which the investment is predicated did not remain the same: the rule of white supremacy that characterized the antebellum South, for example, was not the racism effected in "the putatively race-neutral liberal social democratic reforms of the past five decades" (1995: 372) in which the FHA figures so prominently. Though this racist policy-making, which Lipsitz and others understand as deliberate action on the part of governmental agencies (Lipsitz 1995: 371; Massey and Denton 1993: 19), figures importantly in the post-war production of the possessive investment in whiteness, this investment is particularly pronounced in the initiation of new suburban residents into the club of whiteness from which they had previously been excluded. A clause in the contract of new homeowners in Levittown, NY, suggests the codification of residents' whiteness, and the "proper" relationship to the racial other which this codification attends: "No dwelling shall be used or occupied by members of other than the Caucasian race, but the employment and maintenance of other than Caucasian domestic servants shall be permitted" (quoted in Popenoe 1977: 123). Such an initiation into the club of whiteness calls for an examination of the way in which the residents themselves began to assume responsibility for the enforcement of the racial boundaries they had been encouraged to cross.

The difficulty that would later characterize Levittown's desegregation testifies both to the effects of the assimilation of ethnic Europeans and to the success of the creation of the suburb that facilitated that assimilation. Levittowners' own resistance to desegregation marks a definitive moment in the process by which boundaries dividing geographies and bodies, suburbs and cities, white from black, were deeply etched during this period. "Becoming white" on Levitt's terms entailed molding a kind of suburban lifestyle whereby habits that typified immigrant city life were "corrected" via rulebooks distributed as homeowner's manuals to new buyers, who were instructed that the rules would be "strictly enforced." These included rules prohibiting fences (shrubbery – no more than three feet high – was to be installed instead of a fence) and the requirement of permission from the Levitt organization to change the color of a house. Residents were advised when and how to hang laundry. The maximum number of pets (restricted to dogs and cats) was two (Popenoe 1977: 116). That the first houses available in Levittown were available for rent with the option to buy only after a year signals the consequences of a failure to conform to the expectations specified in the manual, namely, eviction.

The Levittowners, sociologist Herbert Gans's famous study of the "third" Levittown in New Jersey, opened in 1958 (called Willingboro since the early 1960s, the township's

original name), offers an account of the way in which the claim to whiteness represented by suburban homeownership was assumed by Levittowners. While William Levitt's own publicly repeated confirmations of the exclusion of blacks from successive developments could have once been credibly attributed to his dependence on federal funding, those same declarations made a decade later cannot adequately account for the persistence of racist exclusion in the absence of such constraints. Something else had to account for Levitt's public refusal to sell houses to black people in Levittown, New Jersey, after the state had passed legislation outlawing discrimination in connection with federally subsidized housing. The intervention of a New Jersey senator with the FHA, appeals to the governor, picketing of model homes by a local Quaker group: nothing would change Levitt's mind, not even the suit brought by two black families who had been refused sale. Fighting the suit, Levitt was not only contesting New Jersey state law; he was resisting considerable grassroots pressure exerted by Jewish and pro-integration groups nationwide (Gans 1967: 372–373). Without what the Levitt organization characterized as a compelling economic incentive, Levitt would have been forced to acknowledge the racist underpinnings of his policy. Instead, Levitt's representative justified the company's policies by reference to economic realities that government financing policies had created in the 1930s: "Our firm is liberal and progressive, but we don't want to be singled out or used as the firm which should start the other builders off. If there is no other builder who can keep Negroes out, we will not do so either; we will go with the group if the state makes us, but we don't want to lose millions by being the first . . . we could not afford to take such losses" (quoted in Gans 1967: 372). Levitt's fear of financial loss was not wholly unfounded, and stood credibly at the time for a reasonable refusal to allow integration of his housing. After all, the presence of black residents had twenty years earlier caused the government to downgrade the classification of a neighborhood to "hazardous." In the late 1950s, the last of the houses in Levittown, Pennsylvania, were selling sluggishly in the wake of what was described as a "stone-throwing riot" occasioned by the arrival of a single black family, the Myers, to whom a house had been discreetly sold. The congregation of a "milling crowd of about five hundred angry people" – which the local police declined to disperse (Gans 1967: 375) – speaks to the degree to which, having assumed the mantle of whiteness, the new residents were determined to protect their investments, even to the point of taking it upon themselves to enforce the exclusion of the racial other now signified by "the Negro." The tale, Gans suggests, was inflated (two stones were thrown), demonstrating the ways in which this narrative of inevitability, of facts that are known, came to represent the hopelessness of the cause.¹ Levitt's refusal to integrate in the context of the events in Pennsylvania – the development that would ever after be known as "the one that had the riot" (Gans 1967: 375) – cannot then be explained simply in terms of Levitt's own individual preference or decision. His refusal speaks, rather, of an understanding itself informed by a set of assumptions taken to be established truths concerning race and grounded in relations of power.

Indeed, the formation of the improbable "mob" of Levittown, PA, can be understood both as an effect and another instantiation of the power/knowledge circulating there. Theirs was an apparently spontaneous response to what residents took to be a violation of the conditions of their homeownership, many of which were unspoken. But at the

same time, of course, we must not neglect the resonance of *pouvoir* with more ordinary conceptions of power, with force or *puissance*, the kind of power most commonly associated with institutions, exerted from above or from without, for it was also this kind of power, issuing from a federal government, that established the conditions of the milling homeowners' "truth."

Racism on the part of his buyers, then, no less than his own, strongly motivated Levitt to stave off integration for as long as possible, if only to instill confidence in the buyers Levitt still needed to attract, confidence that theirs would be an "all-white" neighborhood. The assurance that one's investment was safe from intrusion of people of color was increasingly important in the wake of the building of highways and urban redevelopment that displaced thousands of black families and contributed to the worsening conditions of the inner city.

Thus, Gans's account illustrates how, at least by the late 1950s and early 1960s, the possessive investment in whiteness that a move to Levittown entailed was not simply a function of federal policy, or even the greed of builders like Levitt. Had that been the case, Gans would probably not have found among the Levittowners with whom he lived that "[m]ost whites who got along well with their neighbors were reluctant to sell to Negroes if the neighbors opposed it" (Gans 1967: 379). This included Gans himself, who was concerned that if he sold to non-whites, his ongoing research would be, as he put it, "endangered" (Gans 1967: 405 n.).

Gans acknowledges his own capitulation to a body of rules governing Levittown and its residents. These rules were enforced locally, via rumor, as Gans recounts, but the force of rumor to ensure order is itself grounded in a disciplinary mechanism that Foucault calls "the distribution of individuals in space." It is instructive to note the multiple levels on which the distribution of individuals can be seen to be operating in Levittown.

The "enclosure" that discipline may involve (FSP, 166/DP, 141) is manifested in the relative isolation of the suburb from the city, e.g. in the parkway designs of Robert Moses in and around New York City, preventing buses and other transport likely to carry "undesirable" people onto selected parts of the island (Caro 1974: 318, 951–952; Winner 1980: 123–124). Refined by Levitt in the diversion of through traffic to the development's periphery (Jackson 1985: 236), the suburb was physically set apart from the city and its inhabitants. Within Levittown, a vaunted "privacy" was secured by the construction of houses to suit only nuclear families no longer connected to their neighbors as in the city, but joined instead by newly acquired similarities of status. This feature evokes the second principle of discipline, namely, "partitioning." More "flexible and detailed" than simple "enclosure" of a factory, a monastery, or a town, partitioning requires that "[e]ach individual has his own place; and each place its individual" (FSP, 167–168/DP, 142–143). In Levittown, not only did each individual family have its own domicile, separate from and yet identical to every other house on the block, but within the house each family member occupied a distinct place as well. Women belonged in the modern kitchen installed in every house, children in the front yard where their mothers "could watch [them play] from the kitchen windows and do their washing and cooking with a minimum of movement" (Jackson 1985: 235). When not at work, men would be occupied by the "do-it-yourself" basement-finish, porch-building, and eventually, "additions" that the design of small houses on large lots accommodated (Hayden 1984: 8).

Perhaps Levitt's remark that "No man who owns his own house and lot can be a communist. He has too much to do" (quoted in Hayden 1984: 8), best captures the image that guided Levittown's design. It also suggests the sort of "machinery," in Foucault's terms, which Levittown would have to establish and maintain. The regular division of houses and subdivisions that served to "individualize" families allowed Levitt and his organization to supervise the maintenance of the town, insuring the value of this and future Levittowns. The attention devoted to the smallest details of upkeep is indicated by the prohibition of outdoor clotheslines (drying clothes in the sun required the use of "specially designed, collapsible racks") and the supervision of lawn-cutting to which homeowners were subject in their first years.

The vigilance of the Levitt organization bears comparison with the disciplinary supervision of which Foucault speaks, the supervision that came to characterize institutions as diverse as factories and schools (FSP, 170–175/DP, 145–149):

In organizing "cells," "places" and "ranks," the disciplines create complex spaces that are at once architectural, functional and hierarchical. It is spaces that provide fixed positions and permit circulation; they carve out individual segments and establish operational links; they mark places and indicate values; they guarantee the obedience of individuals. (FSP, 173/DP, 148)

Levitt's design was not simply concerned with how to organize space to best serve the needs of those understood to form members of a household; the ordering of neighborhood and familial spaces that characterized Levittown actually prescribed those roles, enforcing them by means of the uniform placement of houses and individuals. For Levittown, like other "great operations of discipline," "it was a question of organizing the multiple, of providing . . . an instrument to cover it and to master it; it was a question of imposing upon it an 'order'" (FSP, 174/DP, 148). Levitt's preoccupation with fussy details like clotheslines or tidy lawns may appear excessive; taken as constitutive of a disciplinary regime, however, his concerns demonstrate the prescience of one who understands that "the slightest incompetence, if left unnoticed and therefore repeated each day, may prove fatal to the enterprise" (FSP, 206/DP, 175).

In a discussion of the effects of the GI Bill, cultural historian George Sánchez suggests that the rationale that guided federal housing policy in the 1940s was animated by a vision of the social order prevailing before the war. The segregation that marked fighting units from which soldiers returned was reproduced by the entitlements that "consistently, if covertly, heightened the racial divide" (Sánchez 1995: 389). Though the interracial congregation of workers necessary to maintain and expand industries essential to the war effort at home (e.g. Hayden 1984: 4) did not reflect the organization of soldiers fighting abroad, rather than extending the social changes the war had occasioned, post-war federal policies instead reproduced the segregation that had been enforced among military units. As white soldiers did not fight with soldiers of color, they would not be forced to work or to compete with racial minorities in business or education upon their return home.

Nor were they forced to compete with women. Just as racial divisions were temporarily upset by the pressing needs of war, so, too, were the rules of gender bent during wartime to allow women to replace conscripted workers. While they were not in combat

with men overseas, images of Rosie the Riveter at home beckoned women to work as welders, carpenters, and a variety of employment previously closed to them. Furthermore, industry giants such as Henry Kaiser – themselves supported by considerable government subsidies – went to great lengths to accommodate women workers and their families. In under a year, Kaiser built Vanport City, Oregon, equipping it with multiple nursery schools, kindergartens, grade schools, and supervised playgrounds designed for the 9,000 children who would live there. The director of childcare at Vanport City remarked that “In the past, good nursery schools have been a luxury for the wealthy. The Kaiser Child Service Centers are among the first places where working people, people of average means, have been able to afford good nursery education for their children” (quoted in Hayden 1984: 161). While in the absence of wartime profits it could not be hoped that the “unprecedented . . . range of services” (Hayden 1984: 161) that included “infirmaries for sick children, child-sized bathtubs so that mothers don’t need to bathe children at home, [and] cooked food services so that mother can pick up hot casseroles along with their children” (Hayden 1984: 4), could possibly be maintained, the immediate halting of childcare services by employers and states, together with the sweeping lay-offs of women workers after the war (1984: 161), not to mention the complete dismantling of Vanport City after the war (1984: 8), suggests that the considerations motivating these closings were not merely economic, but rather part of a more encompassing concern over the complexion of American family life.

The wartime opening of jobs to women who had previously been barred from them had been simultaneous with the racial integration of areas of employment that had been the exclusive domain of white men. However, disparate mechanisms enabled white men to resume and furthermore consolidate their place in the workforce at the expense of white women and people of color upon their return home. We have seen how racial segregation was enforced through housing policies that forbade entrance into the new suburbs by “non-whites,” thereby contributing to the density of inner cities through urban renewal. By contrast, the “restoration” of middle-class white women to their occupations as homemakers was enforced by means of the promotion of a middle-class ideal symbolized by the pre-installed washing machines that promoted familial “privacy and autonomy” by permitting women to “wash their dirty linen at home” (Cowan 1983: 149–150). Put simply, racial segregation was secured by keeping blacks (and other “non-whites”) out of the suburbs, while the subordination of middle-class white women as wives was enforced by keeping them in.

The particular manifestation of gender regulation in post-war suburbia has received broad feminist treatment since Friedan’s *The Feminine Mystique* (1963). Outfitting of single-family houses with the commodified spoils of the “miniaturization of technology” that made relatively inexpensive, mass-produced refrigeration and vacuum-cleaning systems available, and thereby necessary to the “dream house” (Hayden 1981: 25), was among the means by which the isolation of women was assured. The higher expectations of cleanliness and order that increased household technologization brought occupied women full-time with household chores – the work that was “never done” (Hayden 1981: 26; Wajcman 1991: 84); at the same time, the lack of childcare made young children a mother’s sole responsibility. Finally, the absence of public transportation made her also the chief “transporter of goods” (Cowan 1983: 83–84) as well as the family “chauffeur” (Langdon 1994: 46).

The production of wives at this period was thus accomplished in no small measure by the architectural innovations that Levittown assembled. Even as they were intended to spare her effort or save her time, the strategic placement of rooms and appliances dictated women's movements. Unlike the mechanisms of power that barred people of color from entering suburban life (save as domestic servants) through the complex federal policies and zoning restrictions that formed a protective wall around the suburb, the operation guiding the suburban woman's movements in her house exemplified a more refined method of regulation, one that strikingly resembles what was for Foucault the premier "architectural figure . . . [embodying] a whole set of techniques and institutions for measuring, supervising and correcting the abnormal": Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon (FSP, 233/DP, 200).

In Bentham's vision of the ideal "inspection house," individuals – whether prisoners, madmen, or schoolchildren – are consigned to isolated cells arranged in rings stacked around a central tower occupied by a supervisor. The supervisor who, Bentham notes, could be "anyone" (FSP, 236/DP, 202), enjoys unimpeded powers of surveillance even as he is invisible to his charges. Windows on the central tower give onto corresponding windows on each cell, backlit by a window at the other end. The design provides visual access to each cell while the "lateral arrangement" of the cells precludes inmates' interaction with one another. The supervisor's continuous presence is rendered unnecessary by the effects of the panoptic arrangement, for its design produces a relation whereby one, "subjected to a field of visibility . . . assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection" (FSP, 236/DP, 202–203).

The image of "[s]everal million American women cook[ing] supper each night in several million separate homes over several million stoves" (Cowan 1979: 59, cited in Wajcman 1991: 87) is a striking one to consider in the context of Bentham's plan. A woman in each house located along Levittown's orderly streets, preparing dinner for her family in the space recognized as that to which she "belongs," the kitchen window giving on to the front yard so that she can watch her children play on the unfenced lawn, a window into which those outside may also look in: the orderly arrangement of kitchen "cells" offers itself as an exemplar of disciplinary surveillance ensuring that each individual woman assumes her proper task in the home. If it seems unreasonable to compare Levittown with the "total institution" (Goffman 1961; cf. FSP, 239/DP, 205) of the Panopticon, further examination of panopticism suggests that the "encompassing tendencies" (Goffman 1961: 4) of both are borne out in Bentham's own treatment of panopticism in the letters that comprise the text, *Panopticism, or, The Inspection-House, &c.* (1787).

In his discussion of panopticism in *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault argues that the Panopticon "must be understood as . . . a way of defining power relations in terms of the everyday life of men" (FSP, 239/DP, 205). Foucault's discussion of panopticism nevertheless obscures the extent to which Bentham's formulation of the panoptic operation depends upon a prior disciplinary institution that complexly delineates "the everyday life of men," namely, the family. Indeed, though the position of the family in the tower goes unmentioned by Foucault in *Discipline and Punish*, Bentham himself treats the family as a locus (indeed a focus) of the panoptic operation. In his fifth letter, for instance, entitled "Essential Points of the Plan," he notes,

[a] very material point is, that room be allotted to the lodge, sufficient to adapt it to the purpose of a complete and constant habitation for the principle inspector or headkeeper, and his family. The more numerous also the family, the better; since, by this means, there will be as many inspectors, as the family consists in persons, though only one be paid for it. (Bentham 1962 [1787]: 44–45)

In this way Bentham suggests that the support of the family in promoting the illusion of constant supervision in the panoptic operation should not be understated; the positioning of the family in the warden's tower is essential for its operation. But as the case of Levittown demonstrates, the question of the panoptic role of the family is inextricably tied to the question of gender: the family in Levittown was constituted in such a way as to define and enforce women's position within it, thereby producing and perpetually reinforcing gender roles throughout the community.

There is a sense, however, in which families, understood in more ordinary terms, resist the characterization that would liken them to Bentham's constabulary clan. Conceived in ideal terms, "the family" is a domain of nurturance and development, not a "means of correct training"; it is a field of support, not of surveillance. But perhaps the persistence of that normative ideal, positioned in opposition to the panoptic representation of the family, is precisely what enables families to exercise considerable power, both among their members and as an ideal to which other families ascribe. The idealization of the family as a field of support can mask the power circulating within it. Images of nurturance can render that power tolerable, and so sustainable. We may say the same of the vaunted notion of "privacy" sought by the buyers of Levitt's single-family houses, which might appear to set ordinary understandings of family apart from Bentham's carceral design. Privacy after all signifies a space of not being observed, a luxury that panopticism explicitly disallows. The position of the warden, constructed as a supreme observer within the prison, most vividly illustrates the prohibition of private space, for even the inspector himself is immersed in the mutually enforcing levels of the Panopticon. The threat of an unexpected arrival of some outside inspector activates disciplinary effects within and upon the head inspector himself, which ensures, in turn, that the head inspector's "fate [is] entirely bound up with [the functioning of the disciplinary mechanism]" (FSP, 238, 241/DP, 204, 207). The anonymous surveillance that produces individuals out of juridical subjects in the prison thus also serves to individualize the inspector, himself observed by those outside the prison, be they state inspectors or amusement-seeking passers-by (Bentham 1962 [1787]: 46).

But even as a space of "not being observed" is disallowed by the institution, such a space seems nevertheless to be conceptually required by its complement, observing. Indeed, the strata of surveillance at work in the Panopticon are constructed not only within a hierarchical scheme, but one in which the synchronous occupation of rigidly maintained binary positions, i.e. observer/observed, is essential. Even as we might understand that there is and can be no private space in the Panopticon, the notion of privacy is nevertheless essential to its operation. It is constitutive, in other words, of the binary formation in which the panoptic operation is grounded, much the way that the idea of "freedom" is essential to the regime of power that precludes it, as Foucault argues in the first volume of the *History of Sexuality* (FHS1, 114/HS1, 86).

What buyers of Levitt's houses were seeking was in part the privacy that city living made scarce, but Bentham's placement of the family in the tower should call that notion into question. Though marked as wholly private, domestic space is itself divided architecturally between public, e.g. dens and dining areas, and private, e.g. bedrooms and bathrooms. But like the inhabitants of the Panopticon who take on the roles of both watcher and watched, members of households similarly assume both roles. Failures of observation, both of others and of oneself, will prompt the correction necessary for restoring the discipline that animates the observation. Already we have seen how explicit rules – concerning visible displays of laundry or neat lawns, for example – functioned to enforce among families the proper stylization of middle-class life. There were of course other rules governing middle-class life – within the private space of the family – that were not written in rulebooks. These are perhaps especially visible in the management of female sexuality, which came at this moment, to function as an important “transfer point,” as Foucault puts it (FHS1, 136/HS1, 103), for the enforcement of the idealized image of middle-class life.²

As Bentham himself understood, panopticism functions not only to circulate power, as it clearly does in the Panopticon, but also to produce knowledge. Foucault's formulation of the term “power/knowledge” is developed from Bentham's own expectation that the Panopticon would serve as a “laboratory . . . [that] could be used as a machine to carry out experiments, to alter behavior, to train and correct individuals” (FSP, 136/DP, 203). It is a “privileged place for experiments on men, and for analyzing with complete certainty the transformations that may be obtained from them” (FSP, 238/DP, 204). Herbert Gans's study, as well, presents not only a discrete case, but also a nested series of cases of disciplinary power in action. Levittown was a great experiment in living, creating a multitude of small laboratories and subjects for study and manipulation – from Levittowners' daily routines to their expectations for themselves and for their families. Insofar as Gans himself becomes an object of scrutiny when it comes time to sell his house, it is testimony to the flexibility of the machine and its insistence that all participants play “both roles,” observer and observed. More than he may himself have understood, Gans was a true “participant-observer,” his study marking another moment of surveillance that served to reinforce the vision of Levittown that has animated planned communities in the decades since. The suburb has come to emblemize middle-class living, and with it, the division between men and women, white and black that it shaped. “Thanks to its mechanisms of observation,” Foucault reflects, the Panopticon “gains in efficiency and in the ability to penetrate into men's behavior; knowledge follows the advances of power, discovering new objects of knowledge over all the surfaces on which power is exercised” (FSP, 238–239/DP, 204).

The construction of Levittown, together with the systematic exclusion of the racialized other and the regulation of gender it entailed, provide telling examples of the production and enforcement of difference. Even as gender and race differ in important ways, their respective operations are, as the story – or stories – of Levittown show, imbricated with one another: the formation of Levittown as a new white town depended on its exclusion of the racial other. The proper image of white motherhood, the fulcrum of the white family, is maintained “within” the family, while the excoriation of black women that would soon become the shorthand for the “problem” of the black family (Moynihan 1967 [1965]) may be understood to come from outside it.

Genealogies of Race and Gender: Levittown and the Construction of Difference

As we have seen, the concept of race that an analysis of Levittown brings to light is one that is above all tied to a process of exclusion: while gender was, in Levittown, subjected to a thorough and rigorous process of disciplining, black racial identity was constituted above all as one to be kept outside of the novel communities that were being erected at the time. In this way, Levittown represents a point of intersection between the operation of a number of disciplinary mechanisms that took gender as their point of application, and regulatory state mechanisms that sought to establish a homogeneous population through the exclusion of a racialized class of individuals deemed to pose a risk to the social order. Now, to be sure, the “ethnic” concept of race one encounters in the case of Levittown differs from the concept of the “abnormal” that Foucault analyzed in his later work, but they are not entirely unrelated.

In his work at the Collège de France, Foucault had provided the genealogy of a specific form of racism, a monistic, internal racism against the abnormal, a racism whose function was inextricably tied to the operation of biopower, and more specifically to biopower’s function as guarantor of the biological well-being of the population. At issue in the biologized discourses of race Foucault analyzed in *Abnormal* and *Society Must Be Defended* was not an ethnic conception of race, but rather the constitution of an abnormal class of individuals within the population and the protection of the social body from those deemed to pose a threat, by virtue of their hereditary abnormal conditions, to the health of the population as a whole. This is why, according to Foucault, the racism against the abnormal proved to be absolutely central to the emergence and promulgation of biopower.

But even as the two concepts of race we have discussed here – an ethnic conception of race in the case of Levittown, a biologized conception of the abnormal in the case of nineteenth-century psychiatry and criminology – do indeed differ in many respects, they are grounded in a similar process of exclusion, whereby an entire class of subjects – whether blacks or abnormal, “degenerate” individuals – is deemed dangerous and subsequently excluded from a population for the sake of that population’s own well-being (whether understood in terms of social stability or biological health). In fact, the two conceptions of race would intersect once again in forms of discourse that sought to establish an inextricable connection between race (whether conceived of in terms of ethnicity or in terms of abnormality) and criminality. In both instances, the conceptions of race at work in these mechanisms of exclusion were constituted by, and served as support for, an entire network of power relations, in the same way that both men and women in Levittown were subjected to a number of mechanisms and institutions whose effect was the production of a certain kind of family, as well as of specific conceptions of gender.

Thus, to take the genealogical method seriously is to treat values, concepts, discourses, and practices not as metahistorical truths but as the result of a continuous play of forces, such that their meanings and functions vary from epoch to epoch, from context to context. What Foucault’s treatment of race and a genealogical analysis of Levittown reveal is that both gender and race are constructs; indeed, these analyses

reveal that the concepts of race and gender are not only essential to any conception of modern subjectivity, but also the products of a network of relations of power within which they play central roles and whose operation they help to support. Thus, whereas treating race and gender as stable truths obscures the myriad ways in which they serve to constitute a certain form of modern subjectivity, treating them as the contingent effects of the play of power/knowledge allows us to understand the strategic and tactical functions they fulfill within relations of power, while at the same time freeing us of the illusion that concepts such as race and gender are necessary values whose content must remain fixed. For Foucault, as for Nietzsche, it is in the space created by the contingency of values that the possibility for novel forms of subjectivity, for novel forms of thinking, and for novel practices, lies.

Notes

- 1 Gans's narrative minimizes the events. We should not forget that for the members of the Myers family themselves, as for their sympathetic Jewish neighbors, the situation was more accurately cast in the terms of the title of the *Look* magazine article written by a resident journalism, as the "Ordeal in Levittown" (Bittan 1958). See also Daisy Myers' telling account of her family's experience published almost fifty years later in *Sticks 'n Stones: The Myers Family in Levittown* (2005).
- 2 Ricki Solinger's history of single pregnancy during this era provides an excellent illustrative case of the way that an apparatus of power functions simultaneously to promulgate the "truth" about white girls and, by extension, what is true about white families (Solinger 1992).

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Part V

Ethics and Modernity

Foucault's Ontology and Epistemology of Ethics

JAMES D. FAUBION

Foucault characterizes ethics as “the reflexive practice of freedom” (EW1, 284). The characterization attributes to ethics two of its ontological grounds: it is a practice, and its prerequisite is freedom. It attributes to ethics as well at least one of its epistemological hallmarks: it is reflexive, considered (*réfléchie*); it demands that subjects attend at once to themselves and to the circumstances in which they find themselves. This characterization may be general, but it is nevertheless insufficient; subjects might reflexively exercise their freedom in ways that no one anywhere would regard as ethical. Foucault does not, however, have the ambitions of the usual moral philosopher. He develops a robust conceptual apparatus appropriate to the ethical domain, but he does not seek an exhaustive stipulation of its invariant features. Nor does he pose epistemological questions of an entirely abstract order, such as how we might come to have ethical knowledge or whether we can even come to have it at all. Instead, he explores and elucidates the problematics of the reflexive practice of freedom that genealogically connect an extended family of ethical systems – classical, early Christian, modern – that center on self-care or self-concern (*le souci de soi*). As his exploration proceeds, it is increasingly confined within the boundaries of what I identify as an analytical triangle that connects self-care, the governance of others, and *parrhesia* – plain speaking, or as Foucault often prefers to define it, the plain speaking of the truth. The triangle coalesces first in the third volume of *The History of Sexuality* and specifically in Foucault's treatment of *gnothi seauton* – the Pythian imperative to “know thyself.” It is central to the lectures that Foucault delivered at the Collège de France while he was giving that volume its finishing touches. It is the most effective frame through which to assess both the content and the limits of what – with qualification – can be cast as Foucault's ontology and epistemology of ethics. Or so I shall argue.

Ethics and a Historical Ontology of Ourselves

Precisely because Foucault does not have the ambitions of the typical moral philosopher, qualification is immediately in order. In “What is Enlightenment?” he writes of what is to his mind a distinctively modern “philosophical *ēthos*” – and his own *ēthos* – that consists of “a critique of what we are saying, thinking, and doing.” Against the background of the philosophical tradition, the term he introduces to characterize the means of such a critique has a distinctly oxymoronic ring. The term at issue is “historical ontology of ourselves” (EW1, 315; cf. Rabinow 1997: xxxv–xxxvi). The critique is “genealogical” in its design. In contrast to a prominent strand of philosophical precedent, “it will not deduce from the form of what we are what it is impossible for us to do and to know,” but rather separate out, “from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking as we are, do, or think” (EW1, 315–316). It is “archaeological” in its method. Again in contrast to philosophical precedent, it “will not seek to identify universal structures of all knowledge or of all possible moral action, but will seek to treat the instances of discourse that articulate what we think, say, and do as so many historical events” (EW1, 315). The “historical ontology” that accumulates as critique proceeds thus neither posits nor aspires to discover any timeless essence, of either human subjects or their affairs. The beings – the subjects – that it catalogues are not merely within the temporal. They are the products of temporal processes, and whether or not they might act constitutively within and on such processes, they are first and foremost products of them.

The work of the historical ontologist – whose critical ambitions are invoked in the introduction to the second volume of *The History of Sexuality* (HS2, 8–9) – is not merely that of the chronicler, the recorder of the passing show, of just one thing after another. The temporal processes that are constitutive of subjects must and do coalesce into “practical systems” (EW1, 317), or systems of action, of which three are of special salience. One has to do with “relations of control over things.” The second has to do with “relations of action upon others.” The third has to do with “relations with oneself.” These systems suggest in turn systematic interrogatives:

How are we constituted as subjects of our own knowledge? How are we constituted as subjects who exercise or submit to power relations? How are we constituted as moral subjects of our own actions? (EW1, 318)

The practical systems at issue are interactive: “control over things is mediated by relations with others; and relations with others in turn always entail relations with oneself, and vice versa” (EW1, 318). The interrogatives guiding the historical ontologist’s inquiries must accordingly be understood not as mutually exclusive or independent of one another, but instead as determining a triad of axes “whose specificity and whose interconnections have to be analyzed” (EW1, 318). Hence we have the broad reach of Foucault’s own inquiries: knowledge (*savoir*), power, and ethics.

That said, Foucault’s inquiry into ethics is not an inquiry into contingency with no end. To reiterate: ethics is a systematic practice whenever and wherever we might find it; its prerequisite, as Foucault affirms and reaffirms, is always and everywhere freedom

(EW1, 284, 300; cf. Rabinow 1997: xxv). Freedom is, in his own words, the property of "individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several kinds of conduct, several ways of reacting and modes of behavior are available" (EW3, 342). It can be manifest only in those practical systems that allow subjects to engage in those fluid, mobile, and always asymmetrical engagements of influence that Foucault deems to be "power relations" (EW1, 291–292). It has its negative limit in its dissolution into the ossified; the "frozen" dynamics of power relations become economic exploitation, political domination, and characterological subjugation: "when a man is in chains" (EW3, 342). Hence, ideal-typically, Foucault can pronounce that "the slave has no ethics" (EW1, 286). More precisely put, the slave – as man (or woman, or collective) in chains – is debarred from the very sort of relations with himself (or herself, or themselves) and with others that would be the prerequisite for ethical practice of any sort whatever.

Foucault, as historical ontologist of ethics, lets the positive limit of freedom remain vague – and perhaps for this reason, scholars are not in agreement about just what conception of freedom he might actually be putting forth. Many take Foucault's affirmation in 1964 that "man does not begin with freedom but with the limit and the line of the insuperable" (FDE1, 414) and his later insistence upon distinguishing freedom from liberation (EW1, 284–285) to imply his rejection of any notion of freedom as even potentially absolute, even potentially unqualified (Davidson 2005: 127; Sybylla 2001: 74; cf. Bernauer and Mahon 2005). Timothy O'Leary shares their view, but adds that "in Foucault's later work, freedom would operate as both the ontological condition of . . . ethical work and as its ultimate aim" (2002: 155). Paul Patton also finds an always qualified conception of freedom in Foucault's thought (1998: 73), but less cautiously infers from it a more "fundamental" conception of "autonomy" (1998: 75). Christopher Corder suggests that Foucault's conception of the self's relation to itself (*rapport à soi*) "can be seen as elaborating Nietzsche's view that moralities are projections of the human will-to-power" (2008: 597, 602; cf. Milchman and Rosenberg 2007). Michael Gardiner suggests that Foucault privileges "the unrestricted achievement of unrestricted self-constitution" (1996: 35) and that "the ideal Foucauldian self is sovereign" (1996: 38). Neve Gordon advocates reading Foucault against the background of Heideggerian and Sartrean precedent, and that doing so reveals a conception of freedom not "as a property that can be expropriated from human beings, but rather as the condition of the possibility of human beings" (1999: 404).

One has to proceed cautiously here. Foucauldian freedom can be rendered as the property of that actor or actors within a given field of possibilities who have the capacity and the active opportunity to pursue the greatest number of opportunities open to them. This is, however, a far cry from the Nietzschean subject of the "will-to-power," a radical transgressor one of whose most significant features is his lack of reflexivity. It is, moreover, misleading at the very least to define freedom (*liberté*) as autonomy (cf. also Ramos 1994), a Kantian term that belongs to a transcendental metaphysics of morals, to which the historical ontologist is explicitly opposed (cf. Connolly 1993; Koopman 2010; Scott 1990, 2009). The ethical subject is, for Foucault, surely not the sovereign, whether conceived as a law unto himself or with only the slightest modulation, as Carl Schmitt's governor of the state of exception (1985). Foucault's ethical subject is, as we have seen, always a subject residing and acting within a given practical

system. The sovereign as the unqualified declaimer of the law, the sovereign as sole adjudicator of the suspension and redefinition of the law, has no place within any such system. Extra-systemic, any such sovereign is, in a Foucauldian lens, without any actual historical – much less ethical – portfolio. Finally, if freedom is for Foucault the very condition of the possibility of being human, then all the exploited, dominated, and subjugated – all the world’s slaves – would have to be deemed nonhuman, or at least nonhuman until released from their chains. It is beyond imagining that Foucault – ambivalent about Heidegger and at pains to distance himself from Sartre (EW1, 262, 298–299; cf. Koopman 2010: 106–107) – would ever have thought any such thing.

Foucault’s ethical subjects are subjects in evaluatively relevant and resonant positions: positions held in esteem, or whose worthiness or unworthiness is at the very least an open question. Foucault introduces the concept of subjects as beings in position early on, in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (AK, 55). Perhaps with less terminological prominence, the concept still continues to operate in his genealogical archaeology of ethics. It does so above all as a register of the methodological level at which those investigations proceed, which is not that of the individual but, again, that of the practical systems through which individuals are constituted – and in the case of ethics, also partially constitute themselves – as subjects. More carefully, however, ethical subjects should be conceived of as beings not merely in positions, but instead as being sometimes in them, sometimes working their way toward them, and sometimes working their way out of them. Subject positions orient ethical action, but such action is directional and dynamic. Its trajectory is that of “subjectivation” – of becoming a subject of a certain qualitatively distinctive sort (EW1, 264–265). “Subjectivity” or subjecthood is its fulcrum, its terminus, and the point of departure and return (C-HS, 2–3). Foucault only rarely speaks of desubjectivation. He does so in characterizing the ambitions of Nietzsche, Maurice Blanchot, and Georges Bataille – all of whom he cites as influences (EW3, 241). He does so again – and again with a personal inflection – in a discussion of the modern enterprise of critique (WC, 386, 387). Although the exact term may not be used, concepts of a very similar sort are nevertheless present at many junctures in his work – and long before he turns to ethics (e.g., EW2, 69–88, 147–170). Gerald Bruns and Saul Tobias regard something very like desubjectivation as a signature of both the entirety of Foucault’s oeuvre and his personal quest (Bruns 2005; Tobias 2005; cf. Huffer 2010; O’Leary 2002). Opinions vary as to whether it does or does not belong to the ethical domain (O’Leary places it there [2002: 153]; Tobias does not [2005: 78]). In any case, the modern critic’s and the genealogical archaeologist’s central interest in ethical change – whether small-scale or large-scale – would be poorly served were desubjectivation absent from their conceptual toolkits.

The Ontological Parameters of the Ethical Domain

Foucault stipulates four general parameters of the ethical domain. The second of these – the mode of subjectivation – is primarily of epistemological thrust; I will come to it in due course. The other three – ethical substance, ethical *askēsis*, and the ethical *telos* – are of straightforward ontological thrust. First, ethical substance is the only one of the four parameters that Foucault himself explicitly classifies as ontological (HS2, 37).

It amounts, from one case to the next, to whatever “part of himself” an aspiring ethical subject must constitute as the “prime material” of its “moral conduct” (HS2, 27; cf. EW1, 264). Whatever else it might be, an ethical substance – for those who regard it as such – must be amenable to shaping, to management, to modulation, or to channeling. It must, moreover, be regarded as neither intrinsically good nor intrinsically evil. Instead, it must allow for being turned toward or trained to ethically legitimate norms and ends. In the second volume of *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault highlights *ta aphrodisia*, “carnal pleasures,” the stuff of sex and eating and drinking and so on, both the dangers and benefits of which ancient Greeks fully recognized. Carnal pleasures might compromise the ethical subject should they overwhelm his powers of reason or drift beyond his control, their indulgence becoming what we now think of as addiction. Suitably constrained and indulged in proper measure, they were part and parcel of a life deemed to be *eudaimōn*, “thriving” – although Plato, Diogenes, and Aristotle do not agree on the matter of just what sort of constraint suits them best. Carrying the musings of a few “austere philosophers isolated in the midst of” a Roman imperial world “that did not itself appear to be austere” (HS3, 235) to their spiritual limit, the Christian ascetics of later antiquity (and beyond) were of a profoundly anti-Hellenic cast of mind. They regarded carnal pleasures as the very essence of corruption and sin. The ethical substance that concerned them was instead the soul, and the labors that had to be devoted to its moral refinement were precisely those labors of extracting and freeing it from the malignancy of the flesh.

Next, the Greek term “ethical *askēsis*” in general means “work, training, exercise.” We derive “ascetic” and “asceticism” from it, but *askēsis* is by no means the same thing as – but instead only one of the modalities of – asceticism. The transformation of any given ethical substance into a mode consonant with legitimate norms and ends requires *askēsis*, “not only to bring one’s conduct into compliance with a given rule, but to attempt to transform oneself into the ethical subject of one’s behavior” (HS2, 27). Foucault is not repeating here Aristotle’s seminal claim that one becomes an ethical subject, a man of *phronēsis*, “practical wisdom,” in and through practice. Nor is he repeating Aristotle’s claim that *phronēsis* cannot be a *tekhnē*, an “art” or “craft” – which, by fiat, always has to do with bringing forth an object that is different from its creator – but instead must be a *praxis*, a practice or activity done for its own sake (1934: 334–335 [*Nicomachean Ethics* VI.iv.4–5]). To the contrary, by implication at least, Foucault rejects the Aristotelian divide between craft and practice in favor of an analytics of the ethical *askēsis* that involves both. The transformation of the actor into an ethical subject indeed involves “practices of the self” (HS2, 28), but among them are practices in which the self is at once the agent and the object of its own actions. *Askēsis* is poetic or “aesthetic” in just this sense (cf. O’Leary 2002: 13–14, 86). The poetic pitch of self-transformation is, moreover, neither passive nor active: It unfolds instead in the middle voice, in which the subject of action is also its object (Faubion 2001: 94; 2011: 50).

What *askēsis* requires is tools. Every practice of the self must have its accouterments, its attendant “techniques” or “technologies of the self” (EW1, 223–251). Such technologies are also things of this world; they, too, have an ontological register. The historical ontologist catalogues them extensively as he advances from the classical, to the Hellenistic, to the Roman, and to the early Christian eras. The catalogue includes,

Foucault notes in particular, several tools of the examination of the self that antiquity leaves to posterity: the physical exercises that the Greeks pursued in the interest of sustaining their personal vigor and military skill (EW1, 239–240); the Stoic collection of *hupomnēmata*, “notebooks” or “jottings” through which one might “make one’s recollection of the fragmentary logos transmitted through teaching, listening, or reading a means of establishing a relationship of oneself with oneself, a relationship as adequate and accomplished as possible” (EW1, 211); meditative disciplines from the Greek *meletē*, “(self-)study” to the Stoic *praemeditatio malorum* or “pondering of future ills,” intended to prepare the self to face with dispassion any misfortune that might befall it (EW1, 239–240); the interpretation of dreams (EW1, 241–242; HS3, 4–36); the writing and exchange of personal letters (EW1, 218–220); the Christian examination of conscience and *exomologēsis*, the “recognition of truth” or, as it comes to be known, “confession” (EW1, 243; Faubion 2011: 47–48); and others.

Finally, there is the ethical *telos*: it is the goal and the consummation of ethical self-transformation, the end to which *askēsis* is directed (HS2, 27). Systematicity is once again of the essence:

an action is not only moral in itself, in its singularity; it is also moral in its circumstantial integration and by virtue of the place it occupies in a pattern of conduct. It is an element and an aspect of this conduct, and it marks a stage in its life, a possible advance in its continuity. A moral action tends toward its own accomplishment; but it also aims beyond the latter, to the establishing of a moral conduct that commits the individual, not only to other actions always in conformity with values and rules, but to a certain mode of being, a mode of being characteristic of the ethical subject. (HS2, 27–28)

The ethical *telos*, as the genealogical archaeologist self-consistently conceives it, is – in substance if not form – relative to a given practical system, in all its circumstantial and historical particularities. As a consequence, it is ontologically at odds with the ontology of “Being” in such existentialist renderings as those of Heidegger. Practices and technologies of the self might fall (weakly) under the existentialist rubric of the “project.” They are not, however, the means to authenticity – a term that has no function in Foucault’s investigations of ethics and a term that, contra Sartre, he pointedly rejects (cf. EW1, 264) – against the artificiality of mere convention. Ethical subjectivity consists instead in the realization of integration within a practical system that may allow for individual modulations, but which is never a matter of strictly individual self-determination.

Outside and Inside the Triangle: On Ethical Others

In a 1984 interview (EW1, 281–301), Foucault posits in general terms that ethics is the considered practice of freedom. In the same interview, he offers an extended response to questions concerning the ethical subject and its relation to others. Much of the response makes specific reference to ancient Greece. The view that the ethical subject “who cares for himself must first care for others,” he says, “came later” (EW1, 287). In Greece itself, the care of the self was taken to be “ethical in itself” and “onto-

logically prior" to the care of others (EW1, 287). It nevertheless "implies complex relations with others":

the *ēthos* of freedom is also a way of caring for others. This is why it is important for the free man who conducts himself as he should to be able to govern his wife, his children, his household; it is also an art of governing. *Ēthos* also implies a relationship with others, insofar as the care of the self enables one to occupy his rightful position in the city, the city, the community, or interpersonal relationships, whether as magistrate or as friend. And the care of the self also implies a relationship with the other insofar as proper care of the self requires listening to the lessons of the master. One needs a guide, a counselor, a friend, someone who will be truthful with you. (EW1, 287)

Here, two angles of Foucault's analytical triangle – the governance of the self and the governance of others – clearly meet. The third, *parrhesia*, is at least implicit in the nature of the relationship between the ethical subject and the master who speaks the truth. Near the conclusion of the interview, Foucault again makes a generalization: "the freedom of the subject and its relation to others . . . constitutes the very stuff [*matière*] of ethics" (EW1, 300).

Many of Foucault's readers are, however, dissatisfied with what they regard as his relative lack of attention to the other, not as the subject of governance, but instead as an ethical subject in its own right. Pierre Hadot criticizes Foucault's neglect of the role of "physics" in Stoic "spiritual exercises" and so the neglect of the Stoic aspiration to identify with "an 'Other': nature, or universal reason, as it is present within each individual" (1995: 211). As Hadot does, Michael Gardiner objects to Foucault's "ethical aestheticism." He makes no mention of the ancient Greeks, but blames Foucault's (presumptive) aestheticism for denying "that intersubjective relationships are ontologically primary" (1996: 29) just as – in Foucault's opinion – the Greeks themselves did. Like Richard Wolin (1986), Corder finds insufficient room within Foucault's parameters of the ethical domain for either the disposition or the obligation to pay ethical regard toward the other (2004: 600); he is worried that Foucault's construal of ethics amounts to an endorsement of "moral self-indulgence" as a consequence (2004: 603). Barry Smart does not share Corder's worries, but he does fault Foucault for giving too little consideration to the issue of the "moral responsibility" that the ethical subject has toward others (1995: 100; cf. Smart 1998).

The critics have their points – but they only underscore the prominence of the triangle of governance of self, governance of others, and *parrhesia* in Foucault's research into ethics. The one ethical other who resides tidily within its boundaries is an other whom we have met and to whom I will return: the ethical "master," the other to whom one must listen and who can be counted on to tell one the truth. The ancient virtue of *sophrōsunē*, self-governance, is also well within the bounds of the triangle, and Foucault accordingly scrutinizes it at length. The equally cardinal virtue of *dikaiosunē*, the quintessentially other-regarding virtue of justness, a major theme in ancient philosophical discourse, is tangential to the triangle. Foucault acknowledges it (FC-GSA, 48, 52, 220), but he does not elaborate upon it. That he does not do so leaves something to be desired on two fronts. On one, it leaves his treatment of ancient ethics incomplete. As O'Leary reminds us, however, we should not expect the historical genealogist of

ourselves to conform to the standards of total history – as if such standards could ever be met in any case (2002: 70). We should not expect him to be motivated by a “disinterested curiosity about the past,” but always instead by “present concerns” (2002: 82). Even so, on another front, the conceptual, Foucault’s sidelining of the issue of regard for the other is less acceptable. Among the Greeks, as among many others, the issue falls squarely within the ethical domain. It is not merely an obligation posed from without, but also a matter of the self’s relation to itself. Foucault’s four parameters of the ethical domain could thus benefit from the addition of a fifth parameter. It might be called the mode of ethical regard or the mode of ethical valuation, which can and does vary from one ethical system to another. The long-standing battle between deontologists and utilitarians is only one case in point.

The Ethical Domain and Its Epistemological Dynamics

Ethical systems change, as the marked differences between the systems featured in the second volume of *The History of Sexuality* and those featured in the third (1986) amply illustrate. Systemically, the ethical domain is open; not all of the practical processes internal to it are recursive. It is, again, a creative domain; ethical subjecthood permits revision, invention, and discard (EW1, 262). Utopians (and dystopians) have their part to play in this respect, the role of what might be thought of as ethical poets. Their interventions belong, however, to a domain that is capable of change and amenable to it for two, more constant, reasons, both epistemological in their substance. First, the ethical domain (like other domains) is a domain of contestation. It hardly needs to be pointed out that everyday life, more or less everywhere, is replete with competing judgments of good and bad, right and wrong, ideal and despicable. Discursively, religious and philosophical interlocutors are more often at odds than not: Diogenes against Plato, Aristotle against both, Neoplatonists and Stoics against Aristotelianism, Christian Doctors against pagans, utilitarians against deontologists – the list goes on. Second – and what Foucault is most at pains to emphasize – ethical discourse and practice alike are subject to macrostructural perturbations that regularly, if not inevitably, result in “problematization”: an intellectual stepping back from the taken-for-granted modes of acting or reacting; a questioning of their meanings, conditions, and goals:

for a domain of action, a behavior, to enter the field of thought, it is necessary for a certain number of factors to have made it uncertain, to have made it lose its familiarity, or to have provoked a certain number of difficulties around it. These elements result from social, economic, or political processes. But here their only role is that of instigation. They can exist and perform their action for a very long time before there is effective problematization of thought. And when thought intervenes, it doesn’t assume a unique form that is the direct result or necessary expression of these difficulties; it is an original or specific response – often taking many forms, sometimes even contradictory in its specific aspects – to these difficulties, which are defined for it by a situation or a context, and which hold true as a possible question. (EW1, 117–118)

Problematization may lead to changes that preserve continuities over discontinuities and so can be deemed intrasystemic. It is at least as likely, however, to provoke changes

of a much more thoroughgoing, intersystemic effect (cf. Rabinow 1997: xxxvi; 2003: 19–20).

Whether changing or remaining the same, any given ethical system further includes one or more modes of subjectivation. As the remaining parameter of Foucault's four, the mode of subjectivation is for all its substantive variations another constant feature of the ethical domain as such and, as I have already noted, is also primarily epistemological in its substance. Foucault's epistemology of ethics is less resolved than his ontology and, no doubt in part for that very reason, it imposes itself on his later research with an insistence that can at times seem nagging. The obstacles to epistemological resolution already arise with his characterization of the mode of subjectivation in the second volume of *The History of Sexuality*, some of it hinging on semantic ambiguity. The original French term is ambiguous: *mode d'assujettissement*. The standard meaning of *assujettissement* is "subjection" or "subjugation." This won't do, however, because subjugation is among the conditions that negate the very possibility of ethical conduct. This ambiguity has since been corrected. The now-standard translation of Foucault's term is "mode of subjectivation," the latter a technical invention that Foucault himself later imports into his French (FDE4, 632). He characterizes it – with notable brevity – as "the way in which an individual establishes his relation to the rule and recognizes himself as obliged to put it into practice." Foucault points to "deontology" – systems of moral imperatives and rules – as the correlate of the mode of subjectivation (HS2, 37). Another ambiguity thus arises. The examples of modes of subjectivation that Foucault provides do not uniformly illustrate the relation between individuals and moral rules. Beyond rules, they include values and ideals:

One can, for example, practice conjugal fidelity and comply with the precept that imposes it, because one acknowledges oneself to be a member of the group that accepts it, declares adherence to it out loud, and silently preserves it as a custom. But one can practice it, too, because one regards oneself as an heir to a spiritual tradition that one has the responsibility of maintaining or reviving; one can also practice fidelity in response to an appeal, by offering oneself as an example, or by seeking to give one's personal life a form that answers to criteria of brilliance, beauty, nobility, or perfection. (HS2, 27)

This ambiguity is never really resolved lexically or conceptually, but it leads to a distinction that Foucault makes clearly enough between two moral orientations. One orientation marks "code-oriented moralities," in which "subjectivation occurs basically in a quasi-judicial form, where the ethical subject refers his conduct to a law, or set of laws, to which he must submit at the risk of committing offenses that may make him liable to punishment" (HS2, 29–30). Another orientation marks "ethics-oriented" moralities. In the latter:

the system of codes and rules of behavior may be rather rudimentary. Their exact observance may be relatively unimportant, at least compared to what is required of the individual in the relationship that he has with himself, in his different actions, thoughts, and feelings as he endeavors to form himself as an ethical subject. (HS2, 30)

Ascetic Christianities (and Kantianisms) are code-oriented. In contrast, the ancient Greeks and Romans were, in Foucault's judgment, primarily ethics- or practice-oriented.

The distinction highlights the questions of the “how” of subjectivation: How does an individual establish his relation to the rule (or value or ideal)? How does he recognize himself – or, widely beyond classical Greece, herself – as being obliged (or inspired) to put it into practice? Ascetics and Kantians can answer the questions easily: their mode is one of strict conformity to what are indeed moral rules. The Pythian imperative is enough to indicate that the Greeks grappled – or at least were made to grapple – with an epistemological adverbiality of ethical judgment and so of ethical conduct more complex than their ascetic and Kantian successors had to face. Foucault heeds the Pythia as well, and just as much heeds the Greek and later responses to it. Crudely put, those responses hinge on two assumptions that one might expect to prevail within any practical system of any durability whatever: ethical subjects can teach themselves to know themselves; and they can also be taught. The former leads Foucault to attend carefully to the epistemological function of technologies of the self. The latter leads him – and leads us back – to the figure of the ethical master. His treatment of both increasingly respects the boundaries of the triangle of self-governance, governance of others, and *parrhesia* as he proceeds.

Within the Triangle: Technologies and Their Masters

Among the technologies of self are those – military or athletic regimens of training, the classical pedagogies of memorization and recitation of the oeuvres of the canonical poets – whose executors are not the self, but instead pedagogues, disciplinary or governing others, of a more or less gentle hand from one case to the next. They result, or are supposed to result, in the self’s acquisition of particular dispositions that manifest themselves more or less spontaneously, as occasion demands. They are aimed at instilling competencies, or performative skills. They may include the imparting of formal principles, especially at their outset, but their primary aim is the literal molding of the substance of the self and, if successful, of the self’s internalization not of conscious knowledge but instead of subliminal cognitive and affective schemata – in other words, not knowing one thing or another, but having *savoir-faire* or know-how. The technologies that selves deploy on themselves, however, are by and large ones of self-reflection, and if their intended outcome is often also the acquisition of dispositions that have no need of being called explicitly to mind in order to inform ethical conduct, they typically remain reflexively at hand, to be supplemented as necessary whenever dispositions fade or prove to be inadequate in the face of the novel or the unexpected. The self makes use of them – whether reflecting on future misfortunes or examining its conscience – again and again. Aurelius’ exchange of letters with Fronto belongs more to the realm of reflexive than to disciplinary technologies, although it is clear that the young, beloved Aurelius is the ethical charge, and the lover Fronto the ethical master, in what passes between them.

Reflexive technologies of the self and ethical masters first come together in Foucault’s investigations, however, not with the Roman Stoics but with their classical predecessors. Although the *Phaedrus* is of relevance, the master text in which they meet is Plato’s *Symposium*. The technology at play is the Platonic dialectic, which the enlightened courtesan Diotima lays out in her disquisition on the stages through which the lovers

of beautiful boys must pass before arriving at the recognition that the real object of their love is love itself, love in its true nature, love in its truth. The master – a parrhesiast by example in his serene, erotic self-reserve, the man who has indeed arrived and, in so doing, has become the beloved of the very boys who would have him be their own lover (HS2, 241) – is Socrates. The *Symposium* is, in Foucault's reading, a dialogue already troubled by the social problematization of ephebophilia, the eroticization of relations between young men coming of age and their adult male superiors, an eroticization that was acknowledged, condoned, and cultivated especially among the Greek elite. The problems of such relationships prove to be multifaceted: they inflict upon the boy beloved a passing adoration that must end when he himself arrives at adulthood. They place him under a domination that is inappropriate to the standing of a freeborn male and by doing so dishonor him. They bring him into intimate contact with a body – classical corporeal aesthetics being what they were – for which he could only (or was supposed to only) feel disgust. They feminize him. They might also lead to the lover squandering resources – physical and material – that he could put to more productive use (HS2, 231–232). The *Symposium* is a solution – if of a decidedly Platonic and so idiosyncratic sort – to these problems. In its solution, it links the ethics of the use of pleasures to the self's relation to truth in a manner that is much more direct and universal than the link is ever made in the other domains (dietetics and economics) in which it functions.

In Foucault's reading, Plato's response to the problems of ephebophilia hinges on a detachment from and a shifting of the thematics of the problems themselves (HS2, 243). Four such shifts are pivotal. The first consists in turning away from the worries surrounding the potential infelicities of homophilic relationships and toward a query into what brings such relationships into being in the first place. The obvious answer is Eros, Love personified, whose precise nature must carry the query forward. The second shift puts at a distance the prevailing accord on what modality the relation between beloved and lover should take in order to preserve the honor of both, an accord that underscores the lover's "respect for the beloved, for his real nature," which should then endow the latter with a "sober style" in his handling of "whatever might be asked of him" (HS2, 237–238). "Platonic erotics" departs instead from the presumption that a "reflection on the nature of love itself . . . ought to lead to a true determination of its object" (HS2, 238). Hence, we have Diotima's argument that "love seeks to beget spiritual children, and to contemplate 'absolute beauty' in its true nature, its unalloyed purity, and in the 'oneness of its form'" (HS2, 238). Foucault notes that the implication is not "the exclusion of the body," an ascetic rejection of the attractions of the beloved in his corporeal beauty, "that characterizes true love in a fundamental way; it is rather that, beyond the appearances of the object, love is a relation to truth" (HS2, 239 – of which, for Plato, the world in its concrete materiality offered only the palest and most obscure shadow, but love perhaps being the brightest exception to that rule; see Reeve 2011).

The third shift is against the more conventional wisdom that *eros* always originated in the lover, and that the lover alone was the truly "active" or "energetic" agent that common mores expected every freeborn male always to be in whatever affairs in which he might engage. Plato expects the same, but he is not content to settle for the conventional wisdom that aging alone, with its diminishing of the passions, could afford the opportunity for the beloved and the lover "to become bound to one another by

a relationship of exact reciprocity" (HS2, 239). Plato recommends the restoration of balance by other means: that the lover counsel and encourage the beloved to direct himself toward truth and be moved "by the force of the same Eros" by which he himself is moved (HS2, 240). Within Platonic erotics, it is thus proper for the beloved himself to join the lover in becoming and being "a subject in the love relation" and not just the object. The fourth shift also involves conventional wisdom, which further had it that the boy's sense of honor, his disdain, however callow, for being rendered the object of the lover's urges and seductions, was the best bulwark against the relation between the two degenerating into impropriety. Platonic erotics continues to maintain a certain asymmetry between the partners in such relationships, but it is no longer the asymmetry of object to subject. It is instead the asymmetry of counselor to counseled. The right – and the duty – to adopt the role of counselor is in its own turn dependent on being "the better versed in love," but *only* because the one better versed is the one who is the greater master of the truth (HS2, 241). The master has, moreover, a curriculum. Whatever its precise content, it includes instruction in how the beloved might conquer his own merely bodily desires, and, in conquering them, become "stronger than himself" (HS2, 241); and so, the master himself becomes the object of the beloved's desire. Asymmetry is subverted. The master "turns the game upside down, reverses the roles, establishes the principle of a renunciation of the aphrodisia," and becomes, "for all young men who are eager for truth, the object of love" (HS2, 241). The genealogist of sexuality finds in Platonic erotics "a transition from an erotics structured in terms of 'courtship' practice and recognition of the other's freedom, to an erotics centered on an ascesis of the subject and a common access to the truth," in which the glimmer of a later reworking of the problematization of sexual behavior "in terms of the concupiscent soul and the deciphering of its arcana" can first be detected (HS2, 241).

In Foucault's exegesis of the Platonic shift, the triangle of the care of the self, the governance of others, and *parrhesia* is already operative. It remains operative in the last two years of his lectures at the Collège de France, but also shifts its purview. If the historical genealogy of ourselves continues, so does the genealogy of sexuality from *The Use of Pleasure* and *The Care of the Self*. The lectures have little if any room for what in those volumes unfolds as the long and shifting ethical problematization of the flesh. They visit the sexual occasionally, pausing at Apollo's seduction of Creousa and reiterating for the amusement of the audience Diogenes' happy onanism. But their fulcrum is elsewhere. It gives way to the genealogy of the care of the self, the governance of others, and the relation of both to *parrhesia*, not merely as truth-telling, but as the plain or unreserved speaking of the truth to others, and especially to powerful others.

It should be noted that *parrhesia* is a topos of the New Testament, its exemplars Jesus of Nazareth and his apostles, noted for speaking boldly to their Roman overlords. Foucault, for his part, does not overlook the Christian heritage of *parrhesia*, but the prophet is absent, as are the sage and the technical teacher. The Doctors of ethics who preside over the institutionalized church take their place, because they are among the purveyors of *parrhesia* as Foucault specifically conceives it – speaking plainly not of matters of destiny, or of being as such, or of art or craft, but instead of *ēthos* (FC-CV, 25). In fact, neither the link between *parrhesia* and truth nor the link between *parrhesia* and the truth of *ēthos* is strictly semantic. Liddell and Scott's venerable lexicon defines *parrhesia* as "outspokenness," "frankness," "freedom of speech," and also "freedom of

action" (and in the pejorative sense as "license of tongue" [Liddell and Scott 1940: 1344]). It does not include any such gloss as "truth-telling." Nor does it register any link between *parrhesia* and speaking about *ēthos*. This isn't surprising. From Euripides through Aristotle, the archetypical scene of *parrhesia* is the political assembly and of particular mode of oratory in which the truth (*logos*) is indeterminate. Foucault's linking of *parrhesia* to the truth about *ēthos* is an indication of how central the Socratic, Platonic, and Cynical problematization of the relationship between speaking frankly and speaking the truth becomes in his analytical trajectory.

This is not to say that Foucault neglects the political practice of *parrhesia*. On the contrary: the lectures hold many surprises, among them a structuralist comparison of *Oedipus Tyrannus* and Euripides' *Ion* entirely worthy of Claude Lévi-Strauss himself. The *Ion* is not one of the most admired or best known of Euripides' plays; it needs a brief summary. Apollo's seduction of the noble Creousa is for its part the critical underpinning of the *Ion*, the secret that neither Apollo nor Creousa can bring themselves to divulge and that alone would allow their issue, Ion, to determine his true parentage. Through a bit of Apollonian trickery, Ion finds himself the son *de jure* and heir apparent of Xuthus, who also happens to be Creousa's husband and Athens' king. Xuthus is not, however, an Athenian native. Ion accordingly sees no way that he might justify his status as the future leader of Athens unless his mother at least is an Athenian by birth (a slight but typically Euripidean twist on the requirements of citizenship prevailing at the time, which required that the father, the mother, and the maternal and the paternal grandparents of the candidate citizen all be freeborn members of an Athenian township). Only if Creousa is his mother does Ion think it his proper place to exercise *parrhesia* before the citizen assembly, as any leader worthy of the title must do. Creousa has impeccable filial credentials – she is one of Erechtheus' daughters, and so the daughter of one of the legendary founders of Athens herself – and in the end Athena herself steps in to clarify matters. Of course, she settles to the satisfaction of the great majority of Euripides' original audience that Athens itself has priority over her children, the Ionians.

Foucault devotes almost one hundred pages of text to the *Ion* – and for good reason. Euripides' oeuvre is the locus classicus of the term *parrhesia*, and the *Ion* is well supplied with it. Foucault further reads the play as an apologia for Athenian democracy or, more precisely, for an Athenian democracy in which actual leaders are fit to be leaders and, in leading, at once privileged and obliged to lead *parrhesiastically*, whether or not the assembled like what they hear. Foucault in other words reads the play as a defense of a democracy in which the truth, and nothing but the truth, prevails over flattery, and legitimate counsel and persuasion reign over manipulative demagoguery. He concludes that *parrhesia* in its original, Euripidean expression is a distinctly governmental practice, a practice integral to the justification of the democratic hegemon and democracy alike. It is a feature of best civic practice. It is also the source of two problems, both of which will occupy the greatest of the philosophical minds to come. The first and most fundamental of these is the question of the circumstances in which *parrhesia* might indeed prevail over flattery, and enlightened hegemony over dark despotism. The second is the correlative question of whether such circumstances must include what Foucault characterizes as the "ethical differentiation" of those fit to be *parrhesiasts* from those fit only to benefit from their guidance. In brief: does *parrhesia* have a place in an assembly of

equals, or does it require the elevation of an aristocracy of special characterological and intellectual virtues?

Foucault reads Plato as arguing forcibly for the latter alternative. He reads him – in accord with majority scholarly opinion – as a skeptic of democracy. The reading is familiar enough that it need not be spelled out. It is nevertheless worth pausing at Foucault's interrogation of Plato's development of the alternative he prefers, for two reasons. First, the interrogation results in a compelling elaboration of one strand of the usual story. Addressing *The Seventh Letter*, Foucault highlights Plato's (or "Plato's"; the authenticity of the letter is somewhat in doubt) admission that his acceptance of Dionysius II's invitation to come to Sicily to counsel him rested importantly in his not wanting to be merely the voice of *logos* or to be considered only as such. He traveled (for the third time) to Sicily because he wanted to show that he was "capable of participation, of putting his hand to the *ergon*" (FC-GSA, 261; translations from the French here and below are my own). Just what *ergon* – what task or work – is at issue preoccupies Foucault for another sixty pages. As we might expect, his initial conclusion is that philosophical work is the work of *parrhesia*, of that now formulaic task of "speaking truth to power" (FC-GSA, 201–211). Hence, "the test by which philosophy will manifest itself is not *logos* itself . . . [but] the fact that it addresses itself, that it can address itself, that it has the courage to address itself to whoever exercises power" (FC-GSA, 210). Of just what such an address consists is still unclear. Again after Plato, Foucault underscores that it does not consist of practical advice, which in accord with *The Seventh Letter* should be sought not from the philosopher, but from the local "sages" (FC-GSA, 251). Philosophical rationality is not political rationality (FC-GSA, 266). Philosophical *parrhesia* is not political economy or political science, and it is not "the rationalization of political action" (FC-GSA, 198). The reality, the work of philosophy, is instead the sustained practice of "the articulation of the *problem* of the government of the self and of the government of others" (FC-GSA, 236).

Second, Foucault's interrogation further results in a startling revision of the usual story. Philosophical practice has its preconditions. One is courage. The philosopher cannot realize himself (or herself) as the parrhesiast who speaks truth to power if he does not have the courage to incite a powerful interlocutor's wrath and, in doing so, potentially put his life at risk. The other precondition Foucault gleans from *The Seventh Letter*. In that letter, Plato writes of the *pragmata*, the "things," the "affairs" that constitute philosophy. They are not at base contemplative, but rather have the character of "a long and painful labor," an everyday practice, "at the interior of which the subject should show himself to be *eumathēs* [capable of learning], *mnēmōn* [capable of remembering], *logizesthai dunatos* [capable of reasoning]." Foucault educes several consequences from this characterization. Posing the question of what import such a practice might have, he infers that it is "quite simply the subject himself":

It is in the relation to self, in the work of the self on itself, in the labor upon oneself, in this mode of activity of the self on itself that the reality of philosophy will in effect be manifested and attested. Philosophy encounters its reality in the practice of philosophy, understood as the ensemble of practices by which the subject has relation to himself, elaborates himself, labors on himself. The labor of the self on itself – that is the reality of philosophy. (FC-GSA, 224)

One can ask whether Foucault is reading Plato here or instead reading himself. The most plausible answer is the same as the one that Alexander Nehamas offers in considering Foucault's reading of Socrates: he is doing both (Nehamas 2000). Here, his philosophical triangle skews from the equilateral to the isosceles, with the juncture of the care of the self and *parrhesia* as its prevailing angle. The angle created by the intersection of the governance of self and the governance of others also begins to lose its closure.

"The labor of the self on itself – that is the reality of philosophy": this pronouncement has its rhetorical flourish, and it is one of several similar pronouncements that have led certain of Foucault's readers to the conclusion that he conceives of the philosophical care of the self as "essentially individual." Nehamas is one such reader (2000: 169). James Miller (1993) is another. Such a view is at the very least difficult to reconcile with Foucault's synopsis in "What is Enlightenment?" of ethics as a practical system in which subjects are beings of positions. Nehamas' and Miller's primary interest is an assessment of Foucault's own ethics – a thorny subject. In any circumstance, their view is difficult to reconcile with his statement in one of his last interviews, made with all apparent academic conviction, that "the freedom of the subject and its relationship to others" is "the very stuff of ethics." "What is Enlightenment?" was published the same year as the interview was recorded, 1984, not long before Foucault's death, after the second and third volumes of *The History of Sexuality* were in press, and after the last of his lectures had been delivered. Nor is the view confirmed by any of the philosophers that appear either in the volumes of the *History* or in the lectures. One can grant Nehamas and Miller this much: philosophers and parrhesiasts may in some respects be especially well equipped to care for themselves. Even they, however, need to be able to call on their masters, at least by way of reminder, as Aurelius needed Fronto. The possibility of mentoring must, moreover, remain live; such a parrhesiastic other is for the ethical ego "indispensable in order that I be able to speak the truth about myself." Ethical practice is, for Foucault's "Everyperson" as for his philosophers, at least in this respect "essentially" an intersubjective affair, in which the other is part and parcel of the self, however partial a part it might be.

In antiquity, Foucault says, this necessary other might be a professional philosopher, but also a "*quidam*," a professor, and "also a personal friend, also a lover." In modernity, he says, the case is very different. Our parrhesiastic masters are now "the doctor, the psychiatrist, the psychologist, the psychoanalyst" (FC-CV, 7). This contrast may or may not be self-referential; I leave such speculations for others. It is surely ironic, if perhaps in the manner of a terrible irony. That the author of *The History of Madness* and the first volume of *The History of Sexuality* would identify the psychiatrist, the psychologist, and the psychoanalyst as our only available parrhesiasts could hardly bode well, by his own past account, for the critical progress of a historical ontology of ourselves. This is not, however, the end of the story. Parrhesiastic philosophers do not appear in the last lectures after the eighteenth century. Surveying the modern landscape for heirs to the most scandalous of the parrhesiastic currents of the philosophical tradition, that of the Cynics, Foucault nevertheless finds more than one plausible representative: one is the political militant or revolutionary (FC-CV, 169–171); another is the modern artist (FC-CV, 172–173). So, all hope is not lost.

Or is it? At least one of the epistemological features of *parrhesia* that both vexed and impelled ancient philosophical inquiry remains disturbing as the last lectures come to

a close. Parrhesiasts speak frankly, and they dare to do so in the face of the powers that be. They presumably speak what they frankly believe to be the truth. The speaking of the truth, however, remains ideal-typical, a best-case scenario. Such parrhesiasts as political revolutionaries do not in fact always agree. Indeed, they rarely agree. Such would-be parrhesiasts as Holocaust revisionists and biological racists appear at times to sincerely believe that they are speaking the frank truth, and indeed that they are speaking not merely the truth about events but also the truth about *ēthos* to the confused, the powers they believe to be in error. To a great many of us, to be sure, the evidence speaks against them, and the evidence they do muster speaks less authoritatively than they presume. So far, as the saying goes, so good. But evidence in the human sciences is – as Foucault himself insisted – less than incontrovertible. Perhaps one must, in the end, count on parrhesiasts themselves to be their own most effective epistemological police. This tips again, however, in the direction of the ideal-typical. It also asks us to have more faith in the acuity of even the most sincere self-reflexive policing than many of us would be inclined to have. It looks accordingly as if there is nothing else to do but the best we can. The problem that still lingers is what the metrics of doing the best we can might be.

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Foucault, Subjectivity, and Technologies of the Self

MARK G. E. KELLY

In this essay, I analyze Foucault's conception of subjectivity and his history of technologies of the self, the collections of practices by which, on his conception, subjectivity constitutes itself. The essay has four sections. The first situates Foucault's conception of subjectivity in his overall body of work and in his intellectual context, particularly in relation to two figures in French philosophy who play important comparative roles at two crucial points in his history of subjectivity, René Descartes and Jacques Lacan. In the second section, I explore the conception of the subject that Foucault develops in his late work. Having explained the importance of historical practices to his conception of subjectivity, I will go on in the third section to consider his history of Western practices of the self, mapping the relative fortunes of what Foucault calls the "technologies" of ethics and spirituality. In the fourth section, I explore Foucault's consideration of the contemporary implications of his position, his assessment of the scope for and importance of spiritual or ethical practices today. Specifically, I consider Foucault's suggestion that there may be a political necessity today to formulate an ethics, and then his suggestion that there has been a reactivation of spirituality, specifically considering the examples, which he himself gives in this regard, of Marxism and Lacanian psychoanalysis.

Context

Foucault's approach to subjectivity must be understood as an intervention in a contestation of the notion of the subject in French philosophy. It was Immanuel Kant who introduced the word "subject" into modern philosophy, establishing an identification of subjectivity with consciousness that survives to this day (Balibar 1994: 6). However, in doing so, Kant was only applying a new name to an identification of the self with consciousness that had already been established by René Descartes, the founding father

of modern philosophy. Descartes, more than any other thinker, is responsible for putting subjectivity qua consciousness at the center of the philosophical enterprise. Hence this conception of and emphasis on the conscious subject is often called “Cartesian.”

In French philosophy at the time Foucault began his career, in the 1950s, a particular philosophy of the conscious subject, phenomenology, was the orthodoxy. Phenomenology is a method of investigation that starts with the subject qua consciousness, as Descartes did. The pre-eminent French philosopher of the time, Jean-Paul Sartre, emphasized consciousness to an extreme degree, though there was also a trend in phenomenology, associated most closely in France with Foucault’s sometime teacher Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1967), to correct Descartes’s dualism of mind and body in favor of a holistic “embodied” subject, following the work of Martin Heidegger.

Many of Foucault’s peers reacted against phenomenology, adopting a so-called “structuralist” perspective that emphasized anonymous structures and explained subjectivity as a product of these. Foucault was prominently identified with this tendency in the 1960s, though he was ambivalent about the identification, and indeed about the use of the term “structuralist” to describe any of his French peers. One “structuralist” approach to subjectivity was to formulate a theory of the subject that analyzed it in terms of a complicated constitutive structure. Jacques Lacan produced the most sophisticated and influential such theory, in a psychoanalytical framework that understands consciousness as dwarfed by unconscious processes in the mind.

Foucault by contrast is sometimes identified as representing a more thoroughly “anti-subjectivist” position, completely rejecting subjectivity.¹ This identification is incorrect, however. Foucault never denied that the subject exists. In fact, towards the end of his life, he repeatedly maintained that his work had always been related to the question of the subject (RM, 70; EW1, 281), and indeed he talked often about the subject in both his early and late work. His doctoral thesis, and first major book, *The History of Madness*, first published in 1961, is replete with references to the subject. It is only in his works of the later 1960s that he brackets the subject. He on occasion uses the word in *The Order of Things* (1966), but mostly only in the grammatical sense, and sometimes to describe the way the subject entered into the calculations of prior systems of knowledge. In *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969) he speaks often of the subject, but in a generally negative tone. Foucault’s project at this time was to bracket the subject outside an analysis of discourse. However, this was only a methodological move: he was attempting to study language from a resolutely non-subjective point of view, which does not imply any ontological claim about the subject, or indeed even a permanent methodological rejection of the concept. What the bracketing of the subject does mean is that Foucault did not produce any account of subjectivity itself during this time.

The subject re-emerges as a positive theme in Foucault’s books of the 1970s, *Discipline and Punish* and *The Will to Knowledge*, the latter being the first volume of his *History of Sexuality*. Here, though, it is subordinated to Foucault’s main theoretical preoccupation during the mid-1970s, power, thus appearing as something produced by what he calls “subjection” (*assujettissement* – “subjection” in the sense of “subjugation”). There is no explanation of what the subject itself is, no interest in subjectivity as such.

Foucault did turn his attention finally to the nature of the subject itself in earnest in the 1980s. Like most of his work, his work of the 1980s is concerned with the

discourses of a particular historical period, in this case those of ancient Greece and Rome. Subjectivity is one of a trio of key concepts that Foucault employs in examining these texts, the others being ethics and truth. The conjunction and precise direction of these concepts and this textual material are new for Foucault, but no element of this new configuration is unprecedented in his work. As we have seen, this is not the first time he had shown an interest in subjectivity; this interest is now revived. His attention to ancient texts was not new either: he had previously studied ancient material in his Collège de France lecture series of 1970–71, *Leçons sur la volonté de savoir*. He previously reflected on ethics briefly in *The Order of Things* (OT, 356–358). He had not used the word “truth” prominently before, but his work had always centered on related concepts, such as knowledge, so much so that he can now plausibly maintain that truth was always at the heart of his project (EW1, 281).

The first major venue for this new combination of themes in his thought was his annual Collège de France lecture series for the academic year 1980–81, entitled *Subjectivity and Truth*. This course is still awaiting publication in French, and will likely not be published in English until 2016. The best widely available source we have for Foucault’s views on this conjunction is at present his lecture series of the following academic year, *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*, in which he continues to treat the same themes. These themes are further explored in two further annual lecture series between the *Hermeneutics of the Subject* and his death in 1984, *The Government of the Self and Others* (from 1983) and *The Courage of Truth* (1984), both of which have recently been published, and in the second and third volumes of his *History of Sexuality*, published at the end of his life in 1984. Several interviews with Foucault from the same time period are also important, most notably “On the Genealogy of Ethics,” given in English in 1983 (EW1, 253–280), and “The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom,” conducted in 1984 (EW1, 281–302).

Subjectivity

Foucault’s approach to subjectivity in these texts is correlative with a study of “techniques of the self” (EW1, 88). The question of technique was already prominent in his reflections of the 1970s on power; indeed, of all his writings, he uses the word “technique” most frequently in *Discipline and Punish*. This concept is now applied to the self, that is, to what we do to ourselves rather than to others. When applied to the ancient Greek and Roman texts, this focus on techniques of the self implies a focus on ethics, since ethics is the major area of technique of the self in antiquity.

Much of the material of his lectures details these ancient techniques; there is comparatively little focus on the abstract concepts of subjectivity and ethics themselves as such. This is Foucault’s usual *modus operandi*. He is concerned mainly with understanding historical material, and the concepts he invokes to this end are presented as tentative conceptualizations rather than full-blown theories. Foucault thus cannot strictly be said to have a *theory* of the subject or of ethics. Nevertheless, what he has to say about these things is both original and immensely influential. In this section I will present what Foucault has to say about subjectivity in abstraction from his historical presentation.²

There are several propositions about the subject that Foucault asserts in his work of this period which we can take as definitional:

- 1 Foucault takes subjectivity to be something *constituted* (EW1, 290), and specifically something *historically* constituted (PK, 117).
- 2 Moreover, he claims that the subject *constitutes itself* (*se constitue lui-même*) (EW1, 290).
- 3 He associates subjectivity with “a reality ontologically distinct from the body” (C-CT, 159).
- 4 This however is a *form*, rather than a substance.
- 5 Lastly, the subject for Foucault is constituted through *practices*.

If we put these together we get the following picture: the subject constitutes itself in different forms at different times through the use of varied practices, but always by distinguishing itself from the physical body that engages in those practices. I will in what follows deal with the above-mentioned facets of Foucault’s conception of subjectivity in turn: firstly the historical self-constitution of the subject, and then the ontological nature of the subject; the question of practices will mostly be considered in the later sections of this essay dealing with ethics and spirituality. However, all these facets are, naturally, interrelated in Foucault’s conception of the subject.

Firstly, the question of historical constitution. This is the most radical part of Foucault’s conception of subjectivity, because it contradicts the traditional notion of subjectivity as historically invariant and transcendent. The subject is understood by Foucault not as something simple, merely a conscious doer, but as something that must be constructed. This is correlative to his focus on practices and techniques: since these things vary historically, so too does subjectivity itself.

Foucault’s definition of subjectivity itself seems to apply across history. This may seem to be another instance of an apparent contradiction, often encountered in his thought, between his radical historicism and his use of modern terminology to understand the past. His conception of subjectivity is not self-contradictory in this way, however, since he takes subjectivity precisely as something that has no universal content, but rather needs to constitute itself in specific ways at any given time.

Subjectivity, however, is not for Foucault merely the passive product of impersonal historical processes, as one might have thought from his earlier accounts of the “subjection” of the subject in relation to power. Rather, he insists that the subject constitutes itself (our second proposition above), a process that Foucault calls “subjectivation,”³ using the techniques available to it historically, and doubtless under the influence of myriad factors outside its control. Now, the concept of a self-constituting entity might seem paradoxical. However, Foucault is not breaking new ground by proposing that the subject constitutes itself. Kant himself saw the subject as self-constituting. The difference between Foucault’s and the Kantian conception of the subject is that for Foucault the subject is essentially historically variable, and indeed not just historically. Whereas, for Kant, the self-constitution of the subject always produces the same thing, for Foucault, the subject can constitute itself in different ways.

What would be genuinely paradoxical would be for the subject not only to constitute but *create* itself. But Foucault does not make any pronouncement about where the

subject comes from. He is rather pointedly disinterested in such questions of origins: “my problem was not defining the moment from which something like the subject appeared” (FL, 472). Foucault does not enter into a direct discussion of the ontological basis of the subject then, but he does consider in detail Greek discussions of its ontology, and the historical posing of ontological questions in relation to the subject. In *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*, for example, Foucault (C-HS, 53–54) discusses the question asked in Plato’s *Alcibiades* of what the self is. What has been posed here by Plato, says Foucault, is “the question of the subject,” which

involves drawing the dividing line within a spoken action that will make it possible to isolate and distinguish the subject of the action from the set of elements (words, sounds etc.) that constitute the action itself and enable it to be carried out. In short it involves, if you like, making the subject appear in its irreducibility. (FC-HS 54/C-HS, 54–55, translation amended)

Thus, Foucault thinks that the question of the subject is a matter of distinguishing a doer from the actions they carry out. This distinction between actor and action seems in itself rather Cartesian, in that it seems to imply the distinction notoriously drawn by Descartes between the soul and the body. This was hardly invented by Descartes, however: Plato too, two millennia before, also believed in an inherent separateness of soul from body. This indeed is how he answers the question of the subject in *Alcibiades*: the self is the soul, a separate entity temporarily united with the body during this lifetime.

Foucault, like most philosophers of recent times, does not believe in such an answer to the question of the subject. For him, rather, the subject “is not a substance. It is a form, and this form is not primarily or always identical to itself” (EW1, 290). The idea that the subject might be a substance can be taken to refer to Descartes’s claim that our soul is a separate substance from the matter of which our body is composed. Nevertheless, Foucault claims that the subject is a reality distinct from the body (proposition 3 above). If it is not a distinct substance in its own right like a soul, then the reality of the subject Foucault speaks of must mean the reality of a form of matter. Thus the self-constitution of the subject is not the subject producing itself out of thin air, which would clearly be paradoxical, but rather shaping what is already there. We can understand Foucault’s claim that the subject is not identical to itself in light of this. Rather than being something that simply is what it is, like a substance, subjectivity for Foucault is something that is fundamentally constituted by what it is not, a form that exists on the basis of an underlying substance that subjectivity might appear to be (as Plato and Descartes took it to be), but which in fact is something else, namely something material. The subject, then, is something that is founded on a kind of ontological split between itself and the body, but a split that is only relative rather than substantial or absolute. Moreover, the subject can be said to lack self-identity inasmuch as it has, because of this split, the capacity and tendency to change continuously, indeed to take on different forms even at the same time. It is always changing and always plural, giving it a distance from itself that allows it to work on itself.

This is not how the Greeks saw things. Indeed, according to Foucault, not only did they not have such a conception of the subject, they did not use the word “subject” or

any equivalent (C-HS, 38): “no Greek thinker ever found a definition of the subject, never looked for one” (FL, 473). What the Greeks did do was to pose the *question* of the subject, of what the thing is that does actions. Plato’s answer, the eternal soul, is relevant to Foucault inasmuch as it entails a particular historical constitution of subjectivity: the answer to the question of subjectivity relates fundamentally, as a discourse, to the social practices by which subjectivity is constituted. What we take ourselves to be, then, affects who we are. It is part of how we constitute ourselves, though for Foucault it is assuredly not a matter simply of thought determining our being, but of a self-understanding that is connected to more concrete practices, in line with the fifth proposition above:

You do not have the same type of relationship to yourself when you constitute yourself as a political subject who goes to vote or speaks at a meeting and when you are seeking to fulfill your desires in a sexual relationship. Undoubtedly there are relationships and interferences between these different forms of the subject; but we are not dealing with the same type of subject. In each case, one plays, one establishes a different type of relationship to oneself. (EW1, 290)

Here, subjectivity is taken to be something that varies according, more or less, to what one might call a social role. This is disconcerting, inasmuch as it seems to imply that subjectivity is something that can be put on or removed like clothing. This seems to contradict the intuition, shared by Descartes and Plato, that there is something about ourselves that is immutable. Now, one might argue that this intuition is simply an illusion of solidity, to which we are culturally deeply attached.

Still, Foucault does not imply that our subjectivity *instantly* changes with our role. In order to take on a new role we have to constitute ourselves in a different way, and constituting ourselves is not simple, nor could it be. In fact, the notion of self-constitution implies that there is work involved. Similarly, the notions of techniques and practices of the self imply that we have to learn how to constitute ourselves in certain ways in order to do so. Even though our situation affects our self-constitution, a new situation does not mean that all our practices change, let alone that they change instantaneously. We acquire our practices, and so they are habitual; thus, even though subjectivity is relative to practices, since practices are themselves repeated habitually over time, this implies continuity in subjectivity.

Yet it seems odd to say that we change at the level of subjectivity itself at all. Clearly we do to some extent change ourselves to adapt to different situations, but one might think that this process is both gradual and relatively superficial. To an extent, the problem here is semantic: what Foucault is calling “subjectivity” is not what we are used to thinking of this term as referring to. Foucault is not talking about the transcendental quality of consciousness that has traditionally been identified as subjectivity. He does not mean by “subject” some conscious kernel of our being. Rather, for Foucault, the belief that subjectivity is identifiable purely with consciousness is an understanding that relates to a particular way of constituting ourselves. His position is not that the existence of consciousness is historically variable. Rather, his position is that it is the way we relate to our consciousness that varies. Consciousness is not separable from historical conditions that lead us to relate to ourselves in different ways.

Foucault's position can be clarified further by examining how he situates it in relation to other thinkers whose positions were close to his own. He says that there are two contemporary ways of approaching the relation of the subject to truth, namely Lacan's and Heidegger's (C-HS, 189). Since Foucault is only concerned with this subject in relation to the truth, this implies that these are the two positions that approach the subject in broadly the same way as he does. Indeed, both are linked to and in certain respects similar to his own. Foucault says here that 'I have tried to reflect on all this from the side of Heidegger and starting from Heidegger', although he does not expand on what he means by this. Quite a lot has been written concerning the relationship between Foucault's thought and Heidegger's, but not about this specific remark.⁴ The question is, what does Foucault share with Heidegger that he does not share with Lacan? Foucault in fact does share some obvious things with Lacan that he does not share with Heidegger. Lacan and Foucault were both working in the same place at the same time, and both were bracketed by others as "structuralists." As I have indicated, in both cases this implies a rejection of Heideggerian-influenced phenomenology that was the orthodoxy in the previous generation of French philosophy. Heidegger's early work breaks pointedly with Cartesianism, but keeps a certain kind of practically engaged subjectivity, *Dasein*, at its heart, although in Heidegger's later work he broke with phenomenology more decisively.

Heidegger's focus on practices is something that Foucault takes up, and that Lacan does not. Foucault, like Heidegger, seems to take the approach, emanating from phenomenology, of treating subjectivity in its synchronicity. That is, both thinkers ask how the subject constitutes itself at a given moment, rather than across its lifespan. Lacan, by contrast, is primarily concerned with the self-constitution of the subject through formative experiences and the formation of the personality. Moreover, Heidegger like Foucault studies subjectivity in a historical way, though not to the same extent of historicism as Foucault, whereas Lacan tends to see his discoveries as universal in their validity.

This is not to say though that Foucault takes a resolutely anti-Lacanian stance, just that his investigations of subjectivity have little in common with Lacan's, however much he might have had in common with Lacan in other ways. Foucault and Lacan do indeed seem to be referring to different things when they speak of subjectivity; Lacan to a deep structure of the psyche, and Foucault to historically variable practices of self-constitution. There is no logical contradiction between these approaches, however: we can claim that human beings have both established psychic structure and variable practices. These are just two different approaches, one historical, one biographical. Foucault simply does not deal in his discussions of subjectivity with the deep structure of the personality or absence thereof. The point of Foucault's approach to subjectivity is not to reduce what we are to our practical, functional engagements, but rather to analyze our self-constitution in such practical terms. Foucault indeed seems to present his view as an addition to the Lacanian view when he says that "it is not enough to say that the subject is constituted in a symbolic system. It is not just in the play of symbols that the subject is constituted. It is constituted in real practices – historically analyzable practices" (EW1, 277). It is something of a caricature of Lacan to reduce his account to a purely symbolic game, since the symbolic is only one of several orders, including the real, that Lacan invokes in his theory of the subject. Indeed, since Foucault does not actually name Lacan here, he could be talking about someone else, even

perhaps about the perspective he himself had during the 1960s. In any case, what he says about the symbolic approach is not that it is wrong, but only that it is insufficient. His point is that one needs to analyze historical practices to fully understand subjectivity, but presumably one could conversely say that if that was all one did, one would be making the same mistake in an opposite direction.

Technologies of the Self

Foucault's interest is in the specific category of historical practices by which people constitute their own subjectivity. This is a long-neglected area. Far from simply forming automatically in relation to our practical role, the self-constitution of the subject according to Foucault passes through techniques – and indeed entire technologies (EW1, 225) – of the self: “Techniques of the self, I believe, can be found in all cultures in different forms” (EW1, 277). More generally, Foucault speaks of “practices of the self,” through which “the subject constitutes itself in an active fashion” (EW1, 291). These are “not something invented by the individual himself. They are models that he finds in his culture and are proposed, suggested, imposed upon him by his culture, his society, and his social group” (EW1, 291). This is one way, indeed, in which the subject is not purely self-creating.

Although the ancients did not have a concept equivalent to the modern notion of subjectivity, according to Foucault they paid a level of attention to the self-constitution of the subject that is not found today. In particular, they constituted themselves as subjects in a mode and through techniques that Foucault designates as “ethical.” Ethics for Foucault can be “understood as the elaboration of a form of relation to self that enables an individual to fashion himself into a subject of ethical conduct” (HS2, 251; cf. EW1, 263). Thus, ethics is defined by Foucault as one way for people to constitute themselves as subjects. Of course, this definition of ethics is very different from the one that is usual nowadays. Ethics is generally understood today as a matter of rules or principles for actions that can be labeled as “right” or “good,” hence “ethical” or “moral.” The word “ethics” however does not etymologically, in its Greek root, relate to the right and the good or to rules, but rather to *character*, that is, in effect, to a dimension of ourselves. Whereas, in contemporary philosophy, ethics and morality are usually taken to be synonymous, Foucault distinguishes sharply between the two.⁵ He defines *morality* as encompassing a moral code and the behavior in relation to that code, between which there are varying degrees of compliance in practice (HS2, 25; cf. EW1, 263). What is normally called “ethics” today belongs in fact to this category. Where contemporary ethics generally understands itself to express historically universal truths, however, Foucault takes morality merely to be a social fact, and hence historically relative. To such morality, he counterposes “the kind of relationship you ought to have with yourself, *rapport à soi*, which I call ethics, and which determines how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of his own actions” (EW1, 263; cf. HS2, 26). Ethical self-constitution thus takes place in relation to a moral code, but is itself something completely different.

Ancient ethics was, according to Foucault, dominated by the guiding concept of *epimeleia heautou*. This Greek term Foucault renders in French as *souci de soi*; *souci* is

translatable as either care or concern in English, but “care” is the more common translation here, hence the most common translation of the phrase into English is “the care of the self.” Ethics in the ancient world, Foucault says, “revolved around this fundamental imperative: ‘Take care of yourself’ ” (EW1, 285; cf. EW1, 226). We could call this the *ethos* of Greek ethics (cf. EW1, 287). Within this ethics, all specific “practices stem from the principal task, the care of the self” (EW1, 227).

This notion that the main thing is to care for our selves might sound like a license for self-indulgence, directly contrary to what we have since Christianity considered to be ethical behavior. However, Foucault is quick to assure us that the care of the self was not exclusively about oneself, but also about others, even if it was primarily directed towards the self (EW1, 287). Since Foucault defines ethics as a matter of self-relation, it must always lead back to the self in some sense, even though for the Greeks it was a practice with a social component that had to involve others. The notion of “care” similarly might make one imagine that Greek ethics was inclined towards self-indulgence, but Foucault assures us that if anything the opposite is true, that Greek ethics was a form of self-mastery through restraint.

Still, the notion of “care of the self” is ambiguous, and Foucault details how, across its history in the ancient world, the care of the self changed from being primarily a civic activity to being primarily personal (EW1, 260). This eventually led to the situation where, with the arrival of Christianity, the care of the self was suppressed: the concern for one’s self was transformed into a concern for one’s salvation. But salvation was to be attained by the active abnegation of the self (C-HS, 250), such that, in one’s own self-interest, the care of the self as such must be disavowed (EW1, 284). This is indeed the reason that “care of the self” has come today to sound to us like the opposite of an ethical commandment.

The ethical technology of the care of the self in the ancient world is correlative with another technology, that of self-*knowledge*. Each of these technologies relates to a fundamental injunction, to take care of yourself on the one hand, and to know yourself on the other. Foucault claims that this second injunction has had more historical staying power: it has dominated modern Western philosophy as well as ancient, while the notion of caring for oneself has disappeared. That is, ancient ethics has declined, while a certain imperative that was connected with it, self-knowledge, has taken over. As we have seen, this transition is linked to the rise of Christianity, where the imperative to take care of oneself was derided, in favor of a requirement to mortify oneself and be selfless. And, in order to do that, to avoid sin, one had to try to know oneself. Foucault had already in his *Will to Knowledge* shown how the confessional impulse that emerged from medieval Christianity became secularized and a more general and intense compulsion to know ourselves began to take over (HS1, 18–19). Paradoxically, knowing ourselves is in actuality one of the acts by which we constitute ourselves: our attempt to know ourselves is not a neutral act that allows us to see what was already there, but for Foucault a ritual by which we change and produce our own subjectivity.

In his 1984 lectures, *The Courage of Truth*, Foucault returns to Plato to explore these two different technologies through two of Plato’s dialogues, the *Alcibiades* and the *Laches*. As we saw above, Foucault had already shown in *Hermeneutics of the Subject* how, in the *Alcibiades*, Plato poses the question of the subject, in what Foucault now calls an “ontological” way. The aim here is knowledge of the self. In the *Laches* there is

by contrast a concern with the care of the self as what Foucault calls an “aesthetics of existence” (C-CT, 161), a phrase that Foucault adopts from the nineteenth-century historian Jacob Burckhardt (EW1, 278). Aesthetics is included in ancient techniques of the self not least because the Greeks did not distinguish between the aesthetic and the instrumental, with the single word *tekhnē* referring to art in the aesthetic sense and to instrumental practices.

Foucault here identifies two fundamental strains in Western philosophy, “on the one hand, a philosophy whose dominant theme is knowledge of the soul and which from this knowledge produces an ontology of the self. And then, on the other hand, a philosophy as test of life, of *bios*, which is the ethical material and object of an art of oneself” (C-CT, 127). While the former is an ontological inquiry seeking knowledge, the ethics of the care of the self sought to fashion the self according to the principle of maximizing the beauty of one’s life, hence “aesthetics of existence.” For the Greeks, these concerns were entwined and complementary: ontological knowledge of the self was prized precisely as necessary to caring for the self, which was inseparable from making one’s self beautiful.

On Foucault’s understanding of subjectivity, we always have some kind of practices of the self, and we always have some kind of ontology, and these always maintain some kind of relation to one another, namely that we “put into practice” the metaphysical conception of ourselves (C-CT, 164). However, the relation of metaphysics of the soul to aesthetics of existence is variable: many different practices can fit with any given metaphysics and vice versa.

Since the emergence of Christianity, Foucault argues, we have seen the subordination of our practices of the self in favor of a concern with the being of the soul. Foucault notes that the first traces of this trend can be found in antiquity in Cynicism. The Cynics, whom he spends much of *The Courage of Truth* discussing, subordinated their style of life to the truth and sought an ugly life deliberately in opposition to any aesthetic of existence qua attempt to lead a beautiful life, much against the grain of ancient culture. This rejection of the aesthetics of existence occurs on the basis of a particular orientation in what Foucault calls “spirituality.”

Foucault defines spirituality in *The Hermeneutics of the Subject* as “the search, practice, and experience through which the subject carries out the necessary transformations on himself in order to have access to the truth” (C-HS, 15). The Cynics believed one had to suppress the aesthetic concern for the self in order to get to the truth, and this idea is picked up again by Christianity: both Cynicism and Christianity involve a spirituality which ties access to the truth to the repudiation of aesthetics. Christianity goes further, repudiating even the self as such.

Christianity’s preoccupation with self-knowledge, then, means accentuating spiritual practices of the self that are in opposition to any ethics of the care of the self. More recently, however, Western culture has suppressed spirituality itself. Foucault associates this with what he calls the “Cartesian moment” (C-HS, 17). He apologizes for using the epithet “Cartesian,” since “the break does not occur . . . on the day Descartes laid down the rule of self-evidence or discovered the Cogito” (C-HS, 26). The break is older in its origins, since there was already a serious effort in Christian theology “to remove the condition of spirituality” for access to truth (C-HS, 27, 190–191). Christianity’s spirituality is in tension with a supposition that all believers have access to God’s truth.

Nevertheless, Descartes is the first thinker Foucault identifies (EW1, 279) as having declared that one does not need to cultivate oneself in order to know, but rather that knowledge is accessible to subjectivity as such without the need for the subject to transform itself.

This relates to the Cartesian conception of subjectivity as simple and substantial rather than constituted and formal: subjectivity is taken to be unchanging, hence any notion of spiritual practices of self-transformation ceases to make sense. Both major sides of modern philosophy, the rationalist and the empiricist, share this non-spiritual conception of the relation between subjectivity and truth. Whereas “spirituality and philosophy were identical or nearly identical in ancient spirituality” (EW1, 294), today the philosopher or scientist doesn’t need to do anything to access the truth. The only conditions required today for access to the truth are circumstantial: sanity and a decent education (C-HS, 18). In any case the truth is today increasingly seen as being of only incidental value, since it “cannot save the subject” (C-HS, 19). Whereas in Christianity one needs to know the truth to save one’s soul, secular modernity holds out no such promise.

While Plato claimed that the soul was eternal, he nevertheless advocated arduous spiritual exercises. The rationale for this is that the soul had forgotten what it should naturally know, and that exercises were necessary for it to recover itself. As Foucault notes, even Descartes practiced a kind of spiritual exercise in the meditations that he conducted to try to reach the underlying truth that is accessible to the subject (EW1, 294). Later philosophers, however, finally dispose of the ideas that we have innate knowledge, or that any practice of the self is necessary to reach knowledge. This is not to say that the subject no longer transforms itself in order to know, but that what it transforms itself into is precisely the scientific version of the knowing subject: today, “philosophy superimposes the functions of spirituality upon the ideal of a grounding for scientificity” (EW1, 294). Self-knowledge continues, but it is now understood “scientifically” as objective knowledge of the subject, rather than as an exercise of self-constitution – yet subjectivity continues to constitute itself within this understanding.

Ethics and Spirituality Today

So, according to Foucault, both ethics and spirituality have been “discredited” (C-HS, 14). However, the histories of ethics and spirituality are not entirely in tandem. As we have seen, ethics declined with the rise of Christianity in a way that initially saw it lose ground to spirituality, which then dominated for a thousand years or so. Even now, Foucault (C-HS, 28) points out that “the structures of spirituality have not disappeared,” even if they have lost their dominance. The ethics of the self, by contrast, has gone extinct. Foucault (C-HS, 251) posits a substantial revival of ethics in the Renaissance, “which refers explicitly, moreover, to what is found in the Greek and Latin authors I am talking about,” but this then subsides. In the nineteenth century, there is a “more or less blocked and ossified” attempt to reconstitute an ethics and aesthetics of existence, which Foucault identifies in “Stirner, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, dandyism, Baudelaire, anarchy, anarchist thought.” He concludes though that “I do not think we

have anything to be proud of in our current efforts to reconstitute an ethic of the self" (C-HS, 251). This leads Foucault "to suspect that we find it impossible today to constitute an ethic of the self" (C-HS, 252). This is because for a long time "all of Western culture" has revolved around an "obligation of truth," and "nothing so far has shown that it is possible to define a strategy outside of this concern" (EW1, 295). We no longer have a properly aesthetic concern with the cultivation of the self, because our attitude towards ourselves is today always governed by a concern with finding out the truth, with scientific inquiry into our natures, which will then tell us the correct way to behave. In our society, he claims, art in the aesthetic sense is not practiced on ourselves, nor is it practiced by everyone (EW1, 261). The vocation of producing beauty in modernity is rather confined to art as a specialism. Indeed, if I may extend Foucault's argument, the production of beauty is a function barely even to be found in modern art since its conceptual turn.

Foucault is, however, careful to insist that "nothing is more foreign to me than the idea that, at a certain moment, philosophy went astray and forgot something" (EW1, 294). This is both because he believes that these changes occurred slowly, and because he has no time for nostalgia. On this point he differs from Heidegger. By discussing old forms of subjectivity, then, Foucault is not suggesting them as "an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised by another people" (EW1, 256). Rather, he emphasizes that anything we produce today, even if it is produced by contact with old ideas, "would be something new" (EW1, 295).

Foucault does advocate the production of a new aesthetics of existence, taking his cue from the existence of such a technology in the ancient world, but he is adamant that nothing like this actually exists today. To a suggestion that plenty of people in our society expend a lot of effort on the style of their life, Foucault (EW1, 271) replies by arguing that what one saw in California at that time, where he was frequently sojourning and where the interview was taking place, was not really a case of people constituting themselves as works of art, but rather people constituting themselves as subjects in relation to what they saw as the truth. They were seeking the truth about themselves, living in a way that they thought was the one true way to live, according to scientific principles of health, psychology, and so on. Indeed, I would add, though such practices pursued today are often thought of as "spiritual," for Foucault they are anything but, since they require no transformation of the self to get at the truth.

So there is no ethics of the self today for Foucault, but he nonetheless suggests that the formulation of a new "ethic of the self" may be an urgent, fundamental, and politically indispensable task, if it is true after all that there is no first or final point of resistance to political power other than in the relationship one has to oneself" (C-HS, 252). Interestingly, he elsewhere in fact avers that this is *not* true after all, that ethics is not "the only possible point of resistance to political power" (EW1, 299–300). Still, he nevertheless holds that political resistance "needs" ethics: "Recent liberation movements suffer from the fact that they cannot find any principle on which to base the elaboration of a new ethics. They need an ethics, but they cannot find any other ethics than an ethics founded on so-called scientific knowledge of what the self is, what desire is, what the unconscious is, and so on" (EW1, 255–256).

That ethics should for Foucault have political stakes is not surprising. While Foucault's late work is relatively apolitical compared to his overtly political studies

of the 1970s, he remained politically active throughout the period. Moreover, ancient Greek ethics had a clearly political complexion, directed as it was at the political elite and relating explicitly to the kind of self-mastery required by those who rule others. For Foucault, the need for ethics today is not for a tool to gain mastery over others, but for something that would help people to obtain their own freedom. This is of crucial importance as the point at which Foucault's abstract, historical reflection on subjectivity and techniques of the self links to practical questions in the lives of his readers.

The contemporary need for ethics is for Foucault not so much a matter of what is required by liberation movements here and now, as it is something that will be needed later. Foucault defines ethics as "the conscious [*réfléchie*] practice of freedom," arguing that "freedom is the ontological condition of ethics," and that "ethics is the considered form that freedom takes when it is informed by reflection" (EW1, 284). Thus, ethics is not what is required to produce freedom, but indeed can only really begin to be practiced once we are free. To the extent that we are unfree today, this can be seen as a barrier to the re-emergence of the practice of ethics. Foucault thus differentiates between the mere "practice of liberation" and practices of freedom, saying that the former "is not in itself sufficient to define the practices of freedom that will still be needed . . . to define admissible and acceptable forms of existence or political society" (EW1, 282–283). The need for an ethics is, then, in Foucault's view, primarily not as a point of resistance to produce social change today, but for guidance in the world after liberation: "Liberation paves the way for new power relationships, which must be controlled by practices of freedom" (EW1, 284). If we gain greater freedom, yet lack the ability to practice this freedom, we will be presented with serious difficulties.

If our current political situation can be seen as a barrier to articulating an ethics, however, Foucault refuses to accept that we are trapped in this regard. On the contrary, he believes that we are trapped in part because we perceive ourselves to be constrained by our circumstances:

For centuries we have been convinced that between our ethics, our personal ethics, our everyday life, and the great political and social and economic structures, there were analytical relations, and that we couldn't change anything, for instance, in our sex life or our family life, without ruining our economy, our democracy, and so on. I think we have to get rid of idea of an analytical or necessary link between ethics and other social or economic or political structures. (EW1, 261)

Foucault's claim here, one should note, is not that ethics is completely indifferent to social, political, and economic context. He explicitly sees the change in ethics at the end of the ancient period, for example, as owing to political, economic, and social changes (EW1, 267). Rather, his claim is that ethics is not completely determined by these structures, and thus that any argument that we are powerless to produce an ethics today will only serve to be self-fulfilling. We are not constrained only by social structures, but by our way of thinking about things, such as a conception of subjectivity which does not allow us to recognize the crucial question of the relationship of the subject to itself which is the condition of having a conscious exercise of freedom. Of course, from Foucault's perspective, we can't simply think our way out of the problem, since it is not just a question of thought, but of techniques and practices that need to be socially produced and supported.

Foucault believes that his own work offers a gesture in this direction. He argues that his analysis of power in the 1970s has itself produced the conditions for a re-emergence of ethics. Specifically, his notion of “governmentality,” whereby power is understood as connected to the subject, he thinks “makes it possible to bring out the freedom of the subject and its relationship to others – which constitutes the very stuff [*matière*] of ethics” (EW1, 300). It remains an open question whether a reactivation of ethics can or will proceed from this quarter; Foucault leaves us only with some possible avenues for the renewal of ethics, via a new conception of subjectivity, rather than articulating an ethics himself.

The prospects for spirituality, on the other hand, are more hopeful than those for ethics, since spirituality has never disappeared. Foucault (C-HS, 28) argues that in philosophy since Kant there has in fact been “a reappearance of the structures of spirituality.” He gives two specific examples of this continuing reappearance today: Marxism and psychoanalysis (C-HS, 29).

The focus on Marxism and Lacanian psychoanalysis might seem somewhat arbitrary, but it is not. Foucault names them because they were monolithically prominent in the French intellectual terrain at that time, and also, I would argue, because they were (therefore) close to Foucault’s own position. Psychoanalysis and Marxism are moreover significant for us today because of the recent resurgence in the conjunction of the two in discussions of politics and subjectivity in English, most closely associated with the name Slavoj Žižek.

Foucault (C-HS, 29) is quick to clarify that he is not claiming that Marxism and psychoanalysis are “forms of spirituality.” Rather, he is only willing to assert that they feature “at least certain elements” of spirituality. Specifically,

for completely different reasons but with relatively homologous effects, the problem of what is at stake in the subject’s being (of what the subject’s being must be for the subject to have access to the truth) and, in return, the question of what aspects of the subject may be transformed by virtue of his access to the truth . . . are . . . at the source and outcome of both of these knowledges. (C-HS, 29)

Foucault (C-HS, 29) alludes to the fact that both psychoanalysis and Marxism have been castigated for a perceived lack of scientificity, whereas their adherents have generally insisted on their scientific character. He says that the alternative, critically designating them as “religions” “is meaningless and contributes nothing.” From Foucault’s perspective, both Marxism and psychoanalysis combine certain features of spirituality with a scientific attitude to subjectivity.

In the case of Marxism, there is on the one hand a perception of a need for a change in “consciousness,” by which the people attain the “class consciousness” necessary to oppose capitalism. Moreover, as Foucault (C-HS, 208–209) discusses, revolutionary politics is the heir to the religious conversion experience qua technology of the self, with individuals converting to the revolutionary cause.⁶ On the other hand, there’s a tendency in Marxism to imply that exploitation is obvious, that in fact the only reason people fail to see it is because of “false consciousness,” and indeed that the proletariat are natively equipped with a “scientific consciousness.”

The category of spirituality is, I would argue, somewhat more applicable to psychoanalysis, inasmuch as there is an explicit relation of truth to subjectivity, most obviously

in the notion that there are repressed truths deep within our minds. The core insight of psychoanalysis indeed is that subjectivity is opaque and requires great effort to know. However, psychoanalysis remains typically scientific in thinking of self-knowledge as truth that can be understood through a specific method of investigation. There is a crucial difference in Lacanian analysis, however, inasmuch as its purpose is not to seek the singular truth of ourselves, but rather to articulate a new knowledge by which we understand ourselves (Lacan 1977: 36). Foucault asserts that Lacan in particular has “actually reintroduced into psychoanalysis the oldest tradition, the oldest interrogation, and the oldest disquiet of the *epimeleia heautou*, which was the most general form of spirituality,” and the “specifically spiritual question: that of the price the subject must pay for saying the truth” (FC-HS 31/C-HS 30, translation amended). Lacanian psychoanalysis requires a process of self-transformation to access otherwise hidden knowledge, and not only for the analysand, but for the analyst herself qua analysand, since the analyst has to undertake her own psychoanalysis to prepare her to analyze others.

It is significant that, in talking about Lacan, Foucault relates spirituality to the care of the self (*epimeleia heautou*). He makes an almost identical statement relating spirituality to the care of the self earlier in the same paragraph (C-HS, 29). His phrasing in both statements leaves it unclear, however, as to the exact relationship he posits between spirituality and care of the self. We know though that he thought spirituality and the care of the self were correlative in antiquity, and that spirituality has survived in some form after the demise of the care of the self. What Foucault seems to say here is that spirituality, in its general form (perhaps the general form in which it has survived) is basic to the care of the self. This indicates that the reactivation of spirituality could presage a return to ethics. More pessimistically, one might conversely conclude that without a new spirituality, ethics remains impossible.

Foucault thinks the problem for Lacan's approach is the posing of the transformation of the subject in terms of self-knowledge. This is problematic because it appeals to knowledge, to science, to fulfill the function of spiritual transformation. This is not how spirituality classically operated. Foucault is, however, unwilling to pass judgment as to whether or not this means that psychoanalysis is capable of producing a spirituality, though he is clear that it cannot do it purely in terms of knowledge, since it is a question that by definition exceeds knowledge (C-HS, 30). The essential problem affecting both Marxism and psychoanalysis for him is a failure to acknowledge the questions of self-constitution that he himself raises (C-HS, 29). This problem is doubtless related to the fact that psychoanalysis and Marxism both understand themselves as sciences, given that science and spirituality are seen today as mutually exclusive (C-HS, 28). In itself, scientificity is not necessarily a stumbling block: one could argue that in the current conjuncture any new spirituality would have to understand itself as scientific. For Foucault, while we do still in effect have “spiritual structures,” we cannot have a genuine spirituality until we acknowledge this sphere of subjective practice. As with ethics, Foucault's own work could serve as a catalyst to the articulation of a spirituality, though he again does not articulate one himself.

What Foucault gives us, then, is a conception of subjectivity that allows a historical investigation of a category of specific practices of self-constitution that have come to be ignored through a long and varied historical process of suppression and denial. This disappearance of practices of the self cannot simply be wished away in a moment, but

the uncovering of this category *prima facie* opens avenues for exploring and reviving this tradition in the West.

Notes

- 1 See Mansfield 2000 – though Mansfield extraordinarily identifies this perspective with Foucault's position across the latter's output.
- 2 For an account of Foucault's ethics that is both critical (in the sense of probing, rather than excoriatory) and does look at the ancient historical aspect in detail, see O'Leary 2002.
- 3 For a discussion of this term, see Kelly 2009: 88–89.
- 4 See in particular Elden 2001 and Rayner 2007. Both these books dealing with Heidegger and Foucault were written before the publication of *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*, so do not deal with the passage in question.
- 5 Foucault (OT, 327–328) makes this distinction as early as 1966 in *The Order of Things*, but only in passing and without defining these terms, and not apparently using them in the way that he defines them in his late work. The common theme between this earlier treatment and his later work is the claim – much more emphatically expressed in *The Order of Things*, however – that there is here an area of life that has disappeared in modernity, which we cannot recapture. In *The Order of Things*, though, Foucault says it is morality that is impossible within contemporary ethics, whereas in his late reflections the roles are reversed, with ethics as that which seems impossible today, while contemporary morality is simply not discussed.
- 6 For a discussion of the communist conversion experience in relation to Foucault see Bernauer and Mahon 2005: 166–167. Though Bernauer and Mahon do quote a communist convert as describing his conversion as “spiritual,” this does not imply spirituality in Foucault's sense. Moreover, Bernauer and Mahon indicate precisely that we can see a shift in communist hermeneutics of the subject during the early years of the Soviet Union, from one which is concerned with the constitution of the self to one which has a more “ontological” outlook.

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The Formation and Self-Transformation of the Subject in Foucault's Ethics

COLIN KOOPMAN

Foucault's Two Ethical Projects

Michel Foucault's late writings on ethical subjectivation traverse two different, but related, spaces of inquiry. These writings are a contribution to his genealogies of the formation of the modern subjects that we are. They are also an ethical response to the problematization of the modern subjects we have become that is intended to provoke the self-transformation of that subject. Foucault's ethical writings are thus located at the hinge between a history of the formation of the subject and the possibility of the future transformation of the subject. This interplay of formation and transformation, subjectivation and desubjectivation, is crucial for an understanding of Foucault's work, located as it always was in the decisive moment of the present.

The interdigitation between how we find our selves formed, on the one hand, and how we transform those same selves, on the other hand, is crucial for an understanding, analysis, and diagnosis of ethical forms. For ethics, as a first-order practice of emplaced activity rather than a second-order discourse on such activity, requires both the backward-looking historical gaze in which we discern the inheritance that bears on present ethical action and also the forward-looking, future-oriented hope in virtue of which that inheritance is productively transformed with the resources furnished us by our present. Foucault's ethics explicitly takes up the relation between these tasks as we face them in our present.

I shall here explicate Foucault's bi-directional ethics of the subject as follows. I begin by briefly considering Foucault's genealogies of the modern moral subject as the backdrop against which he conducted his inquiries on the ethical forms of subjectivation found in antiquity. I then turn at greater length to these inquiries, bringing them into focus in terms of possibilities for the self-transformation of the subject today. To make sense of these possibilities, and defend them against familiar criticisms, I introduce and defend a meta-ethical distinction between "orientations" and "commitments" in ethics.

Foucault has been read as both explicating a range of substantive normative contents (commitments) as well as envisioning a mode of ethical practice centered less on determinate contents and more on practical transformation of what we take to be normative (orientations). Both aspects of ethics are, to be sure, present in Foucault, and I shall argue that the various commitments he mined from antiquity and elsewhere are best construed in light of Foucault's overall ethical orientation. The guiding ethical orientation in Foucault's late writings is, I shall argue, a conception of freedom as self-transformative practice. This conception stands as an intriguing alternative to prevailing modes of modern moral self-making. Understanding this orientation helps us to see Foucault's discussions of determinate ethical contents in their best light, namely as possibilities for responding to the problems at the heart of our contemporary selves. Thus, the long third section of this essay is devoted to showing how self-transformation makes sense of a range of topics featured in Foucault's late ethical writings. I focus primarily on the care of the self (including aesthetics of existence and pleasure) and the philosophical way of life (including ancient *parrhesia* and modern critique). I conclude by opening a window onto further possibilities raised by the foregoing discussion.

The Genealogy of the Formation of the Modern Subject

Contrary to what remains, quite unfortunately, the familiar wisdom, there is no deep break between Foucault's genealogies of modernity from the 1970s, namely *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality*, volume 1 (more properly titled *The Will to Know*), and his inquiries from the early 1980s into the ethics of antiquity (*The Use of Pleasure*, *The Care of the Self*, and his lectures at the Collège de France). Foucault's writings on ethics in antiquity pick up right where his prior writings on power and knowledge in modernity left off in at least two ways: first, as an expanded historical inquiry into the emergence of modern ethical problematizations out of the problematization of the ethics of antiquity, and second as an outline of an ethical response to the problems diagnosed in his prior work on modern morality.

First, then, Foucault's writings on ancient ethics extend his genealogies of the modern subject back into those "dark" periods before modernity where it is so difficult for us to discern the histories that continue to condition our present selves. In this sense, Foucault's late ethical writings comprise a diagnostic dimension which involves an archaeological-genealogical problematization of the conditions of modern subjectivity. Foucault's ethical inquiries of the early 1980s are historical investigations into some of the oldest (but not necessarily the most important) strands constituting the formation of our modern selves. These inquiries thus further build upon Foucault's previous genealogies of the modern moral subject in which he had diagnosed the dangers of the disciplinary and biopolitical forms of self-fashioning in which we find ourselves so readily engaged. Whereas Foucault's work in the 1970s diagnosed the emergence of some of our most central modern self-technologies, his work in the 1980s extended that diagnosis by charting those self-technologies of antiquity which preceded, and in different ways informed, our own. One way of formulating the sequence charted in this work is as follows: Foucault's genealogies taken together move from ancient self-care

through self-knowledge and self-decipherment down to modern self-surveillance and finally self-discipline.¹ Another formulation of the sequence is more political in focus and involves what Foucault once described as “the genealogy of what could be called political discourse”: this genealogy travels from the public orator and counselor in antiquity to the pastoral minister of early modernity to critical discourse in the Enlightenment and then to the more recent emergence of the figure of the revolutionary (C-GSO, 69–70). Variation in formulations notwithstanding, Foucault is explicit that his work on antiquity is offered as “obviously a sort of prehistory of those practices which are organized and developed later around some famous couples: the penitent and the confessor, the person being guided and the spiritual director, the sick person and the psychiatrist, the patient and the psychoanalyst” (C-CT, 7). The genealogies of modern moral self-formation deployed in *History of Madness, Discipline and Punish*, and elsewhere are traced even further back in the material that would be published in only partial form in the final two volumes of *The History of Sexuality*.

Why extend the history of our selves back through modernity and then even further back into antiquity? Why do we need to understand where we have come from? What, in other words, is the point of a genealogy of the modern subject? One piece of familiar wisdom has it that Foucault’s genealogies function under the rule of what might be called *the anti-inevitability thesis*. This thesis holds that whatever we take to be inevitable about ourselves is in actual fact the process of contingent historical accretion. This is indeed one of Foucault’s aims. But it is not the only aim, and it is unfortunate that much of the commentary engine on Foucault has emphasized anti-inevitability over and above a second and more important aim of his genealogies. We can refer to this second aim in terms of what might be called *the composition thesis*. This thesis suggests that the point of a genealogy is not just to establish *the fact that* the formation of modern subjectivity has been a contingent process subject to all manner of historical accidents and humble accumulations, but also to describe *the process of how* modern subjectivity was contingently composed of a whole congeries of elements that contribute to who we are. Knowing *how* we have become who we are furnishes us with the resources which we would need to have at our disposal if we are to do anything at all about the sorts of selfhood we would continue to inhabit. For example, knowing how Christian practices of confession helped compose our modern sexual subjectivity opens up terrain upon which we can resist certain aspects of our selves, should we wish to so resist our selves.²

This final caveat brings me to another piece of familiar wisdom about Foucault’s genealogies: that is, that they bring into focus the dark underbelly of how we came to be who we are, such that we can come to better see *what is wrong* with us. Call this *genealogical subversion*. I find this view misleading. Genealogies cannot be used to show that we should resist our selves in the strong normative sense of *ought*. Genealogies can provoke in us a sense that we should change ourselves but they cannot place us under an obligation. To argue that they can, a temptation for so many Foucault’s readers, is to fall prey to the genetic fallacy. Foucault’s point was never to show us that what we are doing is bad or wrong. It was rather to point out the insidious and subtle dangers in who we are. Call this genealogical *problematization*. A recognition of problematizations, in the sense of deep dangers, does not oblige self-transformation though surely it goes some way toward making it look both attractive and possible.³

If all of this is right, then we can affirm that Foucault was interested all along in developing an ethical response to the problems of modern subjectivity diagnosed by his genealogies. This is the second of the two senses in which there is no deep cleavage between Foucault's genealogies of the modern subject and his subsequent critical inquiries into practices of self-formation in antiquity. If Foucault's genealogies tell the story of how we have become who we are in terms of the historical conditions that make subjects like us possible, then Foucault's ethics carries this story forward into the future in order that we might become otherwise. Genealogies provoke a problematization, while ethics responds to that which is problematic in our condition. Foucault's later writings on ethics in antiquity (and in modernity) speak in part to aspects of ourselves that remain buried deep within the histories that condition us. Some of these aspects are stultifying and dangerous. Others, however, provide underexplored possibilities that we may yet find ways of leveraging in order to sponsor the further transformation of our selves.

In not insignificant ways, then, it may appear as if Foucault is attempting to revive antiquity's ethics as an alternative to modernity's moralities. If Foucault's project in its second sense of ethical response to the present is revivalist at least part of the time, as I suggest in the next section, then we would do well to bear in mind the first sense of Foucault's genealogies as ethical histories, in part as a caution against excessive ethical revivalism. Another contemporary genealogist, Bernard Williams, also devoted extensive thought to processes of self-formation in antiquity, and in describing the goal of his own genealogical inquiries he articulated the contrast between the two senses of Foucault's ethics I am here working with: "It is not a question of *reviving* anything What is alive from the Greek world is already alive and is helping (often in hidden ways) to keep us alive" (1994: 7). Where Williams was often suspicious of revival, Foucault has often appeared to many readers to be downright enthusiastic: it is difficult not to hear Foucault's own voice of endorsement in his descriptions of, for example, ancient practices of pleasure and *parrhesia*. Surveying Foucault's more measured moments, the attitude in question might be better described as "curiosity" in the sense of "that which enables one to get free of oneself" (HS2, 8). I turn now to surveying some of the objects of that curiosity.

The Ethical Self-Transformation of the Modern Subject

In an interview at Berkeley in 1980 Foucault was asked a question that we have all silently put to him in reading his work: "Are there positive themes in your concept of what is good? In practice, what are the moral elements on which you base your actions toward others?" Foucault's answer to this question is refreshing: "I've already told you: refusal, curiosity, innovation" (Foucault 1988: 13). A thread that links all three of these elements together can be put in terms of what I shall refer to as the overriding orientation of Foucault's ethics, namely that of self-transformation. What do I mean by self-transformation?⁴

To get at this notion, I need to first explain what I mean by orientation, which I understand by way of a meta-ethical distinction between ethical orientations and ethical commitments. *Orientations* are metatheoretical elements structuring the way in

which one orients oneself to ethics by positioning their ethical reflection in terms of certain questions, categories, structures, and other background features they take to be basic. *Commitments*, by contrast, refer to the products that emerge out of ethical inquiry – commitments take the form of principles, theses, positions, strategies, techniques, rules, concepts, and other contents produced in ethical inquiry and moral practice. What we take to be of real value in philosophical work on ethics depends on the relative priority we assign to orientation and commitment. An ethics centered on commitments will be eager to produce judgments and make moral verdicts. An ethics centered on orientations will aim, in a quite different way, to situate and structure extant possibilities for ethical living in the present. The work of every important moral philosopher contains elements of each.

The ethical orientation of self-transformation in Foucault

Making use of this meta-ethical distinction, my argument is that self-transformation is the guiding ethical orientation of Foucault's ethical writings such that self-transformation is not itself usefully seen as a primary ethical commitment forwarded by Foucault. To put it plainly, Foucault is not telling us that we ought to transform ourselves, but is rather telling us that the work of ethics today stands in need of a structuring tendency toward transformativity. Transformation *orients* ethics, for Foucault, but is not itself a substantive normative *commitment*. If you want to engage in an ethical relation of working on the self, Foucault is saying, then try thinking about ethics as a practice of transformation. By contrast, seeing Foucault's talk of self-transformative freedom as a commitment to freedom or as the advancement of a normative thesis about freedom involves us in confusions, as critics of Foucault have been eager to point out in contrasting such commitments to his genealogical accounts of how we modern subjects have formed ourselves (cf. Fraser 1989; Habermas 1987; Rorty 1981).

What, then, is self-transformation? The idea involves a reworking and re-creation of the self. There are two central elements here: reflexivity and process. Self-transformation involves the subject taking itself as an object of the activity of work. Practices of self-transformation thus take place at the point of intersection between our being a subject for ourselves and our being an object to ourselves. We find ourselves already made up as an object of work at the same time that we find ourselves capable as a subject of reworking our selves.

The transformation of the self, as seen by Foucault, involves a formal conception of freedom. "Freedom is the ontological condition of ethics," Foucault once said in an interview (EW1, 284). Freedom, for Foucault, must remain undefined, in the sense that it must be something that we work out for ourselves in practice. The ethics of freedom which Foucault began to work on in his final years was one in which freedom is not conceived as a state or a capacity, but rather as a practice or a process. Whereas capacities can be specified in advance, processes must work themselves out. Processes thus tend toward the formal where capacities tend toward the substantive.

There is certainly room for criticism of a conception of freedom that remains formal in this way. In the 1980 Berkeley interview already cited above, Foucault's frustrated questioner pressed him to say more about ethics beyond his appeal to a self-

transformative orientation: "I have to admit, I find myself a bit lost . . . because there's too much openness." Foucault's response:

Listen, listen . . . How difficult it is! I'm not a prophet. I'm not an organizer. I don't want to tell people what they should do. I'm not going to tell them, "This is good for you, this is bad for you!" I try to analyze a real situation in its various complexities, with the goal of allowing refusal, and curiosity, and innovation. (1988: 13)

Despite such remarks, Foucault said more about what self-transformation might look like than he sometimes let on. Foucault's writings do of course feature (by way of both description and endorsement) numerous ethical commitments. These commitments, I would argue, should be seen as oriented by a conception of self-transformation. Indeed it is only in the light of self-transformation (structured as an orientation not itself a commitment) that these commitments can be understood as promising ethical opportunities for us in the present. The idea is that if self-transformation understood as a kind of formal orientation can help explicate the content of particular ethical commitments, then perhaps Foucault's formalism about freedom will turn out to be an advantage after all. Specifically, it will be advantageous to the extent that it offers guidance in taking up the various ethical commitments we require of ourselves in the present.

Ethical commitments in Foucault

I turn now to offering what might be described as an abbreviated catalogue of Foucault's commitments. My aim is to show how these commitments can be usefully worked with when oriented by the light of self-transformation. I divide my catalogue into two broad constellations of ethical practice featured in Foucault's late writings: *the care of the self* (involving the aesthetics of existence and the ethics of pleasure) and *the philosophical way of life* (involving ancient *parrhesia* and modern critique). The crucial question that we should put to all of these items is the following: are these mere museum pieces retrieved from the past and now detailed in a merely descriptive catalogue authored by Foucault or are they historical possibilities lodged in our present capable of revival today? In answering this question with respect to my shorter list I shall argue that each of these elements ought to be read through the general ethical orientation of self-transformation if it is to make sense at all for us today.

The care of the self: aesthetics and pleasure

Of particular interest to Foucault in his final years were ethical relations of self-care as developed across two different eras in antiquity. In a passing remark in a lecture at Berkeley, Foucault told his audience that "the care of the self" is "a notion which, as some of you know, I like a lot" (FS, 92). We can understand Foucault's investigations of self-care as working toward the beginnings of a response to our fraught forms of ethical self-relation such as self-knowledge, self-obedience, and self-legislation.

As these ancient practices are detailed in *The Use of Pleasure* and *The Care of the Self*, one central theme that emerges is that of aesthetics of existence or art of the self (cf. Davidson 1994 and O'Leary 2002). In the former volume Foucault suggests: "classical antiquity's moral reflection concerning the pleasures was not directed toward a

codification of acts, nor toward a hermeneutics of the subject, but toward a stylization of attitudes and an aesthetics of existence" (HS2, 92). In the latter volume he describes the process by which the uses of pleasure became increasingly organized by a theme of self-care such that, "It was against the background of this cultivation of the self, of its themes and practices, that reflection on the ethics of pleasure developed in the first centuries of our era." This background was described in terms of "a certain art of living which defines the aesthetic and ethical criteria of existence" (HS3, 67).

What did Foucault mean by aesthetics of existence? This idea involves a practice of adopting an aesthetic relationship of care and creativity about oneself, in contrast to a relation of rule over and obedience to oneself. The idea is that of working on oneself so as to realize a degree of stylization of the self. This could not count, of course, as a justification of the ethics that one has realized. But it could count, perhaps, as a transformation of the kinds of ethical relations that one might be able to realize. In another interview at Berkeley, Foucault expressed great curiosity about the possibility of bringing this notion to bear on morality today: "What strikes me is the fact that, in our society, art has become something that is related only to objects and not to individuals or to life, that art is something which is specialized or done by experts who are artists. But couldn't everyone's life become a work of art?" (EW1, 261). The point, I take it, is that there is much to be gained ethically from the theme of returning to our selves as materials to be worked over, shaped up, and stylized without subjecting these selves to the familiar rituals of "the modern morality system" (cf. Williams 1985). In a world where identity is more fluid than ever, it is clear that we indeed have something to learn about practices of remaking ourselves. Today there is nothing, not even the body, that is an invariant requirement for who we might be. Everything is up for grabs, capable of being reworked, and a possible material for the transformation of the self. This opens up a tremendous field of problems to which the ancient aesthetics of existence could help us respond. Foucault noted that our widespread lack of binding sets of moral requirements for practices of self-formation compares to ethical antiquity in terms of a "similarity of problems" (EW1, 255). What this suggests is not only the pregnancy of the possibility of a contemporary artistry of the self, but perhaps more crucially the need for an elaboration of a purposive aesthetics of existence. To put it negatively, if we do not undertake the aesthetic cultivation of our selves in the present, then it is likely that somebody (or something) else will perform this work on us with results that we might wish we had resisted.

Another theme that repeatedly surfaces in Foucault's discussions of ancient practices of self-care is that of pleasure. In a cryptic remark at the end of *The History of Sexuality*, volume 1 Foucault suggested that the "rallying point" against the modern disciplinary and biopolitical deployments of sex and desire might be "bodies and pleasures" (HS1, 157). As he restated the point in an interview five years later: "What we must work on, it seems to me, is not so much to liberate our desires but to make ourselves infinitely more susceptible to pleasures" (EW1, 137). Foucault's curiosity with regard to an ethics of pleasure is focused on the possibility of elaborating a relation to oneself that is not articulated on a model of the desiring subject who locates the self in terms of how it lacks what it wants, but rather on a model of the subject of pleasure who locates the self along the flows of pleasure it is already in the midst of. This conception has proven famously puzzling (cf. Butler 1999 and McWhorter 1999).

This is not because Foucault refused to elaborate the idea of an ethics of pleasure. He indeed developed the idea at great length in his 1984 *The Use of Pleasure* as well as in a number of interviews prior to that volume's publication. It is clear from many of these interviews that Foucault understood pleasure's value in terms of the more general orientation of self-transformation under which he often discussed practices of self-care. In one interview he plainly stated: "my problem is my own transformation." His interviewer responded by asking if this involved prescribing a moral norm: "Are you not in some ways telling us how to act?" Foucault responded:

"No But if by ethics you mean the relationship you have to yourself when you act, then I would say that it intends to be an ethics, or at least to show what could be an ethics of sexual behavior The relationship that I think we need to have with ourselves when we have sex is an ethics of pleasure, of intensification of pleasure." (EW1, 131)

Not so much "I want you" or "I want you to want me" but rather "I take enormous pleasure in us." Pleasure for Foucault can thus be understood as part of a more general set of practices of self-care through which we reflexively facilitate self-transformation. Thus, a question we can, and should, ask of Foucault's ethics of pleasure concerns the extent to which such an ethics helps us understand how pleasure enables self-transformation rather than self-stultification or one of its other opposites. Asking this question helps us to see that pleasure, like much else in Foucault's ethics, pulls whatever load that it does only insofar as it is oriented by a conception of self-transformation.

One of the central problems in understanding how Foucault thinks we ought to use pleasure for self-transformation concerns his emphasis on pleasure as a kind of extreme intensification. In the interview just quoted Foucault says: "I think that the kind of pleasure I would consider as *the* real pleasure would be so deep, so intense, so overwhelming that I couldn't survive" (EW1, 129). He goes on to describe a near-death experience (being hit by a car) as a paradigm of the intensification of pleasure – elsewhere he discusses pleasure in terms of the limit-experiences of drug use and sado-masochism. These are perhaps not the first examples one would choose to parade under the banner of ethics in, say, an introductory moral philosophy course. Such practices of pleasure may, of course, prove useful for some persons in some contexts to facilitate self-transformation. But we ought to be cautious about endorsing Foucault's ethics of pleasure if we do not believe that his paradigmatic cases can be easily generalized to most lives.

What should we do about Foucault's ethics of pleasure given its tendency toward over-intensification? Richard Shusterman urges caution about Foucault's pleasure in the extreme: "The persistent demand for extreme intensities threatens not merely to reduce the range of our felt pleasures but even to dull our affective acuity, our very capacity to feel our bodies with real clarity, precision, and power" (2008: 38). Shusterman accordingly reads Foucault through the lens of his own project in pragmatist somaesthetics (cf. Shusterman 1992). A central part of somaesthetics involves the project of, as Shusterman puts it, "improving our capacities for pleasure" in ways that extend well beyond Foucault's focal range on the extremely intense (2008: 6). Shusterman asks, "In proposing an 'ethics of pleasure,' doesn't Foucault need a more careful 'logic' and 'logistic' of its central concept, a more refined and delicate appreciation

of the diversities and subtleties of pleasure, including its more tender, gentle, and mild varieties?" (2008: 37). Shusterman's approach involves carefully attending to the wealth of middle-range pleasures made available through somatic practice. This seems a viable way of following up on Foucault, but a worry remains that middle-range pleasures too often leave us as we are whereas Foucault's point in emphasizing pleasure was to pave the way to a transformative dissembling of the self. Standard critiques about hedonist conservatism rear their ugly head here. Our ordinary pleasures often further entrench us in existing ways of living. Shusterman is surely right that they need not if carefully attended to and cultivated with the express aim of transformation in mind. But some will remain plausibly skeptical about our capacities for overcoming our normalized selves by way of too-easy middle-range options. One response to these worries could be to focus explicitly on ways in which more middle-range pleasures can open up spaces for self-transformation. This is Shusterman's own intention, and two recent contributions to Foucauldian queer theory provide valuable further guidance here.

First, Jana Sawicki links Foucault's ethics of pleasure with "redirection, reversal, or diminution" and with "the possibility of detaching us from ourselves in order to support movement in a different direction" (2010: 191, 194). Sawicki thus ably sets the Foucauldian ethics of pleasure under the sign of self-transformation. This is of value insofar as Foucault's ethics is a response to the conformism implicit in the disciplinary constitution of the modern subject. Thus Sawicki concludes, I think rightly, that, "the potential of pleasure to resist normalizing power has been overlooked" (2010: 201). More specifically, and with respect to sexual pleasure as a means of transforming our self-subjection in terms of sexual desire, she highlights Foucault's "appeal[s] to pleasures as historical (and bodily) resources that might be of strategic value in experimenting with new ways of living as erotic beings – ways of living that produce alternatives to subjection within the modern regime of sexuality" (2010: 201).

Second, Lynne Huffer offers a rereading of Foucault's ethics of pleasure under the same light I am here urging: "We might go so far as to call transformation the basic ethical principle in Foucault" (2010: 243). I agree with Huffer that the transformation of the self is what should take priority, though my emendation is to explicitly situate this as an orientation rather than as a commitment or a principle. Doing so enables appropriate caution about further commitments to pleasures in the extreme that incline so many to shy away altogether from what Foucault was saying. Huffer proceeds to show how our sexuality is a domain in which pleasures that are readily available to all (for what could be more quotidian than sex today?) open up spaces of radical transformation at the limits of our selves. She writes: "We queer Cartesians love our orgasms because they allow us to flirt with those errancies of the mind that we touch, ever so gently, in *la petite mort*. Still, I've always been struck that although people tune in to the *mort* part of the metaphor, it's the *petite* dimension of it that's important. The *petite* makes it livable, pleasurable, repeatable" (2010: 126). There are little pleasures whose importance lies not so much in their being middling as in the way they combine a certain availability with a space of transformability.

There is no good reason to deny that the interwoven themes of care, pleasure, and aesthetics remain extraordinarily vague in Foucault's discussions. But perhaps that is in keeping with the spirit of the ideas themselves. Critics will, nonetheless, point out that caring for the self through arts of existence or practices of pleasure can just as

well lead to ethical degradation as to ethical regeneration. Sometimes the little pleasures help us become other than who we are, but nobody should deny that they also often entrench us further in extant regimes of self-constitution. What, then, should we do with this central ambiguity of Foucault's ethics? Perhaps the following: if the ethical commitments featured in Foucault's ethics are of necessity vague, then we should be careful to read these commitments through the lens of a self-transformative ethical orientation which would guide us in reconstructing our own ethical commitments. The commitments we make in our own contexts may end up looking quite different from those featured by Foucault in his context. This is sure to follow from prioritizing a self-transformative ethical orientation over the ethical commitments which Foucault himself elaborated under that orientation. Is this problematic for a Foucauldian? No. Going beyond Foucault is of course exactly what Foucault would have expected of us. He was clear that he did not want to set himself up as a prophet: "So you see, there really is a call for prophetism. All this prescriptive network has to be elaborated and transformed by people themselves" (EW1, 133). The crucial questions that remain concern how we should build on Foucault's work when we elaborate upon his ethics for ourselves.

Philosophy as a way of life: *parrhesia* and critique

Another theme that emerges in Foucault's late writings, this one less prevalent in the published *History of Sexuality* volumes and late interviews but more prevalent in his late lectures in Berkeley and in Paris, is that of the philosophical way of life. Foucault explored this thematic in a number of domains, two of which appear foremost. The first involves the practice of *parrhesia* in antiquity. The second involves the practice of *critique* in modernity. These two isolated archaeological moments were explicitly connected by Foucault in his 1982–83 Collège de France lectures, *The Government of Self and Others*, where he outlined a genealogical interrogation of the transformations that led from one to the other.⁵ Foucault there claims that the Kantian project of a critical inquiry into our historical present serves as a relay for central ideas that can be traced back to the Platonic project of a philosophical *parrhesia*. It is notable that Foucault's readings of both philosophical moments involve dramatic reversals of philosophy's traditional histories of itself: Foucault's Kant is not the author of the three *Critiques* so much as the author of the short "What is Enlightenment?" essay, just as Foucault's Plato is not so much the name associated with *The Republic* and *The Laws* as it is the author of the *Seventh Letter*.

To begin in antiquity, Foucault offered detailed examinations of the emergence and evolution of the ancient practice of *parrhesia* in his Collège de France lectures from 1982 through 1984, in a series of 1983 lectures at Berkeley subsequently published under the title *Fearless Speech*, and in a number of other lectures from that period. The ancient Greek *parrhesia* can be translated in many ways: "truth-telling" or "frank speech" or "fearless speech" or "free speech." I prefer "truth-telling" if only because it nicely connects Foucault's work back to the discussions of the value of truth featured in the work of other genealogists, including Friedrich Nietzsche and Bernard Williams.⁶ But the rendering of "free speech" serves as a helpful reminder that *parrhesia* is a practice of freedom, such that it was generally translated into Latin as *libertas*. Foucault

underscores this connection to freedom: “What is basically at stake in *parrhesia* is what could be called, somewhat impressionistically, the frankness, freedom, and openness that leads one to say what one has to say, as one wishes to say it, when one wishes to say it, and in the form one thinks is necessary for saying it” (C-HS, 372). Perhaps, then, the best translation would be “free truth-telling” or “freedom in truth-telling” though these are clearly too cumbersome. Foucault, of course, offered a much more complex explication than mere translation notes can achieve.

In the *Fearless Speech* lectures of 1983, Foucault summarizes the four qualities of this *parrhesia* in its most general sense: “a kind of verbal activity where the speaker has a specific relation to truth through frankness, a certain relationship to his own life through danger, a certain type of relation to himself or other people through criticism (self-criticism or criticism of other people), and a specific relation to moral law through freedom and duty” (FS, 19). What Foucault offers (and in greatest detail in his final two years of course lectures in Paris) are archaeological portraits of different moments of this general practice of *parrhesia* found throughout antiquity. Two moments in particular stand out: an earlier model of *parrhesia* in the context of politics where Pericles is a paradigm (cf. FS, 75ff, C-GSO, 173ff) and a later model of *parrhesia* in the context of philosophical ethics where Socrates is the familiar hero (cf. FS 89ff, C-GSO 279ff, C-CT, 57ff). Both of these moments are part of the prehistory of the later deployment of *parrhesia* in later Cynical philosophy (cf. C-CT, 157ff) and Christian thought (cf. C-GSO, 301ff, C-CT, 316ff). There are, of course, other uses of *parrhesia* both before and after the Periclean and Socratic models upon which Foucault is focused. *Parrhesia* is a genus of which its political and its philosophical implementations are only two species. Despite notable differences, in all of its varieties *parrhesia* is a practice of freedom or liberty. *Parrhesia* connects to freedom just insofar as its primary aim is not to secure a truth but rather to effect a conversion in the relationship that one’s audience has toward the truth one speaks, perhaps most instructively in the philosophical *parrhesia* of Socrates and Diogenes where one’s audience is one’s own self (cf. FS, 142ff). This conversion or transformation is a philosophical practice that functions primarily on the ethical register and provides Foucault with a privileged point of access to “the practice of what could be called the government of oneself and others” (C-CT, 8). How, then, does *parrhesia* involve a transformative enactment of freedom? We can take up this question with respect to both social and individual transformation.

Socially, *parrhesia* involves not gaining knowledge that certain of our social practices are unjust, but rather transforming our conceptions of justice such that we can come to recognize certain practices as possibly unjust.⁷ *Parrhesia* in this sense does not show what is true or false about society but transforms the conditions of the possibility of showing something to be true or false. Think of the difference between Martin Luther King, Jr. (who effected a change in our very conception of justice) and the United States Supreme Court in *Brown v. Board of Education* (which applied an existing conception of justice to a new case). The parrhesiast does not offer evidence to make a case, but rather works to transform the conditions under which cases may be brought to court. Foucault explicitly contrasts ancient *parrhesia* to modern epistemology on this point, insisting that the truth established in the ancient practice is not an evidential relation established between beliefs and their objects but is rather a verbal relation established between speakers and truths (cf. FS, 14). The implicit epistemology of the ethical practice of

parrhesia, then, is quite unlike our modern epistemology of justification and more a kind of epistemology of transformation. The point is not to demonstrate that something is right or wrong, or true or false. The point is to change social attitudes and cultural behaviors by a change in orientation effected by a practice of philosophical truth-telling.

At a more individual level, not to be confused with an individualistic register, *parrhesia* functions to reflexively effect transformations in our selves. Here Foucault's discussion of philosophical *parrhesia* hooks up with his discussions of care of the self. Philosophy as a way of life is to be understood as one way of reflexively taking care of our selves. As he put it in his 1982–83 Collège de France lectures: "The reality of philosophy is found in the relationship of self to self" (C-GSO, 255). This relation of self to self should be understood not in terms of hermeneutically deciphering some essential self that remains buried within us, but rather in terms of a remaking of the self by the self. Just as *parrhesia* in its social function does not show us what justice must be but rather facilitates ongoing social self-transformation, *parrhesia* at a more individual level does not reveal something about a self to which one must remain obedient but rather functions as a practice sponsoring the constant reworking the self. This emerges most clearly in one of Foucault's most provocative discussions of the philosophical way of life. In the 1984 Collège de France lectures, Foucault tracks the inflection of philosophical *parrhesia* after Socrates in the hands of Diogenes the Cynic. Basing his analysis on a distinction between "the metaphysics of the soul" and "a stylistics of existence" (C-CT, 161), Foucault explores the Cynic practice of philosophy as a stylistics of the *bios philosophikos* that "is strongly connected to the principle of truth-telling" (C-CT, 165; cf. 217ff). Of particular note is how Foucault figures the Cynic *bios philosophikos* as a life of transformation. For Foucault the most interesting and intensifying principle of Cynic philosophy is the practical maxim to "change the value of the currency" (C-CT, 226ff). Foucault analyzes this famously difficult epigram as follows: "Cynicism is in fact this movement by which life changes as a result of being really and truly, in actual fact, stamped with the effigy of philosophy . . . [F]or life to be truly the life of truth, must it not be an *other* life?" (C-CT, 245). Foucault positions the Cynic ideal of a transformed "other life" over against that other classical ideal of an eternal "other world" and in so doing recapitulates the distinction between the stylization of life and the ontology of the soul. In the final lecture of the 1984 course series, which was indeed the final lecture Foucault would deliver at the Collège de France, we confront directly the displacement of a Cynic thematics of transformation by a Christian thematics of obedience: "this theme of *parrhesia*-confidence will be replaced by the principle of a trembling obedience" (C-CT, 333). In noting the obedience that is so dominant in our contemporary cultures of the self, Foucault seems to lament the obscuration of self-transformative *parrhesia* which covered over philosophical truth-telling with our now-dominant frames of obeying a truth that resides in some other world, be it divine or transcendental in order.

On the whole, Foucault's discussions of the philosophical way of life sound themes that resonate throughout both ancient and modern philosophy in their better moments: have the courage to be your own authority without obedience to another. The idea of non-obedience, for example, offers a useful index for Foucault's discussion of what is valuable in both ancient and modern forms of the philosophical way of life. This brings

me to the long transformation of *parrhesia* into the modern philosophical practice of critique.

Foucault outlined a genealogy of this transformation in his 1983 lectures in both Paris and Berkeley. In his fall 1983 Berkeley lectures, Foucault concluded his discussion of *parrhesia* by distinguishing a universal-rational “analytics of truth” from a “critical tradition” that seeks to understand the value of truthful speaking. The point of this distinction is to situate his archaeologies of *parrhesia* within a longer genealogy of this critical practice: “you will recognize one of my targets in this seminar, namely to construct a genealogy of the critical attitude in Western philosophy” (FS, 170). This reproduced ideas from lectures half a year earlier in his spring 1983 Collège de France course where he distinguished at the outset the “analytic of truth” and “critical questioning” as two philosophical options stemming from Kant’s three *Critiques* and Enlightenment writings respectively (C-GSO, 20). As he would again in Berkeley later that fall, Foucault coordinated his own work with respect to the latter option, as a genealogy of critical practice: “I would like to see whether, from this double, philosophical and methodological point of view, we might not undertake the history, the genealogy, etcetera, of what could be called political discourse” (C-GSO, 69). Foucault’s writings on philosophical critique, like all of his late writings, are articulated in both of the two senses I noted at the outset: they are simultaneously genealogical and ethical. Foucault’s work on critique is concerned at once with the historical formation of the subject and also with the futural self-transformation of the same so that we may yet become different selves.

Having charted, to at least some degree, the genealogy of critical philosophy, Foucault’s “What is Enlightenment?” essay, prepared for publication in 1984 exactly 200 years after Kant’s essay of the same name, effects a reappropriation of critical practice by rescuing it from the requirements of universal and necessary knowledge imposed by the analytics of truth. Foucault ends the essay with a call, also a self-description, for a philosophical practice that takes the form of historico-critical reflection on the present:

The critical ontology of ourselves must be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it must be conceived as an attitude, an ethics, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them. (EW1, 319)

Critique, for Foucault, figures in the philosophical way of life as a practice of transforming ourselves. Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, critique here involves exactly those two features embodied in Foucault’s own philosophical practice. First is the historical, or rather archaeological and genealogical, analysis of the limiting conditions that our inheritance brings to bear on who we may become. Second is critique as a future-oriented ethical “work done at the limits of ourselves . . . [a] test of the limits we may go beyond, and thus as work carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings” (EW1, 316).

Foucault forwards his own ethics of critical practice in such a way as to demonstrate the necessity (and yet not the sufficiency) of genealogy for critique. This is one of

Foucault's most valuable contributions to contemporary ethics: the idea that there is no such thing as a normative looking forward without also a descriptive looking back. Foucault's work evinced a different form of ethical self-reflection in which the normative and the historic-descriptive standpoints of thought work in coordinate fashion. Foucault, following Kant at the same time as he departed from him, expressly situated this dual-standpoint practice of philosophy as a practice of critique. We are likely to fail at remaking ourselves if we do not understand the conditions under which we have been made in the first place. Why? Because we always already find ourselves historically emplaced. None of us begins an ethical project as an unconditioned new creation. We all begin exactly where we find ourselves and with the weight of an enormous history bearing down upon us. The very space of possibilities in which we begin to imagine better forms of selfhood is already conditioned by the past that constitutes us. This does not mean that we are trapped in the iron cage of the history of the present. Foucault always believed in the possibilities of our freedom, in what he called "the undefined work of freedom" (EW1, 316). (Re)defining our freedom involves learning to recondition our constituted selves so that we might begin to inflect ourselves differently. And the subtlest inflection, as a number of twentieth-century philosophers taught us to see, can make a world of difference.

To move now into our present, we would do well to consider how the philosophical way of life as we have inherited it from practices of *parrhesia* in antiquity and critique in early modern philosophy might be made use of today. Foucault scholar Arnold Davidson offers the bold claim that, "This idea of philosophy as a way of life and, I shall argue, of ethics as proposing styles of life is one of the most forceful and provocative directions of Foucault's later thought" (1994: 123). I find Davidson's claim quite difficult to deny, but yet I note that in accepting it we may still remain unclear as to how to follow up on these forceful provocations. I am not sure how to resolve this unclarity. But rather than try to solve the problem, I shall instead try to make its force felt, because my sense is that the problem itself may be important for us today.

Foucault's aim was to conceptualize philosophy as a practice that could enable us to transform our selves in the face of particularly intractable problematizations. According to his interpretation, philosophy involves practices of free and critical truth-telling that sponsor the long labor of constituting ourselves otherwise. There are many contexts in which this free truth-telling can take place: the philosopher is in some instances the teacher challenging his or her student and in other instances is the cultural critic challenging the polity to live in a different way. Those who proffer such an interpretation are right to suggest that philosophy could play this role in contemporary culture, but there are also reasons to be skeptical. For one, ancient philosophical *parrhesia* and modern philosophical critique were not mediated by mass communications technologies but were rather embodied in relationships between a philosopher and specific others such as students, friends, governors, and so on. Further, and more poignant for most readers I suspect, it remains quite unclear how in the present era of academic professionalization we might develop an ethical orientation that would form a philosophical way of life, if philosophy is supposed to be both a university affair and a public affair. Foucault himself was clear that our contemporary academic philosophy in the universities is not to be regarded as a model for what he understood as the philosophical way of life in antiquity: "Modern Western philosophy, at least if we take it as it is

currently presented as an object of academic or university study, has relatively few points in common with the parrhesiastic philosophy" (C-GSO, 346). It is hard to see in theory just how a philosophical way of life might serve as an ethical exemplar in the face of the stultifying rituals characteristic of the contemporary academic industry. That said, perhaps we may glean some hope from Foucault's own self-transformative practice. We may regard Foucault himself as attempting to develop this philosophical life of self-transformation in contrarian fashion in his final years. With this suggestion I follow Paul Rabinow's rereading of Foucault's ethical writings in the context of Foucault's ethical practices of "spirituality" as resistance to the professionalization of disciplines whose drill we all know all too well (cf. Rabinow 2009: 36–41). For further Foucauldian reflections on how we might reconstruct these disciplines in our contemporary moment, Rabinow's most recent work (2011) affords particularly instructive guidance. I hope that Rabinow, along with Davidson and others, will come to be proven right about the viability of the philosophical way of life in our present (Davidson 1994 and Rabinow 2009; cf. Flynn 1987; Nehamas 1998; McGushin 2007; and Luxon 2008). I find their proposed possibilities rich pathways for future inquiry, but at present they remain open experiments whose critical function should be situated on the plane of the possible. How we might actualize these possibilities is therefore an unconcluded question, which is to say, a problem, or problematization.

Self-transformative practices

Having surveyed some of the most provocative commitments found among Foucault's late ethical writings, I now return to my broader thesis about Foucault's ethics, namely that the most valuable aspect of that ethics is its general theme of self-transformation. It is in their orientation toward self-transformative freedom that Foucault's ethical commitments, ranging from practices of a philosophical ethics to practices of a care of the self, gain their greatest purchase. The ethics of pleasure and the telling of truth cannot, for example, be construed as substantive moral goods in their own right. There are always counter-examples. That is why the good of these commitments should be located in the good that they *do*. Foucault's point, then, is not to tell us what to do, what is right, and what is good. An ethics, rather, should help us better understand how to orient and situate what we are doing such that we might be able to do these things well. Caring for yourself as an alternative to knowing yourself, or attending to pleasures rather than desires, are the kinds of things that are good when leveraged as practices in self-transformation. From this it does not follow that self-transformative freedom is itself a good. All that follows, rather, is the following: "Freedom is the ontological condition of ethics. But ethics is the considered form that freedom takes when it is informed by reflection" (EW1, 284).

Foucault Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow

How viable is a Foucauldian ethics today? Rafts of critics remain unconvinced. Many regard the ethical ideals of a philosophical way of life and an aesthetics of existence,

and indeed every other ethical practice excavated by Foucault from our antiquity, as more or less ideal museum pieces. It is indeed quite difficult to see what philosophical truth-telling or pleasure as a practice of self-care might look like today in a world saturated by soundbites of half-truth and unimaginably long aisles of supermarket self-cures just waiting to articulate our desires and capture our very selves. But, on the other hand, there is little to be gained by refusing to take seriously Foucault's elaboration of practices of ethics. It is worth the experimental effort of practicing an ethics through such ideas as self-transformative pleasure or self-transformational critique. Even if to us today those ancient Athenian ideas look like mere museum pieces of yesterday, they are entirely fascinating ones which many of his readers will find promising, and rightly so. Their possibilities are truly inspiring. We lose nothing of this inspiration in admitting that possibilities come cheap and that promises need to be actualized for us to realize any value in them.

Those working to develop the nascent possibilities suggested in Foucault's late writings ought to reply to Foucault's strongest critics that there is indeed no principled reason why Foucauldian ethical endeavors could not yet be valuable for us today. Too many readers have charged Foucault with making freedom seem impossible in one moment (roughly, the moment of his work on discipline and biopower) and then in the next making freedom seem too easy (roughly, the moment of his late ethical criticism). I hope to have shown here that this criticism is massively off mark: Foucault's late ethics of freedom does not involve a commitment to such determinate forms of freedom as autonomous self-legislation that were put in doubt by his genealogies of the modern moral subject, but rather his late work evinces an orientation enrolling ethical practices in the always undefined work of self-transformation. Contrary to the criticisms of the critics, Foucault was always all about freedom, and indeed so much so that he would not allow himself to constrain in advance the forms that our self-transforming freedoms must take. If freedom as self-transformation is the central ethical idea in Foucault's late writings, then it would fall to us, and not to him, to facilitate transformations in our selves. If Foucault did not say enough on our behalf, then perhaps this was because he affirmed that we can and should say more for ourselves by following up on those important things that he did say.

In doing so, we would do well to turn toward other modern philosophers for whom freedom similarly mattered as an effort in self-transformation. Other philosophical approaches in which freedom seems to matter in this way include critical theory from Horkheimer to Habermas to Honneth, American pragmatism from James to Dewey to Rorty, moral perfectionism from Emerson to Cavell, and of course many more besides.⁸ There is nothing in Foucault that prevents us from developing his work by putting it into motion alongside insights developed in these and other traditions in modern moral thinking. The stubborn idea that Foucault does not make room for ethics is in part an indication of an unwillingness to read Foucault alongside other contemporary moral philosophies with which he can be placed in profitable dialogue. There is nothing to be gained from leaving these dialogues unopened. And indeed there is, possibly, everything to be lost. Foucault's ethics present us with possibilities whose promise it would be unwise to ignore. If we cannot find ways of making good on this promise, then perhaps it is we who will have failed ourselves, not Foucault who has failed us.

Notes

For comments on earlier versions of this material (including a much earlier iteration in which a major portion of this piece formed a section of a chapter in my book manuscript on genealogy) I would like to thank Amy Allen, Jeff Edmonds, Lynne Huffer, and Jana Sawicki, all of whom offered thoughtful comments and discussion which were both critical and sustaining. I would also like to thank the members of the University of Oregon Critical Genealogies Collaboratory, who offered me feedback on an earlier version of this material: particular thanks here to Elena Clare Cuffari, George Fourlas, Gregory Liggett, and Katherine Logan. I also thank an audience at the University of California, Santa Cruz, where I presented a nearly final version of this work (at last detached from the book manuscript chapter): particular thanks there to David Hoy and Christoph Durt.

- 1 The key published writings which fill in parts of this missing story include the 1979 “Omnes et Singulatim” lectures at Stanford (EW3), the 1980 “About the Beginnings of the Hermeneutics of the Self” seminars at Berkeley and Dartmouth (PT), the 1982 “Political Technology of Individuals” lectures at Vermont (EW3), and certain portions of Foucault’s Collège de France course lectures during these years, especially the outline provided in the March 9, 1983 (C-GSO) and March 28, 1984 (C-CT) lectures. As for the supposedly written but still unpublished fourth volume, it remains an unfortunate mystery to too many of us.
- 2 For further details, see my discussion and citations in Koopman (forthcoming: ch. 4) and Koopman (2011).
- 3 For further details, see my discussion in Koopman (forthcoming: ch. 2).
- 4 For further details, see my discussion in Koopman (forthcoming: ch. 6).
- 5 For further details, see my discussion of the relation between archaeology and genealogy in Koopman (2008).
- 6 The connection between Foucault and Nietzsche is a huge theme in the existing literature. On the underexplored connections between Foucault and Williams see Koopman (2009).
- 7 See again the 1983 Collège de France course where Foucault usefully distinguishes between institutionalist political theory and immanent political theory (cf. C-GSO, 158–159) and offers a rereading of Plato’s political philosophy (cf. C-GSO, 252–255).
- 8 For further details on those approaches explicitly mentioned here, see my arguments for these sorts of combinations in Koopman (2009: ch. 7) and Koopman (forthcoming: ch. 7).

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Foucault, Nature, and the Environment

PAUL ALBERTS

Introduction

Foucault wrote virtually nothing on environmental issues, so despite the vast influence of his writings across the humanities, social sciences, and beyond, only limited direct connections have so far been made between his work and environmental thinking, and it has been the task of interpreters to draw out and elucidate possibilities.¹ However, Foucault certainly made significant contributions to a range of epistemological, political, and ethical inquiries about how nature and things deemed natural have been crucial to European and Western traditions in general, and, therefore, helped excavate some of the intellectual ground lying beneath contemporary environmental debates. His understanding of modern governmentality underlined the emergent relations between the administration of human populations and geographical territories – including the ways in which knowledges of natural terrains and living things were appropriated by the logics of modern governance. His influential conception of a modern biopolitics, which showed how human life has been investigated, tabulated, and administered in increasing detail, also drew attention to how modernity is a time of human intervention and attempted control over the biological realm in general. So, while Foucault was far from being an environmental thinker himself, many of his texts provide insights that are relevant to environmentalism, and it is the task of this essay to elucidate them.

To begin, we need to clarify how the terms “environment” and “nature” are to be understood in this essay, since they can be employed in many different ways. “Environment” designates the surroundings or nonhuman settings in which human societies make their home, and to some extent, the human built environments that are established in direct relation to natural settings. Other senses, which denote very particular surrounds removed from natural settings, such as office environment, family environment, or media or computer environments, are not implied. The term “nature” refers

A Companion to Foucault, First Edition. Edited by Christopher Falzon, Timothy O’Leary, and Jana Sawicki.
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to the physical universe as such, and then, more narrowly, to the physical conditions of inanimate things and life on the planet. Importantly, this must include the ways in which we refer to the natural conditions *for* humans, and the way we humans are naturally or human nature, since human life is part of the totality of nature. Now, Foucault was critically interested in precisely how these human-oriented senses of the natural are mobilized in our explanations of human society and the human condition broadly conceived. So we cannot stipulate at the outset a singular usage for Foucault, and this essay will traverse a number of his writings in search of how he investigated the different usages.

These writings, however, do *not* form an explicit philosophy of nature: Foucault approached these matters from a range of different perspectives over the course of his career as he engaged in different projects. Indeed, for many readers, the most powerful and lasting influence of Foucault on questions of nature might simply be his ability to raise important skeptical doubts about the validity of positing nature as an unquestionable foundation or given for the production of knowledge. Foucault emphasized the social and historical constitution of the human place in the nonhuman natural world, and demanded we question both the ways in which we articulate relations to that world and how we perceive that which is deemed natural within us. Foucault thus can be interpreted as disestablishing common acceptance of the stability and uniformity of our relations to the natural world.

This essay will broadly follow the chronological order of Foucault's texts, selecting only those which supply crucial views about nature or the environment, expanding on the most salient issues: it is therefore task-specified rather than offering a total survey of *all* of Foucault's mentions of nature or environment. I begin however, with some comments on Foucault's histories in general, in order to sketch how his methodologies opened up questions about our suppositions and received histories, and how they are relevant to the skeptical interrogation of the usage of "nature."

Writing Histories

Foucault's histories were wide-ranging, and included examinations of government and institutional powers, the human sciences, sexuality, medicine, prisons and punishment, morality, and the treatment of madness. In one later description of his projects, which we can use here as a useful frame of reference, he gathered them together as having the objective of "creat[ing] a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made into subjects" (EW3, 326). These "modes" involve both the *concepts* defining subjects, and the *practices* of organizing them in society. Concepts and practices, or thought and action are entwined, without one or other positioned as philosophically prior. Foucault at one stage represented this through the confluence of "power/knowledge": knowing about the world and ourselves implies at the same time concomitant activities of practical engagement. Knowledge is thus always "interested" for Foucault – that is, always located and motivated in practical social activities, and *not* partitioned from value judgments, decisions, and forms of politics. Importantly, Foucault emphasizes that we cannot stand outside of these modes and secure ultimate truths beyond or beneath them (see PK). Thus, in inquiring about "how human beings

are made into subjects”, Foucault understood that his own particular perspectives were themselves “interested” according to contemporary values and politics, and were not revealing timeless truths standing apart from such conditions. This critical, interrogative approach has a crucial bearing on how Foucault understood the category of the natural. Foucault’s histories, beginning with his history of madness, suppose no pre-given natural object of study, such as an extra-historical generalized humankind, since any conceptual framing of naturalness is itself contingent, part of human historical conditions, and should also be examined (EW3, 327). On this view, we cannot proceed by determining either a human subject *apart* from history, or abstracted nonhuman natural conditions as a zero ground from which human history springs. So Foucault’s approach was also not oriented to an uncovering or explication of the natural human being standing apart from the subject: on this view, we cannot meaningfully isolate a human condition to stand as foundation prior to the terms and practices of making subjects.

If we pause to look at one issue, from one of his histories, we can see the critical lines of explanation and questioning when we interrogate the role of the natural in understanding how human subjects are made: if we were to accept some instances of mental illness in subjects as purely the result of their natural biological conditions, Foucault would be interested in how, and under what conditions this knowledge was developed, with what consequences, for what purposes. From Foucault’s perspective, the idea of delimiting something about human life as purely biological (and therefore in many types of contemporary discourse the natural) even if highly powerful and practically useful, still leaves open the question of how and why this focus and particularization of a human subject was carried out. What terms and perspectives are used, and how is the subject actually engaged? As a passive object? As having a relevant voice or agency alongside its biological state? How is it that our current society focuses on the human body in certain technical ways, utilizing certain biological data, and why is it that such approaches have superseded other, older traditions? This line of inquiry by Foucault did not seek to invalidate the modern focus on biological data, or propose that a particular usage of “natural” was correct in opposition to others, but it did imply that harder critical questions needed to be asked, because the very framing and mobilization of such knowledge carries with it a host of ethical and political considerations.

For Foucault, making subjects is contingent upon particular, historically changing contexts, so that deeper questions of *how* we define our past conditions and their differences from our present should also be posed, since it is from the present and its concerns that we arrange our perspectives on the past. This Nietzschean historiography tried to counter our desires for imagining a constant unfolding of events according to a higher logic (LCP, 154–155). Writing critical histories is a task of choosing carefully our questions about the past, and not starting out from assumptions about what remains constant, and what changes. For Foucault, critical histories need to constantly scrutinize received categories, and avoid importing figures that might predetermine an overall narrative or teleology, such as a presumption of increasing progress in human societies, or a right to mastery over the natural world, or an assumed realization of human potentiality. For Foucault, the radically contingent character of human events – the possibilities of chance effects, disorder and conflict, and many forms of uncertainties in our understanding – means we should not imagine history to have certain

rational structure(s) or to be an expression of deep anthropological givens (EW3, 226–228). History cannot be grasped by positing a natural underpinning, nor can it be confidently viewed as constantly evoking timeless human ideas or values. Thus, Foucault's very mobile and critical stance towards historiography suspends reliance on reference to a stable environmental background, or the invocation of a human nature within us expressing itself across time. Rather than searching for a master key that might grant us an apparent total historical vision, and perhaps then a line of demarcation from the totality of the nonhuman natural world, Foucault worked on specific, local historical narratives.

In another, more philosophical, sense, and without wishing to overcomplicate Foucault's critical approach to the natural, we should insist at the outset that his approach suspended any judgment in advance about how the natural would function in regard to truth if it was posited as an external framing condition, or, as a constant within humans (human nature). The truths we take as assured, even the truths about our natural conditions, in fact always emerge from complex social and political arrangements (EW3, 131). The making of human subjects as Foucault described it, implies a series of struggles across history, both dividing and uniting people, and validating certain knowledges and beliefs. Thus truth as the result of contingent conditions, including the very actions, conflicts, and institutions that position subjects and provide their descriptions, is itself a very human construct, and one not to be imagined as having a natural propensity to reveal itself in such and such a way.

We can say that Foucault wanted to suspend presumptions about nature at three different levels of theorizing: first, by questioning how nature is invoked in knowledge and practices, and how that changes across time; second, in terms of writing history – how historiography should not suppose nature or human nature as background or essential constants against which to map historical change; third, the sense of truth as something not unfolding but struggled over by humans, means that we should not suppose it reveals itself as a natural phenomenon given to human thought. Together, these are challenges to conventional historiography and to those epistemological perspectives that would hope for stable relations between our knowledge and the natural world. To see how Foucault developed these critical inquiries, we can begin with the early *History of Madness* and show how some of the significant positions he takes there develop in different directions in later texts.

Madness

Foucault argued that madness is a phenomenon that must be considered in relation to human reason – those historically varying systems of understanding that offer explanations of the human condition. Madness has been fundamentally positioned as Unreason: it is not uncovered or discovered as if human understanding progressively brings into clarity something that was previously obscure. If modern psychology now includes explanations of mental maladies using ideas of naturally given states or predispositions, that is, for Foucault, itself the outcome of a long and often occluded history.

In writing this history, Foucault sought to show how madness was long tied to narratives and knowledges that explained the world in pre-modern metaphysical terms,

and only later was it resituated as a concern for secular investigation. As late as the Renaissance, madness could be interpreted as a “fascinating” symbol of the Christian cosmos, in which human mortality, judgment of souls, and a final apocalypse were guaranteed (HM, 20). Madness, read in the inexplicable presentation of distorted human comportment, could function as a sign of the transcendent order beyond social bonds. Created Nature laid before the human gaze many mysteries, including some of human variation: reading this world required reference to the religious narratives founding its sense. The grotesque figures of fools and crazed monsters, imagined by painters such as Brueghel and Thierry Bouts, for example, signified the terrible inevitability of mortal decay, and the other realities of Heaven, Hell, and Purgatory subtending the limits of earthly human experience.

The earliest humanist thinking opposed this tragic vision, with some of the first secular sympathetic analyses of madness; but, Foucault argues, these would take some time and some cultural displacements to take practical effect, and they would still be enmeshed with moral judgments that remained potent even into modernity. In the centuries of increasing “confinement”, the mad, along with the poor, unemployed, and destitute, were understood less and less through ideas of sanctified creation, and more as products of human weakness to be morally condemned and set right (HM, 57). An emerging orientation to the mad was to view them as needing domestication: just as animals extracted from nature could be tamed and made useful, the “immoral” mad might be reclaimed, set to work if possible, made properly pious and orderly (HM, 76).

Thus as confinement developed in Europe, the question of natural attributions of insanity arose from the complex realignment of moral dictates, shifting religious beliefs, and the emerging demands for social orderliness. Foucault views institutional confinement as part of the shaping of metropolitan environments, with growing concerns for the taming of the wild at the margins, but also developing techniques for controlling abnormality within (EW3, 184). Some types of criminals, libertines, and variously labeled “dangerous individuals,” began to be understood as *naturally determined* beings – a fundamental shift towards modern biological thinking about the human body (HM, 100). Foucault argues that from the eighteenth century forward, approaches to madness explicitly utilized ideas from biology and medicine, “opening the new space into which madness, like disease, was to fit” (HM, 189). Just as nature produced species of plants, so too it produced anomalies of the mind – such as feebleness, stupors, hallucinations, vertigo, and exhaustions of mental capacity. Lengthy typologies of these conditions, often based on rudimentary empirical evidence, and still overlaid with moral approbation, were produced to try to account for the perceived range of human mental maladies. Although crude, these strategies of “typing” were to lead irrevocably towards the modern medicalization of madness, and powerful techniques of intervention in the bodies and lives of those categorized as insane.

In the course of the nineteenth century, specialized asylums gradually superseded the old institutions, which had been based on prisons and lazar houses. Sometimes set in country locales, they divided the mad from all other social deviants, and afforded them less confining and generally healthier spaces. In part, these great humanitarian reforms drew from popular sentiment about Nature – that it grants us Reason, Truth, and Health – and the insane could at least be placed back in connection with its well-springs (HM, 474–475). If we have left the State of Nature, the narrative went, and

embarked on the long path away from its originating vitality, then ameliorating the conditions of those apparently least able to perform their social obligations could be achieved by returning them to some degree of natural physical liberty and care. Social reformers such as Tuke (England) and Pinel (France) gained enough influence to shift public perceptions in favor of these vivifying interventions. The unchaining of the mad signified a growing trust that if a truth to madness could be found, it was not through the severity of chains and punishment, but more likely through the powers of medical and physiological investigation. The social place of the mad in early modernity would be increasingly tied in with a network of scientific and government institutions that sought, implicitly and explicitly, to regulate populations and social relations. Thus, the mad liberated from the Great Confinement were in fact displaced into new apparatuses attempting new types of understanding and control – and not simply freed into congenial arrangements. Although some aspects of modern psychiatry and psychoanalysis conform to liberal attitudes supporting degrees of freedom and autonomy for those with “mental conditions,” Foucault stressed that medicalization has still meant significant power over individuals’ bodies and lives. If the conception of nature as a lost state of well-being that can be recalled (however distantly) through therapy appears as a definitive advance in the treatment of the mad in early modernity, then it is only as an element in an ensemble of new regulatory practices.

Foucault’s history of madness shows remarkably different iterations of nature in relation to the perceived problems of the inner human condition. It reveals how that which is deemed natural is tied to how a social order produces and enforces normativity. The vital questions of how a society deals with aberrations of human behavior, mind, and consciousness are also questions of what characteristics will be accepted as given natural conditions, and what will be marked off as caused by particular social conditions, and then as demanding segregation, or moral condemnation, or sanctioned intervention. Foucault shows that the typing of subjects can be influenced in part by how nature is conceptualized or metaphysically imagined as the source or ground of the “properly human,” and agencies can be empowered to demarcate and institutionalize the “abnormal” through such conceptions.

Pathologized Bodies

The attention Foucault paid to analyzing the layers of perception of subjects in the *History of Madness* was reinforced in his history of modern medicine – *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception* (1963). Here, Foucault focuses more narrowly on the reorganization of medical vision, as knowledge of the human body was transformed, and new discourses articulated the conditions of the human body in new ways. Starting from rapid transformations in medical experience, which saw the human body in different ways and, even more so, saw that which had previously been invisible, Foucault wonders how this was possible, and argues we must look “to the region where ‘things’ and ‘words’ have not yet been separated, and where – at the most fundamental level of language – seeing and saying are one” (BC, xi). The very conditions of medical experience shifted, as medical discourse invented new terms and entered the human body through examination and autopsy. Diseases, once considered

as natural species in their own right, were gradually rethought in relation to the human. Human bodies, thought of as mere accidents to the primary existence of separate diseases, are then gradually understood as also essential to such phenomena (BC, 14–15). Bodies are recognized as inevitably subject to decay and death, *such that* diseases will find their home in them.

Hence, Foucault reads in medical history how the natural condition of human life is rewritten as pathologized; disease is a certain “deviation within life” (BC, 153). Life is the natural support for the range of possible diseases that can make their home there, and bring about death. On the other hand, the variations in natural conditions in different geographical regions are understood as conditioning the distribution of diseases: people die in different ways in different places, and medicine begins to tabulate those likelihoods. Death is thus also the natural goal of life, for individuals and for populations; disease is one form of its varying manifestations *within* life (BC, 156). Disease, which had been thought of as a “counter-nature,” a manifestation of evil in the world, becomes rewritten as the visible positive expression of death’s embodiment in life (BC, 196). Foucault argues that a decline of long-standing metaphysical orientations to nature and the body is reflected in medicine’s recognition of such finitude to the human condition. Medicine’s philosophical importance in early modernity was to illuminate these limits, and reveal some of the objective conditions that determine each individual’s life (BC, 198). Both nature and a conception of environment come into play as the investigations of pathological life reconfigure the known conditions of human life. Although Foucault does not extend his discussion, the short conclusion to *The Birth of the Clinic* makes it clear that he interpreted medicine’s exploration of human life to be of ontological importance (BC, 197). Human mortality is resituated alongside other living things, and the body, now open to investigation, is a natural object in a new way.

Order

Following the studies of madness and medicine, and in important ways intersecting with them, Foucault wrote *Les Mots et les choses* (“Words and Things” – but translated as *The Order of Things*), reiterating his perspective in *The Birth of the Clinic*: that he was trying to investigate the plane on which words and things come together – the plane of organizing knowledge. *The Order of Things* can be said to pursue this further with its concept of the episteme – the historical a priori of knowledge formation, enabling sciences, rationalities, and experiences to be formulated and grounded (OT, xxii). Foucault’s precise domain was the human sciences, and he was concerned to explain their emergence from Renaissance and Classical thinking to the “threshold of modernity” in the early nineteenth century. The place of nature and the environment in this narrative is particular, and can be delimited in two related directions: first, the ways in which nature was articulated in knowledge; second, and far more important in its explanatory role, the ways in which the knowledge relation *itself* is articulated as part of, or distinct from, a natural world, and is disclosed in particular ways.

This latter framing of epistemic history reiterates and expands in detail some of the views developed in the *History of Madness*. Foucault argues that the intellectual

perspective of the Renaissance “read the world” and saw it as already structured and replete with given signs. Nature is “written,” and looking across its apparent differences from a learned Renaissance position, resemblances and analogies of many kinds could be found (OT, 17–23). This is broken by the emerging episteme of the Classical age, and the rising importance of representation: the naturalness of language as woven into the very fabric of the world gives way to a concept of the sign as no longer in natural relation to what it can signify.

Classical representation engages in new processes of finding and attributing order in the world – increasing, Foucault says, the work of discriminating and signifying identity and difference (OT, 55–57). A dual process of ordering takes place in the Classical era: classifying and naming what is available to human experience, and organizing the terms into divisions, tables, strata, that are held to reflect the ordering of the world. The term “structure,” for example, was taken up in natural history to represent the way parts of botanical specimens fit together, and then the structures of drawings and diagrams, explanations and descriptions, were arranged to echo that (OT, 134–136). Foucault’s mapping of these epistemic changes shows how conceptions of nature were also loaded with *preconceptions* of the proper way to investigate it and divulge knowledge.

The radical shift into early modernity would alter things profoundly: in the center of the new episteme will emerge the figure of Man – who is both the subject who knows and the object of investigation. In both guises, Man evokes depths – the transcendental height of standing above the field of possible representations and questioning their limits, and the dispersed empirical finitude of being something investigated through human knowledge itself. Relying strongly on Kant for this explanation of the rupture of Classical thought and the emergence of modern forms of knowledge, Foucault underlines the dual situation of humanity – as a being that knows it is located in a natural world of objects, yet in that knowing transcends its placement. This implies finitude, yet a permanently receding (or non-finite) position of knowing finitude in the depths of the subject. We study ourselves, our place in the world, and our psychological depths in great detail in modernity, yet, for Foucault, we escape final representation – or are, rather, dispersed through concepts of self-description, which cannot posit the “unthought” behind our representations (OT, 322–327). The “I think . . .” and its possible range of contents cannot subsume the act of thinking: the living, working, speaking being that modern human sciences elaborate is a being of the world, which can be placed within knowledge of the natural world, but the *possibility* of doing this, is for Foucault, elaborating Kant, a characteristic within human thought – an opacity that resists adequate representation (OT, 328). The importance of this position for Foucault is that it provides an explanation of the schematic work of the figure of Man as a locus for modern thought, and articulates his critical view that modern thought is mesmerized by the (impossible) hope of finally grasping a final truth of the human condition – a type of mythical mission Foucault dubs an “anthropological sleep” – something like a hypnotic focus perhaps forestalling further critical reflection (OT, 340). Standing in nature, yet above it, the modern celebration of human self-description loses sight of its contingent and specific character. It is a figure in a historically constituted stratum – not an eternal figure that transcends history – as much as our

anthropological thinking might suppose that to be the case. For these reasons, Foucault famously claims at the end of *The Order of Things*, “man is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end” (OT, 387).

Foucault’s closing claims, received as controversial and much debated, are consistent with his strong historical relativism, and nominalist orientation: human history dynamically makes anew truths about the character and limits of being human. We invent terms for the realities we perceive as relevant. Human knowledge of our condition is carried in discourse, which can only disperse, fragment, and endlessly proliferate as our historical situations change. Discourse does not circulate around a pre-given human character. Therefore Foucault can argue that Man appeared as a dispassionate secular object of knowledge only relatively recently, as new types of statements produced a central focus. But as an accompaniment to emerging human sciences, this figure has also become a *value* to be preserved – through humanistic rhetoric or a posited Universal Humanity. Narratives of human self-realization, or of utopian goals for a human project appear from early modernity onwards, and for Foucault our continued reliance on this thinking should be questioned, certainly insofar as we might assume that human realization can be assumed to be a natural propensity.

As the organizing figure of Man becomes prominent, we can equally say that non-human nature is opened to knowledge anew, as the idea of human secular emplacement in nature becomes accepted. *The Order of Things* shows how empirical sciences gradually embraced the human as an object of study, placing it increasingly within or in connection to studies of the natural world, and the natural world is therefore *reconfigured* as the biological processes and physical forces determining human life are ordered in knowledge. Nature is the object of intense and acutely focused studies around the question of human life amongst other forms of life: it is a space that is “dis-sociated,” Foucault says, in the shift from Classical “order” to the exploration of “depth” in a variety of ways (OT, 268). Nature ceases to be a great table of things, and is recognized as having a historicity itself – a consequence that leads to theorizing the intricate interrelations of animate and inanimate things in life-cycles, and of course to the groundwork leading to Darwinian evolution (OT, 276). Human life is understood as subject to the same immediate vicissitudes that all living things undergo, and as having a place amongst the long patterns of natural history.

Foucault then locates the problem of scarcity for human life in the natural world as the pivotal issue that knits the natural sciences with the emerging modern paradigms of social and political thought. Nature is revalued in light of scarcity, such that it becomes thought as an exploitable but changing possession capable of serving the expanding place of the human. But the empirical realities of human biological demands aggregating across time are assessed as perilous (OT, 259). Growing populations and historical change could bring about famine or plenty, and just distribution or worsening inequality. Nature, no longer understood as the static providence of things but as the moving ground upon which human existence strives to secure itself, then becomes linked to the problem of securing social order and human flourishing. For Foucault, modern political theory gains a crucial impetus from this intersection of developing natural sciences with the imagining of human society and its needs. Nature’s provisions form an increasingly important element in understanding the challenges of political order, and the ordering of living humans as limited biological beings. As much as

The Order of Things was a work focused on the organization of human knowledges, its findings also brought Foucault to question how understanding humans through material and biological paradigms became important to the formation of modern societies.

The Genealogical Body

We can see from the two early histories of madness and medicine that “the natural body” for Foucault stood as a shifting category tied to practices and knowledges that interpreted it in different ways across time. Then *The Order of Things* showed conceptions of nonhuman nature and “natural life” for humans to be interconnected in discourses that emerged historically under specific conditions. In the important methodological essay “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” (1971), Foucault radicalizes his historicist views further: he discounts the hope that the human body could serve as trans-historical constant for our understanding: “Nothing in man – not even his body – is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding other men . . . ‘Effective’ history deprives the self of the reassuring stability of life and nature” (LCP, 153–154). Echoing these Nietzschean sentiments, Foucault rejects the understanding of the human body as a singular form or natural essence: no necessary set of characteristics or teleology guides the body’s development across historical time. We cannot guarantee an essential human quality, or recognize in others an unquestionable similarity. The events of the body’s alteration are moments in a genealogical descent, which is haphazard and broken by discontinuities – sudden changes, mutations, and yet some apparent stabilities. More a methodological than a thoroughgoing ontological claim, Foucault argues we can only grasp the human body through particular perspectives, deploying Nietzsche’s perspectival view of human knowledge, such that our reconstructions of natural bodies are only particular diagrams drawn for specific purposes. The emergence of the modern pathological body, even with all the accumulated data and impressive capacities of care and manipulation, is still the body enculturated and overlaid with significance for particular institutional settings. We have not, on Foucault’s account, become closer to the body’s real nature as the tools of technology have explored ever deeper.

Of course, for many readers of Foucault, claiming that the human body lacks trans-historical constants, in the light of so much recent success in genetic, epidemiological, and evolutionary sciences, can read as an unlikely philosophical posture. However, Foucault’s work can be readily accepted as the critical accompaniment to such success – an approach that asks how the very strength and importance of our contemporary knowledges arose out of contingent social institutions that in their own day were also strong and assured, yet imbued with utterly different principles of knowledge formation and practical application. If we now take nature to be *better* investigated and understood (and that judgment could only be provisional from a Foucauldian perspective) it is not because of a *necessary* or eternal capacity granted or perfected by humans, but because of a contingent and open series of endeavors that have both brought about a certain technical mastery and also made intense and invasive demands on the human body and form of life. According to Foucault’s histories – nature as grasped, we might say, also grasps us: in redefining how we think of the natural body and manipulating

it in different ways, we are also directed, constrained, and reoriented in our experiences. This pronounced Nietzschean approach to the human body was crucial to the genealogical turn in Foucault's work.

Power and Life

Through the 1970s, in lectures, essays, and two longer published works, Foucault shifted emphasis in his historical studies away from questions centered on knowledge and discourse, to the associated problems of authority, domination, and those systems by which society positions subjects. The conditions of knowledge remain important, but they are more closely located in the particular enabling powers operating in a social order. In a late lecture (1982) Foucault linked the rise of the human sciences directly to the rise of a "new political technology" (EW3, 417). The tenor of genealogy, discussed in terms of the body, echoes through these later approaches: concerned to disallow ideas of the trans-historical continuity of an essential human nature or condition, Foucault instead sought the immanent conditions of social rule and change. The human body as a locus for the developing human sciences remains important, but Foucault also explores the powers and practices invested in directing and normalizing the body. Its purported naturalness remains for him a conceptual theme requiring analysis. The modern world, Foucault argues, adopts powerful disciplining and normalizing techniques, as it understands the distribution of varying characteristics across populations – both nonhuman and human.

How did this form of perception, and associated techniques of governing living things, arise? In focusing on this question, we set aside most of the other statements about the character of power that Foucault focused on during the early 1970s – since these were almost entirely focused on social relations and administration, and hardly deal with our question of the place of nature in his oeuvre. From the mid-1970s, a particular strand of historiography becomes relevant to Foucault, which leads to the later formulation of biopolitics.

Foucault argues that the long development of Western governance in part rewrites pre-modern models of "pastoral power" – the very ancient relations of a shepherd to a flock (EW3, 312, 333–336). There are many forms of power for Foucault, and we should not suppose that governmental power is always the most important, or the most dominant – but he was interested in its reach over and particular investment in life. While the church largely maintained aspects of this pastoral tradition in its internal structures, certain themes of it made their way into techniques of modern governance: concepts of salvation of sorts in modern ideas of improving health, security, general well-being; policing and ensuring hygiene, public standards for commerce; developing knowledge of "the flock," both global or quantitative and analytic, concerning the individual (EW3, 334–335). The ancient domestication of animal life thus provided one of the basic models for the care of human life. While the lineages of transformation from ancient to modern are too dense to trace here, the crucial juncture appears in the eighteenth century with perceptions of population and territory combining into a complex problematic for governance (C-STP, 20–22).

The natural and built environments in which people are emplaced (cities, towns, villages, farms, etc.) – appear to sovereigns as increasingly necessary to understand. The very first glimmerings of modern environmental thinking are located in these conceptual challenges to governmental rationality. With the realization that the territory under one's sovereign control was modulating the lives of one's people, the sovereign of the eighteenth century increasingly ordered studies of its conditions and possibilities. For if a population suffered hunger, and crops failed due to poor soil or changes to the landscape, then an issue of security might arise. The demands of population, linked to the problem of scarcity that Foucault already dealt with in *The Order of Things*, returns in these later studies of governing powers. He recognizes that human politics of developed societies deals with the realities before it, including the materialities of its existence: "to act in the political domain is still to act in the domain of nature" (C-STP, 47). The arts of governance must take the composition of the human population in its given natural setting as the material to be secured and encouraged to thrive. Monarchical power is increasingly qualified by the recognition that territory and population co-determine the success of sovereignty. Therefore, sovereign power had to recognize freedom – thought in several dimensions, such as commerce, movement of people and things, communication (C-STP, 48). The particular refinements of modern governance, which increasingly took active pastoral interest in subjects, by its very logic of maintaining well-being, also had to allow for forms of *laissez-faire* – the "letting be" of people within the geographical domains in which they lived. The realities of emplaced subjects, established cities and towns, and natural terrain, Foucault argues, are essential elements in the developing logic of modern governance.

The issue of freedom in modern societies resonates in another way with Foucault's views on nature (C-STP, 48). Modern governance, committed to forms of pastoral care, transformed traditions of sovereign rule, which were previously far less concerned to nourish subjects' lives. But modern power is still "agonistic" in character (EW3, 342). Subjects wrestle with the invasive forms of modern "concerned" governance. In some of the writings on power, Foucault had thus raised the related concept of resistance (see HS1, 95–96). Both resistance and freedom are intrinsically supposed in systems of power, unless we were to imagine domination so complete that living things would be reduced to automatons (EW1, 292; TS, 12). Modern governance allows for degrees of freedom, and will deal with resistances to *some* extent, without denying absolutely the intransigence of people and their struggles. Foucault's assertion of resistance and necessary degrees of freedom is also a deeper philosophical commitment to life-as-struggle, or the character of life as not reducible to total calculation or absolute domination. Life in conjunction with power is always also a mutual "provocation" – the tussle between exterior rule and an inherently "intransitive" quality – a remainder outside the logics of power (EW3, 342–343). What is the "intransitivity of freedom" for Foucault? It could appear to be inherent in living things, a natural propensity or will, which only partially adapts to power relations. Governance produces power relations, but these relations engage subjects in struggles, and subjects resist and deny in different ways. To propose that Foucault held to a clear philosophical view on life as implying natural will which cannot be completely ordered is going too far, but the repeated agonistic themes Foucault pursued, while nonetheless describing the invasive and controlling character

of modern power, at least raise the possibility that he theorized the recalcitrance of subjects as simply given by virtue of their being alive.

We can see how modern pastoral governance turns towards a type of rationality that normalizes and disciplines its population, and therefore turns towards a politics of life (a biopolitics), by considering how it altered its orientation to the problems of intransigence and resistance – for example, the problem of the subject who attacks the sovereign. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault opens with a report of the spectacular scene of torture and execution of the attempted regicide Jean-François Damiens in 1757: his body is brutalized and dismembered before a large crowd of onlookers (DP, 3–5). Animals pull his limbs apart before it is burnt to ashes. Foucault then discusses the abrupt shift in emphasis to that of prison incarceration as punishment a short three decades later, whereby we read of the regulated lives of prisoners carefully organized away from public gaze, but overseen and corrected by guards. The report on Damiens' execution reveals pre-modern sovereign power displaying its brutality. Public torture and execution shows people that their resistance, if violent, will be canceled by taking life, and taking it cruelly, matching the violence of the crime with the direct revenge of sovereign power. Atrocity answers atrocity. Incarceration, on the other hand, signifies more recent, modern power – demanding regular, obedient subjects to continue their lives in disciplined fashion, and, as Foucault develops it further, to continue their lives with an inculcated attitude of *self-discipline*.

Modern “gentle” punishment looks upon the human body in a new way – to be directed, harnessed, corrected to socially useful endeavors. Spectacular sovereign power that brutalized had made sense in an era when plagues, warfare, poverty, and poor hygiene shortened many lives. But as the phenomenon of rising populations in sovereign territories raised new issues for statecraft, the administration of lives became more relevant. The logics of normalization thus superseded violent spectacle. Deviant, unhealthy, or idle subjects were divided, counted, and isolated from civil society in order to be corrected. Foucault argues that the logic of incarceration is reiterated in many other emergent institutions – armed forces, schools, hospitals and orphanages share similar general and individualizing logics. In great detail, subjects are administered to direct themselves – to sit up straight, march correctly, dress properly and generally comport themselves according to new codes of discipline (DP, 150–152). While we read of this training as the height of human social modification, for the early modern disciplinarian, melding correct gestures in docile bodies was the naturally proper direction of the human, shaping the available population, and amending the individuals straying from required norms. Subjects were trained, but also trained to accept discipline themselves – to understand themselves as the proper *objects* of discipline – as if they were material that must be given proper form, or distorted material in need of remodeling.

In many discourses, the figures of the “normal” are reinforced by the construction of “the natural”: individuals being disciplined are imagined as realizing a natural propensity in the body and mind (DP, 156). Subjects are made to understand that their natural form must be shaped or realized properly. Criminals and rebels are held to be “animals” or “monsters,” degenerative or pathological in their very composition (C-AN, 90–92). Or alternatively, the criminal or abnormal is viewed as reverting back to the state of nature, having chosen to reject the social compact, reveling in cruelty or excess (C-AN, 92, 100). Those individuals deemed at the margins of normality were therefore

perceived as figuratively crossing or annulling the boundaries of civilized society hard-won from wild nature. For the early modern imaginary, the figures of monsters, ogres, and cannibals – some the distortions of colonial adventures – stand logically alongside the growing powers of normalization, the emblems of fear and loathing appropriate to a society ordering subjects to be docile and complicit with new disciplines. Foucault argues that the monster is also logically connected to the crisis of the sovereign, who is seen by the time of the French Revolution as often despotic, even bloodthirsty and predatory (C-AN, 97). Fears of aberrant and violent nature are transposed onto the king; the first monster, Foucault claims, is the king (C-AN, 94). The figures of both normality and abnormality thus drew from ideas of the diremptions of the social world from nature, and the possible violent reappearance of the natural in the popular political imaginary.

Sexuality and Self

By the time Foucault announced that his researches were focused on questions of sexuality (1975–76) most of the theoretical elements comprising biopolitics were already extant in previous studies. But from the earlier strong emphases on bodies, the later volumes of the *History of Sexuality* shift towards a concern with the self, and the ways in which subjects are incited to be oriented to themselves. A notable exception, highly relevant to the concept of biopolitics is the much-discussed “Right of Death and Power Over Life” in the first volume, which reprises some of the historical shifts in sovereign power, and directly introduces the concept of biopower. The crucial statement that “a society’s ‘threshold of modernity’ has been reached when the life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies” crystallizes Foucault’s developing perspective that modern power operates around the stake of human life, its modification and direction (HS1, 143). Biopower names this “explicit calculation” of human life, which overtakes the pre-modern acceptance of death as imminent and difficult to moderate. Biological existence is made political, as the normalization of populations, and the increasing study and manipulation of natural settings, enables the rationalities of governance to manage people in the nation-state. Biopower *implies* the politicization of the environment, but Foucault does not directly investigate this beyond some mentions of agriculture and metropolitan planning. His focus, on human subjects and on the discourses on sexuality, is concerned to show that the family becomes a politicized unit. Reproduction and sexual morality are then at the heart of modern biopower – where analyses of the population intersect broadly with politics of individuals and their bodies (HS1, 145).

For Foucault, the technologies of sexuality are not natural, even if they deploy ideas of what is or is not natural about the human sexual response. In line with his previous histories, Foucault sees sexuality, like madness, as a name, a “historical construct” that “must not be thought of as a kind of natural given,” to be uncovered (HS1, 105). Sexuality as a construct has become scientific object, and endlessly spun out in studies and programs, through techniques of power. Far from being repressed, or from simply lifting the repressive atmosphere around sexual matters, sexuality for the modern world incites discourses and confessions: subjects are implicated in training about normal

desires, responses, and patterns of conduct, and entreated to seek out within themselves their “true” sexual character. A host of experts, medical, legal, and moral, is at hand to confront subjects with their problems, or determine what corrective course of action should be taken against “abnormal” desires.

Foucault sees in the rapidly increasing studies on sexuality in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a “multiplication of singular sexualities” (HS1, 47). Categories of “acts contrary to nature,” which of course had existed through many centuries of Christian morality, were then investigated and rethought as perversions – which were of psychological state or character. Modern sexology invented virtual sub-species of aberrantly sexualized humans – the homosexual, the pedophile, zoerasts, gynecomasts – a host of personality categories debated and revised in a pattern of scientized concern continuing in fact to the present day (HS1, 43–45). While the categories of perversions became types of people to be located and remediated from the dark margins of social relations, located at the center was the valorization of heterosexual normativity and the family. As it became politically important and socially normalized, it could often be supposed as the natural ensemble for parenting and childrearing, even though it has a distinct European history. The desire for family, as much as it can be experienced as a natural propensity, is, rather, a certain historically defined experience. Foucault goes so far as to argue that the deep, thoroughgoing regulation of individuals through the “deployment of sexuality” has ancillary effects of “intensifying” some pleasures, and inciting certain self-understandings. On this view, subjects themselves do *not* experience sexuality as a purely natural phenomenon from within that is then clothed in prescribed terms; rather, the very experience of “having a sexuality” for a self is always-already a negotiation (or agonistic relation) for a subject becoming a sexual being in a society.

The importance of these many interlinking social reforms and burgeoning theories of subjects to the wider frame of biopower and its relation to the question of nature for Foucault is that biopower, invested in the lives of people, invests also in the biological conditions for reproduction – and therefore the very continuation of the human species, *in a specific historical mode of possibility*. Fertility rates, eugenics, contraception technology, and population dynamics became crucial elements in the twentieth-century politics of managing population. The central importance of this to modern history can be understood from one extreme of biopower. The Nazi campaigns to racially purify the German population and create *Lebensraum* (living space or territory) selectively utilized and distorted ideas of a natural history of humankind and its superior and inferior types. Such versions of (supposedly) natural typologies of humans and of natural environments to which they belong can be mobilized within biopolitical paradigms to justify the violent control and forced reshaping of whole populations. Remarkably prescient, Foucault’s focus on biopolitical forces has echoed through recent decades of world political events, marked by ethnic cleansings, forced depopulations, immigration fears, border controls, and territorial disputes.

From the perspective of individuals, the array of concerns about sexuality, its defended heterosexual core, and its marginalized “other desires” articulate, for Foucault, that modernity individualizes subjects in such a way as to provide narrowed avenues for the very expression of individual being. We are positioned and disciplined throughout our modern lives. Foucault understood that resistance, refusal, and dissent by

subjects against such strictures *would* occur – and many read his subdued critical intent as suggesting oppositional practices *should* occur. Foucault offered no programmatic statement, but in a late interview he saw his role (in part) as showing people that they are “freer than they feel” (TS, 10). Perhaps this indicated that biopower is never total, but it can also be speculated that for Foucault subjects’ lives generate their own trajectories and perspectives that always have possibilities for transformation, but we perhaps misrecognize the potentials. No natural loadstone pulls subjects towards a necessary pattern of behavior, and Foucault commented that constraints on subjects are intolerable if they cannot be amended, or are held to be (for example) “necessary consequence[s] of medical science” (EW1, 148).

The later volumes of *The History of Sexuality* pursue more ethical dimensions, which expand the question of sexuality to include questions about how individuals have viewed their own lives and validated their individual practices. It involved, Foucault argued, developing further the question of the “historicity of forms of experience” which he had posed as far back as the *History of Madness* (EW1, 200–202). In many respects, these later volumes fit together with the major statements of volume 1, and the narrative of biopower’s expansion in modernity, but Foucault also argued that a wider series of questions was implied. Modern sexuality showed certain procedures for producing truths of the subject, but Foucault wondered about “the games of truth in the relationship of self with self and the forming of oneself as a subject” (HS2, 6). In setting out to study this, Foucault recognized “problematizations” and “practices” for subjects, which implied the ways in which subjects viewed their lives as requiring ongoing practices to curb, alter, and improve their desires and modes of behavior (HS2, 11–13). In different historical moments, Foucault shows how practices were oriented by views on the naturalness or otherwise of desires: for ancient Greeks, a principle of moderation of pleasure should make a man abstain from relations “against nature” (HS2, 44). Homosexuality is not unnatural/abnormal as in modernity – but rather the result of excess, the self-indulgence that some display (HS2, 45). So the sense of Greek pleasure (*aphrodisia*) that an ancient subject would judge as appropriate was in part conditioned by ideas of quantities. Sexual activity was held to be natural and necessary – one of the three fundamental appetites of eating, drinking, and reproduction (HS2, 49). It also carried the essential risk of excess by virtue of its natural character: the moral question for the self reflecting on the self was one of regulation and economizing its force, and not at all a fundamental judgment of moral or immoral desire (HS2, 50).

Foucault traces many such practices of the self, in the ancient world, showing the problematization of diet, drinking, and relations with others. Pleasures had better and worse domains for practice, and the subject should train him/herself to recognize appropriate contexts. The subject that could direct and master pleasures appropriately would produce a better “stylization” and a worthy “aesthetics of existence” (HS2, 92). This relation of the self to self would be overturned dramatically in Christian morality, which would view the body utterly differently – in terms of sin and self-renunciation, and the need to interpret and seek out hidden inner desires which might corrupt and damage a path to salvation (HS2, 92). The relationship of the self to self would shift dramatically then, and vastly different senses of how nature imposes itself in the subject would be written into moral doctrines. The natural in terms of the subject’s autopoietic activities is not a static plenitude, even if Foucault recognizes that some long continuities

existed in thinking of the problems of forming oneself as a subject. The character of the body as a locus for concern is vastly different from the notion of “flesh” for Christianity, and different Greek and Roman conceptions of body and soul intersect with conceptions of “the natural” in different ways. While sexuality is a modern system, sexual conduct, with the potential of reproduction as a crucial element, has been an issue in virtually the entire history of Western moral deliberation, yet the terminologies and practices have varied widely. The strongest sense of continuity that Foucault discovers in his later studies of the history of sexuality might be that of the “care of the self,” which the ancient Greeks formulated as a concern for the subject of actions, behavior, relations, and attitudes (C-HS, 57).

The care of the self includes not only the need for knowledge of the self – and therefore a sense of the characteristic natural elements which are at play in the self – but also knowledge of the world, and of how the knowledge relation itself is an art to be practiced. So the relation of self to self as a set of techniques articulates the ways in which the natural can be understood as elemental to the self, and as an externality towards which the subject should be oriented. Foucault’s examinations of these ancient dimensions of the care of the self show that knowledge of nature according to these two relations is an ethical practice of the subject – a type of internal or spiritual training that is seen as a moral good. Knowledge of nature can provide a type of freedom from preceding demands of social relations, or, as happens in early Christianity, it can be a reminder of one’s essential place in the greater scheme (see CH-S, 261–276). Turning back from our modern perspectives to read the changing roles of comportment to nature in this way is a type of shock that Foucault’s project of “historicizing experience” enables. The constitution of self which modern discourses have explored in psychology, sociology, and the human sciences in general, validates *certain* forms of relations to nature, but they are not then essentially better in a way that can guarantee an improved mode of caring for the self.

Conclusions

Foucault’s extensive histories and critical theories are rightly understood as strong statements of the historically variable constitution of subjects in society. The place of human subjects within the natural world is also characterized as varying according to culture and time, and becomes comprehensible within frameworks of knowledge and belief, which are also provisional, even if they are often experienced as fixed and closed. For Foucault, nature is signified as a partition mobilized in different ways by different technologies – oriented both to things and human subjects. It has been invoked within subjects as much as without, and Foucault’s narratives reveal its various functions and effects woven through knowledge and practices. For Foucault, the natural world must only be an aspect of the experienced world and he challenged readers to pursue what he believed were the profoundly contingent conditions that determined human experience as such. The character of Human Nature then, was not of an experienced plenum that needed to be opened to knowledge, but was more like a centripetal force for much of early modernity – arranging around itself projects of understanding that were to form alliances with the capillary actions of modern power. An unquestioned anthro-

pological center, Foucault argued, masked the ruses of power, and he imagined the present as a time still critically discovering the legacy of that modern tradition.

The first elements of environmental thinking came about as growing metropolises became problematic for governance – and the emplacement of populations in governed territories became strategically subject to calculation and care. While Foucault was intensely focused on the politics of human subjects, he nonetheless also sought to explain how a constellation of knowledges, including the life sciences, produced truths about the natural world interconnected with political rationality. If human life becomes a crucial focus in modern political thought, it is also, on Foucault's account, because a regime of understanding of the natural world and its processes helped formulate types of investigation, calculation, and objectification of human subjects. Nonetheless the modern subject is also then, according to Foucault, emplaced with degrees of freedom, and capable of recalcitrance, or imbued with capacities for transformation and redefinition.

In two respects, then, Foucault's work also offers important resources for contemporary environmental theory. First, since Foucault details many paths by which Western modernity established a dominant humanistic and anthropocentric culture, but understands them in terms of their contingent strategies and risks, Foucault can be used to open up questions of how contemporary human subjects are brought to embody and defend anthropocentrism, often unknowingly, through their ordinary practices. Much critical work, explicating the entrenched cultural disconnect between contemporary Western modes of living and our deeply sedimented emplacement in the natural world, is still to be done. Second, the paradigm of biopower that Foucault developed to explain the politicized character of human life in modern political rationality can be expanded and elaborated to include the ways in which living things in general, wild and domesticated, form the necessary infrastructural supports to modern, secure, normalized life. Ecology now explains the intricate interdependency between living things and inanimate materials: organized human life is also subject to these laws. Foucault's work understands the political stake that is human life, but if we are living in a time that continues to wager human existence as such, then it is also because we have remained relatively blind to the exhaustion of the environmental resources that has enabled metropolitan life to succeed so spectacularly. In more general terms, a Foucauldian approach that asserts the potential for self-transformation will be crucial for human populations that are likely to be confronted with rapidly shifting environmental conditions. Foucault was not an environmentalist, but at a time of environmental crisis environmentalism might become Foucauldian.

Note

- 1 One of the few texts dealing with Foucault and environmental issues is Eric Darier, ed. (1999) *Discourses of the Environment*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Appendix

Michel Foucault's Shorter Works in English

Bibliography and Concordance

RICHARD A. LYNCH

This list provides bibliographical information for the English versions (either translations or original English-language versions) of Michel Foucault's shorter texts.

Part I includes texts collected in *Dits et écrits* (Paris: Gallimard, 1994, 4 vols., and 2001, 2 vols.), organized by DE number (and hence by year of initial publication). In cases where multiple translations (or multiple publications of a single translation) are available, they are designated with Arabic numerals, in order of publication.

Part II includes English versions of works not included in *Dits et écrits*, listed (as far as can be determined) in order of initial presentation or publication. Taken together, these two lists aim to include all of Foucault's shorter works available in English. Monographs and the complete courses given at the Collège de France are excluded; however, portions of either that were published separately are included.

PART I Texts Included in *Dits et écrits*

1954 (no. 1)

- 001** 1. "Dream, imagination, and existence" *Review of existential psychology & psychiatry*, 19:1 (1985), pp. 29–78. Translated by Forrest Williams.
2. "Dream, imagination, and existence" M. Foucault and L. Binswanger (K. Hoeller, ed.), *Dream and Existence* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993), pp. 29–78. Translated by Forrest Williams. [This is a reprint in book form of the journal publication in 001.1, with an English translation of the Binswanger text.]

1957 (nos. 2–3)

1961 (nos. 4–6)

- 004** 1. [complete] "First preface to *Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique* (1961)" *Pli: The Warwick journal of philosophy*, volume 13: *Foucault: madness/sexuality/biopolitics* (2002), pp. 1–10. Translated by Alberto Toscano.
2. [in part: pp. 159–161, 164–165] "Preface" *Madness and civilization: a history of insanity in the age of reason* (New York: Vintage, 1965), pp. ix–xii. Translated by Richard Howard.
3. [complete] "Preface to the 1961 edition" M. Foucault, *History of madness* (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. xxvii–xxxvi. Translated by Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa.
- 005** 1. "Madness only exists in society" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1961–1984)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 7–9. Translated by Lysa Hochroth.

1962 (nos. 7–11)

- 007** 1. "Introduction to Rousseau's *Dialogues*" J. Faubion, ed., *Aesthetics, method and epistemology* (New York: New Press, 1998), pp. 33–51. Translated by Robert Hurley.
- 008** 1. "The father's 'no'" D. Bouchard, ed., *Language, counter-memory, practice: selected essays and interviews* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 68–86. Translated by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon.
2. "The father's 'no'" J. Faubion, ed., *Aesthetics, method and epistemology* (New York: New Press, 1998), pp. 5–20. Translated by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon, slightly modified.
- 010** 1. "Speaking and seeing in Raymond Roussel" J. Faubion, ed., *Aesthetics, method and epistemology* (New York: New Press, 1998), pp. 21–32. [Extensive modification of chapter 1 of *Death and the labyrinth*.]
- 011** 1. "So cruel a knowledge" J. Faubion, ed., *Aesthetics, method and epistemology* (New York: New Press, 1998), pp. 53–67. Translated by Robert Hurley.

1963 (nos. 12–18)

- 013** 1. "A preface to transgression" D. Bouchard, ed., *Language, counter-memory, practice: selected essays and interviews* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 29–52. Translated by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon.
2. "A preface to transgression" J. Faubion, ed., *Aesthetics, method and epistemology* (New York: New Press, 1998), pp. 69–87. Translated by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon, slightly modified.
3. "A preface to transgression" J. Carrette, ed., *Religion and culture* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), pp. 57–71. Translated by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon. [Reprint of 013.1 above.]
4. "A preface to transgression" P. Rabinow and N. Rose, eds., *The essential Foucault* (New York: New Press, 2003), pp. 442–457. [Republication of 013.2 above.]
- 014** 1. "Language to infinity" D. Bouchard, ed., *Language, counter-memory, practice: selected essays and interviews* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 53–67. Translated by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon.
2. "Language to infinity" J. Faubion, ed., *Aesthetics, method and epistemology* (New York: New Press, 1998), pp. 89–101. Translated by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon, slightly modified.
- 017** 1. "Distance, aspect, origin" P. ffrench [sic] and R.-F. Lack, eds., *The Tel Quel reader* (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 97–108. Translated by Patrick ffrench.

1964 (nos. 19–29)

- 020** 1. “Fantasia of the library” D. Bouchard, ed., *Language, counter-memory, practice: selected essays and interviews* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 87–109. Translated by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon.
 2. “Afterword to *The temptation of St. Anthony*” J. Faubion, ed., *Aesthetics, method and epistemology* (New York: New Press, 1998), pp. 103–122. Translated by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon, slightly modified.
 3. “Introduction” G. Flaubert, *The temptation of Saint Anthony* (New York: Modern Library, 2001), pp. xxiii–xliv. [Reprint of 020.1 above.]
- 021** 1. “The prose of Actaeon” J. Faubion, ed., *Aesthetics, method and epistemology* (New York: New Press, 1998), pp. 123–135. Translated by Robert Hurley.
 2. “The prose of Actaeon” P. Klossowski, *The baphomet* (Hygiene, CO: Eridanos Press, 1998), pp. xxi–xxxviii. Translated by Stephen Sartarelli.
 3. “The prose of Actaeon” J. Carrette, ed., *Religion and culture* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), pp. 75–84. [Reprint of 021.2 above.]
- 022** 1. [part only] “The debate on the novel” J. Carrette, ed., *Religion and culture* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), pp. 72–74. Translated by Elizabeth Ezra.
- 024** 1. “The language of space” J. Crampton and S. Elden, eds., *Space, knowledge, power: Foucault and geography* (Aldershot: Ashgate Press, 2007), pp. 163–167. Translated by Gerald Moore.
- 025** 1. “Madness, the absence of work” *Critical Inquiry* 21 (Winter 1995), pp. 290–298. Translated by Peter Stastny and Deniz Sengel.
 2. “Madness, the absence of work” A. I. Davidson, ed., *Michel Foucault and his interlocutors* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), pp. 97–104. Translated by Peter Stastny and Deniz Sengel. [Reprint of 025.1 above.]
 3. “Madness, the absence of an œuvre. Appendix I of 1972 edition” M. Foucault, *History of madness* (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 541–549. Translated by Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa.

1965 (nos. 30–32)

- 030** 1. “Philosophy and psychology” J. Faubion, ed., *Aesthetics, method and epistemology* (New York: New Press, 1998), pp. 249–259. Translated by Robert Hurley.
- 032** 1. [with differences] “Las Meninas” M. Foucault, *The order of things: an archaeology of the human sciences* (New York: Vintage, 1973), pp. 3–16 (Chapter 1).

1966 (nos. 33–44)

- 033** 1. “The prose of the world” *Diogenes* 53 (Spring 1966). pp. 17–37. Translated by Victor Velen.
 2. [with slight differences] “The prose of the world” M. Foucault, *The order of things: an archaeology of the human sciences* (New York: Vintage, 1973), pp. 17–45 (Chapter 2).
- 034** 1. “The order of things” S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1966–84)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1989), pp. 1–10. Translated by John Johnston.
 2. “The order of things” S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1961–1984)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 13–18. Translated by John Johnston.
 3. “The order of things” J. Faubion, ed., *Aesthetics, method and epistemology* (New York: New Press, 1998), pp. 261–267. Translated by John Johnston, slightly modified.
 4. “The order of things” M. Drolet, ed., *The postmodernism reader: foundational texts* (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 67–71. [Republication of 034.3 above.]

- 036** 1. "Behind the fable" *Critical texts* 5 (1988), pp. 1–5. Translated by Pierre A. Walker.
 2. "Behind the fable" J. Faubion, ed., *Aesthetics, method and epistemology* (New York: New Press, 1998), pp. 137–145. Translated by Robert Hurley.
- 038** 1. "Maurice Blanchot, the thought from outside" *Foucault/Blanchot* (New York: Zone Books, 1987), pp. 7–60. Translated by Brian Massumi.
 2. "The thought of the outside" J. Faubion, ed., *Aesthetics, method and epistemology* (New York: New Press, 1998), pp. 147–169. Translated by Brian Massumi, slightly modified.
 3. "The thought of the outside" P. Rabinow and N. Rose, eds., *The essential Foucault* (New York: New Press, 2003), pp. 423–441. [Republication of 038.2 above.]
- 042** 1. "Philosophy and the death of God" J. Carrette, ed., *Religion and culture* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), pp. 85–86. Translated by Elizabeth Ezra.
- 043** 1. "André Breton: a literature of knowledge" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1961–1984)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 10–12. Translated by John Johnston.
 2. "A swimmer between two words" J. Faubion, ed., *Aesthetics, method and epistemology* (New York: New Press, 1998), pp. 171–174. Translated by Robert Hurley.

1967 (nos. 45–51)

- 046** 1. "Nietzsche, Freud, Marx" [not including discussion which followed] *Critical texts* 3:2 (Winter 1986), pp. 1–5. Translated by Jon Anderson and Gary Hentzi.
 2. "Nietzsche, Freud, Marx" G. L. Ormiston and A. D. Schrift, eds., *Transforming the hermeneutical context: from Nietzsche to Nancy* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1990), pp. 59–67. Translated by Alan D. Schrift.
 3. "Nietzsche, Freud, Marx" J. Faubion, ed., *Aesthetics, method and epistemology* (New York: New Press, 1998), pp. 269–278. Translated by Jon Anderson and Gary Hentzi, slightly modified.
- 048** 1. "The discourse of history" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1966–84)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1989), pp. 11–33. Translated by John Johnston.
 2. "The discourse of history" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1961–1984)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 19–32. Translated by John Johnston.
 3. "On the ways of writing history" J. Faubion, ed., *Aesthetics, method and epistemology* (New York: New Press, 1998), pp. 279–295. Translated by Robert Hurley.
- 050** 1. "Who are you, Professor Foucault?" J. Carrette, ed., *Religion and culture* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), pp. 87–103. Translated by Lucille Cairns.
- 051** 1. "Words and pictures" unpublished manuscript, 5 pp. Translated by Monica Tyler.

1968 (nos. 52–59)

- 052** 1. "Religious deviations and medical knowledge" [not including discussion which followed] J. Carrette, ed., *Religion and culture* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), pp. 50–56. Translated by Richard Townsend.
- 053** 1. "Ceci n'est pas une pipe" *October* 1 (Spring 1976), pp. 6–21. Translated by Richard Howard.
 2. [enlarged edn.] *This is not a pipe* (with illustrations and letters by René Magritte) (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). Translated and edited by James Harkness. [This version has significant variations from the version in *Dits et écrits*.]
 3. "This is not a pipe" J. Faubion, ed., *Aesthetics, method and epistemology* (New York: New Press, 1998), pp. 187–203. Translated by James Harkness, modified.
- 055** 1. "Foucault responds to Sartre" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1966–84)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1989), pp. 35–43. Translated by John Johnston.

2. "Foucault responds to Sartre" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1961–1984)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 51–56. Translated by John Johnston.
- 058**
1. "History, discourse, discontinuity" *Salmagundi* no. 20 (Summer–Fall 1972), pp. 225–48. Translated by Anthony Nazzaro.
 2. "History, discourse, discontinuity" R. Boyers, ed., *Psychological man* (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1975), pp. 208–231. Translated by Anthony Nazzaro. [Republication of 058.1 above.]
 3. "Politics and the study of discourse" *I&C* no. 3 (Spring 1978), pp. 7–26. Translated by Colin Gordon.
 4. "Politics and the study of discourse" C. Gordon, ed., *The Foucault effect* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 53–72. Translated by Colin Gordon. [Extensive revision of 058.3 above.]
 5. "History, discourse and discontinuity" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1961–1984)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 33–50. Translated by Anthony Nazzaro. [Republication of 058.1 above.]
- 059**
1. [abridged] "On the archaeology of the sciences" *Theoretical practice* 3–4 (Autumn 1971), pp. 108–127. No translator identified.
 2. "On the archaeology of the sciences: response to the epistemology circle" J. Faubion, ed., *Aesthetics, method and epistemology* (New York: New Press, 1998), pp. 297–333. Translation extensively modified.
 3. "On the archaeology of the sciences: response to the epistemology circle" P. Rabinow and N. Rose, eds., *The essential Foucault* (New York: New Press, 2003), pp. 392–422. [Republication of 059.2 above.]
- 1969** (nos. 60–71)
- 061**
1. See **050**.
- 066**
1. "The archeology of knowledge" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1966–84)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1989), pp. 45–56. Translated by John Johnston.
 2. "The archeology of knowledge" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1961–1984)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 57–64. Translated by John Johnston.
- 068**
1. "The birth of a world" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1966–84)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1989), pp. 57–61. Translated by John Johnston.
 2. "The birth of a world" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1961–1984)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 65–66. Translated by John Johnston.
- 069**
1. [Abridged. This text covers DE v. 1, pp. 791–812, with a number of omissions.] "What is an author?" *Partisan Review* 42:4 (1975), pp. 603–614. Translated by James Venit.
 2. [Abridged. Omits Jean Wahl's opening remarks and the debate that followed the lecture (see 069.3 for the debate). The first paragraph is an interpolation, not a direct translation.] "What is an author?" D. Bouchard, ed., *Language, counter-memory, practice: selected essays and interviews* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 113–138. Translated by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon.
 3. [selections] "Discussion" [following the lecture, "What is an author?"] *Screen* 20:1 (1979), pp. 29–33. Translation by Kari Hanet.
 4. "What is an author?" D. Preziosi, ed., *The art of art history: a critical anthology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 299–314, 547–548 (notes).
 5. See **258**. [258 is a modification of this lecture, originally presented in English.]
- 071**
1. [Abridged extracts] "Earlier work" D. Eribon, *Michel Foucault* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 214–216. Translated by Betsy Wing.

2. "Candidacy presentation: Collège de France, 1969" P. Rabinow, ed., *Ethics: subjectivity and truth* (New York: New Press, 1997), pp. 5–10. Translated by Robert Hurley.

1970 (nos. 72–83)

072 1. "Foreword to the English edition" *The order of things* (1970), pp. ix–xiv. English original.

075 1. See **020**.

077 1. "Cuvier's position in the history of biology" *Critique of anthropology* 4:13–14 (Summer 1979), pp. 125–130. Translated by Felicity Edholm.

079 1. "Open letter to Pierre Guyotat" *Paris exiles* 2 (1985), p. 25. Translated by Edouard Roditi.

080 1. "Theatrum philosophicum" D. Bouchard, ed., *Language, counter-memory, practice: selected essays and interviews* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 165–196. Translated by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon.

2. "Theatrum philosophicum" J. Faubion, ed., *Aesthetics, method and epistemology* (New York: New Press, 1998), pp. 343–368. Translated by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon, slightly modified.

3. From "Theatrum philosophicum" M. Drolet, ed., *The postmodernism reader: foundational texts* (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 161–166. [Republication of 080.2 above, pp. 343–352 only.]

083 1. "Madness and society" J. Faubion, ed., *Aesthetics, method and epistemology* (New York: New Press, 1998), pp. 335–342. Translated by Robert Hurley.

2. "Madness and society" P. Rabinow and N. Rose, eds., *The essential Foucault* (New York: New Press, 2003), pp. 370–376. [Republication of 083.1 above.]

1971 (nos. 84–101)

084 1. "Nietzsche, genealogy, history" D. Bouchard, ed., *Language, counter-memory, practice: selected essays and interviews* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 139–164. Translated by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon.

2. "Nietzsche, genealogy, history" P. Rabinow, ed., *The Foucault reader* (New York: Pantheon, 1984), pp. 76–100. [Reprint of 084.1 above.]

3. "Nietzsche, genealogy, history" J. Faubion, ed., *Aesthetics, method and epistemology* (New York: New Press, 1998), pp. 369–391. Translated by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon, slightly modified.

4. "Nietzsche, genealogy, history" P. Rabinow and N. Rose, eds., *The essential Foucault* (New York: New Press, 2003), pp. 351–369. [Republication of 084.3 above.]

5. "Nietzsche, genealogy, history" M. Drolet, ed., *The postmodernism reader: foundational texts* (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 72–85. [Republication of 084.3 above.]

6. "Nietzsche, genealogy, history" B. Leiter and J. Richardson, eds., *Nietzsche* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 341–359. [Reprint of 084.2 above.]

7. "Nietzsche, genealogy, history" L. E. Cahoon, ed., *From modernism to postmodernism: an anthology* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 360–379. [Reprint of 084.1 above.]

089 1. "A conversation with Michel Foucault by John K. Simon" *Partisan review* 38:2 (1971), pp. 192–201.

2. "Rituals of exclusion" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1966–84)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1989), pp. 63–72. English original. [Reprint of 089.1 above, not including the final several pages.]

3. "Rituals of exclusion" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1961–1984)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 68–73. [Reprint of 089.1 above, not including the final several pages.]

- 097** 1. "Monstrosities in criticism" *Diacritics* 1:1 (Fall 1971), pp. 57–60. English original.
- 098** 1. "Revolutionary action: 'until now'" D. Bouchard, ed., *Language, counter-memory, practice: selected essays and interviews* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 218–233. Translated by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon.
- 100** 1. "Foucault responds" *Diacritics* 1:2 (Winter 1971), p. 60. English original.
- 101** [Cours au Collège de France, 1971]
 1. "History of systems of thought" D. Bouchard, ed., *Language, counter-memory, practice: selected essays and interviews* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 199–204. Translated by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon.
 2. "The will to knowledge" P. Rabinow, ed., *Ethics: subjectivity and truth* (New York: New Press, 1997), pp. 11–16. Translated by Robert Hurley.
- 1972** (nos. 102–115)
 - 102** 1. "My body, this paper, this fire" *Oxford literary review* 4:1 (Autumn 1979), pp. 5–28. Translated by Geoff Bennington.
 2. "My body, this paper, this fire" J. Faubion, ed., *Aesthetics, method and epistemology* (New York: New Press, 1998), pp. 393–417. Translated by Geoff Bennington, slightly modified.
 3. "My body, this paper, this fire. Appendix II of 1972 edition" M. Foucault, *History of madness* (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 550–574. Translated by Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa.
 - 103** 1. "Return to history" J. Faubion, ed., *Aesthetics, method and epistemology* (New York: New Press, 1998), pp. 419–432. Translated by Robert Hurley.
 - 104** 1. "Reply to Derrida ('Michel Foucault Derrida e no kaino')" M. Foucault, *History of madness* (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 575–590. Translated by Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa.
 2. See **102**. [This is an earlier, and quite different, version than 102.]
 - 106** 1. "The intellectuals and power: a discussion between Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze" *Telos* no. 16 (Summer 1973), pp. 103–109. Translated by M. Seem.
 2. "Intellectuals and power" D. Bouchard, ed., *Language, counter-memory, practice: selected essays and interviews* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 205–217. Translated by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon.
 3. "Intellectuals and power" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1961–1984)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 74–82. Translated by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon. [Reprint of 106.2 above.]
 - 107** 1. [abridged] "Confining societies" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1961–1984)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 83–94. Translated by Jeanine Herman.
 2. [abridged] "Social work, social control, and normalization: roundtable discussion with Michel Foucault" A. Chambon, A. Irving, and L. Epstein, eds., *Reading Foucault for social work* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 83–97. Translated by Adrienne S. Chambon.
 - 108** 1. "On popular justice: a discussion with Maoists" C. Gordon, ed., *Power/Knowledge: selected interviews and other writings, 1972–1977* (New York: Pantheon, 1980), pp. 1–36. Translated by John Mepham.
 - 109** 1. "An historian of culture" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1966–84)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1989), pp. 73–88. Translated from the Italian by Jared Becker and James Cascaito.
 2. "An historian of culture" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1961–1984)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 95–104. Translated from the Italian by Jared Becker and James Cascaito.
 - 110** 1. "The great functions of medicine in our society" unpublished manuscript, 2 pp. Translated by Kevin Thompson.

- 114** 1. [abridged] "The guillotine lives" *New York Times* (April 8, 1973) sect. 4, p. 15. Translated by Paul Auster.
2. "Pompidou's two deaths" J. Faubion, ed., *Power* (New York: New Press, 2000), pp. 418–422.
- 115** [Cours au Collège de France, 1972]
1. "Penal theories and institutions" P. Rabinow, ed., *Ethics: subjectivity and truth* (New York: New Press, 1997), pp. 17–21. Translated by Robert Hurley.
- 1973** (nos. 116–131)
- 118** 1. "The force of flight" J. Crampton and S. Elden, eds., *Space, knowledge, power: Foucault and geography* (Aldershot: Ashgate Press, 2007), pp. 169–172. Translated by Gerald Moore.
- 122** 1. See **139**. [This is an extract from the roundtable discussion.]
- 128** 1. "Summoned to court" J. Faubion, ed., *Power* (New York: New Press, 2000), pp. 423–425. Translated by Robert Hurley.
- 129** 1. "The equipments of power: 2. Is the city a productive or anti-productive force?" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1961–1984)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 108–112 (of 105–112). Translated by Lysa Hochroth.
- 130** 1. "The equipments of power: 1. Establishing 'logical categories'" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1961–1984)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 105–108 (of 105–112). Translated by Lysa Hochroth.
- 131** [Cours au Collège de France, 1973]
1. "The punitive society" P. Rabinow, ed., *Ethics: subjectivity and truth* (New York: New Press, 1997), pp. 23–37. Translated by Robert Hurley.
- 1974** (nos. 132–143)
- 132** 1. "Human nature: justice versus power" (Noam Chomsky and M[ichel] F[oucault]) E. Elders, *Reflexive water: the basic concerns of mankind* (London: Souvenir Press, 1974), pp. 133–197.
2. "Human nature: justice versus power" (Noam Chomsky and M[ichel] F[oucault]) A. I. Davidson, ed., *Michel Foucault and his interlocutors* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), pp. 107–145. [Reprint of 132.1 above.]
3. "Human nature: justice versus power (1971): a debate between Noam Chomsky and Michel Foucault" N. Chomsky and M. Foucault, *The Chomsky–Foucault debate: on human nature* (New York: New Press, 2006), pp. 1–67. [Reprint of 132.1 above.]
- 137** 1. "Michel Foucault on Attica: an interview" *Telos* no. 19 (Spring 1974), pp. 154–161. English original.
2. "On Attica" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1961–1984)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 113–121. [Reprint of 137.1 above.]
- 139** 1. [Lecture III only (DE v. 2, pp. 570–588 only) – original French includes five lectures and a roundtable discussion] "Truth and juridical forms" *Social Identities* 2:3 (October 1996), pp. 327–341. Translated by Lawrence Williams with Catherine Merlen.
2. [Complete five lectures; no roundtable discussion] "Truth and juridical forms" J. Faubion, ed., *Power* (New York: New Press, 2000), pp. 1–89. Translated by Robert Hurley.
- 140** 1. [some omissions] "Film and popular memory" *Radical philosophy* 11 (Summer 1975), pp. 24–29. Translated by Martin Jordin.
2. [incomplete: missing selections from pp. 649–652, 656, 659–660] "Film and popular memory – Michel Foucault: interview" *Edinburgh Magazine* 2 (1977), pp. 20–25. Translated by Martin Jordin. [Reprint of 140.1 above.]

3. "Film and popular memory" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1966–84)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1989), pp. 89–106. Translated by Martin Jordin.
 4. "Film and popular memory" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1961–1984)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 122–132. Translated by Martin Jordin.
 - 142** 1. "White magic and black gown" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1961–1984)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 287–291. Edited version. Translated by Lysa Hochroth.
 - 143** [Cours au Collège de France, 1974]
 1. "Psychiatric power" P. Rabinow, ed., *Ethics: subjectivity and truth* (New York: New Press, 1997), pp. 39–50. Translated by Robert Hurley.
 2. "Course summary" M. Foucault, *Psychiatric power: lectures at the Collège de France, 1973–74* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 335–347. Translated by Graham Burchell.
- 1975** (nos. 144–165)
- 150** 1. "Photogenic painting" *Critical texts* 6:3 (1989), pp. 1–12. Translated by Pierre A. Walker.
 2. "Photogenic painting" G. Deleuze, *Gérard Fromanger* (London: Black Dog Publishing, 1999), pp. 81–104. Translated by Dafydd Roberts.
 - 151** 1. [excerpts] "Michel Foucault on the role of prisons" *New York Times* (Aug. 5, 1975), p. 31. Translated by Leonard Mayhew.
 2. "From torture to cellblock" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1961–1984)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 146–149. Translated by John Johnston.
 - 152** 1. "An interview with Michel Foucault" *History of the present* 1 (February 1985), pp. 2–3, 14. Translated by Renée Morel.
 - 156** 1. "Prison talk: an interview with Michel Foucault" *Radical philosophy* 16 (Spring 1977), pp. 10–15. Translated by Colin Gordon.
 2. "Prison talk" C. Gordon, ed., *Power/Knowledge: selected interviews and other writings, 1972–1977* (New York: Pantheon, 1980), pp. 37–54. Translated by Colin Gordon.
 - 157** 1. "Body/power" C. Gordon, ed., *Power/knowledge: selected interviews and other writings, 1972–1977* (New York: Pantheon, 1980), pp. 55–62. Translated by Colin Gordon.
 - 161** 1. "Talk show" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1961–1984)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 133–145. Translated by Phillis Aronov and Dan McGrawth.
 - 164** 1. "Sade: sargeant of sex" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1961–1984)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 186–189. Translated by John Johnston.
 2. "Sade: sargeant of sex" J. Faubion, ed., *Aesthetics, method and epistemology* (New York: New Press, 1998), pp. 223–227. Translated by John Johnston, slightly modified.
 - 165** [Cours au Collège de France, 1975]
 1. "The abnormals" P. Rabinow, ed., *Ethics: subjectivity and truth* (New York: New Press, 1997), pp. 51–57. Translated by Robert Hurley.
 2. "Course summary" M. Foucault, *Abnormal: lectures at the Collège de France 1974–1975* (New York: Picador, 2003), pp. 323–329. Translated by Graham Burchell.

- 1976** (nos. 166–187)
- 168** 1. "The politics of health in the eighteenth century" C. Gordon, ed., *Power/knowledge: selected interviews and other writings, 1972–1977* (New York: Pantheon, 1980), pp. 166–182. Translated by Colin Gordon.
 2. "The politics of health in the eighteenth century" P. Rabinow, ed., *The Foucault reader* (New York: Pantheon, 1984), pp. 273–289. [Reprint of 168.1 above.]

3. "The politics of health in the eighteenth century" J. Faubion, ed., *Power* (New York: New Press, 2000), pp. 90–105. [Reprint of 168.1 above.]
4. "The politics of health in the eighteenth century" P. Rabinow and N. Rose, eds., *The essential Foucault* (New York: New Press, 2003), pp. 338–350. [Republication of 168.3 above.]
5. See 257.
- 169 1. "Questions on geography" C. Gordon, ed., *Power/knowledge: selected interviews and other writings, 1972–1977* (New York: Pantheon, 1980), pp. 63–77. Translated by Colin Gordon.
2. "Questions on geography" J. Crampton and S. Elden, eds., *Space, knowledge, power: Foucault and geography* (Aldershot: Ashgate Press, 2007), pp. 173–182. Translated by Colin Gordon. [Reprint of 169.1 above.]
- 170 1. "The crisis of medicine or the crisis of antimedicine?" *Foucault Studies* 1 (November 2004) (<http://www.foucault-studies.com>). Translated by Edgar C. Knowlton, Jr., William J. King, and Clare O'Farrell.
2. "A crisis of medicine or a crisis of antimedicine?" Unpublished manuscript. Translated by Edgar C. Knowlton, Jr., William J. King, and Clare O'Farrell, revised by Richard A. Lynch.
- 171 1. "Paul's story" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1961–1984)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 181–185. Translated by Lysa Hochroth.
- 172 1. [large excerpts] "The politics of crime" *Partisan review* 43:3 (1976), pp. 453–459. Translated by Mollie Horwitz.
2. "The politics of Soviet crime" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1966–84)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1989), pp. 121–130. Translated by Mollie Horwitz. [Reprint of 172.1 above.]
3. "The politics of Soviet crime" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1961–1984)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 190–195. Translated by Mollie Horwitz. [Reprint of 172.1 above.]
- 173 1. "The social extension of the norm" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1961–1984)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 196–199. Translated by Lysa Hochroth.
- 175 1. "Sorcery and madness" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1966–84)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1989), pp. 107–112. Translated by John Johnston.
2. "Sorcery and madness" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1961–1984)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 200–202. Translated by John Johnston.
3. "Sorcery and madness" *Review of existential psychology and psychiatry* 23:1-2-3 Special Issue (1997), pp. 81–84. Translated by John Johnston.
- 178 1. "Some questions from Michel Foucault to *Hérodote*" J. Crampton and S. Elden, eds., *Space, knowledge, power: Foucault and geography* (Aldershot: Ashgate Press, 2007), pp. 19–20. Translated by Stuart Elden.
- 179 1. "Bio-history and bio-politics" Unpublished manuscript. Translated by Richard A. Lynch.
- 180 1. [incomplete: only p. 99–end] "Film and popular memory – Michel Faucault [sic]: interview 'I, Pierre Rivière'" *Edinburgh magazine* 2 (1977), pp. 31–33. Translated by Kari Hanet.
2. "I, Pierre Rivière" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1966–84)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1989), pp. 131–136. Translated by John Johnston.
3. "I, Pierre Rivière" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1961–1984)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 203–206. Translated by John Johnston.
- 181 1. "The West and the truth of sex" *Sub-Stance* 20 (1978), pp. 5–8. Translated by Lawrence Winters.

- 184 1. "The political function of the intellectual" *Radical philosophy* 17 (Summer 1977), pp. 12–14. Translated by Colin Gordon.
2. See 192.
- 187 [Cours au Collège de France, 1976]
 1. "War in the filigree of peace" *Oxford literary review* 4:2 (1980), pp. 15–19. Translated by Ian McLeod.
 2. "Society must be defended" P. Rabinow, ed., *Ethics: subjectivity and truth* (New York: New Press, 1997), pp. 59–65. Translated by Robert Hurley.
 3. "Course summary" M. Foucault, *"Society must be defended": lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–76* (New York: Picador, 2003), pp. 265–272. Translated by David Macey.
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1988 (nos. 362–364)

- 362** 1. "Truth, power, self: an interview with Michel Foucault, October 25, 1982" by Rux Martin. L. Martin, H. Gutman, and P. Hutton, eds., *Technologies of the self: a seminar with Michel Foucault* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press; 1988), pp. 9–15. English original.
- 363** 1. "Technologies of the self" L. Martin, H. Gutman, and P. Hutton, eds., *Technologies of the self: a seminar with Michel Foucault* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press; 1988), pp. 16–49. English original.
 2. "Technologies of the self" P. Rabinow, ed., *Ethics: subjectivity and truth* (New York: New Press, 1997), pp. 223–251.
 3. "Technologies of the self" P. Rabinow and N. Rose, eds., *The essential Foucault* (New York: New Press, 2003), pp. 145–169. [Republication of 363.2 above.]
- 364** 1. "The political technology of individuals" L. Martin, H. Gutman, and P. Hutton, eds., *Technologies of the self: a seminar with Michel Foucault* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press; 1988), pp. 145–162. English original. [Portions of this reduplicate "Omnes et singulatum," 291.]
 2. "The political technology of individuals" J. Faubion, ed., *Power* (New York: New Press, 2000), pp. 403–417.
 3. See **291**.

PART II Other Short Texts by Foucault Available in English
 (not included in *Dits et écrits*)

Note

The following English texts are not included in *Dits et écrits*, and are labeled "OT," to designate that these are "other texts." Each text is designated first with OT, followed by

the last two digits of the year of publication (or writing, if appropriate), followed by a sequential number, a period, and (if there are multiple English versions) another sequential number. Some of them, however, are listed in the supplemental bibliography appended to that collection ("Complément bibliographique" by Jacques Lagrange, 1994 vol. 4, pp. 829–838; 2001 vol. 2, pp. 1649–1664). If they are included, I have noted their listing as "CB...". When appropriate, archival catalog numbers or other bibliographical citations are also included. "Saulchoir" refers to the catalog numbers introduced at the Bibliothèque du Saulchoir, Paris. Since the Fonds Michel Foucault was transferred in 1998 to the Institut Mémoire de l'Édition Contemporaine, Paris, these catalog numbers may eventually be superseded. "Clark" refers to the annotated bibliography of Foucault's work by Michael Clark: *Michel Foucault, an Annotated Bibliography: Tool Kit for a New Age* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1983). "Macey" refers to the bibliography included with David Macey's biography of Foucault: *The Lives of Michel Foucault* (New York: Vintage Books, 1995).

1961

- OT-61-01** [A chapter from *Folie et déraison. Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique*. (CB nos. 1961 L. & 1972 L.)]
- OT-61-01.1 "Experiences of madness" *History of the human sciences* 4:1 (February 1991), pp. 1–25. Translated by Anthony Pugh. [Chapter I:4 of the French edition of *Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique*, not included in *Madness and civilization*, but available in *History of madness*.]
- OT-61-02** [*L'Anthropologie de Kant* (thèse complémentaire), t. I: *Introduction*, [*L'Anthropologie de Kant* (thèse complémentaire), t. I: *Introduction* (Paris: Bibliothèque de la Sorbonne). (CB no. 1961 L.)] OT-61-02.1
- "Introduction to Kant's *Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view*" <http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpoucault1.htm> Translated by Arianna Bove.
- OT-61-02.2 *Introduction to Kant's anthropology*, R. Nigro, ed. (Cambridge, MA: Semiotext(e), 2008). Translated by Roberto Nigro and Kate Briggs.

1970

- OT-70-01** [Leçon inaugurale au Collège de France, 2 décembre 1970; *L'ordre du discours* (Paris: Gallimard, 1971). (CB no. 1971 L.)]
- OT-70-01.1 "Orders of discourse," translated by Rupert Swyer in *Social science information* 10:2 (April 1971), pp. 7–30. [A list of corrections to this English translation by Meaghan Morris is included in M. Morris and P. Patton, eds., *Michel Foucault: power, truth, strategy* (Sydney: Feral Publications, 1979), pp. 102–105.]
- OT-70-01.2 "The discourse on language," translated by Rupert Swyer in *The archaeology of knowledge* (New York: Pantheon, 1972), pp. 215–237. [Reprint of OT-70-01.1 above.]
- OT-70-01.3 "The order of discourse," translated by Ian McLeod in R. Young, ed., *Untying the text: a poststructuralist reader* (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), pp. 48–78.
- OT-70-01.4 "The order of discourse," in M. Shapiro, ed., *Language and politics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), pp. 108–138. Translated by Ian McLeod. [Reprint of OT-70-01.3 above.]

1971

- OT-71-01** [Transcription of a tape recording of a lecture given in Tunisia, in 1971. First published in French: *La peinture de Manet* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2004).]
OT-71-01.1 *Manet and the object of painting* (London: Tate Publishing, 2009). Translated by Matthew Barr.

1972

- OT-72-01** ["Cérémonie, théâtre et politique au XVIIe siècle" *Acta I: Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Conference of XVIIth Century French Literature*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota, 1 (1972), pp. 22–23. (résumé établi par S. Davidson d'une conférence à l'université du Minnesota, 7 avril 1972.). (CB no. 1972 R.)]
OT-72-01.1 "Cérémonie, théâtre et politique au XVIIe siècle" *Acta: proceedings of the fourth annual conference of XVIIth century French literature*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota, 1 (1972), pp. 22–23. (Summarized in English by Stephen Davidson.)

1973

- OT-73-01** ["Présentation" in *Moi, Pierre Rivière, ayant égorgé ma mère, ma soeur et mon frère . . .* (Paris: Gallimard-Julliard, 1973), pp. 9–15. (CB no. 1973 L.)]
OT-73-01.1 "Foreword" M. Foucault, ed., *I, Pierre Rivière, having slaughtered my mother, my sister, and my brother . . .* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1975), pp. vii–xiv.
OT-73-02 ["Les meurtres qu'on raconte" in *Moi, Pierre Rivière, ayant égorgé ma mère, ma soeur et mon frère...* (Paris: Gallimard-Julliard, 1973), pp. 265–275. (CB no. 1973 L.)]
OT-73-02.1 "Tales of murder" M. Foucault, ed., *I, Pierre Rivière, having slaughtered my mother, my sister, and my brother . . .* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1975), pp. 199–212.

1975

- OT-75-01** [A 1975 lecture, given in Berkeley and New York.]
OT-75-01.1 "Discourse and repression" Unpublished manuscript, 23 leaves. Dated "Berkeley, May 8, 1975." Transcribed by John Leavitt. Available for consultation at the Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, CA, catalog no. MSS 90/136 Z, Box 1, Folder 1:8. [Macey notes that this is slightly different from OT 8.2 and incomplete.]
OT-75-01.2 "On infantile sexuality" undated typescript. [Listed in Macey bibliography, no. 175.]
OT-75-01.3 "Schizo-culture: infantile sexuality" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1961–1984)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 154–167. [A lecture given at the Schizo-Culture conference organized by Semiotext(e) at Columbia University in 1975. Very slight variations from OT 8.1 above.]
OT-75-02 [A panel discussion following a 1975 lecture (OT-75-01).]
OT-75-02.1 "Schizo-culture: on prison and psychiatry" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1961–1984)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 168–180. [A panel discussion that took place as part of the conference on the morning following Foucault's Columbia University lecture (OT 8.3, above).]
OT-75-03 ["Foucault, passé-frontières de la philosophie" *Le Monde* Sept. 6, 1986. (propos cites par R.-P. Droit, 20 juin 1975). (CB no. 1986 Cit.)]

- OT-75-03.1 "On literature" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1966–84)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1989), pp. 113–119.
- OT-75-03.2 "The functions of literature" L. Kritzman, ed., *Politics, philosophy, culture: interviews and other writings, 1977–1984* (New York: Routledge, 1988), pp. 307–313.
- OT-75-03.3. "On literature" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1961–1984)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 150–153. Translated by John Johnston.

1978

- OT-78-01** ["Qu'est-ce que la critique? (Critique et *Aufklärung*)" *Bulletin de la Société française de Philosophie* 84 (1990), pp. 25–63. (communication à la Société française de philosophie, séance du 27 mai 1978). (CB no. 1990 Posth.)]
- OT-78-01.1 "What is critique?" J. Schmidt, ed., *What is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-century answers and twentieth-century questions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 382–398. Translated by Kevin Paul Geiman.
- OT-78-01.2 "What is critique?" S. Lotringer, ed., *The politics of truth* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1997), pp. 23–82. Translated by Lysa Hochroth.
- OT-78-01.3 "What is critique?" P. Rabinow and N. Rose, eds., *The essential Foucault* (New York: New Press, 2003), pp. 263–278. [Republication of OT 11.2 above.]
- OT-78-01.4 "What is critique?" D. Ingram, ed., *The political* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 191–211. Translated by Lysa Hochroth. [Republication of OT 11.2 above.]
- OT-78-01.5 "What is critique?" S. Lotringer, ed., *The politics of truth*, 2nd edn. (New York: Semiotext(e), 2007), pp. 41–81. Translated by Lysa Hochroth. [Republication of OT 11.2 above.]
- OT-78-02** [Excerpts from Thierry Voeltzel, *Vingt ans et après*.]
- OT-78-02.1 "On religion" J. Carrette, ed., *Religion and culture* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), pp. 106–109. Translated by Richard Townsend. [This is a small excerpt of conversations between Foucault and a young hitchhiker, published without attribution, from Thierry Voeltzel, *Vingt ans et après* (Grasset, 1978), pp. 155–159.]
- OT-78-03** "Du pouvoir" *L'Express* no. 1722 (July 6–12, 1984), pp. 56–68; and in P. Boncenne, *Écrire, lire, et en parler* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1985), pp. 355–363. (CB nos. 1984 Cit. & 1985 Posth.)]
- OT-78-03.1 "On power" L. Kritzman, ed., *Politics, philosophy, culture: interviews and other writings, 1977–1984* (New York: Routledge, 1988), pp. 96–109.
- OT-78-03.2 "Strategies of power" W. T. Anderson, ed. *The truth about truth: de-confusing and re-constructing the postmodern world* (New York: Tarcher/Putnam, 1995), pp. 40–45. [Partial reprint of OT-78-03.1 above, pp. 101–107 only.]
- OT-78-04** [Conducted in 1978 and published in *Nameh-yi Kanun-I Nevisandegan* (Publication of the Center of Iranian Writers), no. 1 (Spring 1979), pp. 9–17.]
- OT-78-04.1 "On Marx, Islam, Christianity & revolution: dialogue between Michel Foucault & Baqir Parham:" *Dædalus* 134:1 (Winter 2005), pp. 126–132. Translated from the Persian by Janet Afary.
- OT-78-04.2 "Dialogue between Michel Foucault and Baqir Parham" J. Afary and K. B. Anderson, *Foucault and the Iranian revolution: gender and the seductions of Islamism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), pp. 183–189. Translated from the Persian by Janet Afary. [Reprint of OT-78-04.1 above.]
- OT-78-05** [A petition listed in Clark's bibliography.] OT-78-05.1
[A letter.] *New York Review of Books*, December 7, 1978, p. 264. [From Clark: "A letter signed by several people on behalf of Doctor Martha Frayde, a prisoner in Cuba."]

1979

- OT-79-01** "La phobie d'État" *Libération* no. 967 (June 30 – July 1), p. 21. (extrait du cours du Collège de France, January 31, 1979). (CB no. 1984 Posth.)]
- OT-79-01.1 "31 January 1979" M. Foucault, *The birth of biopolitics: lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–79* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 75–100. Translated by Graham Burchell.
- OT-79-02** "Power and norms: Notes" M. Morris and P. Patton, eds., *Michel Foucault: power, truth, strategy* (Sydney: Feral Publications, 1979), pp. 59–66. (CB no. 1979 Cit.)]
- OT-79-02.1 "Power and norm: notes" M. Morris and P. Patton, eds., *Michel Foucault: power, truth, strategy* (Sydney: Feral Publications, 1979), pp. 59–66. Translated by W. Suchting.

1980

- OT-80-01** [A petition listed in Clark's bibliography.]
- OT-80-01.1 [A letter.] *New York Review of Books*, January 24, 1980, p. 49. [From Clark: "A letter signed by several people in support of an 'open', non-approved university in Poland."]
- OT-80-02** ["Truth and subjectivity," Howison Lectures at the University of California]
- OT-80-02.1 "Truth and subjectivity," Howison Lectures, October 20 and 21, 1980, University of California at Berkeley. [Typescript, available on audiocassette; text and tape also available at the University of California, Berkeley special collections held in the Bancroft Library.] Cf. also OT-20.
- OT-80-03** ["About the beginnings of the hermeneutics of the self"]
- OT-80-03.1 "About the beginning of the hermeneutics of the self: two lectures at Dartmouth" *Political theory* 21:2 (May 1993), pp. 198–227. English original. [These lectures, given November 17 and 24, 1980, are very similar to the Howison lectures that MF gave in October 1980 (OT-19); and correspond to Lectures III, IV, and V, «Mal faire, dire vrai», given May 1981 in Leuven (Saulchoir no. D201)]
- OT-80-03.2 "About the beginning of the hermeneutics of the self" J. Carrette, ed., *Religion and culture* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), pp. 158–181. Transcript by Thomas Keenan and Mark Blasius.
- OT-80-03.3 "Subjectivity and truth" and "Christianity and confession" S. Lotringer, ed., *The politics of truth* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1997), pp. 171–231. [Revised version of OT 20.1 above.]
- OT-80-03.4 "Subjectivity and truth" and "Christianity and confession" S. Lotringer, ed., *The politics of truth*, 2nd edn. (New York: Semiotext(e), 2007), pp. 147–191. [Republication of OT 20.3 above.]
- OT-80-04** ["Power, moral values and the intellectual" (CB nos. 1980 Cit. & 1988 Cit.)]
- OT-80-04.1 "Power, moral values and the intellectual" typescript interview with Michael D. Bess, San Francisco, 3 November 1980.
- OT-80-04.2 [Extracts] "An interview with Michel Foucault" *Inside (Daily Californian)* (November 10, 1980), p. 15.
- OT-80-04.3 "Power, moral values and the intellectual" *History of the present* no. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 1–2, 11–13.

1981

- OT-81-01** ["Michel Foucault's new clothes" *The village voice. The weekly newspaper of New York* 26:18 (April 29–May 5, 1981), pp.1, 40–42. (CB no. 1981 Cit.)]

- OT-81-01.1 "Michel Foucault's new clothes" *The village voice* 26:18 (April 29–May 5, 1981), pp.1, 40–42. [Includes quotations from an interview with C. Romano, New York, Fall 1980.]
- OT-81-02** "Entretien avec Michel Foucault" *Le genre de l'histoire. Cahiers du G.R.I.F.* 37–38 (1988), pp.9–19. (Réalisé par le Pr André Berten en mai 1981, à l'occasion des conférences données à la faculté de droit de Louvain, "Mal faire, dire vrai : sur la fonction de l'aveu en justice"). (CB no. 1988 Posth.)]
- OT-81-02.1. "What our present is" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1961–1984)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 407–415. Translated by Lysa Hochroth.
- OT-81-02.2 "What our present is" S. Lotringer, ed., *The politics of truth* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1997), pp. 147–168. Translated by Lysa Hochroth.
- OT-81-02.3 "What our present is" S. Lotringer, ed., *The politics of truth*, 2nd edn. (New York: Semiotext(e), 2007), pp. 129–143. Translated by Lysa Hochroth. [Republication of OT 23.1 above.]
- OT-81-03** ["France's philosopher of power" *Time* 118:20 (November 16, 1981), pp. 147–148. (CB no. 1981 Cit.)]
- OT-81-03.1 Otto Friedrich, "France's philosopher of power" *Time* 118:20 (November 16, 1981), pp. 147–148. [Includes quotations from an interview with S. Burton, Paris, October 1981.]

1982

- OT-82-01** ["Response to Susan Sontag" *The Soho news*, 2 March 1982, p. 13. (CB no. 1982 Attr.)]
- OT-82-01.1 "Response to Susan Sontag" *The Soho news*, 2 March 1982, p. 13.
- OT-82-02** [Excerpts from Foucault's final lecture at the University of Vermont, Fall 1982.]
- OT-82-02.1 "Afterword" L. Martin, H. Gutman, and P. Hutton, eds., *Technologies of the self: a seminar with Michel Foucault* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), p. 163. English original [from Foucault's final lecture at Vermont].

1983

- OT-83-01** [Typescripts of discussions; preparatory material for Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: beyond structuralism and hermeneutics*.]
- OT-83-01.1 "Discussions with Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow" 15, 19, 21 April 1983 (18 typescripts) [Saulchoir no. D250.]
- OT-83-02** ["The power and politics of Michel Foucault" *Inside* (April 22, 1983), pp. 7, 20–22. (CB no. 1983 Cit.)]
- OT-83-02.1 "The power and politics of Michel Foucault" *Inside* (Daily Californian) (April 22, 1983), pp. 7, 20–22. English original.
- OT-83-03** [Six lectures at the University of California, October and November 1983 (CB no. 1985 Posth.). There is significant overlap between these lectures and the final two courses (1982–83 and 1983–84) at the Collège de France.]
- OT-83-03.1 *Discourse and truth: the problematization of parrhesia*. (six lectures given at the University of California at Berkeley, October–November 1983), ed. Joseph Pearson, unpublished typescript, available only in photocopy and audiotapes. English original.
- OT-83-03.2 *Fearless speech*, J. Pearson, ed. (New York: Semiotext(e), 2001).
- OT-83-04** [A 1983 interview by Thomas Zummer.]
- OT-83-04.1 "Problematics: excerpts from conversations" R. Reynolds and T. Zummer, eds., *Crash: nostalgia for the absence of cyberspace* (New York: Thread Waxing Space, 1994), pp. 121–127. Interview conducted by Thomas Zummer in November 1983.

OT-83-04.2 "Problematics" S. Lotringer, ed., *Foucault live (interviews, 1961-1984)* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), pp 416-422. [Reprint of OT-83-04.1 above.]

OT-83-05 [Conversations with Foucault, Fall 1983.]

OT-83-05.1 Phillip Horvitz, "Don't cry for me academia" *Jimmy & Lucy's House of K 2*, August 1984, pp. 78-80. [Conversations with Foucault.]

1984

OT-84-01 "A last interview with French philosopher Michel Foucault." *City paper* 8: 3 (July 27-August 2, 1984), p. 18 (CB no. 1984 Cit.)]

OT-84-01.1 "A last interview with French philosopher Michel Foucault." *City paper* 8:3 (July 27-August 2, 1984), p. 18. (Conducted in March 1984 by Jamin Raskin.) English original.

OT-84-02 [A chapter from *L'usage des plaisirs: Histoire de la sexualité*, v. 2.]

OT-84-02.1 "Erotics" *October* 33 (Summer 1985), pp. 3-30. Translated by Robert Hurley. [Chapter 4 of *The use of pleasure*.]

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